T-2165-95
BETWEEN:
CABOT SAFETY INTERMEDIATE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
- and -
ARKON SAFETY EQUIPMENT INC.,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD J.:
By Notice of Motion dated December 23, 1996, the plaintiff seeks to strike paragraph 2 of the defendant's "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle" dated March 7, 1996, as well as the prior art references referred to in the defendant's particulars of August 19, 1996. Paragraph 2 reads:
| La matière définie dans le brevet 278 n'est pas brevetable au motif qu'elle était évidente par rapport à l'état des connaissances de l'homme de l'art au moment où la prétendue invention a été faite par la personne dont le nom apparaît au brevet 278 à titre d'inventeur. Il en va de même pour la matière définie dans toutes et chacune des revendications de ce brevet, lesquelles sont nulles. La défenderesse démontrera lors du procès l'état des connaissances de l'homme de l'art à la date de la prétendue invention par le biais de témoignages d'experts. La défenderesse précise cependant que l'ensemble des divulgations contenues aux brevets suivants, faisait partie des connaissances de l'homme de l'art à la date de la présente invention. |
The defendant listed eight patents in paragraph 2 to its "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle".
In a Notice of Motion dated March 20, 1996, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, particulars of this allegation.
At the hearing before the prothonotary, on March 25, 1996, the defendant argued that particulars were not necessary. In its "Exposé de la Défenderesse", the defendant made the following submissions with respect to the above allegation and the prior art referred to therein:
| La nature du brevet en cause, c'est-à-dire son degré de complexité est très pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer si des précisions sont nécessaires ou non. |
| Il est important de noter la simplicité du brevet 1,261,278 (ci-après '278) de même que la ressemblance frappante entre le bouchon d'oreille du brevet '278 et ceux qui sont présentés dans l'art antérieur. De plus, ces brevets sont courts et généralement très simples à comprendre. |
| La demanderesse n'a pas le droit d'obtenir plus de précisions eu égard aux prétentions de la défenderesse à l'effet que la matière définie dans le brevet '278 n'est pas brevetable au motif qu'elle était évidente par rapport à l'état des connaissances de l'homme de l'art au moment où la prétendue invention a été faite et à l'effet que les revendications de ce brevet sont nulles pour les mêmes raisons. |
In his Order of June 19, 1996, the prothonotary rejected the defendant's submissions on this point. He ordered:
| With respect to paragraph 2 of its Particulars to the Defence and Counterclaim, Defendant shall describe all of the prior art, including the patents listed in paragraph 2, which the Defendant alleges as having been known and used prior to the date of the invention and the parts of each relied upon by the Defendant as constituting such prior art. The Defendant shall also identify the combination of those parts which read together support the allegation that the invention was obvious. |
By letter to the Registrar of the Federal Court dated September 5, 1996, the defendant withdrew its appeal of the June 19, 1996 Order with the result that the order is now final.
On August 19, 1996, the defendant provided the following particulars in response to the prothonotary's Order and referred to eleven additional patents. These particulars are as follows:
| En ce qui concerne le paragraphe 2 des "Précisions à la Défense et demande reconventionnelle, la défenderesse précise que les brevets mentionnés ci-dessous (copie ci-jointe) font également partie de l'état des connaissances de l'homme de l'art au moment où la prétendue invention a été faite par la personne désignée au brevet 278. |
| La défenderesse précise également que chacun des brevets mentionnés ci-dessus ainsi que ceux déjà énumérés au paragraphe 2 des "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle" porte directement sur les bouchons d'oreille et compte tenu de la simplicité de la technologie divulgée et du fait que les mémoires descriptifs de chacun de ces brevets sont pour la plupart très courts elle s'appuiera sur la totalité des enseignements de chacun d'eux. La défenderesse précise également qu'elle entend démontrer lors du procès que la matière définie dans le brevet 278 est évidente par rapport à l'état des connaissances de l'homme de l'art à la date de la prétendue invention dont fait partie l'ensemble des divulgations contenues aux brevets mentionnés ci-dessus et au paragraphe 2 des "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle". |
On October 16, 1996, the plaintiff's counsel wrote to the defendant's counsel indicating that the above particulars supplied by the defendant with respect to paragraph 2 of the "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle" did not fulfil the requirements of the June 19, 1996 Order. The defendant was asked to provide the required particulars.
