Federal Court Decisions

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Decision Content

Date: 20021001

Docket: IMM-2857-01

Neutral citation: 2002 FCT 1025

BETWEEN:

                                                            GUY-NOEL ANGANDEH

                                                                                                                                                       Applicant

                                                                                 and

                             THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

                                                                                                                                                   Respondent

                                                            REASONS FOR ORDER

MacKAY J.

[1]                 These are reasons why, after consideration of submissions made by counsel for both parties when this application was heard in Ottawa on May 6, 2002, I now dismiss this application for judicial review by separate order.


[2]                 The applicant, a citizen of Congo, arrived in Canada on May 5, 1997 and claimed refugee status. On August 27, 1998 his application was rejected. He then spent three months in the United States before returning to Canada whereupon he filed a second claim that he was a Convention refugee.

[3]                 When that claim was heard the panel of the Convention Refugee Determination Division heard primarily evidence of new facts put forward by the claimant, relying upon Vasquez v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1998] F.C.J. No. 1769 QL (T.D.). The panel did consider the applicant's testimony, his personal information form, documentary evidence adduced about the situation in Congo, including the evidence of new facts since the first hearing when his claim had been rejected because his evidence was not found to be credible.

[4]                 The new evidence included a copy of a letter he said he had sent to Congo, resigning from his political party, the Congolese Labour Party, a letter dated August 30, 1988. It also included his testimony that he had learned of the deaths of his fiancé and his son in Congo in 1998, though their deaths apparently occurred in the previous year and he could not remember when in 1998 he had learned this distressing news. He claimed an uncle had been killed for political reasons but did not know who the perpetrators were. Finally, he claimed to be a founding member of the Congolese Coalition in Canada, an organization with some 15 members in Ottawa.


[5]                 The CRDD panel was not satisfied with his explanations about why he had written to resign from his Congolese Party on the date he did, almost two years after he first arrived in Canada, particularly since his resignation was said to be the result of the wrongdoings by his party causing the deaths of thousands of people, but those deaths were a matter of record both before and after the party came to power in 1997. The panel further noted there was no evidence of a receipt or a copy of a stamped envelope that would support the applicant's claim that the letter had been sent. As for the Congolese Coalition in Canada, while the claimant's name appeared on its application for letters patent, he was not a continuing member since he had not paid his annual dues, he said because of limited income and his apparent lack of commitment.

[6]                 The panel was not satisfied with his explanation for his failure to remember when in 1998 he had learned of the deaths of his fiancé and his son. It did not give credence, as explanation for his failure, to letters written by him to family or to a psychological report of his condition of depression prepared after his return to Canada in 1998. Finally, the panel noted he was of the same clan as the President of Congo and many of his supporters, and it was unlikely he would face serious threat to his well being if he were returned to Congo.

[7]                 At the hearing of this application the applicant's argument was limited to the issue whether the panel's findings of fact were patently unreasonable, made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the evidence before it. In particular it is urged that it was unreasonable to expect the claimant to establish that his letter resigning from his party was sent or received, that the claimant was unlikely to suffer harm if he returned merely because he was of the same clan as the President when he claimed to be an opponent of the President's regime.

[8]                 While I might not have drawn the same conclusions, that is not the test. Moreover, neither of those inferences drawn by the panel were keys to its finding that the applicant did not have a credible basis for his claim. The panel simply did not believe his evidence was credible for he could not explain the delay in resigning from the government party which he claimed to fear and he could not explain why he failed to recall when he heard of the death of his fiancé and his son, or the perpetrators said to have killed an uncle for political reasons.

[9]                 The panel's principal conclusions were that it was not satisfied with the explanations offered for delay in writing to resign from the government political party in Congo almost two years after his first arrival in Canada as one claiming refugee status on grounds of political opinion and alleged fear of persecution by that party.

[10]            I am not persuaded that the panel's principal conclusion, and its determination that the claimant's evidence was not credible, was patently unreasonable. Nor am I persuaded that it erred in giving no weight to the report of the psychologist insofar as that might be supportive of the applicant's claim, for it was based on information provided after the events of concern by the claimant about his background and experience. That conclusion was open to the panel who heard the applicant's testimony and considered the other evidence he adduced. Moreover, the weight to be given to evidence is a matter for determination of the panel, and only where the panel is considered to have acted in a patently unreasonable manner, would the Court intervene. Here, that is not the case.


[11]            No basis is established that would warrant intervention of the Court for the panel's findings, upon which its decision is based, are not patently unreasonable or without reference to the evidence before the panel. Thus, a separate order goes, dismissing this application.

[12]            No question was proposed by counsel for consideration pursuant to s. 83(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as amended, now s. 74(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. No question is certified.

  

                                                                                                                              (signed) W. Andrew MacKay

                                                                                                              ___________________________

                                                                                                                                                           JUDGE

  

OTTAWA, Ontario

October 1, 2002


                                   FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                                       TRIAL DIVISION

                      NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD

COURT FILE NO.:                  IMM-2857-01

STYLE OF CAUSE:                 GUY-NOËL ANGANDEH

v.

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING:              OTTAWA, ONTARIO

DATE OF HEARING:              MAY 6, 2002

REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MACKAY

DATED:                          October 1, 2002.

APPEARANCES:

MR. ISAAC SECHERE FOR THE APPLICANT

MS. LYNN MARCHILDON FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD:

ISAAC SECHERE, Barrister & Solicitor, Notary Public FOR THE APPLICANT

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

MR. MORRIS ROSENBERGFOR THE RESPONDENT

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

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