Date: 19980824
Docket: IMM-3550-97
Between :
Yanira Esthel RANGEL BECERRA
Sandra Carolina RANGEL BECERRA
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J. :
[1] The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated July 28, 1997, in which the Board determined they were not Convention refugees as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act.
[2] The Board found that the necessary nexus between the fear of persecution and one of the Convention grounds was absent in this instance. The Board pointed out that the claim was based on allegations of fraud and corruption only involving the private company of a man who holds a political office. By refusing to cover up a fraudulent activity, the principal applicant did not express a political opinion, and there is no evidence that one was imputed to her. Neither did the Board feel that there was any social group to which the applicants belonged.
[3] The applicants attack this decision on the basis of the Board's refusal to find that they were members of a particular social group.
[4] The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 established that membership in a particular social group should fall into one of the three following categories, which they define at page 739:
| (1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; |
| (2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and |
| (3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence. |
[5] The applicants clearly do not fall within the first or third categories. I cannot accept that they fall within a group "whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association".
[6] The facts in this instance are analogous to those faced by Mr. Justice McKeown in Munoz v. Canada (M.C.I.) (February 22, 1996), IMM-1884-95, wherein he accepted the Board's conclusion that the applicant was not the target of persecution because of his membership in a particular social group, but rather because of his conduct as an individual. He quoted approvingly from the Board as follows:
| The claimant's voluntary association of one person committed to exposing drug corruption because it is destroying the fabric of society is a laudable pursuit, but the panel does not believe that this can be so fundamental to the human dignity of persons like the claimant, who is so opposed to the drug trade, that it constitutes a particular social group [. . .] |
[7] A similar result was obtained in the recent case of Mehrabani v. Canada (M.C.I.) (April 3, 1998), IMM-1798-97, wherein Justice Rothstein concluded as follows:
| There is no indication of any credibility concern with respect to the applicant. The panel's reasons indicate that he may well be in need of protection, albeit not for a Convention reason. I fully expect that the respondent will review the matter in accordance with applicable law having regard to humanitarian and compassionate considerations and the risk of harm if he is to return to Iran. |
[8] Similarly, it cannot be said that the applicants were persecuted, if they were in fact persecuted, for one of the grounds in the definition of a Convention refugee. As in Munoz (supra), it is the principal applicant's individual decision, that is her refusal to cover up a fraudulent activity, which is the cause of her problems, and not her membership in a particular social group. In the final analysis, the Board's conclusion is one which is essentially based on facts. In light of the evidence before the Board, a specialized tribunal, I am of the opinion that the latter did not base its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before it. Accordingly, the application must be dismissed.
[9] No question of general importance was proposed for the purpose of certification.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
August 24, 1998