I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that the information contained in the particulars of August 19, 1996, does not comply with the Order of June 19, 1996. In particular, the defendant has failed to:
| a) identify the parts of each prior art reference relied upon by the defendant as constituting such prior art. |
| b) identify the combination of those parts which read together support the allegation that the invention was obvious. |
In his Reasons for Order of June 19, 1996, the prothonotary, ruled that the defendant's pleadings were insufficient:
| Paragraph 2 of the Particulars provides that the invention was obvious, and lists, without limitation, certain patents. The Plaintiff states that it is entitled to know, at this stage of the proceedings, all points of the prior art relied upon by the Defendant to support its allegation. Plaintiff's counsel refers the Court in support of its plea to the case of Mitten, supra, at 233, and to Bror, supra, at 6. I agree with Plaintiff's counsel and therefore the Defendant will have to provide the Plaintiff with the information requested in paragraph 11.2 of the motion. |
The prothonotary ordered:
| It is ordered that the Defendant do, within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, or such further period as the parties may agree, file and serve the following particulars, failing which the paragraphs ordered to be particularized herein could be struck out upon a further application by the Plaintiff. |
In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Interpharm Inc. (1994), 57 C.P.R. (3d) 516, the defendant had previously been ordered to provide particulars of certain of its allegations including references to prior art. When the defendant failed to provide the required particulars, the Plaintiff brought a motion to have the relevant pleadings and prior art references struck.
In ordering that the defendant's pleadings and prior art references relating to obviousness and common general knowledge be struck for failure to provide particulars, MacKay, J. stated:
| Thus prior art may not in itself be evidence of common general knowledge. Perhaps common knowledge may yet be the subject of testimony at trial. However, at this stage defendants have not complied with the express terms of subpara. 7(iv) of the order of McGillis J. I am persuaded that reference to common general knowledge should be struck from subpara. 15(d) of the Amended Statement of Defence, since particulars of such knowledge, ordered to be produced in full, have not been provided in relation to any of the patents-in-suit. In the words of Mr. Justice Addy in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Babcock Allatt Ltd. (1982), 67 C.P.R. (2d) 135 at p. 139, [1983] 1 F.C. 487: |
| A court proceeding is not a speculative exercise and actions are not to be launched or continued nor are defences to be allowed to stand where it is clear that the person making the allegation has no evidence to support it and where the onus of proof rests on that person. |
| There is, however, an exception to this deferral of consideration, that is in relation to prior art which the order of October 19, 1993, directed, inter alia, by subpara. 7(iii) of the order, be provided 'with page and line references of relevant portions'; |
[...]
| In my view, where the specific requirements for copies, or for page and line references of relevant portions, were not provided by the date required by the previous order, or have not since been provided to the satisfaction of plaintiffs if no date was specified in the order of October 19, 1993, those documents are to be struck out. |
Accordingly, I have concluded that paragraph 2 of the defendant's "Précisions à la défense et demande reconventionnelle" as well as the prior art references referred to in the defendant's particulars of August 19, 1996, should be struck out since the particulars specified in the Order of June 19, 1996, have not been provided. The Plaintiff is awarded the costs of this motion.
J.D. Richard
Judge
Montréal, Québec
January 15, 1997
T-2165-95
CABOT SAFETY INTERMEDIATE
CORPORATION
Plaintiff
ARKON SAFETY EQUIPMENT INC.
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
COURT NO: T-2165-95
| STYLE OF CAUSE: CABOT SAFETY INTERMEDIATE CORPORATION |
Plaintiff
- AND-
| ARKON SAFETY EQUIPMENT INC. |
Defendant
PLACE OF HEARING: Montreal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: January 14, 1997
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Richard
DATED: January 15, 1997
APPEARANCE: Me Brian Daley for the Plaintiff
Me Christian Bolduc for the Defendant
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
OGILVY RENAULT for the Plaintiff
Montréal, Québec
SMART & BIGGAR for the Defendant
Montréal, Québec