Date: 19980226
Docket: IMM-1156-97
BETWEEN:
MEI QIN LIN
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
JOYAL, J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration and Refugee Board, dated February 18, 1997. The Board decided that the applicant was not a Convention refugee under s.2(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
The Facts:
[2] The Applicant is a Chinese citizen. She converted to Christianity in 1990. She attended a House Church in her village approximately two or three times a month, and did some membership recruiting and donation collecting for the Church.
[3] In December 1994, the applicant was asked by her pastor to do some recruitment in another village. In January 1995, she went, with a fellow member, to the Hou Shun village to preach. There, they met the Luo family, who invited them to stay and preach to them and their neighbours.
[4] On January 2, 1995, about one half hour after starting to preach, the applicant was warned that village security officers were heading toward the Luo house. The applicant managed to escape through the rear of the house, and followed a path leading to the hills outside the village. The applicant hiked through the hills and eventually reached the home of her husband's uncle, where she went into hiding.
[5] While in hiding, the applicant learned that the religious friend who had accompanied her had not escaped and had in fact been arrested. She also learned that a summons had been issued against her and left with her parents. Thereafter, a wanted notice was posted in her village. The applicant feared she would be arrested and detained, so she sought the assistance of family members to arrange her escape from China.
[6] She arrived in Toronto on April 10, 1995, and claimed refugee status some months later, on July 28, 1995.
The Board's Decision:
[7] The Board based its decision solely on the applicant's lack of credibility. The Board did not believe that she, with little education, was actually asked to preach and recruit new members for her Church. The applicant's version of her escape from the Luo house, in oral testimony, conflicted with that found in her Personal Information Form, and the Board determined that she had concocted the incident so as to advance her refugee claim. The Board went on to conclude that the applicant was simply an ordinary member of her Church, and that it was highly improbable that the Chinese authorities would target her if she returned to her country.
The Issues:
[8] Firstly, the applicant submits that the Board misstated or misapplied the definition of persecution1. The mere fact that her Church is illegal in China is sufficient in itself to constitute persecution. She is prohibited from practising her religion and will face prosecution for that worship.
[9] Secondly, it is argued that the Board's decision is perverse or capricious in that it was based on one document only and ignored a multitude of other documentary evidence proving that the Chinese government harassed members of the applicant's Church.
[10] Lastly, the applicant submits that in a religion-based claim, the Board must first determine whether the claimant practiced the religion as claimed in his or her country of origin, whether the events alleged by the claimant are credible, and whether the claimant is currently practicing that religion in Canada. It is argued that the Board's failure to properly address a central issue in the claim when making its determination as to whether or not the applicant was a practicing Christian in Canada constitutes a reviewable error.
Analysis:
[11] In my respectful view, the applicant does not seem to address the central issue in her argument. The Board, in concluding that she had not shown a subjective fear of persecution in China, did so because they did not believe her story, not because they doubted her religious belief or the difficulty of practising any religion in China.
[12] As far as the Board members were concerned, there were a number of elements in the applicant's story to satisfy them that she was simply not believable or credible. And an analysis of their decision has convinced me that there was sufficient material before them to justify such a conclusion.
[13] As everyone knows, there are many different grounds on which a Court can intervene judicially. Decisions based on credibility, although not beyond the reach of judicial intervention, nevertheless enjoy a special place. Credibility is so much a matter of observations, insight, inferences drawn from any number of factors, that Courts will only intervene in clear and obvious cases. Regrettably for the applicant, this is not one of them.
Conclusion:
[14] The application for judicial review is accordingly dismissed.
L-Marcel Joyal
J U D G E
O T T A W A, Ontario
February 26, 1998.
__________________1 As stated in Rajudeen v. M.C.I. (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.).