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     IMM-2360-96

B E T W E E N:

     MUSHTAQ AHMED

RAZIA SULTANA

ARSALAN AHMED

ADNAN AHMED

     Applicants

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

ROTHSTEN, J.:

     This is a judicial review from a decision of a visa officer dated november 30, 1995 refusing the applicant's application for permanent residence in Canada. The applicant applied in the Assisted Relative category based on the occupation of tailor. He received 67 units of assessment, three less than the required 70 units.

     Applicant's counsel submits the visa officer erred in not assessing the applicant as a tailor, made-to-measure garments, rather than a tailor, ready-to-wear garments. Had he been assessed as a tailor, made-to-measure garments, he would have been over the minimum 70 units

     The difficulty in this case arises because in his permanent residence application, the applicant specified that his intended occupation in Canada is "tailor" whereas the Canadian Classification Directory of Occupations (CCDO) does not list "tailor" as an occupation. Rather, it lists three different types of tailors: tailor, made-to-measure garments-master tailor; tailor, ready-to-wear-garments-shop tailor; and tailor, men's-garment alterations. Applicant's counsel says the visa officer had an obligation to identify these three categories of tailor, to focus on the tailor, made-to-measure garments category and to adduce evidence from the applicant as to whether he fitted that category. Alternatively, applicant's counsel says the visa officer had a duty to inform the applicant of her concerns when it appeared he would not reach the minimum 70 units of assessment and give him an opportunity to address her concerns.

     The definition of tailor, made-to-measure garments includes:

         Confers with customer to determine type of material to be used, style and design of garment desired. Measures customer for size, using measuring tape, and records measurements for use in preparing patterns. Draws original pattern for garment or alters existing pattern to fit customer measurements. ...         

There is no indication that the applicant placed information before the visa officer showing that he met these qualifications. It is apparent that based on the information he did provide, the visa officer assessed the applicant as a tailor, made-to-measure garments under which he achieved only 67 units of assessment.

     In this case the applicant was accompanied by an immigration consultant and there is no explanation as to why the applicant's intended occupation in Canada on his permanent residence application did not conform to a job description in the CCDO. Of course, a visa officer must act in good faith. However, there is no duty on a visa officer to make an applicant's case for him. Nor, if an application is ambiguous as to an intended occupation in Canada, is a visa officer under a duty to give an applicant the benefit of any doubt arising from the ambiguity.

     The applicant says the evidence refers to him being a master tailor in Pakistan and that because tailor, made-to-measure garments is alternatively designated as a master tailor in the CCDO, the visa officer was obliged to treat him as a master tailor for CCDO purposes. Master tailor seems to be an alternative designation for a tailor, made-to-measure garments for CCDO purposes. Had the applicant's intended occupation in his application been master tailor, the visa officer may have had to assess him according to that category of tailor. However, the reference to master tailor in the CCDO does not refer to the applicant's designation in a foreign country.

     It is apparent that based on the evidence supplied by the applicant, the visa officer considered him as a tailor, made-to-measure garments and she made no error in doing so.

     Nor do I accept counsel's submissions that a visa officer has an obligation to notify an applicant of her concerns that he might not attain 70 units of assessment and allow him an opportunity to satisfy those concerns. Such submission is tantamount to saying that any time a visa officer thinks an applicant for permanent residence might be refused, he or she must disclose the expected decision in advance and give the applicant a second chance to meet requirements. While nothing prevent a visa officer for doing so, there is no such obligation on the officer (see for example Prasad v. M.C.I., IMM-3373-94, April 2, 1996 (F.C.T.D.)).

     The judicial review is dismissed.

"Marshall E. Rothstein"

Judge

Toronto, Ontario

July 4, 1997

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

COURT NO:                  IMM-2360-96

STYLE OF CAUSE:          MUSHTAQ AHMED ET AL.

                     - and -

                     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                     AND IMMIGRATION

DATE OF HEARING:          JULY 3, 1997

PLACE OF HEARING:          TORONTO, ONTARIO

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:      ROTHSTEIN, J.

DATED:                  JULY 4, 1997

APPEARANCES:

                     Mr. Paul Vandervennen

                         For the Applicants

                     Mr. Robin Sharma

                         For the Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

                     Paul Vandervennen

                     45 Saint Nicholas Street

                     Toronto, Ontario

                     M4Y 1W6

                         For the Applicants

                      George Thomson

                     Deputy Attorney General

                     of Canada

                         For the Respondent

                     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                     Court No.:      IMM-2360-96

                     Between:

                     MUSHTAQ AHMED ET AL.

     Applicants

                         - and -

                     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

                     AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

                     REASONS FOR ORDER


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