Ottawa, Ontario, April 28, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
and
AMENDED REASONS FOR ORDER
[1] This is an application appealing a decision of a Member of Trade-marks Opposition Board (Board). In the decision, dated July 2, 2004, the Member found that there was a likelihood of confusion, on a balance of probabilities, between the Applicant's trade-mark MAXI & CIE and the Respondent's trade-mark MAX & CO. with respect to some services.
BACKGROUND
[2] The Respondent registered the trade-mark MAX & CO. (TMA 435,440) on November 18, 1994. The MAX & CO. trade-mark was registered for use in association with the following wares:
(1) Women's clothing, namely, suits, dresses, jackets, blazers, coats, raincoats, shirts, skirts, sweaters, vests, pants, jeans, shorts, trousers, T-shirts, hosiery, shawls, scarves, neckties, gloves, belts; women's footwear, namely, shoes, boots; headgear, namely, hats, rain hats; leather and imitation leather; animal skins; trunks and suitcases; bags, namely, handbags; parasols, umbrellas and canes.
(2) Women's clothing, namely skirts, dresses, jackets, trousers, shirts.
[3] The Respondent also holds a valid registration for the MAX & CO. mark (TMA 629,249) issued January 4, 2005, in respect of the following:
(1) Jewels, precious stones and imitations thereof, watches, clocks, wrist watches, pocket watches, electric clocks, electric watches and clocks, watch chains, alarm clocks, table clocks, wall clocks, hall clocks, measuring watches, stop watches, dial plate and watch bands.
(2) Spectacles, glasses, sunglasses, lenses, spectacle cases and holders, spectacle frames, chains, parts and fittings for all the aforesaid goods.
(3) Leather and imitations of leather, articles of luggage, namely, bags, briefcases, hand bags, rucksacks, traveling bags and trunks for traveling, holdall, namely, cases and holders (sold empty) for toilet articles, stationery articles and books, key cases and holders for business cards and credit cards, wallets and purses, all being of leather or imitation of leather, animal skins, hides, umbrellas, parasols, walking sticks, whips, harness, saddlery, textile goods being pieces of cloth, bed sheets, blankets, bed covers, pillow cases, table covers, napkins, towels and dishcloths.
[4] On February 2, 1996, the Applicant, Provigo Distribution Inc., filed an application to register the trade-mark MAXI & CIE (Serial No. 803,758) with the Canadian Trade-marks Office, for use in association with the following:
WARES: Periodic production of advertising circulars; and
SERVICES: Services inherent to or incidental to the operation of food chain supermarket businesses; services inherent or incidental to the operation of retail department businesses, services inherent or incidental to the operation of a computer center; retail photography store and film processing services, audio and video rental services; retail optical store and opticians' and optometrists' services; the operation of a pharmacy and pharmacists' services; the operation of a restaurant and snack bar services; dry cleaning services; the operation of a flower shop; the operation of a business center providing access to automated telling machines allowing the user to transact directly with banks and other financial institutions.
[5] In September 1996, the Applicant opened stores ("magasins à escompte de grandes surfaces") in the name of MAXI & CIE. The Applicant added products to their already established grocery business, notably electronics (video games, CDs and DVDs), home and kitchen supplies, health and beauty supplies, hardware, and office supplies.
[6] The Applicant's application for registration was advertised in the Trade-marks Journal on March 26, 1997. The Respondent filed a Statement of Opposition on August 20, 1997; the grounds of opposition can be summarized as follows:
(a) The Mark is not registrable as it is confusing with the Respondent's registered trade-mark MAX & CO., registration number TMA 435,440, for use in association with "women's clothing, women's footwear, headgear, leather and imitation leather; animal skins, trunk and suitcases, bags, parasols, umbrellas and canes";
(b) The Applicant is not the person entitled to registration as at of the date of filing of the application, the Mark was confusing with the Respondent's trade-mark MAX & CO., which had been previously used in Canada by the Respondent (Section 16(3)(a) of the Act) and for which an application for registration, number 788,370 had been previously filed by the Respondent (Section 16(3)(b) of the Act);
(c) The Mark is not distinctive in that it is not adapted to distinguish the wares and services of the Applicant from those of the Respondent, since the Mark is confusing with the Respondent's trade-mark MAX & CO.;
(d) The Application does not conform to the requirements of Section 30 of the Act in that the application does not contain a statement in ordinary commercial terms of the specific wares or services in association with which the Mark is proposed to be used.
[7] The Applicant filed its Counterstatement on October 16, 1997. Following the filing of written arguments by both parties, and an oral hearing, the Registrar rendered his decision on July 2, 2004.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[8] The Board dismissed the second ground of opposition, insofar as the section 16(3)(a) is concerned, and the third ground of opposition, because the Respondent failed to file any evidence of use of its trade-mark MAX & CO. prior to the material dates (respectively the filing date of the application and the filing date of the opposition) and, therefore, did not meet its initial onus of proof.
[9] As for the fourth ground of opposition, the Board found that the description of the wares and services complies with the test set out in Everything for a Dollar Store (Canada) Inc. v. Dollar Plus Bargain Centre Ltd. (1998), 86 C.P.R. (3d) 269 . The Board also considered premature the argument to the effect that the circulars are not wares transferred in the ordinary course of trade, pursuant to s. 30(a) of the Act, as the Applicant did not have to establish use of the Mark at this stage since it was filed on the basis of proposed use.
[10] Looking at the surrounding circumstances as enumerated in s. 6(5) of the Act, and on the basis of the evidence filed, the Board came to the conclusion that the Applicant's mark could not be registered and that the Applicant was not entitled to registration of the Mark in respect of services inherent to or incidental to the operation of retail department businesses, services inherent to or incidental to the operation of a computer centre and retail optical store and opticians' and optometrists' services. The Board found that the names were sufficiently confusing, given that the names both consisted of a shortened version of the superlative "MAXIMUM", an ampersand (" & "), and a shortened version of the word COMPANY or COMPAGNIE ("CO" in English, "CIE" in French).
[11] It is from that portion of the Board's decision that the Applicant appeals. The Respondent does not dispute the conclusions of the Board with respect to the second, third and fourth grounds of its opposition.
ISSUES
- What is the applicable standard of review?
- Did the Board err in fact and law in determining that the Respondent had met its initial evidential burden in respect of its grounds of opposition of non-registrability and non-entitlement on the basis of a prior-filed application?
- Did the Board err in fact and law in determining that the Applicant had failed to discharge its legal burden with respect to establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that there was no likelihood of confusion between the Applicant's mark MAXI & CIE., and the Respondent's mark MAX & CO., in respect of the rejected services as of the relevant material dates?
