Fredericton, New Brunswick, April 4, 2006
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE de MONTIGNY
BETWEEN:
AURÉLIEN HACHÉ, LUCIEN CHIASSON, SYLVIE CHIASSON, ARMAND FISET, JEANNOT GUIGNARD, HÉLIODORE AUCOIN, GILDARD HACHÉ, GUY HACHÉ, RHÉAL HACHÉ, ROBERT F. HACHÉ, GREG HINKLEY, VINCENT JONES, SOLANGE LANTEIGNE, JEAN-PIERRE LEBOUTHILLIER, RHÉAL H. MALLET, ANDRÉ MAZEROLLE, EDDY MAZEROLLE, ALBANIE NOËL, ALPHÉE NOËL, SERGE C. NOËL, GILLES NOËL, JOSEPH A. NOËL, LÉVI NOËL, LORENZO NOËL, MARTIN NOËL, MATHURIN NOËL, NICOLAS NOËL, ONÉZIME NOËL, PAUL NOËL, RAYMOND NOËL, RENALD NOËL, ROBERT ROSS, BRUNO ROUSSEL, JEAN-CAMILLE ROUSSEL VALMI ROUSSEL, DONAT VIENNEAU, FERNAND VIENNEAU, RHÉAL VIENNEAU, MATHIAS ROUSSEL, SERGE BLANCHARD, ROBERT BOUCHER, ELIDE BULGER, JEAN-GILLES CHIASSON, ROMÉO G. CORMIER, BERNARD DUGUAY, THOMAS DUGUAY, DONALD DUGUAY, EDGAR FERRON, WILBERT GODIN, AURÈLE GODIN, VALOIS GOUPIL, EUCLIDE GUIGNARD, FLORENT GUINARD, JACQUES E. HACHÉ, JEAN-PIERRE HACHÉ, ROBERT G. HACHÉ, DONALD R. HACHÉ, ULYSSE HACHÉ, GAËTAN HACHÉ, GABRIEL JEAN, JEAN-VICTOR LAROCQUE, DASSISSE MALLET, DELPHIS MALLET, ALBERT A. NOËL, GILLES A. NOËL, DOMITIEN PAULIN, SYLVAIN PAULIN, ALMA ROBICHAUD, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEAN-PIERRE ROBICHAUD, SYLVA HACHÉ, MARIO SAVOIE, LES PÊCHERIES JIMMY L. LTÉE, ERIC GIONET, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRUST ALLAIN O. GIONET, LES PRODUITS BELLE-BAIE LTÉE, OLIVA ROUSSEL, E. GAGNON ET FILS LTÉE, BERNARD ARSENEAULT, GÉRARD CASSIVI, JACQUES COLLIN, RAYMOND COLLIN, ROBERT COLLIN, MARC COUTURE, LES CRUSTACÉS DE GASPÉ LTÉE, CIE 2973-1288 QUÉBEC INC., CIE 2973-0819 QUÉBEC INC., BRUNO DUGUAY, CHARLES-AIMÉ DUGUAY, ALBAN HAUTCOEUR, FERNAND HAUTCOEUR, JEAN-CLAUDE HAUTCOEUR, ROBERT HUARD, CHRISTIAN LELIÈVRE, ELPHÈGE LELIÈVRE, JEAN-ÉLIE LELIÈVRE, JULES LELIÈVRE, JEAN-MARC MARCOUX, DOUGLAS MCINNIS, ROGER PINEL, JEAN-MARC SWEENEY, MICHEL TURBIDE, RÉAL TURBIDE, PÊCHERIES DENISE QUINN SYVRAIS INC., STEVEN ROUSSY, GENEVIÈVE ALLAIN, FRANCIS PARISÉ, MARTIAL LEBLANC, DANIEL DESBOIS, ROLLAND ANGLEHART, JACQUES LANGIS, JEAN-PIERRE HUARD, CLAUDE GIONET, CAROL DUGUAY, DENIS DUGUAY, PAUL CHEVARIE, THÉRÈSE VIGNEAU, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF BENOIT POIRIER, DENIS ÉLOQUIN, CLAUDE POIRIER, HENRY-FRED POIRIER, ROBERT THÉRIAULT, RAYNALD VIGNEAU
Plaintiffs
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA, as represented by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Human Resources Development Canada
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
(Delivered from the Bench at Fredericton, N.B., on April 4, 2006
[1] On March 27, 2006, counsel for the Plaintiffs asked for my recusal by way of a letter sent to the Administrator of the Federal Court. Because of the seriousness of such a request, I directed the Plaintiffs to make a request for recusal by way of a formal motion, to be heard at the opening of the Trial, on April 3rd, 2006. I have now had the benefit of hearing the parties, and of examining the motion record as well as the parties' written submissions.
