Federal Court Decisions

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Decision Content

Date: 20020711

Docket: T-867-00

Neutral citation: 2002 FCT 778

BETWEEN:

                                                                         JOHN DOE

                                                                                                                                                       Applicant

                                                                              - and -

                                                         THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

                                                                        OF CANADA

                                                                                                                                                   Respondent

                                               ASSESSMENT OF COSTS - REASONS

Charles E. Stinson

Assessment Officer


[1]                 The Applicant represented himself throughout this application for judicial review of a decision that he was not entitled to a pension for medical conditions. The Court allowed the judicial review with "his allowable costs of the application". The Applicant's bill of costs, totalling $3,200.00, consists of (a) $770.00 claimed under item 1 of Column III in Tariff B for his time to prepare the originating document; (b) $770.00 claimed under item 14 of Column III for his time to prepare and file written argument; (c) disbursements under item 26 of Column III for filing the originating document ($50.00), filing the requisition for hearing ($50.00) and for photocopying ($60.00); and (d) 20 hours @ $75.00 per hour claimed under item 27 of Column III for his research and preparation time for interlocutory matters and the judicial review itself. The bill of costs notes that another 86 hours of his time, as well as two hours of legal services provided pro bono, are left unclaimed.

[2]                 I issued a timetable for written disposition of this matter. The Respondent noted that there was no evidence supporting the photocopying costs, but conceded the disbursements. The Respondent argued that the minimum 4 units in the available range of 4 - 7 units should be allowed for item 1 because Form 301, containing the substance of the originating document, required only that he fill in blanks. The Respondent argued that item 15 was likely the appropriate selection, instead of item 14, and that it should be allowed at 4 units from the available range of 3 - 7 units because this matter was not complex or lengthy. The Respondent argued that Canada (Attorney General) v. Khan (1998), 160 F.T.R. 83, is not relevant because the factual situation there, involving discontinuance, was different and therefore the Applicant cannot rely upon it to claim anything under item 27.


[3]                 The Applicant's rebuttal submissions, which included reliance on his materials filed as part of his motion for directions to the assessment officer, strongly opposed any reduction of the amounts claimed for his time. For reasons apparent below, I do not outline his rationale. I will, however, clarify a point of practice relative to one of the Applicant's concerns. He objected to the Respondent having made written submissions supposedly as a reply because he had documented his intention not to lead written submissions. On that point, I note that the word "materials" in the term "reply materials" as found in my directions setting out a timetable, as opposed to the word "submissions", was carefully chosen to reflect the reality that an adverse party may respond to a bill of costs with evidence and written submissions, and that reply submissions efficiently bring out objections to a bill of costs. In any event, I note without further comment that the Applicant's letter dated May 30, 2002, effectively led written submissions in this assessment of costs by relying on the written representations associated with his motion for directions to the assessment officer.

  

Assessment

[4]                 The positions of the parties leave me in a difficult position as they did not directly address my jurisdiction to allow costs for the time of a self-represented litigant. I did not invite further submissions on this point because I think that the Court's disposition of his motion for directions to the assessment officer has considered and rejected any allowance for his time as part of the award of costs.


[5]                 The Applicant's motion referred to Rule 400(1), (2) and (3)(a), (c), (g), (h), (i), (k) and (o) as well as Rule 403(1)(a) and 2, in asking for directions to the assessment officer that he be reimbursed for his time. He asserted several grounds for this request including that he had incurred a loss of approximately 100 hours of employment as a result of litigation. As well, he asserted that his lack of legal expertise, in representing himself in these proceedings, interfered with maintaining his regular level of employment. He noted that, in a previous proceeding on this same matter, he had consented to costs calculated by counsel from the Department of Justice. He asked for "reimbursement for his own time over and above the allowable costs of the application as per Tariff B, Column 3 of the Federal Court Rules". The Applicant relied on Canada (Attorney General) v. Kahn, supra in support of this motion for directions with particular regard to its allowance of a lump sum for "lost" time of a self-represented litigant in an unnecessary judicial review proceeding. The Respondent's position on the motion was essentially the same as before me on this assessment of costs.

[6]                 The Reasons of the Court dismissing the Applicant's motion without costs on May 15, 2002, stated:

[2]            When I rendered judgment in this matter on January 28, 2002, I ordered that the applicant would "have his allowable costs of the application".

[3]            These words, "allowable costs" are a direction to the assessment officer for the assessment of the applicant's costs.


[7]                 My decisions in Fred Turner v. The Queen (affirmed by the Court in Reasons for Order, 2001 FCA 289), 2001 FCA 33, Raymond Desloges v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2001 FCT 1142 and Gordon E. Smith v. The Queen, 2001 FCA 318, preclude me from assuming jurisdiction to allow any costs for the time of a self-represented litigant. Consent, or silence, does not confer jurisdiction. The core concept of costs as an indemnity for an actual outlay of, or liability to pay, dollars for legal representation remains unchanged. The respective positions of the parties do not convince me otherwise. The bill of costs of the Applicant is allowed at $160.00 for disbursements only.

   

(Sgd.) "Charles E. Stinson"                                                                                                               Assessment Officer

Vancouver, B.C.

July 11, 2002


                          FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                                       TRIAL DIVISION

    NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

    

DOCKET:                   T-867-00

STYLE OF CAUSE: JOHN DOE

Applicant

- and -

  

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF CANADA

Respondent

    

ASSESSMENT IN WRITING WITHOUT PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF PARTIES

  

REASONS FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS BY: CHARLES E. STINSON

DATED:                                                             July 11, 2002

    

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Morris Rosenberg                                                 for the Respondent

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Ottawa, ON

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