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Trade Mark Act
| "confusing", when applied as an adjective to a trade-mark or trade-name, means a trade-mark or trade-name the use of which would cause confusion in the manner and circumstances described in section 6; "distinctive", in relation to a trade-mark, means a trade-mark that actually distinguishes the wares or services in association with which it is used by its owner from the wares or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them; "proposed trade-mark" means a mark that is proposed to be used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by others; |
« créant de la confusion » Relativement à une marque de commerce ou un nom commercial, s'entend au sens de l'article 6;
« distinctive » Relativement à une marque de commerce, celle qui distingue véritablement les marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée par son propriétaire, des marchandises ou services d'autres propriétaires, ou qui est adaptée à les distinguer ainsi; « marque de commerce projetée » Marque qu'une personne projette d'employer pour distinguer, ou de façon à distinguer, les marchandises fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées ou les services loués ou exécutés, par elle, des marchandises fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées ou des services loués ou exécutés, par d'autres; |
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6. (1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first mentioned trade-mark or trade-name would cause confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and circumstances described in this section.
(2) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class.
(3) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with a trade-name if the use of both the trade-mark and trade-name in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with the trade-mark and those associated with the business carried on under the trade-name are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class.
(4) The use of a trade-name causes confusion with a trade-mark if the use of both the trade-name and trade-mark in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with the business carried on under the trade-name and those associated with the trade-mark are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares or services are of the same general class.
What to be considered (5) In determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding circumstances including
(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which they have become known;
(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use; (c) the nature of the wares, services or business; (d) the nature of the trade; and (e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them
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6. (1) Pour l'application de la présente loi, une marque de commerce ou un nom commercial crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce ou un autre nom commercial si l'emploi de la marque de commerce ou du nom commercial en premier lieu mentionnés cause de la confusion avec la marque de commerce ou le nom commercial en dernier lieu mentionnés, de la manière et dans les circonstances décrites au présent article. (2) L'emploi d'une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce lorsque l'emploi des deux marques de commerce dans la même région serait susceptible de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à ces marques de commerce sont fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à ces marques sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces marchandises ou ces services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale. (3) L'emploi d'une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec un nom commercial, lorsque l'emploi des deux dans la même région serait susceptible de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à cette marque et les marchandises liées à l'entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom sont fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à cette marque et les services liés à l'entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces marchandises ou services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale. (4) L'emploi d'un nom commercial crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce, lorsque l'emploi des deux dans la même région serait susceptible de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à l'entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom et les marchandises liées à cette marque sont fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à l'entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom et les services liés à cette marque sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces marchandises ou services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale.
Éléments d'appréciation (5) En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de toutes les circonstances de l'espèce, y compris :
a) le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus; b) la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été en usage; c) le genre de marchandises, services ou entreprises; d) la nature du commerce; e) le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu'ils suggèrent.
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| 12. (1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
(a) a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the preceding thirty years; (b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the character or quality of the wares or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin;
(c) the name in any language of any of the wares or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to be used;
(d) confusing with a registered trade-mark;
(e) a mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10; (f) a denomination the adoption of which is prohibited by section 10.1; (g) in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in association with a wine not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication; and (h) in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in association with a spirit not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication.
(2) A trade-mark that is not registrable by reason of paragraph (1)(a) or (b) is registrable if it has been so used in Canada by the applicant or his predecessor in title as to have become distinctive at the date of filing an application for its registration.
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16. (1) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that he or his predecessor in title has used in Canada or made known in Canada in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of those wares or services, unless at the date on which he or his predecessor in title first so used it or made it known it was confusing with
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person; (b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or (c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
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(3) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a proposed trade-mark that is registrable is entitled, subject to sections 38 and 40, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services specified in the application, unless at the date of filing of the application it was confusing with
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person; (b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or (c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person. |
12. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 13, une marque de commerce est enregistrable sauf dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants :
a) elle est constituée d'un mot n'étant principalement que le nom ou le nom de famille d'un particulier vivant ou qui est décédé dans les trente années précédentes; b) qu'elle soit sous forme graphique, écrite ou sonore, elle donne une description claire ou donne une description fausse et trompeuse, en langue française ou anglaise, de la nature ou de la qualité des marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée, ou à l'égard desquels on projette de l'employer, ou des conditions de leur production, ou des personnes qui les produisent, ou du lieu d'origine de ces marchandises ou services; c) elle est constituée du nom, dans une langue, de l'une des marchandises ou de l'un des services à l'égard desquels elle est employée, ou à l'égard desquels on projette de l'employer; d) elle crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée; e) elle est une marque dont l'article 9 ou 10 interdit l'adoption; f) elle est une dénomination dont l'article 10.1 interdit l'adoption; g) elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d'une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un vin dont le lieu d'origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l'indication; h) elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d'une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un spiritueux dont le lieu d'origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l'indication.
(2) Une marque de commerce qui n'est pas enregistrable en raison de l'alinéa (1)a) ou b) peut être enregistrée si elle a été employée au Canada par le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre de façon à être devenue distinctive à la date de la production d'une demande d'enregistrement la concernant.
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16. (1) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l'article 30 en vue de l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a employée ou fait connaître au Canada en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l'article 38, d'en obtenir l'enregistrement à l'égard de ces marchandises ou services, à moins que, à la date où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre l'a en premier lieu ainsi employée ou révélée, elle n'ait créé de la confusion :
a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne; b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l'égard de laquelle une demande d'enregistrement avait été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne; c) soit avec un nom commercial qui avait été antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne.
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(3) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l'article 30 en vue de l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce projetée et enregistrable, a droit, sous réserve des articles 38 et 40, d'en obtenir l'enregistrement à l'égard des marchandises ou services spécifiés dans la demande, à moins que, à la date de production de la demande, elle n'ait créé de la confusion :
a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne; b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l'égard de laquelle une demande d'enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne; c) soit avec un nom commercial antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne. |
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30. An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an application containing
(a) a statement in ordinary commercial terms of the specific wares or services in association with which the mark has been or is proposed to be used; (b) in the case of a trade-mark that has been used in Canada, the date from which the applicant or his named predecessors in title, if any, have so used the trade-mark in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application;
(c) in the case of a trade-mark that has not been used in Canada but is made known in Canada, the name of a country of the Union in which it has been used by the applicant or his named predecessors in title, if any, and the date from and the manner in which the applicant or named predecessors in title have made it known in Canada in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application;
(d) in the case of a trade-mark that is the subject in or for another country of the Union of a registration or an application for registration by the applicant or the applicant's named predecessor in title on which the applicant bases the applicant's right to registration, particulars of the application or registration and, if the trade-mark has neither been used in Canada nor made known in Canada, the name of a country in which the trade-mark has been used by the applicant or the applicant's named predecessor in title, if any, in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application; (e) in the case of a proposed trade-mark, a statement that the applicant, by itself or through a licensee, or by itself and through a licensee, intends to use the trade-mark in Canada; (f) in the case of a certification mark, particulars of the defined standard that the use of the mark is intended to indicate and a statement that the applicant is not engaged in the manufacture, sale, leasing or hiring of wares or the performance of services such as those in association with which the certification mark is used;
(g) the address of the applicant's principal office or place of business in Canada, if any, and if the applicant has no office or place of business in Canada, the address of his principal office or place of business abroad and the name and address in Canada of a person or firm to whom any notice in respect of the application or registration may be sent, and on whom service of any proceedings in respect of the application or registration may be given or served with the same effect as if they had been given to or served on the applicant or registrant himself; (h) unless the application is for the registration only of a word or words not depicted in a special form, a drawing of the trade-mark and such number of accurate representations of the trade-mark as may be prescribed; and (i) a statement that the applicant is satisfied that he is entitled to use the trade-mark in Canada in association with the wares or services described in the application.
