Date: 19990331
Docket: T-1378-98
BETWEEN:
JOSE PEREZ,
Applicant
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
DENAULT J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission ("Commission") dismissing the applicant"s complaints pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the Canadian Human Rights Act1 ("Act") without ordering an inquiry.
[2] The applicant, José Perez, is a beachcomber operating from Snug Cove, Bowen Island, in British Columbia. In a complaint to the Commission, he alleged that the Department of Transport discriminated against him by subjecting him to differential treatment in the provision of services and harassment on the grounds of his national or ethnic origin contrary to sections 5 and 14 of the Act respectively. A complaint was also filed against the alleged harasser, Mr. Richard King, the harbour master of Snug Cove and an employee of the Department.
[3] The particulars of the complaints are threefold. First, the applicant claims that the harbour master denied him the ability to fuel his boat and use the power at Snug Cove wharf when repairs were required. In addition, he claims to have been subject to derogatory comments. Finally, when he attempted to discuss problems of vandalism to his boat, the harbour master refused to listen and did not provide any help.
[4] The Commission investigated the complaints and concluded that they should be dismissed for lack of evidence. Specifically, no evidence was found that indicated that other individuals were refused power from the dock facilities. In fact, the evidence showed that he was not treated differently. Neither was there any evidence to support his allegation of harassment. Further, the evidence revealed that the harbour master had informed the police of the vandalism of his boat.
[5] In his memorandum of fact and at the hearing, the applicant, who represents himself, made two points. First, he suggests that the Commission did not take into account the fact that Mr. King removed his boomsticks. In his submissions to the Commission in response to the respondent"s position (dated April 10, 1997), the applicant alleged that his booms in three different locations were dismantled by the harbour master without notice between April 1996 and February 1997. It is the most harmful differential treatment he suffered, causing him to lose his livelihood.
[6] Second, even though there were no witnesses to the harassment incidents, he claims that the circumstantial evidence nevertheless supports his allegation.
[7] Under subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i), the Commission has the power to dismiss a complaint "if it is satisfied... that, having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is not warranted". It is well settled law that the Commission"s power to dismiss a complaint is purely discretionary and is therefore entitled to a high degree of deference. It is only to be set aside where crucial evidence was not investigated by the Commission and there were serious omissions in the report,2 or where the Commission improperly exercised its discretion (i.e., where there was a denial of procedural fairness, where decision was taken in bad faith, or based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations).3
[8] In the case at bar, the applicant does not point to any unreasonable omissions in the record before the Commission, except for the boomsticks allegation. However, it did not form part of the original complaint and there was no need for the Commission to investigate it. Still, the investigator looked into the complaint and found that the evidence indicated the boomsticks were removed because the applicant did not have approval for them under the Navigable Waters Act.4
[9] There is also no evidence of a denial of procedural fairness or improper exercise of discretion. In fact, having regard to the investigator"s report and the other materials before it, the Commission"s conclusions do not appear unreasonable.
[10] It follows that in such cases, the Court must give effect to the Commission"s broad discretion.
[11] In this case, the Court has not been persuaded that the Commission"s decision ought to be set aside. For these reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed.
(Sgd.) "Pierre Denault"
JUDGE
Vancouver, British Columbia
31 March 1999
[12]
FEDERAL COURT TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT NO.: T-1378-98
| STYLE OF CAUSE: JOSE PEREZ |
| v. |
| ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
| LOCATION OF HEARING: VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA |
| DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 31, 1999 |
REASONS FOR ORDER OF DENAULT J. DATED MARCH 31, 1999
APPEARANCES:
| Mr. José Perez on his own behalf |
| Mr. Malcolm Palmer for the Respondent |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Mr. José Perez on his own behalf |
| P.O. Box 3036 Main Post Office |
| Vancouver, BC |
| V6B 3X5 |
| Mr. Morris Rosenberg for the Respondent |
| Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
__________________
2 Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), "1994 > 2 F.C. 574 at 600 (T.D.), aff"d (March 26, 1996), A-116-94 (F.C.A.); Jennings v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1995), 97 F.T.R. 10 (F.C.T.D.); Tahmourpour v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (September 10. 1998), T-164-98 (F.C.T.D.); Gostlow v. Canada (Canadian Armed Forces) (December 30, 1998), T-163-98 (F.C.T.D.).
3 Slattery, ibid. at 610; Morisset v. Commission canadienne des droits de la personne et al. (1991), 52 F.T.R. 190 (F.C.T.D.); Maple Lodge Farms Limited v. Government of Canada, "1982 > 2 S.C.R. 2.