Date: 20200131

Docket: IMM-4195-19

Citation: 2020 FC 185

Ottawa, Ontario, January 31, 2020 PRESENT:  The Honourable Madam Justice Strickland BETWEEN:

OWOLOLA ADULRAZAQ KAZEEM

Applicant

And

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1]  This is an application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada dated June 14, 2019. Pursuant to s 111(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”), the RAD confirmed the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) which found that the Applicant is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to ss 96 and 97 of IRPA, respectively.

[2]  For the reasons that follow, this application for judicial review is dismissed.

Background

[3]  The Applicant, Owolola Adulrazaq Kazeem, is a citizen of Nigeria. He left Nigeria in October 2009 and came to Canada on a study permit. He attended college for one year and has remained in Canada ever since. The Applicant claims that in 2012 he received a phone call from his mother, who lives in Nigeria, who told him that she was attacked and beaten by what she suspected to be a Muslim group. At that time, her attackers asked her if she had a child and she told them that she did not. In 2016, she called him again to inform him about another attack that happened to other people somewhere in Lagos in 2014. In 2016, the Applicant’s friend advised him that he could apply for refugee protection in Canada. The Applicant made a refugee claim in March 2017.

[4]  The Applicant claims that he fears random attacks by Muslim extremists in Nigeria and that he will be persecuted because he acquired tattoos while in Canada and Islam forbids tattoos.

[5]  On July 16, 2018, the RPD denied the Applicant’s refugee claim and found that he was not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to ss 96 and 97 of IRPA. The determinative issue was the existence of an Internal Flight Alternative (“IFA”) in either Port Harcourt or Ibadan. The RAD confirmed the decision of the RPD on June 14, 2019. The RAD’s decision is the subject of this judicial review.

Decision under review

[6]  The RAD found the Applicant to be credible and that he was genuinely concerned about random crime following his mother's victimization.

[7]  The RAD then addressed the RPD’s IFA analysis. The RAD agreed that the RPD did not make any findings about whether the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution or a risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment in his city of origin, Lagos. However, the RAD referenced the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Kanagaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 194 NR 46, [1996] FCJ No 75 (CA) (QL/Lexis) (“Kanagaratnam”) in support of its view that it is not necessary to determine whether a claimant faces a risk in their home area. The RAD found that the RPD correctly determined that there is a valid IFA in either of Port Harcourt or Ibadan, that this holds true whether or not a risk exists in Lagos, and that the RPD’s IFA analysis was correct.

[8]  The RAD also agreed with the RPD’s finding the Applicant’s fear of random attacks by Muslim extremists in either IFA location was speculative. The RAD noted that the Applicant had never been attacked or threatened and that because the Applicant’s mother told her attackers that she did not have a son it was likely they did not know the Applicant existed. Further, the Applicant’s mother had no further contact with her attackers since 2012.

[9]  The RAD found that there was no evidence that the Applicant would need to isolate himself to live in either proposed IFA location nor that the agents of persecution remained interested in his mother or that they were ever aware of the existence of the Applicant. Therefore, the RAD found that the Applicant’s IFA locations would not become known to the agents of persecution.

[10]  The RAD also addressed the Applicant’s sur place claim based on his tattoos and his claim that tattoos are forbidden by the Muslim faith. The RAD noted that the RPD found that the Applicant did not provide evidence that people of his profile are targeted in Nigeria because of tattoos. The RAD stated that it also independently reviewed the National Documentation Package (“NDP”) and likewise found no such evidence. The RAD concurred with the RPD’s assessment that the Applicant does not have a sur place claim on the basis of his tattoos and that his tattoos do not undermine the safety of the IFA. The RAD also concurred with the RPD’s assessment of the reasonableness of the proposed IFAs and concluded that the RPD’s analysis was clear, well reasoned, and correct. Because the Applicant has an IFA, the RAD found his claim must fail.

Issues

[11]  The Applicant raises two issues, being whether the RAD’s reasoning on the IFA was coherent and whether the IFA analysis was relevant to the claim.  In my view, these fall under the umbrella question of whether the RAD’s decision was reasonable.