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37. (1) The Registrar shall refuse an application for the registration of a trade-mark if he is satisfied that
(a) the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30, (b) the trade-mark is not registrable, or (c) the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark because it is confusing with another trade-mark for the registration of which an application is pending,
and where the Registrar is not so satisfied, he shall cause the application to be advertised in the manner prescribed.
Notice to applicant (2) The Registrar shall not refuse any application without first notifying the applicant of his objections thereto and his reasons for those objections, and giving the applicant adequate opportunity to answer those objections.
Doubtful cases (3) Where the Registrar, by reason of a registered trade-mark, is in doubt whether the trade-mark claimed in the application is registrable, he shall, by registered letter, notify the owner of the registered trade-mark of the advertisement of the application.
Statement of opposition 38. (1) Within two months after the advertisement of an application for the registration of a trade-mark, any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a statement of opposition with the Registrar.
Grounds (2) A statement of opposition may be based on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30; (b) that the trade-mark is not registrable; (c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark; or (d) that the trade-mark is not distinctive.
Content (3) A statement of opposition shall set out
(a) the grounds of opposition in sufficient detail to enable the applicant to reply thereto; and (b) the address of the opponent's principal office or place of business in Canada, if any, and if the opponent has no office or place of business in Canada, the address of his principal office or place of business abroad and the name and address in Canada of a person or firm on whom service of any document in respect of the opposition may be made with the same effect as if it had been served on the opponent himself.
Frivolous opposition (4) If the Registrar considers that the opposition does not raise a substantial issue for decision, he shall reject it and shall give notice of his decision to the opponent.
Substantial issue (5) If the Registrar considers that the opposition raises a substantial issue for decision, he shall forward a copy of the statement of opposition to the applicant.
Counter statement (6) The applicant shall file a counter statement with the Registrar and serve a copy on the opponent in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time after a copy of the statement of opposition has been served on the applicant.
Evidence and hearing (7) Both the opponent and the applicant shall be given an opportunity, in the prescribed manner, to submit evidence and to make representations to the Registrar unless
(a) the opposition is withdrawn or deemed under subsection (7.1) to have been withdrawn; or (b) the application is abandoned or deemed under subsection (7.2) to have been abandoned.
Withdrawal of opposition (7.1) The opposition shall be deemed to have been withdrawn if, in the prescribed circumstances, the opponent does not submit either evidence under subsection (7) or a statement that the opponent does not wish to submit evidence.
Abandonment of application (7.2) The application shall be deemed to have been abandoned if the applicant does not file and serve a counter statement within the time referred to in subsection (6) or if, in the prescribed circumstances, the applicant does not submit either evidence under subsection (7) or a statement that the applicant does not wish to submit evidence.
Decision (8) After considering the evidence and representations of the opponent and the applicant, the Registrar shall refuse the application or reject the opposition and notify the parties of the decision and the reasons for the decision.
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56. (1) An appeal lies to the Federal Court from any decision of the Registrar under this Act within two months from the date on which notice of the decision was dispatched by the Registrar or within such further time as the Court may allow, either before or after the expiration of the two months.
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(5) On an appeal under subsection (1), evidence in addition to that adduced before the Registrar may be adduced and the Federal Court may exercise any discretion vested in the Registrar.
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30. Quiconque sollicite l'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce produit au bureau du registraire une demande renfermant :
a) un état, dressé dans les termes ordinaires du commerce, des marchandises ou services spécifiques en liaison avec lesquels la marque a été employée ou sera employée; b) dans le cas d'une marque de commerce qui a été employée au Canada, la date à compter de laquelle le requérant ou ses prédécesseurs en titre désignés, le cas échéant, ont ainsi employé la marque de commerce en liaison avec chacune des catégories générales de marchandises ou services décrites dans la demande;
c) dans le cas d'une marque de commerce qui n'a pas été employée au Canada mais qui est révélée au Canada, le nom d'un pays de l'Union dans lequel elle a été employée par le requérant ou ses prédécesseurs en titre désignés, le cas échéant, et la date à compter de laquelle le requérant ou ses prédécesseurs l'ont fait connaître au Canada en liaison avec chacune des catégories générales de marchandises ou services décrites dans la demande, ainsi que la manière dont ils l'ont révélée; d) dans le cas d'une marque de commerce qui est, dans un autre pays de l'Union, ou pour un autre pays de l'Union, l'objet, de la part du requérant ou de son prédécesseur en titre désigné, d'un enregistrement ou d'une demande d'enregistrement sur quoi le requérant fonde son droit à l'enregistrement, les détails de cette demande ou de cet enregistrement et, si la marque n'a été ni employée ni révélée au Canada, le nom d'un pays où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre désigné, le cas échéant, l'a employée en liaison avec chacune des catégories générales de marchandises ou services décrites dans la demande;
e) dans le cas d'une marque de commerce projetée, une déclaration portant que le requérant a l'intention de l'employer, au Canada, lui-même ou par l'entremise d'un licencié, ou lui-même et par l'entremise d'un licencié; f) dans le cas d'une marque de certification, les détails de la norme définie que l'emploi de la marque est destiné à indiquer et une déclaration portant que le requérant ne pratique pas la fabrication, la vente, la location à bail ou le louage de marchandises ou ne se livre pas à l'exécution de services, tels que ceux pour lesquels la marque de certification est employée; g) l'adresse du principal bureau ou siège d'affaires du requérant, au Canada, le cas échéant, et si le requérant n'a ni bureau ni siège d'affaires au Canada, l'adresse de son principal bureau ou siège d'affaires à l'étranger et les nom et adresse, au Canada, d'une personne ou firme à qui tout avis concernant la demande ou l'enregistrement peut être envoyé et à qui toute procédure à l'égard de la demande ou de l'enregistrement peut être signifiée avec le même effet que si elle avait été signifiée au requérant ou à l'inscrivant lui-même; h) sauf si la demande ne vise que l'enregistrement d'un mot ou de mots non décrits en une forme spéciale, un dessin de la marque de commerce, ainsi que le nombre, qui peut être prescrit, de représentations exactes de cette marque;
i) une déclaration portant que le requérant est convaincu qu'il a droit d'employer la marque de commerce au Canada en liaison avec les marchandises ou services décrits dans la demande.