[2] I must say from the outset that a motion for recusal is always a matter of the utmost significance for the parties, for the judge, and most importantly, for the administration of justice in this country. Accordingly, an allegation of real or apprehended bias must be taken seriously and the judge called upon to make a determination in such a case owes it to all those interested in the outcome of a proceeding, as well as to his fellow citizens, to approach the matter with transparency, integrity and open-mindedness. This is what I have striven to do in reaching my decision.
[3] In their notice of motion, the Plaintiffs set out two grounds for their motion. First, they allege "[T]hat the majority of the Plaintiffs, as well as intended witnesses at the Trial, including Mr. Haché, and the assigned Trial Judge were the subject of an investigation by the Canadian Judicial Council during the fall of 2005". They also refer to my "professional relationship with the Department of Justice, including being Chief of Staff, during the currency of the action".
[4] In their reply, counsel for the Defendant urges me to dismiss this motion, essentially because the complaint has been dismissed and has no bearing on this trial. As for the second ground for recusal, counsel for the Defendant argues that a reasonable and well informed person would not conclude that a judge should be disqualified to hear a case involving the Crown simply because he or she has worked for the Department of Justice before being elevated to the bench. Finally, they submitted that my recusal at this point in time would not serve the interests of justice.
[5] Most of the facts upon which this motion was filed are not in dispute, and are more fully developed in the affidavit submitted by Mr. Robert Haché in support of this motion. On September 8, 2005, Mr. Robert Haché, who describes himself as a fisheries consultant, brought to the attention of the Canadian Judicial Council ("CJC") a concern about the judicial independence of the Federal Court and the impartiality of some of its judges. This concern apparently stems from three hearings where the judges were former ministers and, in my case, executive assistant to the Minister of Justice when the Applicants filed the case for judicial review. The gist of his preoccupation is stated in the following paragraph:
"Independently of their good will, it is difficult not to have reservations about the capacity of these judges to detach themselves, deliberately or instinctively, from their previous political allegiances and to review our cases in a clearly impartial manner."
[6] This letter, sent with the letterhead of the Association des crabiers acadiens, Association des crabiers de la Baie and Association des crabiers gaspésiens, was dealt with by the Honourable Robert Pidgeon, Associate Chief Justice of the Quebec Superior Court. By letter dated December 5, 2005, Mr. Haché was apprised by the Executive Director of the CJC that his complaint could not properly be dealt with by the CJC since it raised a potential issue of recusal, and not a question of conduct or ethics. Referring to the oath taken by all federally appointed judges and to a few cases of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Executive Director (on behalf of Associate Chief Justice Pidgeon) goes on to stress that judges are presumed to abide by their oath and that the party alleging bias bears the burden to prove it. Because of its relevance for the disposal of the motion brought by the Plaintiffs in this case, that letter is appended to my reasons.
[7] Unfortunately, and for reasons that are not known to me, the letter of December 5, 2005, from the CJC (with a copy to the Chief Justice) apprising me of the complaint and of the decision to close the file without investigation was apparently never sent to me (nor, for that matter, to the Chief Justice). As I indicated in my direction of March 29, 2006, I only learned of that complaint and of the response by the CJC as a result of the letter sent to the Judicial Administrator on March 27, 2006 by Mr. Rogers, counsel for the Plaintiffs in this trial.
