Date: 19980525
Docket: IMM-4647-97
Between :
ROUHOLLAH MIRI
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J. :
[1] This is an application for judicial review whereby the applicant is seeking an order setting aside the decision of the immigration officer, B. S. Sidhu, dated October 14, 1997 wherein the said officer determined that the applicant did not qualify for the exemption on humanitarian and compassionate grounds from the requirement to have his application for permanent residence considered outside of Canada.
[2] The applicant first argues that the visa officer breached the rules of procedural fairness when he continued to interview him, on October 6, 1997, in spite of the fact that it became apparent that the applicant was not receiving a competent interpretation of the interview and could not understand the proceedings.
[3] In my view, the applicant has not demonstrated that the interpretation was inadequate or was so inadequate that he was denied a full and fair interview. The applicant indicated in answer to question 13 of his Application for Exemption under subsection 114(2) of the Immigration Act (the "Act") that he could "speak", "read" and "write" in the English language. Therefore, the applicant was advised that if he required the assistance of an interpreter to conduct the interview it was his responsibility to engage one for his use. The applicant in this case decided to use the services of his brother and brother-in-law whom he must have considered competent. In his Affidavit, the immigration officer swears that he was not alerted to any problem with the interpretation during the October 6, 1997 interview. Under such circumstances, the applicant's failure to indicate a problem with the interpretation at the time of the interview militates against a finding that the interpretation was inadequate (see Zhu v. Canada (M.C.I.) (May 16, 1997), IMM-2633-96 (F.C.T.D.); Varaich v. M.E.I. (1994), 75 F.T.R. 143 (F.C.T.D.); Mila v. M.E.I. (October 29, 1993), T-2991-92 (F.C.T.D.) and Aquino v. M.E.I. (1992), 144 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.)). Furthermore, it appears that extensive written submissions were made by the applicant, through counsel, and were before the decision-maker and considered in this instance.
[4] The applicant further argues that the immigration officer precluded him from presenting evidence forming the entire basis for his application by advising him that any fears he might have about returning to Iran were not relevant to the application. According to the applicant, this was clearly a breach of the rules of natural justice. He also says that the immigration officer fettered his own discretion by relying entirely on the Convention Refugee Determination Division's conclusion (the "CRDD") that the applicant had nothing to fear if he were to return to Iran.
[5] In that regard, the immigration officer deposes at paragraph 12 of his Affidavit that at no time did he advise the applicant that he did not want to hear about his fears of hardship if returned to Iran. Rather, the immigration officer advised the applicant that a Post-Determination Refugee Claimants in Canada ("PDRCC") risk assessment had been afforded the applicant and that unless the latter had new information not considered in the PDRCC review, the issue of risk would not be revisited. It appears therefore that at no time did the immigration officer refuse to hear information respecting the potential sanctions and mistreatment the applicant might face if returned to Iran. Rather the applicant was advised that absent any new information, the PDRCC decision concerning risk to life, of extreme sanctions, or inhumane treatment would not be revisited. Furthermore, as noted above, extensive written submissions, including submissions concerning the applicant's fear of returning to Iran, were before the decision-maker and considered in this instance. I find, under such circumstances, that it was reasonable for the immigration officer to consider both the CRDD decision and the PDRCC decision, and that the applicant has failed to discharge his burden of establishing that he was not afforded an opportunity to fully present his case.
[6] Consequently, I find that the applicant was afforded a full and fair hearing and that it was open to the immigration officer to find, based on the totality of the evidence before him, that insufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations existed to warrant a recommendation that the applicant be exempted from the requirements of the Act and Regulations, otherwise universally applied. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
[7] This matter raises no question of general importance for the purpose of certification.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
May 25, 1998