Federal Court Decisions

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     Date: 19990608

     Docket: IMM-3649-98

Between :

     PARMJIT SINGH RAI

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD, J. :

[1]      The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated June 25, 1998, in which the Board determined he was not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act (the Act).

[2]      The central issue before the Board was whether the applicant had an internal flight alternative (IFA) in India.

[3]      In making a finding that an IFA exists, the Board is required to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the applicant being persecuted outside of a particular region of the country, and that in all of the circumstances, including those particular to the applicant, conditions outside of that region are such that it would not be unreasonable for the applicant to seek refuge there. The onus is on the applicant to show that an IFA is not available (see Thirunavukkarasu v. M.E.I., [1994] 1 F.C. 589 and Rasaratnam v. M.E.I., [1992] 1 F.C. 706).

[4]      In the case at bar, the Board believed that the applicant had been detained and tortured by the Punjab police in 1995 and believed that the Punjab police knew of the applicant's associations with the All India Sikh Student Federation. However, the Board determined the applicant not to be a Convention refugee, finding that an IFA is available for the following reasons:

-      the Board concluded that there were no outstanding formal charges of any kind against the applicant in India today;
-      the documentary evidence showed that those at risk today in India are militants and close associates of militants;
-      the Board did not believe that the applicant was considered by the Punjab police to be a militant, an affiliate of militants or a "history sheeter";
-      the Board found that the applicant's father had not been persecuted for his own beliefs since the applicant left India and therefore there was no reason to think the applicant would be targeted;
-      the Board found there to be no reasonable chance that the applicant would suffer persecution in Delhi or Bombay even if he were to come to the attention of the police in those cities.

[5]      The only issue raised by the applicant before me is whether the applicant is at risk from the Central Reserve Police Force (the CRPF) as well as from the Punjab police. The problem arises in the following passages from the Board's decision, both taken at page 2:

             In early May the claimant was arrested by members of the Punjab police and the Central Reserve Police Force (the CRPF) from a bus stop in his village, taken to the nearest police station in Sarhali, tortured and accused of being sympathetic to terrorists. [. . .]                 
             The panel accepts that the claimant was detained and tortured by the Punjab police in May 1995, . . .                 
                             (My emphasis.)                 

[6]      In my opinion, even though it indicated that the CRPF was also involved in the arrest of the applicant, the Board clearly specified that it was the Punjab police who had detained and tortured the applicant in May 1995. The case at bar can therefore be distinguished from the case of Sharbdeen v. M.E.I. (1993), 66 F.T.R. 10, on which the applicant relies. In that case, the Court held that once a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the national army in a part of the country it controlled had been established, it was not reasonable to expect the applicant to seek refuge in another part of Sri Lanka controlled by the same army. Here, the Board indicated that it was the Punjab police that had persecuted the applicant and that he therefore has an IFA in Delhi or Bombay.

[7]      As regards questions of fact, I was not convinced, upon reviewing the evidence, that the inferences drawn by the Board, which is a specialized tribunal, could not reasonably have been drawn (see Aguebor v. M.E.I. (1993), 160 N.R. 315).

[8]      Consequently, the intervention of this Court is unwarranted and the application is dismissed.

                            

                                     JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

June 8, 1999


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