Standard of review

[12]  Neither party’s written submissions address the applicable standard of review. When appearing before me counsel submitted, and I agree, that reasonableness continues to be the appropriate standard of review for this Court when assessing the merits of the RAD’s decision.

[13]  In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (“Vavilov”), the Supreme Court of Canada found that there is a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard whenever a Court reviews an administrative decision (Vavilov at paras 16, 23, 25). That presumption can be rebutted in two specified types of situations (Vavilov at paras 17, 69). In this matter, the presumptive reasonableness standard applies because the RAD has the delegated authority to make the decision and because none of the circumstances exist which might rebut the presumption.

[14]  The Supreme Court in Vavilov also addressed how a reasonableness review is to be conducted (at paras 73-145).  In that regard, it held that “[i]n order to fulfill Dunsmuir’s promise to protect ‘the legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process and its outcomes’, reasonableness review must entail a sensitive and respectful, but robust, evaluation of administrative decisions: para. 28.” (Vavilov at para 12). The reviewing court must consider the outcome of the administrative decision in light of its underlying rationale in order to ensure that the decision as a whole is transparent, intelligible and justified (Vavilov at para 15).

[15]  As to deference, a reviewing court must consider the decisions of an administrative decision maker in their own particular contextual constraints, review its reasons in light of the record and with due sensitivity to the administrative setting within which the reasons were given, and with respectful attention to a decision maker’s demonstrated experience and expertise (Vavilov at paras 31, 88-98).

[16]  When a decision is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and is justified in relation to the facts and the law that constrain the decision maker it will be reasonable and is to be afforded deference by a reviewing Court (Vavilov at para 85).

Was the RAD’s decision reasonable?

Applicant’s Position

[17]  The Applicant’s submissions are convoluted and involve much theoretical discussion not supported by references to case law or other authorities.  In a nutshell, the Applicant argues that both the RAD and the RPD’s decisions were incoherent because they did not analyze the risk that the Applicant feared in his home area, Lagos. The Applicant accepts that it is “not necessary to determine whether a claimant faces a risk in their home area before considering safety in another location”. Yet, he also asserts that it is basic to a refugee determination that an analysis of risk has to consider the risk feared and fled and that by skipping this step the reasoning of the RAD and RPD was incoherent. More specifically, that “an [IFA] analysis would have been proper only if the [RAD] had considered the risk found or assumed at the home location and compared the risk at the home location with the flight at the identified [IFA] location”.

[18]  In support of his position, the Applicant relies on Kanagaratnam but seeks to distinguish it on its facts. He submits that in Kanagaratnam the applicant did not claim that the alleged risk existed outside the applicant’s home location, whereas here, the Applicant claims that the risk he faces is also found in the IFA. The Applicant submits that the Federal Court of Appeal in Kanagaratnam did not say it would never be appropriate to consider the risk in the home location, and that Kanagaratnam merely enforces the idea that an IFA is a factual determination.

[19]  The Applicant also disputes the relevancy of the IFA analysis.  He submits that he testified that he feared a random attack by Islamic terrorists anywhere in Nigeria. Given this, it is not clear why the RPD and the RAD engaged in an IFA analysis.  It was essential to first assess the risk in Lagos to determine whether or not to commence an IFA analysis. By failing to do so, the IFA analysis was commenced in a context where it made no sense. Because the proposed IFA locations, Port Harcourt and Ibadan, are similarly located to Lagos, in the south of Nigeria, and neither the RAD or the RPD found the risk in Port Harcourt or Ibadan to be different from the risk in Lagos, the IFA was a red herring and irrelevant.

Respondent’s Position

[20]  The Respondent submits that an IFA is determinative of a refugee application (Magusic v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 823 at para 16 (“Magusic”)) and the suggestion that an IFA assessment could be irrelevant ignores that a claim for refugee protection cannot succeed when a valid IFA exists.

