Federal Court Decisions

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Date: 19981125


Docket: IMM-265-98

BETWEEN:

             TAHER JAVAID, NAILA TAHER, JAWAD TAHER,
             and AMIEN TAHER

     Applicants

     - and -

             THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

ROTHSTEIN, J.:

[1]      The applicants, from Pakistan, were found by a panel of the CRDD to have had a well-founded fear of persecution in Lahore, but a reasonable internal flight alternative ("IFA") at Islamabad. The applicants say the panel erred in finding that Islamabad was a reasonable IFA for two reasons. The first is that it is only as a result of a recent election in which the applicants' party (the "PML") was successful and his persecutor's party (the "PPP") was defeated that the panel found the applicants had a reasonable IFA in Islamabad.

[2]      The panel's IFA finding in this respect states:

                      The panel considered the evidence before it, and concluded that the risk of persecution to the claimant is of a localized nature. Gill and Shah are allegedly powerful politicians in Lahore. It noted that the claimant has a low political profile in Lahore itself, and held no office in the PML. The panel concluded, based on the claimant's political activities, that he would have virtually no political profile outside Lahore. The panel concluded that after the landslide victory by his party in the recent elections, there are many places in Pakistan, including Islamabad, where the claimant and his family could go and live as a faithful supporter of the PML. The panel concluded that the claimant, given his low political profile, is not the type of individual for whom there is a serious possibility that Gill and Shah and his gangsters would seek him out were he to relocate to Islamabad, nor would there be a serious possibility he or his family would face persecution as a PML supporter in the national capital at the hands of the PPP.                 

I do not read the panel's reasons to indicate that it was the election that rendered the risk of persecution localized to Lahore. It was localized because the male applicant's persecutors were only powerful in Lahore and, because of his low profile, his persecutors would not seek him out in Islamabad. I think the reference to the election by the panel was to indicate that with the PML being successful, the applicants could support the PML in Islamabad without fear.

[3]      I would agree with the applicants that if the panel's reasons were only that the applicants' persecutors in Lahore would persecute the applicants in Islamabad except for the election results, its finding might be questioned. I do not think an IFA is reasonable if its reasonableness depends on the success of a particular political party in periodic elections. I do not read the panel to be saying that here.

[4]      The applicants then say the panel failed to take account of a psychological assessment of the applicants which indicates they suffer from stress and depression which would be exacerbated if they were returned to Pakistan. The only reference in the panel's reasons to the psychological assessment is the following:

         The panel also considered the psychological assessment of Dr. Hap Davis in relation to the reasonableness of the claimant and his family relocating to Islamabad. The panel concluded in the particular circumstances of the claimant and his family that it would not be unreasonable for them to relocate to Islamabad.         

[5]      The applicants rely on Narang v. M.C.I. (IMM-75-95), a July 4, 1995 decision of Richard, J. (as he then was). In that case, Richard, J. found that a psychological report was relevant in determining whether an IFA was reasonable:

         The tribunal also committed an error by failing to have regard to the psychological report in a more general sense... In my view, it is also a relevant factor for determining whether an IFA is reasonable in the particular circumstances of the applicants.                 

[6]      After referring to Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 for the proposition that it must be objectively reasonable to expect an individual to seek safety in a different part of a country before seeking asylum in Canada, Richard, J. continued:

                 Thus, a psychological or medical report may provide objective evidence that it would be "unduly harsh" to expect the applicants who have been persecuted in the past in one part of the country to move to a less hostile part of the country. One can expect that like the application of subsection 2(3) such evidence will only "apply to a tiny minority of present day claimants".                 

[7]      In the present case the panel's only observation about the psychological report was that it was considered. In the circumstances of this case I think the panel had an obligation to go further. The psychological assessment was thorough and detailed. The psychologist was clear in his conclusion that the applicants' health would deteriorate if they returned to Pakistan. The psychological report was a centre-piece of the applicants' case. The panel went to some length to explain why, in relation to conditions in Pakistan and the applicant's education and business experience, Islamabad was a reasonable IFA. It is inexplicable why it provided no clue as to why it was not persuaded by the psychological report.

[8]      As a general rule, the Court does not require that a panel address every piece of evidence or argument made before it as long as its decision is coherent and logical and is based on the evidence before it. Further, the weighing of evidence is solely within the purview of the panel.

[9]      However, a panel does not immunize itself from judicial review simply because it says it considered evidence. The circumstances must be taken into account. Where the evidence is specific and important to the applicant's case, prima facie credible and persuasive, I think a panel has some obligation, even very briefly, to explain why it is not persuaded by that evidence. In this case, I am not satisfied that the panel did have regard for the psychological assessment in arriving at its conclusion.

[10]      The judicial review is allowed and the matter is remitted to a different panel for re-determination.

     Marshall Rothstein

    

     J U D G E

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

NOVEMBER 25, 1998

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