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Date: 20060626

Docket: T-1138-05

Citation: 2006 FC 811

Ottawa, Ontario, June 26, 2006

PRESENT:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLAIS

BETWEEN:

DAVID R. JOLIVET

Applicant

and

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADAAND THE COMMISSIONER OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

[1]                This application is for a writ of certiorari and judicial review of a decision of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) to treat April 20, 2011, as the date of statutory release for David R. Jolivet (the applicant) pursuant to the provisions of the Transfer of Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-15 (the Act).

RELEVANT FACTS

[2]                The applicant is currently imprisoned at Mission Institution, a Canadian medium security federal institution, for crimes committed in both Canada and the United States.

[3]                The applicant began serving his Canadian federal sentence on March 20, 1979, after being found guilty of two counts of robbery. On November 11, 1984, while on an authorized unescorted temporary absence the applicant fled custody.

[4]                On December 6, 1984, the applicant was arrested in the United States. He was sentenced in Utah for aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, rape, aggravated robbery and forcible sodomy. The applicant received an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment, pronounced on April 16, 1985 (the state sentence).

[5]                On December 5, 1994, the applicant was convicted of an additional charge while incarcerated in the United States. The applicant was convicted of attempting to escape custody and received a sentence of 41 months to be served consecutively to the state sentence (the first federal offence).

[6]                On January 5, 1995, the applicant was convicted of additional charges of influencing and retaliating against a federal official and mailing threatening communications. He received an additional sentence of 36 months to be consecutively served with the previous convictions (second federal sentence).

[7]                The applicant applied to be transferred to Canadian custody to serve the remainder of both his outstanding Canadian sentence and his American sentence. Prior to being transferred to Canadian custody, CSC advised the applicant that if he returned to Canada he would serve a life sentence in Canadian custody with a commencement date of April 18, 1985. On July 17, 2003, the applicant signed a Verification of Consent to Transfer to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence.

[8]                The applicant was transferred back to Canadaon July 23, 2003. At that time, the applicant's American sentences were of an indeterminate nature and administered by CSC as being a sentence of life imprisonment.

[9]                On May 21, 2004, a hearing was held before the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah concerning the applicant's Utah State sentence and the Board determined that the applicant's Warrant Expiry Date would be February 12, 2009, decreasing the applicant's indeterminate life sentence to a determinate sentence.

[10]            As a result of the indeterminate American sentence being changed to a determinate one, the applicant's statutory release date has been calculated as being April 20, 2011 in Canada.

ISSUES

[11]            1. Did the CSC err in calculating the applicant's statutory release date?

2. Did the CSC err in deciding that the federal sentences would be served consecutively

and not concurrently to the new state sentence?

ANALYSIS

[12]            Although the Transfer of Offenders Act, was repealed and replaced by the International Transfer of Offenders Act, R.S.C. 2004, c. 21, the latter was not in effect when the applicant was transferred to Canada in 2003. As such, for the purposes of this judicial review, the provisions of the Transfer of Offenders Act will apply. The pertinent sections of said Act are as follows:

4. Where a Canadian offender is transferred to Canada, his finding of guilt and sentence, if any, by a court of the foreign state from which he is transferred is deemed to be a finding of guilt and a sentence imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction in Canada for a criminal offence.

11. A Canadian offender transferred to Canada shall, at the date of the transfer, be credited with any time toward completion of a sentence imposed by a court of a foreign state that, at that date, had actually been spent in confinement in the foreign state or that was credited, by the foreign state, towards completion of the sentence.

11.1(1) Where a Canadian offender transferred to Canada is detained in a penitentiary, the offender is entitled to be released on statutory release on the day on which the offender has served the portion of the sentence that remains to be served after deducting the portion of the sentence with which the offender was credited in accordance with section 11

a) any credits, given by the foreign state, towards release before the expiration of the sentence; and

b) one third of the portion of the sentence that remains to be served after deducting the portion referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) Where a Canadian offender transferred to Canada is detained in a prison, the offender is entitled to be released on the day on which the offender has served the portion of the sentence that remains to be served after deducting the portion with which the offender was credited in accordance with section 11 less

a) any credits, given by the foreign state, towards release before the expiration of the sentence;

b) the amount of any remission granted, pursuant to the Prisons and Reformatories Act, on the portion of the sentence that remains to be served after deducting the portion referred to in paragraph (a).