[8] As unfortunate as this situation may be, I have not been persuaded that this factor should weigh on my decision as to whether I should recuse myself or not. Mr. Rogers has argued, both orally and in writing, that the short period of time in which the Court has had an opportunity to react and adjust to the complaint signed by Mr. Haché must be considered, because I would still be in the process of reacting to it and would presumably be more likely to be influenced. To the extent that the letter sent by Mr.Haché to the CJC had nothing to do with my conduct and could therefore not be treated as a "complaint" for the purposes of the Judges Act, I do not think that the timing of my reception of the CJC's response is material.
[9] Counsel for the Plaintiffs also submitted that a number of other factors make this case special. First of all, he pointed out that Mr. Haché, the author of the letter to the CJC, will be one of their penultimate witnesses. Secondly, he indicated that the Plaintiffs in this action that were not involved in the letter sent by Mr. Haché to the CJC (approximately 50 out of a total of 119) may feel that their position was jeopardized as a result of the actions or evidence of Mr. Haché. Finally, he argued that the facts giving rise to Mr. Haché's letter were only eight months old.
[10] Once again, I do not think these factors help to bolster Mr. Rogers' argument. Had there been a genuine complaint by Mr. Haché, one having to do with my conduct, my ethics or my behaviour that could have made me unfit to sit on the bench, the matter could have been different. But as is made clear from a reading of the letter sent to Mr. Haché by the CJC's Executive Director, nothing of the kind was invoked and the allegations had more to do with possible grounds for recusal than with improper conduct. As a result, not only was there no investigation by the CJC, but there was indeed no complaint that could have been treated as such by the CJC. Consequently, none of the "aggravating" factors brought forward by Mr. Rogers can be of any real significance, since there was not even a real complaint in the first place.
[11] As for the fact that this trial was assigned to me, there is very little to be said. Cases are assigned to the various judges of this Court a very long time in advance, according to the judges' availability, and the identity of the parties is obviously not a criterion that is taken into consideration, unless the judicial administrator knows or is told by a judge that there could potentially be a conflict of interest.
[12] It is worth noting that neither of the parties in the application for judicial review that I adjudicated last May (Jean-Victor Larocque v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005 FC 694) have asked me to recuse myself before or during the hearing. That decision was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal by Mr. Larocque, and again there is no reference whatsoever in the grounds of appeal to any bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. And yet Mr. Haché was one of the affiants in support of that application for judicial review, and was therefore personally involved in that case.
[13] Having said all this, should I nevertheless recuse myself now that I know of the letter sent by Mr. Haché? Would reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information, have a reasonable apprehension of bias, to paraphrase Mr. Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al. ([1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394)? Or, to use the language of the Federal Court of Appeal in that same decision ([1976] 2 F.C. 20), what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, conclude?
[14] There is no dispute between the parties as to the proper principles to apply with respect to bias, real or perceived. The Supreme Court of Canada has laid out the relevant considerations to take into account when dealing with such cases in a number of decisions, starting with Committee for Justice and Liberty et a.l v. National Energy Board et al., above, followed by R. v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 R.C.S. 484 and Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 R.C.S. 259. These decisions have, in turn, been applied by a number of other courts, some of which have been quoted to me by counsels: R. v. Melnichuk, 2004 BCCA 332; Hijos v. Canada(A.G.), [2004] F.C.J. No. 2113; Fogal v. Canada, [1999] F.C.J. No. 129; Energy Probe v. Atomic Energy Control Board, [1985] 1 F.C. 563.
[15] I have carefully reviewed these cases, as well as others, and have distilled a few principles that are of relevance in the present case. But before going any further, it is probably fitting to contextualize these principles with the following quote from Justice Cory, writing for the majority in R. v. S.(R.D.), supra, at par. 113:
"Regardless of the precise words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice. (...) Where reasonable grounds to make such an allegation arise, counsel must be free to fearlessly raise such allegations. Yet, this is a serious step that should not be undertaken lightly."
