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     Date: 19971125

     File: IMM-3714-96

Between:

     SANDRA ILIANNE PULGAR VERDEJO,

     ANTONIO IGNACIO ROJAS PULGAR,

     BARBARA PATRICI ROJAS PULGAR,

     Applicants,

     -and-

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION,

     Respondent.

     REASONS FOR ORDER

     delivered on November 18, 1997, filed in accordance

     with section 51 of the Federal Court Act

PINARD J.:

[1]      This is an application for judicial review of the decision of D.A. Jenkin, an immigration officer in the Detention and Removals Unit of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, dated October 7, 1996, directing the applicants to leave Canada on October 16, 1996, in accordance with the removal order made against them on March 5, 1996.

[2]      In fact, the applicants are seeking three remedies:

     - to quash the decision of October 7, 1996, in which the respondent ordered the applicants to leave Canada on October 16, 1996;
     - to order that effect be given to the application to reopen the case which was allowed by the IRB;
     - to order that the removal decision be stayed until the Refugee Decision renders its decision on the applicants' claim.

[3]      On October 17, 1996, the following order was made staying the removal order:

             [translation]

             WHEREAS execution of the removal order made against the applicants was stayed on March 5, 1996;                
             WHEREAS the parties have consented;
             THE COURT ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
         -      That execution of the removal order be stayed until the expiry of the time allowed under subsection 82.1(3) of the Immigration Act for filing an application for leave regarding the decision that may be rendered by the Refugee Division concerning the applicants' claim, unless the applicants abandon their claim;                
         -      If the applicants do not abandon their claim, that they present their case diligently and comply with notices of hearing issued by the Refugee Division.                

[4]      The Refugee Division subsequently heard the applicants' claim, on December 20 and 27, 1996, and reserved decision. On March 7, 1997, the tribunal found that the applicants were not Convention refugees. The applicants then filed an application for leave and for judicial review of that decision, on April 1, 1997. Their application for leave was dismissed on September 5, 1997. Moreover, on October 6, 1997, the respondent determined that the applicants were not members of the Deferred Removal Order Class within the meaning of the definition in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, and that the applicants had to leave Canada by November 13, 1997.

[5]      It is plain that this application for judicial review has become moot, as the applicants have already obtained the remedies sought.

[6]      Accordingly, the application for judicial review is without merit, and for that reason I dismissed it by Order dated November 18, 1997, in which I indicated that in the circumstances there was no question to be certified.

                                         YVON PINARD

                                         JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

November 25, 1997

Certified true translation

C. Delon, LL.L.

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     TRIAL DIVISION

     NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT FILE NO:      IMM-3714-96

STYLE OF CAUSE:      SANDRA ILIANNE PULGAR VERDEJO

     ANTONIO IGNACIO ROJAS IGNACIO

     BARBARA PATRICI ROJAS PULGAR

     v. MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING:      MONTRÉAL

DATE OF HEARING:      NOVEMBER 18, 1997

REASONS FOR ORDER OF PINARD J.

DATED:      NOVEMBER 25, 1997

APPEARANCES:

MICHEL LE BRUN              FOR THE APPLICANTS

MICHÊLE JOUBERT              FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

MICHEL LEBRUN              FOR THE APPLICANTS

MONTRÉAL

GEORGE THOMSON              FOR THE RESPONDENT

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA


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