12 Subject to sections 11 and 11.1, a Canadian offender transferred to Canada is subject to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act or the Prisons and Reformatories Act, as the case may be, as if the offender had been convicted and the sentence imposed by a court in Canada.

4. Lorsqu'un délinquant canadien est transféré au Canada, sa déclaration de culpabilité et sa sentence, le cas échéant, par un tribunal de l'État étranger d'où il est transféré sont présumées être celles qu'un tribunal canadien compétent lui aurait imposées pour une infraction criminelle.

11. Il est tenu compte pour le délinquant canadien transféré au Canada, au jour du transfèrement, du temps véritablement passé en détention et des remises de peine que lui a accordées l'État étranger dont un tribunal l'a condamné.

11.1(1) Si le délinquant canadien transféré au Canada est détenu dans un pénitencier, la date de sa libération d'office est celle à laquelle il a purgé la partie de la peine qu'il lui reste à purger conformément à l'article 11, moins :

a) d'une part, toute réduction de peine que lui a accordée l'État étranger

b) d'autre part, le tiers de la partie de la peine qu'il lui reste à purger, une fois déduite toute réduction de peine visée à l'alinéa a).

(2) Si le délinquant canadien transféré au Canada est détenu dans une prison, la date de sa libération d'office est celle à laquelle il a purgé la partie de la peine qu'il lui reste à purger conformément à l'article 11, moins :

a) d'une part, toute réduction de peine que lui a accordée l'État étranger;

b) d'autre part, la réduction de peine méritée sur la partie de la peine qu'il lui reste à purger, une fois déduite toute réduction de peine visée à l'alinéa a).

12 Sous réserve des articles 11 et 11.1, le délinquant canadien transféré au Canada est assujetti à la Loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition ou à la Loi sur les prisons et les maisons de correction, selon le cas, comme s'il avait été condamné au Canada et si la peine lui y avait été infligée.

[13]            The relevant provisions of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, read as follows:

127(3) Subject to this section, the statutory release date of an offender sentenced on or after November 1, 1992 to imprisonment for one or more offences is the day on which the offender completes two thirds of the sentence.

127(3) La date de libération d'office d'un individu condamné à une peine d'emprisonnement le 1er novembre 1992 ou par la suite est, sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, celle où il a purgé les deux tiers de sa peine.

1. Did the CSC err in calculating the applicant's statutory release date?

[14]            As mentioned above, subsection 127(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act indicates that the statutory release date occurs once the offender completes two thirds of his or her sentence. The applicant claims that the two thirds period should have begun once he started his sentence in Utah. As such, he claims that the CSC erred in calculating the two thirds period from the time the applicant arrived in Canada as a result of the transfer.

[15]            The exact same issue was recently addressed by the Court of Appeal in Charron c. Canada(Procureur général)2005 CAF 442. The Court of Appeal undertook an explanation of the legislative provisions governing statutory release dates and outlined its findings regarding this matter at paragraphs 18, 19, 25, 26 and 28:

L'article 4 de la Loi sur le transfèrement établit une présomption selon laquelle, lors du transfert d'un détenu des États-Unis au Canada, la peine imposée aux États-Unis devient une peine canadienne. En outre, l'article 12 de cette Loi prévoit que le détenu transféré au Canada, sous réserve des articles 11 et 11.1, est assujetti, inter alia, à la Loi sur le système correctionnel, comme s'il avait été condamné au Canada et comme si la peine lui y avait été infligée.

Par ailleurs, l'article 11.1 de la Loi, en dérogation du régime applicable à un détenu condamné au Canada, prévoit que la date de libération d'office d'un détenu condamné aux États-Unis sera non pas la date où il aura purgé les deux tiers de sa peine (paragraphe 127(3) de la Loi sur le système correctionnel), mais plutôt la date qui correspondra aux deux tiers du temps à purger entre la date du transfèrement, soit l'arrivée du détenu au Canada, et sa date de fin de mandat, une fois soustraites les remises de peine et les réductions de peine (article 11 et 11.1) accordées par l'État étranger.

Je commence par l'article 11.1 de la Loi sur le transfèrement, qui constitue une exception en ce qui concerne le calcul de la date d'éligibilité d'un détenu à la libération d'office. En effet, selon cette disposition, le calcul de la date d'éligibilité à la libération conditionnelle d'un détenu canadien, condamné aux États-Unis et transféré au Canada avant l'expiration de sa peine, correspondra non pas aux deux tiers de sa sentence, comme le prévoit le paragraphe 127(3) de la Loi sur le système correctionnel, mais correspondra plutôt aux deux tiers du temps restant à purger entre la date de son arrivée au Canada et la date de fin de mandat, calculées selon les articles 11 et 11.1 de cette Loi.