[16] I am not suggesting in the least that in raising the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias on my part, Plaintiffs and their counsel took the step lightly or did anything improper. The fact remains, however, that the onus of demonstrating bias, real or apprehended, lies with the person who is alleging its existence. This is so because courts have recognised that judges will carry out their judicial duties with integrity and impartiality. To quote again Mr. Justice Cory, at par. 116 of the same decision:
"Often the most significant occasion in the career of a judge is the swearing of the oath of office. It is a moment of pride and joy coupled with a realization of the onerous responsibility that goes with the office. The taking of the oath is solemn and a defining moment etched forever in the memory of the judge. The oath requires a judge to render justice impartially. To take that oath is the fulfilment of a life's dreams. It is never taken lightly. Throughout their careers, Canadian judges strive to overcome the personal biases that are common to all humanity in order to provide and clearly appear to provide a fair trial for all who come before them. Their rate of success in this difficult endeavour is high."
[17] In the present case, and with all due respect, counsel for the Plaintiffs has not filed any cogent evidence that could displace the presumption of impartiality. The allegations that I will not be able to distance myself from the letter sent by Mr. Haché to the CJC are based on speculations and hypotheses. Since I was appointed, I have always endeavoured to live by my solemn commitment to rule on the basis of the facts presented to me and according to my understanding of the law. This is certainly what I have done in the Larocque decision, and I believe that a reasonable and right-minded person, well informed of all the facts, would also conclude that I will do the same in the present case.
[18] This would be enough to dispose of the first ground raised by counsel for the Plaintiffs in support of his motion for my recusal. But there is more. I also believe that I would create a dangerous precedent for the administration of justice in this country if I were to recuse myself as a result of a letter to the CJC that did not give rise to an investigation and which, in fact, was not even considered as a complaint. I am mindful of paragraph E-19 of the Ethical Principles for Judges put out by the CJC, according to which "judges should not withdraw unnecessarily as to do so adds to the burden of his or her colleagues and contributes to delay in the courts". This trial is long overdue, and any further delay would not serve the interests of justice, particularly when there is no convincing reason for postponing it.
[19] As for the substance of the letter sent by Mr.Haché, which constitutes the second ground for seeking my recusal, I am of the view that it is completely without merit. There is no dispute that I joined the Department of Justice in the spring of 2001, after having taught for fifteen years at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa and worked for a few years at Intergovernmental Affairs (which is part of the Privy Council Office). While at the Department of Justice, I acted as Chief Legal Counsel for Public Law, a unit comprised of more than one hundred lawyers who gave specialised legal advice in the field of constitutional law, international law, administrative law, human rights, privacy and access to information. I was also on leave from the Department for a few months (from December of 2004 to May of 2005) to work as Chief of Staff for the Minister of Justice.
[20] Not only have I never dealt with the file that is the subject of this trial during these years that I worked at the Department of Justice, but I was not even aware of the issue that will now be debated in front of me. Lawyers from the regional office in Halifax, over whom I had no supervisory or managerial responsibility, handled the file. Moreover, the facts that gave rise to the present litigation took place, for all intent and purposes, before I even joined the Department of Justice. I was therefore much further removed from this file than Mr. Justice Binnie was of the file for which he was the subject of an allegation of apparent bias. As Associate Deputy Minister of Justice responsible for all litigation, Mr. Binnie (as he then was) had received some information concerning the Campbell River Band's claim and he had attended a meeting where the claim was discussed. And yet, the Supreme Court found in the Wewaykum Indian Band case that no reasonable apprehension of bias was established, since a reasonable person would conclude that his role was of a limited supervisory and administrative nature.
