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     Date : 19990623

     Docket: IMM-4204-98

BETWEEN:

     MANSOUR AHANI

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

McGILLIS J.

[1]      The applicant has challenged by way of judicial review a decision of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ("Minister") that he constitutes a danger to the security of Canada, within the meaning of paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as amended ("Act"). The applicant is a citizen of Iran who entered Canada on October 14, 1991 and claimed

Convention refugee status based on his political opinion and his membership in a particular social

group. On April 1, 1992, he was granted Convention refugee status in Canada.

[2]      On June 9 and June 15, 1993, the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister respectively certified, under subsection 40.1(1) of the Act, that they were of the opinion, based on a security report received and considered by them, that the applicant was a member of an inadmissible class specified in the anti-terrorism provisions in subparagraph 19(1)(e)(iii), clause

19(1)(e)(iv)(C), subparagraph 19(1)(f)(ii), clause 19(1)(f)(iii)(B) and paragraph 19(1)(g) of the

Act. On June 17, 1993, the certificate of the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister was

filed with the Court. The applicant was arrested under paragraph 40.1(2)(b) of the Act, and has remained in custody since that date.

[3]      The applicant instituted an action in which he challenged the constitutional validity of section 40.1 of the Act. On September 12, 1995, the statutory scheme in section 40.1 of the Act was found to be constitutionally valid. [See Ahani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 669 (T.D.); affirmed (1996), 201 N.R. 233 (F.C.A.); application for leave to appeal to S.C.C. No. 25580 dismissed with costs July 3, 1997].

[4]      Denault J. conducted a hearing under the statutory scheme in section 40.1 of the Act, and on April 17, 1998, he determined that the ministerial certificate was reasonable.

[5]      On April 28, 1998, an adjudicator determined that the applicant was a person described in paragraph 27(2)(a), subparagraph 19(1)(e)(iii), clause 19(1)(e)(iv)(c), subparagraph 19(1)(f)(ii), clause 19(1)(f)(iii)(B) and paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Act, and ordered him deported from Canada.

[6]      On August 12, 1998, the Minister issued her opinion, under paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Act, that the applicant constitutes a danger to the security of Canada.

[7]      On August 18, 1998, the applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review of the Minister"s decision in which he raised, among other things, various constitutional questions relating to paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Act ;

[8]      On September 9, 1998, the applicant commenced an action in which he raised the same constitutional questions as in the application for leave and for judicial review. By virtue of an Order issued by Rothstein J. (as he then was) on February 17, 1999, an Amended Statement of Claim was filed on February 24, 1999.

[9]      On February 26, 1999, Rothstein J. granted the application for leave in the present proceeding, and ordered the application for judicial review and the related action in file no.

T-1767-98 to be heard together on June 15, 1999.

[10]      On May 5, 1999, I ordered the judicial review application in file no. IMM-6546-98, Singh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and the action in file no. IMM-4825-98, Singh v. Her Majesty the Queen et al, to be heard together with the present proceeding and the related action in file no. T-1767-98, as they raised the same constitutional questions.

[11]      At the outset of the hearing on June 15, 1999, counsel for the respondent made a preliminary motion requesting that I apply the recent decision of McKeown J. in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, (file No. IMM-117-98, June 11, 1999) to the present proceeding and the related files, to the extent that it decided the same constitutional questions. On June 15, 1999, I delivered oral reasons in which I granted the motion, and adopted and applied the decision in Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, supra, to the extent that it decided the same constitutional questions. Following that ruling, I heard the submissions of counsel on the remaining issues raised in the present application for judicial review.

[12]      During the course of her submissions, counsel for the applicant submitted that the Minister's decision, in which she found the applicant to constitute a danger to the security of Canada under paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Act, was unreasonable. She further submitted that it was unreasonable for the Minister to conclude that the applicant would only face "minimal risk" in Iran.

[13]      Despite the able submissions of counsel for the applicant, I have concluded that there is ample evidence in the record to support the Minister's discretionary decision that the applicant constitutes a danger to the security of Canada under paragraph 53(1)(b) of the Act. In the circumstances, I have concluded that her decision is reasonable. Alternatively, even if the standard of review is not one of reasonableness, I have concluded that the Minister committed no error of any nature that would require the intervention of the Court.

[14]      The application for judicial review is dismissed. Counsel for the parties shall make written representations, if any, on or before June 28, 1999, for the certification of any serious question of general importance under Rule 18(1) of the Federal Court Immigration Rules, 1993, SOR/93-22. My formal Judgment in this matter, and my Judgments in all of the related proceedings, will be issued no later than June 29, 1999.

    

                                         D. McGillis
                                 __________________________
                                         Judge

OTTAWA

June 23, 1999

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