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37.(1) Le registraire rejette une demande d'enregistrement d'une marque de commerce s'il est convaincu que, selon le cas : a) la demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l'article 30; b) la marque de commerce n'est pas enregistrable; c) le requérant n'est pas la personne qui a droit à l'enregistrement de la marque de commerce parce que cette marque crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce en vue de l'enregistrement de laquelle une demande est pendante.
Lorsque le registraire n'est pas ainsi convaincu, il fait annoncer la demande de la manière prescrite.
Avis au requérant (2) Le registraire ne peut rejeter une demande sans, au préalable, avoir fait connaître au requérant ses objections, avec les motifs pertinents, et lui avoir donné une occasion convenable d'y répondre.
Cas douteux (3) Lorsque, en raison d'une marque de commerce déposée, le registraire a des doutes sur la question de savoir si la marque de commerce indiquée dans la demande est enregistrable, il notifie, par courrier recommandé, l'annonce de la demande au propriétaire de la marque de commerce déposée.
Déclaration d'opposition 38. (1) Toute personne peut, dans le délai de deux mois à compter de l'annonce de la demande, et sur paiement du droit prescrit, produire au bureau du registraire une déclaration d'opposition.
Motifs (2) Cette opposition peut être fondée sur l'un des motifs suivants :
a) la demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l'article 30; b) la marque de commerce n'est pas enregistrable; c) le requérant n'est pas la personne ayant droit à l'enregistrement; d) la marque de commerce n'est pas distinctive.
Teneur (3) La déclaration d'opposition indique :
a) les motifs de l'opposition, avec détails suffisants pour permettre au requérant d'y répondre; b) l'adresse du principal bureau ou siège d'affaires de l'opposant au Canada, le cas échéant, et, si l'opposant n'a ni bureau ni siège d'affaires au Canada, l'adresse de son principal bureau ou siège d'affaires à l'étranger et les nom et adresse, au Canada, d'une personne ou firme à qui tout document concernant l'opposition peut être signifié avec le même effet que s'il était signifié à l'opposant lui-même.
Opposition futile (4) Si le registraire estime que l'opposition ne soulève pas une question sérieuse pour décision, il la rejette et donne avis de sa décision à l'opposant.
Objection sérieuse (5) Si le registraire est d'avis que l'opposition soulève une question sérieuse pour décision, il fait parvenir une copie de la déclaration d'opposition au requérant.
Contre-déclaration (6) Le requérant doit produire auprès du registraire une contre-déclaration et en signifier, dans le délai prescrit après qu'une déclaration d'opposition lui a été envoyée, copie à l'opposant de la manière prescrite.
Preuve et audition (7) Il est fourni, de la manière prescrite, à l'opposant et au requérant l'occasion de soumettre la preuve sur laquelle ils s'appuient et de se faire entendre par le registraire, sauf dans les cas suivants :
a) l'opposition est retirée, ou réputée l'être, au titre du paragraphe (7.1); b) la demande est abandonnée, ou réputée l'être, au titre du paragraphe (7.2).
Retrait de l'opposition (7.1) Si, dans les circonstances prescrites, l'opposant omet de soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe (7) ou une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire, l'opposition est réputée retirée.
Abandon de la demande (7.2) Si le requérant ne produit ni ne signifie une contre-déclaration dans le délai visé au paragraphe (6) ou si, dans les circonstances prescrites, il omet de soumettre la preuve visée au paragraphe (7) ou une déclaration énonçant son désir de ne pas le faire, la demande est réputée abandonnée.
Décision (8) Après avoir examiné la preuve et les observations des parties, le registraire repousse la demande ou rejette l'opposition et notifie aux parties sa décision ainsi que ses motifs.
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56. (1) Appel de toute décision rendue par le registraire, sous le régime de la présente loi, peut être interjeté à la Cour fédérale dans les deux mois qui suivent la date où le registraire a expédié l'avis de la décision ou dans tel délai supplémentaire accordé par le tribunal, soit avant, soit après l'expiration des deux mois.
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(5) Lors de l'appel, il peut être apporté une preuve en plus de celle qui a été fournie devant le registraire, et le tribunal peut exercer toute discrétion dont le registraire est investi.
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ANALYSIS
[12] Both parties agree that the appropriate standard of review of decisions of the Board is reasonableness simpliciter, as held in Molson Breweries v. John Labatt Ltd. (C.A.), [2000] 3 F.C. 145; (2000) 5 C.P.R. (4th) 180 (F.C.A.), followed in Novopharm Ltd. v. Bayer Inc. (2000) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 304 (F.C.A.). In the first of these two decisions, Rothstein J. noted the following on the standard of review, at para. 51:
Even though there is an express appeal provision in the Trade-marks Act to the Federal Court, expertise on the part of the Registrar has been recognized as requiring some deference. Having regard to the Registrar's expertise, in the absence of additional evidence adduced in the Trial Division, I am of the opinion that decisions of the Registrar, whether of fact, law or discretion, within his area of expertise, are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness simpliciter.
[13] That being said, Rothstein J. went on in the same paragraph to consider circumstances in which new evidence is adduced, as permitted by subsection 56(5) of the Trade-marks Act:
However, where additional evidence is adduced in the Trial Division that would have materially affected the Registrar's findings of fact or the exercise of his discretion, the Trial Division judge must come to his or her own conclusion as to the correctness of the Registrar's decision.
See also Dion Neckwear Ltd. v. Christian Dior, S.A., (2002) 20 C.P.R.(4th) 155 (F.C.A.); Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. United States Polo Assn., (2000), 9 C.P.R.(4th) 51 (F.C.A.); Garbo Creations Inc. v. Harriet Brown & Co., (1999), 3 C.P.R.(4th) 224 (F.C.).
[14] In the present matter, the parties have both submitted additional Affidavits that were not before the Board. The Applicant filed the affidavits of four employees of its solicitors, who visited Max Mara and Holt Renfrew stores located in Vancouver and Toronto, as well as three stores in Montreal (Les Ailes de la Mode, Les Magasins Simons and Holt Renfrew). They testified that no merchandise bearing the MAX & CO. mark could be located during their visits to these stores. The only products of the Respondent that could be found bear the mark of MAX MARA and other marks.