[21] In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court made some comments with respect to the Department of Justice which are of particular relevance to this motion. In particular, the Court stated (at par. 84):
"Furthermore, in assessing the potential for bias arising from a judge's earlier activities as counsel, the reasonable person would have to take into account the characteristics of legal practice within the Department of Justice, as compared to private practice in a law firm. See the Canadian Judicial Council's Ethical Principles for Judges, supra, at p. 47. In this respect, it bears repeating that all parties accepted that a reasonable apprehension of bias could not rest simply on Binnie J.'s years of service in the Department of Justice. In his capacity as Associate Deputy Minister, Binnie had responsibility for thousands of files at the relevant time. While his views were sought in the negotiations stage of the present dispute, it is relevant that he was consulted on strategic orientations in dozens of cases or classes of cases."
[22] Automatic disqualification, that is disqualification solely for the reason that a judge has been associated prior to his appointment to the bench with an organization like the Department of Justice, has been rejected in Canada. Disqualification must rest either on actual bias or on a reasonable apprehension of bias. In light of all the facts that have been laid out in these reasons, I strongly believe that a reasonable person would not come to the conclusion that I cannot adjudicate this matter with an open mind and without prejudice. As the English Court of Appeal said in Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 451, at p. 487 (quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band, at par. 88): "How can there be any real danger of bias, or any real apprehension or likelihood of bias, if the judge does not know of the facts that, in argument, are relied on as giving rise to the conflict of interest?"
[23] For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion for recusal is therefore dismissed.
ORDER
The Motion is dismissed, without costs.
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-2263-01
STYLE OF CAUSE: HACHÉ et al.. v. H.M.Q.
PLACE OF HEARING: Fredericton, New Brunswick
DATE OF HEARING: April 3, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER: de MONTIGNY J.
APPEARANCES:
| David N. Rogers Danys R.X. Delaquis
|
|
| Michel Doucet Christian E. Michaud |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Gilbert, McGloan, Gillis Saint John, N.B.
|
|
| Patterson, Plamer Moncton, N.B. |
ANNEX I
| ....••• ( CJC CCM Canadian Judicial Council Conseil canadien de la magistrature |
Dossier: 05-0332 Le 5 decembre 2005 |
72 |
Oltawa, Ontario K1A 0W8
M. Robert Haché
Consultant-expert en gestion des pêches Association des crabiers acadiens inc. 183A, bout. S.D. Gauthier
Shippagan (Nouveau-Brunswick) E8S I M8
Monsieur,
Je fais suite a vos lettres du 8 et 23 septembre dernier, dans lesquelles vous logez une plainte dans
Ie cadre d'affaires entendues par les juges de Montigny, Blanchard et Pinard de la Cour fédérale Canada.
Comme vous le savez, votre plainte a été référée à l'honorable Robert Pidgeon, Juge en chef associe de la Cour supérieure du Québec et Vice - président du Comité sur la conduite des juges du Conseil. Suite à son examen, le juge en chef associe Pidgeon m'a prie de vous faire tenir la réponse suivante.
Votre plainte soulevé une question d'apparence de partialité de la part des juges en question. Solon vous, ces juges « ont des antécédents importants ou récents en politique active... » et vous êtes d'avis que ceci jette un doute sur « leur capacité de se détacher, consciemment on inconsciemment, de leurs allégeances politiques antérieures et d'être en mesure de traiter nos dossiers de façon clairement impartiale. » Vous soulignez quo vous ne questionnez pas en soi la conduite des juges mais soulevez toutefois l'apparence de partialité. Vous demandez en outre quo les dossiers pendants devant ces juges soient mis en suspens, en attendant le résultat de l'examen de votre plainte par le Conseil.
Tout d'abord, je dois vous mentionner que le Conseil n'a aucune compétence pour suspendre des procédures judiciaires. Le mandat du Conseil, en matière de plaintes, est de déterminer s'il existe des éléments de preuve d'inconduite qui pourrait le mener à recommander la destitution du juge par le Parlement pour l'un ou I'autre des motifs bonds dans !a Loi sur les juges. Dans certaines circonstances, le Conseil peut exprimer ses préoccupations concernant t la conduite d'un juge. Le Conseil n'a pas d'autres pouvoirs et il ne peut ni revoir, modifier ou & alter la décision d'un tribunal.
