Date: 19980728
Docket: T-646-98
BETWEEN:
DANIEL P. CREIGHTON,
Applicant,
- and -
STEFAN FRANKO, DAVID & SUSAN GRANT, CANADIAN
IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE, MARY, FREDERICK AND
KATHLEEN BOYCHUCK, CAMBRIDGE WESTERN LEASEHOLDS
LIMITED, EDMUND AND SYLVIA MOROSHKYN,
Respondents.
REASONS FOR ORDER
REED, J.
[1] The applicant appeals an order of the prothonotary dated June 26, 1998, for which reasons were subsequently given, dated July 13, 1998. The only issue before me, as I indicated at the hearing of the appeal, is whether the prothonotary erred in striking out the applicant's originating notice of motion on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.
[2] I have reviewed the material on the file, the arguments and materials presented by the parties, in the light of their oral arguments, and cannot conclude there was any error.
[3] Mr. Creighton argues that the prothonotary was in error because: (1) the prothonotary does not have jurisdiction to strike an originating document since such an order affects substantive rights of the parties and this is not within a prothonotary's jurisdiction; (2) there is in any event no jurisdiction to strike an originating notice of motion, as opposed to a statement of claim, the appropriate procedure being to proceed to a hearing on the merits of the application; (3) the prothonotary erred because this Court is the only court that could hear the applicant's application and thus it comes within the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 25 of the Federal Court Act.
[4] While there was at one time jurisprudence indicating that prothonotaries did not have jurisdiction to make orders such as striking out originating documents, be it an originating notice of motion or a statement of claim, the Federal Court Rules were amended effective April 25, 1993 and it can no longer be a matter for debate the prothonotary has the requisite authority: see Rule 50 which replaced old Rule 336.
[5] While Mr. Creighton is correct in that generally originating notices of motion seeking judicial review will not be struck out, there are circumstances when it is appropriate to do so. That is when the application is clearly without merit and it would be a waste of time and resources to require the parties to proceed with the preparation of Application Records and related documentation.
[6] Unfortunately for Mr. Creighton, his application falls within that description. He seeks the review of two decisions, one taken by the Registrar of the Saskatoon Land Titles Office; the other taken by the Registrar of the Kamloops Land Titles Office. He seeks the cancelling of certificates of title issued by each with respect to land under their respective jurisdictions and the reinstatement of previously existing certificates of title. The changes of title occurred as a result of orders that issued from the Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench and the British Columbia Supreme Court respectively, authorizing judicial sales of the parcels of land in question. The sales arose as a result of unpaid debts owed to the Saskatoon Credit Union by Creighton Holdings Ltd. A full description of the circumstances and details of the transactions, and the claims that arise regarding them is found in the prothonotary's reasons of July 13, 1998 and the Motion Records filed by the respondents.
[7] I will ignore the arguments based on res judicata because I do not find it necessary to consider them. There is simply no jurisdiction in the Court to entertain the application in question. Judicial review is available for decisions of federal boards, commissions and tribunals. The provincial land registry offices are not of this nature. Mr. Creighton's argument is that because two parcels of land are involved, one in British Columbia, and one in Saskatchewan, and the Saskatoon Credit Union is a Saskatchewan corporation, this Court must have jurisdiction because no other court is able to deal with the matter. This is not an appropriate interpretation of section 25 of the Federal Court Act. The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench is able to deal with the land in Saskatchewan and has done so. The British Columbia Supreme Court has jurisdiction to deal with the land in British Columbia and has done so. There is no basis on which this Court could be said to have jurisdiction.
[8] For the reasons given the appeal of the prothonotary's order will be dismissed.
(Sgd.) "B. Reed"
Judge
Vancouver, British Columbia
July 28, 1998