[15] The Applicant also filed the affidavit of Ms. Gibson, the Applicant's Vice-President Marketing. Her evidence, similar in many respects to the evidence she filed with the Board, is that the Applicant operates large stores in connection with the MAXI and the MAXI & CIE trade-marks. These stores are designed to provide a more diverse selection of products by offering a one-stop shopping experience. Appended to her affidavit are several annual reports describing the evolution of the MAXI banner and the rationale behind the creation of the new MAXI & CIE stores. Press releases, flyers and magazines are also reproduced to show the type of products sold in these new stores and the range of prices of these products. Finally, there are photographs showing the layout of the stores and the visual impact of the price displays.
[16] As for the Respondent's new evidence, it purports to establish that the Applicant's stores sell fashion and related products such as watches under the names of well-known international designers, that fashion magazines sold by the Applicant's stores contain advertisements for various products of the Respondent, that one of the magazines purchased by the affiant included an article on the apparently common practice of combining high-end fashion articles with lower-priced fashion articles, and that Holt Renfrew stores carry many fashion brands including many of the same brands sold by the Applicant's stores.
[17] I have looked carefully at all this new evidence, with a view to determine if it is of such a nature as to modify the standard of review. I have concluded that it does not. As noted before, the evidence considered not only has to be new, but must also be such that it "would have materially affected the Registrar's findings of fact or the exercise of his discretion". In the best of cases, the new affidavit evidence filed by the parties is redundant and does not significantly shed new light on the dispute to be resolved. At worst, it is irrelevant and of little value. The only possible exception to this finding is the evidence relating to the absence of MAX & CO. wares in the various stores visited by the Applicant's affiants. This could clearly be of significance in deciding whether the Applicant is entitled to register his mark. But since the Board explicitly refers to the failure of the Respondent to file any evidence of use of its trade-mark MAX & CO. in its decision (p. 6), I do not see how this new evidence could have had an impact on its conclusions.
[18] As a result, I am of the view that decisions of the Board, whether of fact, law or discretion, must be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness simpliciter. According to that standard, the question that this court must resolve is whether the Board's reasons can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17 (QL), at para. 55:
A decision will be unreasonable only if there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived. If any of the reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion are tenable in the sense that they can stand up to a somewhat probing examination, then the decision will not be unreasonable and a reviewing court must not interfere. This means that a decision may satisfy the reasonableness standard if it is supported by a tenable explanation even if this explanation is not one that the reviewing court finds compelling.
[19] Turning then to the second issue to be determined, the Applicant contends that the Board did not address whether the Respondent met its initial burden with regard to its allegations pursuant to ss. 12(1)(d) and 16(3)(b) of the Act. The Board, so goes the argument, has considered the burden of proof only with respect to the third ground of opposition and part of the second ground, as evidenced by the following paragraph of its reasons:
The Opponent failed to file any evidence of one of its trade-mark MAX & CO. prior to the material dates with respect to the second ground of opposition, in so far as Section 16(3)(a) is concerned, and the third ground of opposition. Therefore those grounds of opposition are dismissed for failure by the Opponent to meet its initial onus of proof.
[20] In its factum, the Applicant argues that nowhere did the Board impose on the Respondent the same burden of proof with respect to his grounds of opposition based on ss. 12(1)(d) and 16(3)(b) of the Act. Since it is not sufficient for the Respondent to produce a certificate of authenticity of registration for its trade-mark MAX & CO. and another certificate of authenticity for application for the same trade-mark, the Applicant contends that the appeal should therefore be granted and the decision of the Board quashed with respect to these two grounds of opposition.
[21] The Applicant has not argued this point very forcefully in his oral submissions, and rightly so in my opinion. It is true, according to the ordinary rules of evidence, that an opponent bears the initial burden of proving the facts inherent in its allegations. In the present case, however, it was sufficient for the Respondent to establish, in support of its allegation of non-entitlement pursuant to s. 16(3)(b), that the application which it relies upon was filed prior to the filing date of the Applicant's application and that it was not abandoned as of the date of advertisement of the Applicant's application. Similarly, the Respondent bore the burden of evidencing the existence of a valid registration for the mark which it seeks to rely upon in support of its allegation of non-registrability pursuant to s. 12(1)(d), and that such registration remained validly on the Register as of the material date for considering the issue of confusion, namely, the date of disposition of the matter. Once the existence of the registration or of the application has been established, the burden shifts to the Applicant for registration to demonstrate that there is no likelihood of confusion.
Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain(1978), 39 CPR (2d) 32 at 39, affd (1979), 43 CPR (2d) 271 (FCA); Oshawa Group Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade-marks (1982), 61 CPR (2d) 29 at 36 (FCA); Boutique au Coton Inc. v. Pant-O-Rama Inc. (1987), 17 CPR (3d) 409 (FC TD); Molson's Breweries v. Pernod Ricard (1992), 44 CPR (3d) 359 at 365 (FC TD); Canada Post Corp. v. Paxton Developments Inc.
[2000] F.C.J. No. 2021 (QL); Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Wakefield Realty Corp. [2004] F.C.J. No. 235 (QL).
[22] Before dealing with the substantive issue raised by this appeal, I need only say a few words with respect to another argument raised by the Applicant in his written arguments. It is contended that the Board exceeded its authority in considering the Statement of Opposition in that it does not raise any grounds of opposition in respect of the application to register the mark MAXI & CIE, since it refers to MAXI & CO.
[23] It is no doubt true that this Court, in hearing an appeal of the decision of the Registrar, is limited to the consideration of the grounds of opposition raised in the Statement of Opposition. But in the present case, the grounds were set forth in the Statement of Opposition, and the misidentification was only a minor and inadvertent clerical error. Indeed, the mark that was being opposed was correctly identified both in the heading of the Statement of Opposition and in paragraph 1. Moreover, the Applicant filed its Counterstatement and the parties proceeded to file evidence, and written arguments, and did not raise the issue before the Board. It was not until the Applicant filed its appeal that this issue was raised. Accordingly, the Board was correct in considering the underlying opposition in this matter.
[24] The formal statutory basis of the Respondent's opposition to the registration of the mark applied for by the Applicant is predicated upon s. 37(1)(b) and (c) of the Trade-marks Act, R.S. c. T-10. While ss. 37(1)(c) explicitly refers to the confusing nature of the trade-mark applied for, ss. 37(1)(b) must be read in conjunction with s. 12(1)(d). Both grounds of opposition therefore raise the crucial issue in this appeal which is simply whether the proposed trade mark MAXI & CIE applied for by the Applicant is "confusing" with the trade mark MAX & CO. registered by the Respondent with respect to certain wares, and for which an application for registration was pending in association to other products.
