Date: 19980226
Docket: IMM-4591-97
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC, THE 26th DAY OF FEBRUARY 1998
Present: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
Between:
SIXTO RICARDO VALERA MEZA,
Applicant,
AND
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
ORDER
This motion for an extension of time is dismissed.
Richard Morneau
Prothonotary
Certified true translation
M. Iveson
Date: 19980226
Docket: IMM-4591-97
Between:
SIXTO RICARDO VALERA MEZA,
Applicant,
AND
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
[1] The Court has before it a motion made by the applicant under Rule 21(2) of the Federal Court Immigration Rules, 1993 (the Rules) for an extension of the time provided for in Rule 13 for filing and serving a reply memorandum. This motion was made to the Court pursuant to Rule 324 of the Federal Court Rules, which provides that a motion may be disposed of without personal appearance of a party or the party"s counsel and upon consideration of written representations.
[2] It is well established that the Court expects at the outset that the time limits set out in the Rules will be complied with.1 As Strayer J. (as he then was) noted in Beilin2 in disposing of an application for an extension of time:
| . . . an applicant must show that there was some justification for the delay throughout the whole period of the delay and that he has an arguable case (see e.g. Grewal v. M.E.I., [1985] 2 F.C. 263, 63 N.R. 106 (F.C.A.)). |
(emphasis added)
Facts
[3] Counsel for the applicant stated that he was unable to file his reply memorandum in time because during the prescribed period for doing so a briefcase [TRANSLATION] "containing the documents required to prepare the applicant"s reply memorandum" was stolen from his office.
Analysis
[4] In itself, a theft is certainly an unexpected and most deplorable event. In my view, however, the extension sought by the applicant here cannot be granted on the basis of this simple observation alone.
[5] In the case at bar, the applicant has not indicated the nature of the stolen documents, but simply states generally that they were [TRANSLATION] "documents required" to prepare the memorandum.
[6] It should be noted that the applicant had already filed his application record and was at the stage of filing his reply memorandum. It seems to me that under the circumstances the applicant should have identified the documents which came to be considered necessary to his case at the reply stage more precisely in his affidavit in support of the motion for an extension of time. Furthermore, if these documents constituted evidence, the reasons why they were not included in the record filed under Rule 10 would have to be given.
[7] At no time is the nature of the much sought after documents described in detail. It was only in the representations filed in reply on February 24, 1998 that counsel for the applicant mentioned that the documents included cassettes of the hearing before the I.R.B."s Refugee Division.
[8] If cassettes of the hearing are indeed at issue, it seems to me that the courts have consistently held that cassettes are not required to perfect the leave application record, and a fortiori at the reply stage.
[9] Rule 17(d ) provides that when the application for leave is granted, the tribunal must send a transcript of the oral testimony to the Court Registry. It could be argued on this basis that the spirit of the Rules is to avoid the lengthy delays that might result from a request for a transcript or for the actual cassettes in perfecting an application for leave. Evidence of this can be found in the structure of Rule 10(2), which does not refer at all to obtaining cassettes, and in the cases: Peguero v. M.C.I., unreported decision dated July 8, 1994 in docket IMM-2287-94; Karasik v. M.C.I., unreported decision dated July 6, 1994 in docket IMM-2102-94; Ansomah v. M.E.I., unreported decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, No. 90-A-126, dated April 24, 1990; and Simeonov v. M.E.I., unreported decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, No. 90-A-3258, dated January 28, 1991.
[10] As for the second criterion in Beilin , it is enough to observe that neither the applicant nor even his counsel explained by way of affidavit how the merits of the case were arguable.
[11] For these reasons, this motion - and the similar motions in dockets IMM-5527-97 and IMM-5443-97 - will be dismissed.
[12] It cannot be denied that this is an unfortunate situation for the applicants. However, I adopt the following comments of the Court in Chin :
I know that courts are often reluctant to disadvantage individuals because their counsel miss deadlines. At the same time, in matters of this nature, counsel is acting in the shoes of her client. Counsel and client for such purpose are one. It is too easy a justification for non-compliance with the rules for counsel to say the delay was not in any way caused by my client and if an extension is not granted my client will be prejudiced.3
Richard Morneau
Prothonotary
MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC
February 26, 1998
Certified true translation
M. Iveson
| Court No.: IMM-4591-97 |
BETWEEN:
SIXTO RICARDO VALERA MEZA,
Applicant,
- and -
| MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, |
Respondent.
REASONS FOR ORDER
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: IMM-4591-97
STYLE OF CAUSE: SIXTO RICARDO VALERA MEZA,
Applicant,
AND
| MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION, |
Respondent.
MOTION IN WRITING CONSIDERED AT MONTREAL WITHOUT APPEARANCE OF THE PARTIES
REASONS FOR ORDER BY RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
DATE OF REASONS FOR ORDER:February 26, 1998
WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:
Noël Saint-Pierre for the applicant
Ian Hicks for the respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Noël Saint-Pierre for the applicant
Saint-Pierre, Grenier
Montréal, Quebec
George Thomsonfor the respondent
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec
__________________
1 See Chin v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 136, 138.
2 Beilin v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1995), 88 F.T.R. 132.