[21]  Further, that the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Kanagaratnam decisively states that assessing the risk in an area of origin is not a prerequisite to making an IFA finding and confirms the well established principle that, when an IFA finding is made, a refugee claim cannot succeed. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s interpretation of Kanagaratnam distorts the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision and ignores that it was made in response to a certified question.

[22]  The Respondent submits that the RAD’s IFA analysis was also coherent and correct. This Court found in Sarker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 353  (“Sarker”) that the RPD could ignore, or decide not to address whether an applicant faced a risk of persecution in their home region, and could instead skip directly to an IFA analysis, provided that the RPD applied the correct IFA test and its conclusion on the existence of an IFA was not patently unreasonable in the sense that it was unsupported by evidence (Sarker at para 8). Here, the RAD’s reasons demonstrate that the RAD and the RPD considered the evidence before them and applied the correct test for determining whether the Applicant could avail himself of an IFA. Accordingly, this Court should not interfere with its decision.

Analysis

[23]  The starting point for this analysis is the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Kanagaratnam. There, the Court of Appeal noted that the RPD, in that matter, had determined the applicant had an IFA and, therefore, found it unnecessary to also decide whether the applicant otherwise had a well-founded fear of persecution. Because of the existence of an IFA, the RPD found that the applicant could not qualify for refugee status. On judicial review of the RPD’s decision, this Court found that what was relevant was whether the RPD properly determined that there was a reasonable IFA for the applicant. Concluding that it had, the Court dismissed the application but certified the following question:

Is a determination of whether a claimant has a well founded fear of persecution in the area from which he or she originates a prerequisite to the consideration of an internal flight alternative?

[24]  The Federal Court of Appeal found that it was not:

4  The answer to this question is “NO”. In assessing whether a viable IFA exists, the Board, of course, must have regard to all the appropriate circumstances. This was done in this case. Since an IFA existed, therefore, the claimant by definition could not have a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of nationality. Thus, while the Board may certainly do so if it chooses, there was no need as a matter of law for the Board to decide whether there was persecution in the area of origin as a prerequisite to the consideration of an IFA.

[25]  The Applicant seizes on the words “must have regard to all appropriate circumstances” to argue that in some circumstances the RPD must first consider whether there was persecution in the applicant’s home area before undertaking an IFA analysis. In that regard, he submits that cases that cite Kanagaratnam do not have facts such as this one where the Applicant fears the same risk in his home area and in the IFAs, which are demographically and geographically similar to his area of origin. I do not read Kanagaratnam to suggest this. Nor do the cases referenced by the Applicant in any way address his submission.  In my view, the Federal Court of Appeal was very clear in answering “no” to the question of whether it is a prerequisite to the consideration of an IFA to first determine if a claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in the area from which he or she originates.  The Federal Court of Appeal then went on to discuss what is required in the assessment of whether a viable IFA exists. It stated, that the RPD must, when making that assessment, have regard to all the appropriate circumstances. The point being that the RPD or the RAD, in assessing whether there is a viable IFA, must consider all appropriate circumstances. This, in my view, requires that the RPD and the RAD must correctly identify and apply the test for an IFA.

[26]  This view finds support in Sarker. There, the parties and the Court agreed that, when an IFA finding is reached without error, it is determinative.  Justice Snider stated that a finding that an IFA exists is, in essence, a determination that a claimant will not be subject to persecution in the identified IFA. She then noted that there was some discussion by the parties as to what inferences, if any, could be drawn in a situation where the RPD makes an IFA finding but does not make a clear finding on a claimant’s risk of persecution in his home region. The applicant in that case submitted that the inference should be drawn that the RPD has implicitly conceded that that applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution.  Justice Snider found that:

[7]  Whether the Applicant is correct in this assertion is not, in my view, important or necessary for this application. The question of the existence of an IFA is a separate component of the Board's analysis that can stand alone (Tharmaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 92 (F.C.T.D.)). Put simply, where an IFA is found, a claimant is not a refugee or a person in need of protection (Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 (F.C.A.), Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (F.C.A.)). When looking at the existence of an IFA, the Board could find that the Applicant faced a risk of persecution in Bogra, the Board could assume (without finally determining the question) that he faced persecution or it could ignore the whole question. As long as:

(a)  The Board applied the correct test to its IFA analysis; and

(b)  Its conclusion on the existence of an IFA was not patently unreasonable, in the sense that it is unsupported by the evidence (Chorny v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] F.C.J. No. 1263 F.C.)), Charway v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 701 (F.C.));

Its decision should stand.

