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     Date: 19980525

     Docket: IMM-3362-96

Between :

     MANH HUNG NGUYEN

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD, J. :

[1]      This is an application for judicial review of an opinion by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration pursuant to paragraph 53(1)(d) and subsection 70(5) of the Immigration Act (the "Act") dated April 10, 1996, whereby it was determined that the applicant constitutes a danger to the public in Canada.

[2]      The applicant was born January 23, 1959 in Vietnam. He fled Vietnam for Hong Kong, where he was determined to be a Convention refugee on December 21, 1990. On January 5, 1993, he was granted a Canadian immigrant visa as a Convention refugee, and he was landed in Vancouver on January 11, 1993.

[3]      On May 10, 1995, the applicant was convicted in Campbell River, British Columbia of five counts of trafficking in cocaine, and on May 11, 1995, he was sentenced to a total of 21 months in jail.

[4]      In law, this application raises no issues that have not been effectively disposed of by the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Williams v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1997] 2 F.C. 646 (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied on October 16, 1997).

[5]      With respect to the substantive aspect of the Minister's danger opinion and the applicant's contention that the material before the Minister's delegate was not sufficient to establish that he is a "present and future" danger to the public in Canada, I must emphasize that the Williams decision has established a stringent standard for the reviewability of a Minister's danger opinion, as described at page 664:

         [. . .] such subjective decisions cannot be judicially reviewed except on grounds such as that the decision maker acted in bad faith, or erred in law, or acted upon the basis of irrelevant considerations. Further, when confronted with the record which was, according to undisputed evidence, before the decision maker, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the court must assume that the decision maker acted in good faith in having regard to that material. [footnotes omitted]                 

[6]      The Ministerial Opinion Report contains the following comments under the heading of "Danger Rationale":

         Mr. Nguyen has demonstrated a lack of regard for the laws of Canada as is indicated in his criminal conviction. The repetitiveness of his actions are [sic] shown as he was observed on a number of occasions taking part in similar activity, namely trafficking and possession of a narcotic.                 
         Mr. Nguyen has been in Canada since January 1993 and was observed taking part in activity contrary to the Narcotic Control Act starting in May 1994.                 

[7]      There is no evidence that the Minister's delegate acted in bad faith, erred in law, or acted upon the basis of irrelevant considerations in issuing the danger opinion with respect to the applicant. As pointed out in the Ministerial Opinion Report, the applicant was observed trafficking in an illegal and highly addictive drug a mere thirteen months after his arrival to Canada, and he did so on numerous occasions. While it is true that a single conviction may in certain circumstances not be sufficient to show that a person constitutes a danger to the public (see for instance Salilar v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1995] 3 F.C. 150 (T.D.)), the immediate and repetitive nature of the applicant's involvement in trafficking was, in my opinion, a sufficient basis for the Minister's danger opinion.

[8]      Consequently, as the applicant has failed to demonstrate the existence of a reviewable error, the application for judicial review is dismissed.


[9]      This matter raises no question of general importance for the purpose of certification.

                            

                                     JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

May 25, 1998


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