[25] The test for confusion does not require actual confusion, but rather requires that the marks be confusingly similar (Benson & Hedges (Canada) Ltd. v. St Regis Tobacco Corp., [1969] S.C.R. 192). The definition of confusion is found in ss. 6(2) of the Act, and the factors to be considered are listed in ss. 6(5). It is worth repeating that these factors are not exhaustive; the first part of ss. 6(5) explicitly directs the Registrar and the Court to have regard to "all the surrounding circumstances", the factors thereafter listed being only examples of those circumstances to be considered. It has also been repeated over and over that these circumstances are not necessarily to be given equal weight; rather, the importance of certain circumstances in determining the likelihood of confusion will be based on the facts of each particular situation (Everex Systems, Inc. v. Everdata Computer Inc., (1992), 44 C.P.R. (3d) 175, at 180 (F.C.); Kellogg Salada Canada Inc. v.Maximum Nutrition Ltd, Et. Al., (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 133 (F.C.). However, the degree of resemblance between trade-marks in appearance, sound, or in ideas suggested is often the most crucial factor (Effem Foods Ltd. v. Export/Import CLIC Inc. (1993), 53 C.P.R. (3d) 200, at 203-204 (F.C.); Beverley Bedding & Upholstery Co. v. Regal Bedding & Upholstering Ltd. (1980), 47 C.P.R. (2d) 145, at 149 (F.C.)).
[26] To assess the likelihood of confusion, the proper test to be applied is one of first impression and imperfect recollection. Allowance must be made for imperfect recollection and careless pronunciation. In other words, the Court must consider whether it is reasonable that the average consumer might conclude that the wares and/or the services associated with the respective trade-marks of the Applicant and of the Opponent (Respondent), are performed by the same person. As Cattanach J. said in Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd. v. Canada's Manitoba Distillery Ltd. (1975), 25 C.P.R.(2d) 1, at p. 5:
To determine whether two trade marks are confusing one with the other it is the persons who are likely to buy the wares who are to be considered, that is those persons who normally comprise the market, the ultimate consumer. That does not mean a rash, careless or unobservant purchaser on the one hand, nor on the other does it mean a person of higher education, one possessed of expert qualifications. It is the probability of the average person endowed with average intelligence acting with ordinary caution being deceived that is the criterion and to measure that probability of confusion the Registrar of Trade Marks of the Judge must assess the normal attitudes and reactions of such persons.
[27] Once the opponent has established the facts upon which he relies, the burden obviously shifts to the Applicant to prove that the grounds for opposition should not prevent registration of the mark (United Artists Corp. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp., (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 247, at p. 255). Having said this, the burden of proof should not be confused with the standard of proof. As is always the case in civil matters, the Applicant must be able to convince the Registrar that proposed trade-mark is unlikely to confuse the consumer, on a balance of probabilities standard. As Décary J.A. said in Dion Neckwear Ltd. v. Christian Dior, S.A. et al, supra, at para. 15:
The Registrar must therefore be reasonably satisfied that, on a balance of probabilities, the registration is unlikely to create confusion; he need not be satisfied beyond doubt that confusion is unlikely. Should the "beyond doubt" standard be applied, applicants would, in most cases, face an unsurmountable burden because certainty in matters of likelihood of confusion is a rare commodity. At best, it is only where the probabilities are equal that a form of doubt may be said to arise, which is to be resolved in favour of the opponent.
[28] Finally, confusion must be assessed as of the relevant material dates, namely as of the date of filing of the Applicant's mark (in respect of the allegation of non-entitlement pursuant to s. 16(3)(b)) and as of the date of the final disposition of the matter (in respect of the allegation of non-registrability pursuant to s. 12(1)(d)). Since these dates are not at issue in this case, I shall proceed with my analysis of confusion on a generic basis, except as otherwise indicated.
[29] Turning first to the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks and the extent to which they have become known (ss. 6(5)(a) of the Act), what can be said of the Applicant's and of the Respondent's respective marks? The Board spent very little time considering this factor. Adopting the finding of another member of the Opposition Board dealing with the opposition to the Respondent's application for registration of TMA 629,249, Mr. Carrière (the Board member in this case) concluded that the Respondent's trade-mark possesses little inherent distinctiveness, and that there was no evidence that it had acquired such distinctiveness through its use.
[30] As for the Applicant's mark, the Board similarly noted that it possesses little inherent distinctiveness, as MAXI is a truncated version of the word maximum as well. Mr. Carrière added, however, that there is evidence of the use of the MAXI & CIE and mark in association with the services inherent to or incidental to the operation of the Applicant's food chain supermarket businesses since at least 1996. He found, therefore, that the MAXI & CIE mark is known, at least in the province of Québec, and that such a factor favours the Applicant.
[31] The two marks being inherently weak, it is fair to say that even small differences will be sufficient to distinguish among them. Were it otherwise, first user of words in common use would be unfairly allowed to monopolize these words. A further justification given by courts in coming to this conclusion is that the public is expected to be more on its guard when such weak trade names are used (Kellogg Canada Inc. v. Weetabix of Canada Ltd. (2002), 20 C.P.R. (4th) 17 (F.C.); American Cyanamid Co. v. Record Chemical Co. Inc., (1972), 7 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.); Aircraft Technical Publishers v. ATP Aero Training Products Inc. (1998), 84 C.P.R. (3d) 480 (C.F.)). This is particularly the case when abbreviations are used: it has even been held that the same letters in different order (admittedly with a different shape and design) were not confusing (GSW Ltd. v. Great West Steel Industries Ltd. et. al., (1975), 22 C.P.R. (2d) 154).
[32] It is no doubt true, as argued by the Respondent, that the Applicant's mark cannot be held to have become well-known in Canada as of the application filing date, which is the material date for considering confusion in respect of the ground of opposition of non-entitlement. It must be remembered that the application by the Applicant was made on February 2, 1996, on the basis of proposed use, and that the first stores were opened in September 1996. That being said, it may be of some relevance to note that the MAXI & CIE stores are but an extension of the MAXI stores, in operation since 1984.
[33] But the findings of the Board with respect to the use of the mark subsequent to the filing date of the application are not unsubstantiated by the evidence, and are relevant to assess the registrability of the mark. The sales revenue derived from the operation of the MAXI & CIE stores was in the range of $ 871 409 000 for the first three years. Even if the sales figures for the following years do not discriminate between the MAXI stores and the MAXI & CIE stores, there is no reason to believe that these figures have shifted dramatically in the following years. The evidence also reveals that the Applicant spent 13 million dollars in marketing and publicity during the first three years, as well as circulating weekly flyers to millions of households, first with the two marks clearly identified on the cover, and more recently as a separate publication.
[34] It is true that some of the services which are covered in the Applicant's application have in fact been offered under different marks by different entities. The evidence reveals, for example, that photo services are offered under a different trade-mark, whereas pharmacists' services are provided by independent pharmacists. But this does not detract from the fact that the mark itself is well-known, at least in Québec, and has been in use for most of the services covered by the application.