[27]  Justice Snider found that the determinative question, therefore, was whether the RPD’s IFA decision was supported by the evidence, which it was in the matter before her.

[28]  The reasoning in Sarker was subsequently adopted and followed in Nzayisenga v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1103 (“Nzayisenga”). There, this Court found that the RPD had stated and had applied the correct test to its IFA analysis; its conclusions were supported by the evidence, and were reasonable. The Court stated that it did not matter that the RPD did not find or assume the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution in the area from which the applicant originated (Nzayisenga at paras 34-38).

[29]  As stated in Nzayisenga, in order to qualify for protection under either ss 96 or 97 of the IRPA, a claimant must face risk in all parts of the country they are fleeing. If there is a part of the country, an IFA, in which the claimant does not face risk, then that claimant does not meet the requirements for protection, irrespective of whether the claimant faces risk in the area that he fled (Nzayisenga at para 34). Put otherwise, “To put it bluntly, where the claimant has a viable internal flight alternative, there is no well-founded fear and, as such, the test for refugee protection cannot be met (Kanagaratnam v Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1996] FCJ No 75 (CA))” (Magusic at para 11).

[30]  Accordingly, in this matter the RAD was entitled to move directly to an IFA analysis and it does not matter whether the IFAs are geographically and demographically similar or whether the Applicant fears the same risk in those IFAs – as long as the IFA analysis itself was properly conducted. That is the essential question in this matter. This is because a finding that an IFA exists is effectively a determination that the Applicant will not be subject to persecution in the identified IFA (Sarker at para 5). Similarly, the Applicant’s argument that the IFA analysis was incoherent and irrelevant for failing to make a finding about the Applicant’s alleged risk in Lagos, must also fail as long as the RAD’s IFA analysis was reasonable.

[31]  And, while the Applicant also references Dakpokpo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 580 (“Dakpokpo”), and the cases cited therein, I am not convinced that they assist him. In Dakpokpo, the applicant argued that the RAD erred by not addressing the RPD’s credibility findings or conducting its own credibility assessment, and that the viability of an IFA was inextricably linked to the credibility of the applicant’s allegations. Justice Zinn disagreed and stated that:

[9]  In my view, neither Torres or the case cited within (Bokhari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 574) supports the Applicant’s position here.  In both of the above cases, the Court found that the tribunal, in moving directly to the issue of an IFA, must be seen to have accepted the evidence of the claimant.  Where that evidence conflicts with the IFA finding, as it did in those cases, then the tribunal had to first examine the other issues before considering the IFA.  They do not stand for the bald proposition that where credibility is at issue, it must be assessed first, before an IFA is considered.

[10]  I agree with the Respondent that it is not an error for the RAD to find that the IFA was determinative as the credibility issues raised by the RPD in this case (the Applicant’s clan’s traditions, her exit from Nigeria, and her entrance into Canada) were not issues that affected the IFA analysis.  Moreover, in general, it is not an error to move immediately to an IFA analysis provided that analysis considers a claimant’s particular situation, and the testamentary and documentary evidence before the tribunal.  That too was done here.

[32]  Dakpokpo was concerned with whether the RPD was required to assess credibility before considering the viability of an IFA, which is not the circumstance in this matter as the RAD found the Applicant to be credible.