-2-
En ce qui concerne votre allégation d'apparence de partialité, le juge en chef associe Pidgeon estime que vous soulevez fondamentalement une question de récusation potentielle et non pas une question de conduite au de déontologie.
Les juges, lorsqu'ils sort nommes a ce titre, sont tenus de se consacrer uniquement a leurs fonctions judiciaires et a remplir fidèlement les devoirs de leur charge. Les juges de la Cour fédérale, lors de leur nomination, prêtent serment comme suit :
Je, ____ , promets et jure solennellement et sincèrement d'exercer bien fidèlement, et au mieux de ma capacité et de mes connaissances, les pouvoirs et attributions qui me sont devo1us en ma qualité de juge de la Cour fédérale.
Ainsi Dieu me soit en Aide.
Selon le juge en chef associé Pidgeon, on doit présumer que les juges respectent leur serment d'office et remplissent les devoirs de leur charge au meilleur de leurs habiletés.
Dans un appel loge par le Dr Morgentaler devant la Cour suprême en 1974, une requête de l'appelant visait la récusation du juge de Grandpré au motif que ce dernier s'était prononcé sur la question de l'avortement alors qu'il était président de 1'Association du barreau canadien. L'appelant ne contestait pas l'intégrité personnelle ou l'objectivité du juge, mais prétendait qu'il pourrait être influencé - même inconsciemment - par des opinions exprimées alors qu'il n'était pas juge. Dans cette affaire, le juge en chef Laskin avait référé au serment d'office prêté par le juge de Grandpré lors de sa nomination et, au nom de la Cour, avait rejeté la requête de l'appelant. La Cour avait indique
[Traduction] Tous les membres de notre Cour, anciens et actuels, ont, a des degrés divers, avant leur accession a la magistrature et leur nomination a notre Cour, exprime des points de vue sur des questions qui ont des connotations juridiques, sans que cela ait constitué, à quelque moment que ce soit, un élément pertinent a leur récusation.
En ce qui concerne la récusation potentielle d'un juge, vous savez sans doute qu'un juge a le devoir de se retirer de toute cause dans laquelle il pourrait exister pour lui un conflit d'intérêt. Les principes de déontologie judiciaire, ouvrage publié par le Conseil, prévoient au paragraphe 6.E.1 que « Les juges se récusent cheque fois qu'ils s'estiment incapables de juger impartialement. » Ce principe reconnaît d'ailleurs que la décision de se récuser d'une affaire relève du juge.
La Cour suprême du Canada, dans l'affaire Wawaykum ([2003] 2 R. C.S. 259) a rappelé que
impartialité d'un juge doit être présumée. La Cour précise que c'est la partie qui invoque l'inhabilite qui doit établir les circonstances qui permettent de conclure qu' un juge doit se récuser. Ceci doit évidemment être fait dans le cadre d'une procédure introduite devant le tribunal.
Par ailleurs, la décision d'un juge de se récuser ou non peut également faire l'objet d'un appel. Dans la mesure vous croyez qu'il existe des motifs de récusation pour les juges en question (et le juge en chef associé Pidgeon n'exprime aucune opinion à ce sujet), il s'agit d'une question qui doit être soulevée dans le cadre des procédures devant le tribunal.
Il est possible que des circonstances particulières puissant exister, dans une affaire concernant la récusation d'un juge, qui constitueraient un manquement a la déontologie judiciaire et, ainsi, une question de conduite relevant du Conseil. Cependant, le juge en chef associe Pidgeon estime que les faits exposés ne font pas état de telles circonstances.
En bref, le juge en chef associe Pidgeon est d'avis que la question que vous soulevez ne relève pas du Conseil mais pita & des tribunaux. Aussi, il me demande de fermer le dossier en vous faisant tenir la présente lettre.
En espérant que ces renseignements vous seront utiles, je vous prie de recevoir, Monsieur, mes salutations.
Le Directeur exécutif et avocat général,
Norman Sabourin