[35] The Board did not explicitly deal with the second factor prescribed by the Act, that is, the length of time the trade-marks have been in use (ss. 6(5)(b)). It did rely, however, on the fact that the Respondent failed to provide any evidence of use of its mark to reject its ground of opposition based on ss. 16(3)(a). If anything, the affidavits filed by the Applicant showing that merchandise bearing the MAX & CO. mark could not be located or found during visits to a number of stores in 2004 would tend to confirm this finding. Again, this factor should favour the Applicant, especially in the context of the opposition based on ss. 12(1)(d) of the Act since his mark had by then been in use for eight years. It was of course precluded from establishing the use of his mark for any length of time in the context of ss. 16(3)(b), since confusion must be determined as of the filing date of the application (which was for the proposed use of its mark); but at least, it could be argued that the risk of confusion was minimal considering the apparent absence of the Respondent's mark on the market.
[36] The non-use of a mark has repeatedly been held to be a circumstance to be taken into consideration on the issue of confusion. This factor ought to be considered by the Board, whether or not the Applicant can demonstrate use of his proposed mark. Commenting on the decision reached by the Federal Court of Appeal in Park Avenue Furniture Corp. v. Wickes/Simmons Bedding Ltd. (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 413, Reed J. said in Canadian Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., PLC (1992), 42 C.P.R. (3d) 239, at p. 246:
I do not read that decision as requiring that there be both non-use by a respondent and use by the appellant in order to have the non-use taken into account as surrounding circumstances. Both circumstances existed in Park Avenue, but the principle enunciated in the decision is that non-use of a mark is a relevant circumstance.
[37] The third and fourth factors enumerated in ss. 6(5) of the Act (nature of the wares, services or business and nature of the trade) seem to me to be critical in the context of this appeal, considering the major differences between the merchandises and services considered, and the type of stores where they are sold. Yet, it is probably with respect to these two factors that the analysis of the Board member is most deficient.
[38] After having noted that he was unable to draw a conclusion on the nature of the Respondent's business because of a complete absence of evidence, the Board member nevertheless found that there is an overlap between the services offered by the retail department stores operated by the Applicant under the MAXI & CIE mark and the type of wares covered by the Respondent's registration. Relying on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tough Stuff Distributors, Inc. (1999), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 271 (T.M.O.B.), he was of the view that "nothing in the description of Services that would prevent the Applicant from offering for sale those types [i.e. cosmetics, deodorants and eau de cologne] of wares as well as articles of clothing", so that there is "overlap between such wares [namely, cosmetic products and clothing] and the services inherent to or incidental to the operation of retail department businesses" (page 11 of his decision).
[39] The Board member could certainly look at the statement of wares or services as set out in the parties' respective applications or registrations to determine whether there was an overlap or even the possibility of an overlap between the wares and services of the parties (Mr. Submarine Ltd. v. Amandista Investments Ltd. (1987), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 3; Fonorala Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 509). Similarly, the case law is quite clear that an overlap can be found between the wares of one party and the services of another, especially when the wares associated with one mark could be sold in the retail stores associated with the other mark (1055779 Ontario Inc. v. Aliments Carriere Inc. (2001), 11 C.P.R. (4th) 404 (T.M.O.B.); Campbell Soup Co. Ltd. v. Spectrum Foods Inc. (1987), 15 C.P.R. (3d) 362 (T.M.O.B.); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tough Stuff Distributors, supra).
[40] But the mere fact that the wares and services of the two parties overlap is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish a likelihood of confusion. The evidence filed in this Court reveals that the Respondent offers high end women's fashion for wealthy customers, whereas the Applicant's stores target families looking for low prices and consumers more interested by good deals than by exclusive products. Indeed, the flyers produced as exhibits appended to Mrs. Marie-France Gibson affidavits (both in this Court and in front of the Board) bear witness to the fact that the various products sold in MAXI & CIE stores (including clothes and women apparel) are not meant to attract the rich and famous of this world.
[41] This difference in the nature of the products sold obviously translates in the design, layout and appearance of the stores. A simple look at the photographs of the Max Mara stores and of the MAXI & CIE warehouses vividly illustrates that they have nothing to do one with another, if only because two thirds of the floor surface of the latter is devoted to grocery products and the rest to mass consumption products. No fitting rooms are available for customers to try on the clothes they may want to buy, which is clearly another indicia that these clothes are not of a high value. Also of some relevance is the fact that all the stores associated with the mark MAXI & CIE are located in the province of Québec, while the MAX MARA shops are found throughout the world.
[42] In light of these quite significant differences between the nature of the wares, services and businesses of the Applicant and the Respondent, it is highly unlikely that an average consumer, having a vague or imperfect recollection of the Respondent's trade mark, would be led to believe that the wares and services associated with the Applicant's trade mark are provided by the Respondent. How could the person susceptible to purchase the sophisticated and pricy wares of the Respondent be misled by the use of the mark MAXI & CIE on a warehouse type of store and induced to think that such wares could be mixed with low end, inexpensive mass consumption goods such as kitchenware, books, compact discs and cosmetics, all of this in what is essentially a grocery store? To ask the question is to answer it.
[43] It is only common sense that expensive items are likely to be more carefully scrutinized by prospective purchasers that less expensive ones, thereby lessening the risk of confusion (Bally's Shoe Factories Ltd. v. Big Blue Jeans Ltd., [1992] F.C.J. No. 127 (F.C.); Pink Panther Beauty Corp. v. United Artists Corp., supra. The same is true for the nature of the trade: there is necessarily a lower risk of confusion when one party sells at the high end of the trade, in its own shops or in fashionable stores, and the other sells more at the lower end of the trade (M. & K. Stereo Plus Ltd. v. Broadway Sound Plus Ltd. (1985), 5 C.P.R. (3d) 390 (F.C.)).
[44] This principle has been most succinctly and compellingly stated in Hermes Société Anonyme v. Fletcher Golf Enterprises Ltd. (1984), 78 C.P.R. (2d) 134, a case where the underlying facts are interestingly similar in many ways to the case at bar:
There is an overlap in the wares sold by the respective parties in that each deal in wearing apparel. However, the wares of the respondent are of a modest price and are sold through ski shops, tennis and golf stores. As has been repeatedly stated, the appellant's wares are sold through very expensive end exclusive boutiques. Counsel for the appellant made the point that because of the international reputation enjoyed by the appellant should one of its customers chance to enter one of the outlets through which the respondent's wares are sold he would be aghast at the wide difference in prince and upon seeing the hansom cabs and horse trade marks used by the respondent would assume that he had the great good fortune to purchase one of the appellant's products at a much reduced price. Human nature is such that it cannot resist a bargain. I have difficulty in accepting that contention bearing in mind the highly sophisticated clientele to which the appellant caters. The wares of these traders are not sold side by side in the same market-place and the circumstance envisioned by counsel for the appellant is most unlikely to arise.