En raison de cette exception à la règle prévue au paragraphe 127(3) de la Loi sur le système correctionnel, la date de libération d'office d'un détenu canadien transféré au Canada sera toujours postérieure à son transfèrement. Sans cette exception, un tel détenu qui, par exemple, aurait purgé plus des deux tiers de sa peine américaine avant d'être transféré au Canada, serait libéré automatiquement lors de son arrivée au Canada, s'il était assujetti au paragraphe 127(3) de la Loi sur le système correctionnel.

Il est bon de se rappeler qu'en vertu de l'article 4 de la Loi sur le transfèrement, la peine américaine est gérée comme si elle avait été imposée par un tribunal canadien. Nonobstant cette présomption que la peine est    réputée être une peine canadienne, elle est néanmoins assujettie, en raison de l'article 12 de la Loi sur le transfèrement, aux articles 11 et 11.1 de cette Loi pour le calcul de la date d'éligibilité à la libération d'office.

[16]            In light of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the two thirds period begins once the offender arrives in Canada, I find that the CSC did not err in its calculation of the statutory release date.

2. Did the CSC err in deciding that the federal sentences would be served consecutively and not concurrently to the new state sentence?

[17]            The applicant claims that all parties to the international treaty-transfer process had previously agreed that his six and a half year U.S. federal sentences would merge with his Utah state life-sentence upon his transfer back to Canada. As such, the federal sentence would be served concurrently with the state life sentence. However, once the applicant was transferred back to Canada his state sentence had been revised to a 25 year sentence. The applicant submits that although the state sentence had changed, the parties to the international treaty-transfer process had already agreed that his federal sentence would be served concurrently to his state sentence. As such, the applicant claims that the CSC erred in deciding that the federal sentences would be served consecutively and not concurrently.

[18]            I disagree with the applicant's logic. At the time of his transfer, the applicant was sentenced to an indeterminate state sentence and two federal sentences. Because an indeterminate sentence does not exist in Canada, as a condition of transfer, the applicant was to serve a life sentence. As such, it was irrelevant whether or not the federal sentences would be served consecutively or concurrently. There was no practical impact of the two additional federal sentences, as the applicant had been sentenced to serve life in prison. However, once transferred to Canada, the state of Utah changed the applicant's indeterminate sentence into a determinate sentence of twenty five years. Utah has the right to change the applicant's state sentence. Section 11.1(1) of the Transfer of Offenders Act states that Canada must honour the way in which Utah changes the state sentence.

[19]            The specific language of the warrants of committal specifies that the first federal sentence and the second federal sentence are to be served consecutively to the state sentence. The applicant argues that he would not have agreed to the transfer had he known that the federal sentences would be served consecutively. However, such an argument is moot because at the time of transfer the applicant was facing a life sentence and not a determinate sentence of 25 years. The determinate sentence was established only after the transfer. It is inconsequential whether or not the applicant would have agreed to the transfer knowing the federal sentences would be served consecutively because the determinate state sentence was not even a factor at the time of the transfer.

[20]            The State of Utah's decision to change the applicant's sentence into a determinate one was taken after he had been transferred to Canada. The applicant admitted at the hearing that once he was transferred to Canada it would be extremely unlikely that upon his release he would ever be allowed to return to the United States. The State of Utah was cognizant of this situation at the time it decided to change the applicant's sentence to a determinate one. It is mere speculation on the part of the applicant to argue that having remained in the United States he would have been released at an earlier date.

[21]            The CSC did not err in its application of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act in establishing the applicant's statutory release date.

JUDGMENT

The application for judicial review is dismissed.

"Pierre Blais"

Judge


FEDERAL COURT

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                           T-1138-05

STYLE OF CAUSE:                           David R. Jolivet v. The Attorney General of Canada and The Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada

PLACE OF HEARING:                     Vancouver, B.C.

DATE OF HEARING:                       May 17, 2005

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:        BLAIS J.

DATED:                                              June 26, 2006

APPEARANCES:

Mr. David Jolivet (self represented)

FOR THE APPLICANT

Mr. Edward Burnet

FOR THE RESPONDENTS

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

David Jolivet (self represented)

FOR THE APPLICANT

John H. Sims, Q.C.

Deputy Attorney General

FOR THE RESPONDENTS

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