[33]  Bokhari v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 574 (“Bokhari”), cited within Dakpokpo, is an eight paragraph decision. It ultimately turned on the finding that a statement of the RPD indicating that it was mostly interested in IFA and state protection, misled counsel and prevented him from making submissions on credibility, which turned out to be central to the RPD’s decision. The Court in Bokhari stated that the misleading statement could only be interpreted to mean that credibility, objective and subjective fear had been established because “[a]fter all, state protection and IFA (the subjects she is interested in) only become issues once the Applicant’s story is accepted (i.e. his credibility is accepted) and his objective and subjective fear is established” (at para 5). The first paragraph of Torres v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 581 (“Torres”) quoted this statement in Bokhari, without comment. However, it went on to state that the existence of an IFA may be determinative in and of itself, but that a consideration of all of the evidence must be reflected in the RPD’s decision concerning the regions proposed as viable (Torres at paras 1 and 2). In Torres at paras 1 and 2, the RPD’s IFA determination was found to be unreasonable because it was inconsistent with the evidence before it.

[34]  None of these cases make reference to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Kanagaratnam, nor do they turn on the point that the Applicant asserts here, being that the same risk is alleged to exist both in the Applicant’s place of origin and in the IFA locations. To the extent that they contradict Kanagaratnam, I decline to follow them.

[35]  I would also point out that in Sarker, it was held that the question of the existence of an IFA is a separate component of the RPD’s analysis that can “stand alone” (at para 7). This is demonstrated by cases where it is found that although there may be errors in the analysis of the RPD in another aspect of an applicant’s claim, the decision will stand where it is also reasonably found that there is a viable IFA – because that finding is determinative (see, for example, Gutierrez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 266 at para 54).  

[36]  When the RPD conducts an IFA analysis, the onus is on the applicant to provide credible evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that there is a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA. Whether or not the RPD addresses credibility in its analysis before moving to a consideration of an IFA, the salient point remains that in its IFA assessment, the RPD must reasonably consider all of the relevant evidence in making its determination. 

[37]  Here, the RAD found that the Applicant was credible, accepted that the Applicant was genuinely concerned about random crime following his mother’s victimization and, in its IFA analysis, found this fear to be speculative. Further, regardless of whether the same risk of persecution is asserted to exist in Lagos and in the IFAs, if the IFA analysis is reasonable, the fact that the same risk may or may not exist in Lagos is not relevant. The point is that the Applicant will not be at risk in the IFAs.

[38]  This is demonstrated in Dakpokpo where Justice Zinn explicitly acknowledged that it is not an error for the decision maker to immediately address an IFA, as long as the IFA analysis appropriately considers the claimant’s situation.  This is in keeping with the Federal Court of Appeal’s finding in Kanagaratnam. Accordingly, as I have found above, the RAD did not err by failing to first assess the Applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution in Lagos, and the essential issue is whether the RAD’s IFA analysis was reasonable.

[39]  The test for a viable IFA is two-pronged. First, the decision maker must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the IFA. Second, it must be objectively reasonable to expect a claimant to seek safety in the part of the country considered to be an IFA (Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706, [1991] FCJ No 1256 (CA) (QL/Lexis) at para 10 (“Rasaratnam”)). The burden is on the applicant to show that an IFA is not viable (Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589, [1993] FCJ 1172 (CA) (QL/Lexis) at paras 5-6; also see Quebrada Batero v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 988 at para 14).

[40]  The RPD explicitly referenced Rasaratnam and stated the above test correctly in its decision. The RPD found that the Applicant had not met his burden. The RAD agreed that the test as framed by the RPD was correct and proceeded to assess the RPD’s analysis under each prong of that test.

[41]  The RAD agreed that the risk of random attacks by Muslim extremists in either IFA location was merely speculative. The RPD had found that the Applicant had testified that he feared random attacks by Muslim radicals including in the proposed IFAs. The RPD found that this fear was speculative, noting that the Applicant was not in Nigeria at the time of the 2012 attack on his mother and that he testified that his mother told the attackers that she did not have a son. The RPD concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that any members from that Muslim group targeted or would target the Applicant in either of the proposed IFA locations or to support a finding that the Muslim group has the interest, motivation or resources to find him or harm him in either of the IFAs. Further, given the omission of a reference to Boko Haram in the Applicant’s Basis of Claim form, the RPD found that the Applicant had not established that the alleged group that attacked the Applicant’s mother was Boko Haram. The RAD agreed with the RPD’s assessment that the risk was speculative and added that the Applicant’s mother has had no further contact with her attackers since 2012. The RAD also distinguished the case law relied upon by the Applicant in support of his argument on appeal that the RPD failed to consider whether the IFA location would eventually become known to the Muslim extremists, thus putting the Applicant at risk and thereby invalidating the IFA analysis.