[45] Counsel for the Respondent, relying on decision of the Federal Court of Appeal (Bagagerie S.A.v. Bagagerie Willy Ltée. (1992), 45 C.P.R. (3d) 503), tried to impeach the Hermes rationale and argued that there is no merit in the contention that differences in price is apt to diminish the likelihood of similar wares. But a careful reading of that decision shows that the Court of Appeal did not disagree with Hermes, but explains it on the basis that some goods were sold in very specialized stores and other were sold in exclusive boutiques. "The difference was less one of price, though this was a factor, than a distinction pertaining to the type of store where the product is purchased" (at. P. 510). This principle could easily find application in our case.
[46] Once more, we should not lose sight of the fundamental objective sought by Parliament in enacting s. 6 of the Act. I take the liberty at this juncture to quote ss. 6(2), lest we forget it:
"The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or not the wares of services are of the same general class."
[47] According to the evidence that has been filed in front of the Board and in this Court, none of the products found in the MAXI & CIE discount stores come close to the line of products sold by the Respondent. Despite valiant attempts by counsel for the Respondent to demonstrate that high-priced items are sold in MAXI & CIE stores, the evidence does not support his argument. Television sets at $499.98, cameras at $299.96, DVD players at $349.99, electronic game consoles at $209.99 and patio furniture at $449.98 (to take but a few examples) cannot be characterized as high-end goods and bear little resemblance to t-shirts priced between $100 and $125, coats in a price range between $1 000 and $3 000, pants at $400 and vests between $600 and $1 000. Similarly, the fact that MAXI & CIE stores sell a few perfumes or watches bearing a designer name (such as Lagerfeld and Kenneth Cole) is not enough to transform the nature of these stores.
[48] Despite the fact that likelihood of confusion can be based on an overlap between the wares of one party and the services of another, it is certainly less common than confusion between wares or between services; however, it is definitely a factor that can be taken into consideration. The Applicant sought the registration of its mark MAXI & CIE only in association with services, and does not commercialize any products under that banner. This clearly reduces the possibility of confusion with the wares of the Respondent, as found in Oshawa Holdings v. Fjord Pacific Marine Industries Ltd. (1981), 55 C.P.R. (2d) 39 (F.C.).
[49] As previously noted, the Board found that MAXI & CIE and MAX & CO. were quite similar visually, had essentially the same meaning and were both shortened versions of the superlative MAXIMUM. As a result, the mark applied for by the Applicant was found to be sufficiently similar to the Respondent's trade-mark to cause a likelihood of confusion. While there is clearly a close resemblance between the two trade-marks in appearance, this is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration.
[50] In my view, the Board put too much emphasis on that factor and failed to give proper weight to the other factors as well as to other surrounding circumstances. For instance, the Board could and should have considered the fact that the Respondent did not attempt to show any evidence of actual confusion between the two marks. While this may be explainable in the context of its opposition based on s. 16(3)(b) (because the material date is the filing date of the Applicant's application), this factor could certainly be of relevance with respect to the allegation of non-registrability pursuant to s. 12(1)(d). As the Federal Court of Appeal said in Christian Dior, S.A. v. Dion Neckwear Ltd., supra, at para. 19:
With respect to the lack of evidence by the opponent of actual confusion, the Registrar expressed the view that an opponent does not need to file that kind of evidence. This is true in theory, but once an applicant has filed some evidence which may point to unlikelihood of confusion, an opponent is at great risk if, relying on the burden of proof the applicant is subject to, it assumes that it does not need to file any evidence of confusion. While the relevant issue is "likelihood of confusion" and not "actual confusion", the lack of "actual confusion" is a factor 11which the courts have found of significance when determining the "likelihood of confusion". An adverse inference may be drawn when concurrent use on the evidence is extensive, yet no evidence of confusion has been given by the opponent.
See also, to the same effect: Monsport Inc. v. Vêtements de Sport Bonnie, (1978) Ltée (1988), 23 F.T.R. 222 (F.C.); Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd. v. Manjel Inc., 2003 FCT 282, [2003] F.C.J. No. 399 (F.C.) (QL).
[51] The Applicant also contends that the Board erred in not taking into account, as part of the additional circumstances, the fact that the application for MAX & CO. (S.N. 788 370) was refused in part on March 9, 2004, with respect to (inter alia) cosmetics, colognes, cosmetic pencils, cold creams and other similar products. As a result, so the argument goes, there could be no confusion with those products to the extent that they are sold in MAXI & CIE stores. It is true that in Molson Breweries v. Labatt Brewing Co. Ltd., supra, Heald J. came to that conclusion despite the fact that confusion is to be assessed as of the advertisement date of the Applicant's application, pursuant to ss. 16(3)(b) of the Act. To rule otherwise, the learned judge wrote, would lead to an anomaly, since an applicant could be precluded from registration due to confusion with an applied for mark of a competitor which never matured to registration or which was rejected due to confusion with another mark of the applicant.
[52] Unfortunately for the Applicant, I am bound to follow the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Unitel International Inc. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-marks), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1652 (QL), where the Court felt obliged to give effect to the words of the Act and to impose on the unsuccessful applicant the hurdle to re-file its application in those circumstances. Therefore, the Board made no mistake in disregarding the fate of the Respondent's application and the fact that it was rejected in part. It was proper and correct for the Board to have included the Respondent's wares of cosmetics and perfumes in his consideration of the likelihood of confusion with the Respondent's prior-files application for MAX & CO.
[53] For all the above reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the Board erred in refusing the Applicant's application for the registration of the MAXI & CIE mark with respect to services inherent to or incidental to the operation of retail department businesses, services inherent to or incidental to the operation of a computer centre and retail optical store and opticians' and optometrists' services. The Board member focused his attention on only a few factors, and did not give proper weight to the nature of the wares and of the business of both parties, to the channels of trade, and to the absence of any evidence of the use of the mark MAX & CO. in Canada. On that basis, I believe it was unreasonable for the Board to conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion between the wares associated with the trade-mark MAX & CO. and the services excluded from the Applicant's application.
[54] Accordingly, this appeal is allowed with costs.
JUDGE
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET : T-2030-04
STYLE OF CAUSE : PROVIGO DISTRIBUTION INC. v. MAX MARA FASHION GROUP SRL
PLACE OF HEARING : Montréal, Québec
DATE OF HEARING : August 24th, 2005
REASONS FOR ORDER : The Honorable Justice de Montigny
APPEARANCES :
Geneviève Marcotte FOR THE APPLICANT
Cindy Bélanger FOR THE APPLICANT
Lillian L. Camilleri FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICOTORS OF RECORD :
Heenan Blaikie
Barristers & Solicitors
Montréal, Québec FOR THE APPLICANT
Cassan Maclean
Barristers & Solicitors
Ottawa, Ontario FOR THE RESPONDENT