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     IMM-4406-96

OTTAWA, ONTARIO, the 17th day of October 1997

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PINARD

BETWEEN:

     DMITRY FURMAN

     VITALY FURMAN

     SVETLANA FURMAN,

     Applicants,

     - and -

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION,

     Respondent.

     O R D E R

         The application for judicial review from the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division dated November 6, 1996 that the applicants are not Convention refugees is dismissed.

                                                                      YVON PINARD
                                                                      JUDGE

Certified true translation

Stephen Balogh

     IMM-4406-96

BETWEEN:

     DMITRY FURMAN

     VITALY FURMAN

     SVETLANA FURMAN,

     Applicants,

     - and -

     MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

     AND IMMIGRATION,

     Respondent.

     REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD J.

         This application for judicial review is from a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division dated November 6, 1996 that the applicants, Dmitry Furman, his wife Svetlana Furman and their son Vitaly Furman, are not Convention refugees. The applicants, nationals of Israel, base their claims on grounds of religion, nationality and membership in a particular social group.

         Although stating that it accepted the claimants' testimony as generally credible, the Refugee Division determined that they could not have an objective fear of persecution because they had been victims of only harassment or discrimination, not persecution, while in Israel.

         In Sagharichi v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 182 N.R. 398, the Federal Court of Appeal stated the following at page 400:

         . . . it is for the Board to draw the conclusion in a particular factual context by proceeding with a careful analysis of the evidence adduced and a proper balancing of the various elements contained therein, and the intervention of this Court is not warranted unless the conclusion reached appears to be capricious or unreasonable.                 

         In the case at bar, the Refugee Division considered that the applicants, Mr. and Mrs. Furman, had had no serious problems other than being attacked while participating in a religious demonstration. Even in respect of this last incident, the Refugee Division expressly found that it constituted discrimination and intolerance, [translation] "but not persecution". After reviewing the evidence, the Refugee Division's finding that there is no objective basis for the applicants' fear of persecution is in my view neither unreasonable nor capricious.

         In these circumstances, the Refugee Division's comment that the above-mentioned attack during the religious demonstration was [translation] "neither sponsored by the government nor officially encouraged by Israeli authorities" can be of no consequence, since the attack was not found to constitute persecution.

         For these reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

OTTAWA, Ontario

October 17, 1997

                                                                      YVON PINARD
                                                                      JUDGE

Certified true translation

Stephen Balogh

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     TRIAL DIVISION

     NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT NO.:      IMM-4406-96

STYLE OF CAUSE:      DMITRY FURMAN, VITALY FURMAN,

     SVETLANA FURMAN v. MINISTER OF

     CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING:      MONTRÉAL

DATE OF HEARING:      OCTOBER 8, 1997

REASONS FOR ORDER BY PINARD J.

DATED:      OCTOBER 17, 1997

APPEARANCES:

MICHELLE LANGELIER      FOR THE APPLICANT

ÉDITH SAVARD      FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

MICHELLE LANGELIER      FOR THE APPLICANT

MONTRÉAL

GEORGE THOMSON      FOR THE RESPONDENT

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

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