[42]  I see no error in the RAD’s analysis or in its finding that there was no evidence that the Applicant would need to isolate himself from his mother or anyone else in his life in order to live in either of the IFA locations. That finding was based on the fact that the attack on his mother was random in nature, there have been no other threats or communication since 2012, and there was no evidence that the agents of persecution remained interested in the Applicant or were ever aware of his existence. The RAD appropriately considered the IFAs by considering the nature of the threat posed by the random non-state actors that the Applicant claimed to fear and reasonably concluded that his location would not become known to them. The Applicant points to no objective evidence that was overlooked in the RAD’s analysis.

[43]  The RAD’s conclusion that the Applicant has no sur place claim is also reasonable. The RPD found that the sur place claim was not established because the Applicant did not provide sufficient evidence that anyone or any group would target him because of his tattoos and that this harm was speculative. The RAD acknowledged this finding and stated that it had conducted an independent review of the NDP, which did not yield any evidence documenting persecution or abuse in Nigeria on the basis of tattoos. The Applicant does not dispute this finding. The RAD concluded that the Applicant’s tattoos did not undermine his safety in the proposed IFAs. In my view, in the absence of objective evidence as to risk, the RAD’s conclusion was justified and reasonable.

[44]  As to the second prong of the IFA test, that it must be objectively reasonable to expect a claimant to seek safety in the part of the country considered to be an IFA, the RAD found that the RPD had properly assessed the reasonableness of the IFA locations.  The RAD noted that the RPD had found that the Applicant had a secondary school education in Nigeria, some university education in Canada, he speaks both English and Yoruba, he has practical work experience in an industrial setting, and he is Muslim. The RPD had also considered the objective evidence, finding that Nigerians have the right to reside anywhere in that country, approximately half of the population in the IFAs is Muslim and both English and Yoruba languages are prevalent. The RPD found that the Applicant would be able to adapt to life in either of the IFA locations and would be able to access services such as housing, employment and education. The RAD agreed with this assessment and also noted that the reasonableness of the IFA locations had not been challenged on the appeal before it.

[45]  I note that the RPD found that it was objectively reasonable in all of the circumstances, including the Applicant’s personal circumstances, to relocate to either of the IFA locations. I see no error in the RAD’s assessment and acceptance of this finding. And, by way of the assessment of the second prong of the IFA test, and the finding that it was objectively reasonable for the Applicant to seek safety in the proposed IFA locations, the RAD had regard to all the appropriate circumstances (Kanagaratnam at para 4).

[46]  Having considered the outcome of the RAD’s decision in light of its underlying rationale, I am satisfied that the decision as a whole is transparent, intelligible and justified (Vavilov at para 15). Accordingly, the RAD’s IFA analysis was reasonable.

JUDGMENT in IMM-4195-19

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1.  The application for judicial review is dismissed;

2.  There shall be no order as to costs; and

3.  No question of general importance for certification was proposed or arises.

“Cecily Y. Strickland”

Judge 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-4195-19
STYLE OF CAUSE:	OWOLOLA ADULRAZAQ KAZEEM v MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	WINNIPEG, MANITOBA
DATE OF HEARING:	January 20, 2020
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	STRICKLAND J.
DATED:	january 31, 2020

APPEARANCES:

DAVID MATAS DAVID GROHMUELLER

FOR THE APPLICANT FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

DAVID MATAS BARRISTER & SOLICITOR WINNIPEG, MANITOBA	FOR THE APPLICANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA WINNIPEG, MANITOBA	FOR THE RESPONDENT