Date: 19980513
Docket: T-376-98
Between :
KARL LEROY STARRATT,
Plaintiff,
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER
MULDOON, J. :
[1] The Court is seized with two motions relating to the statement of claim herein, filed on March 9, 1998: a defendant's motion filed on April 14, 1998, seeking the striking out of the statement of claim, pursuant to rule 419(1)(a) to (f); and a plaintiff's motion filed on April 15, 1998 seeking judgment for default of filing a statement of defence.
[2] It is logical to consider first the defendant's motion to strike for at least a minor and a major reason. The minor reason is that the defendant's motion was the earlier filed. The major reason is that if the statement of claim be truly, out-strikeably deficient, there would be no sense in granting upon it a default judgment which would be equally deficient, if deficient it be.
[3] The plaintiff's plight as reported in his self-drawn statement of claim evokes sympathy. However that sympathy cannot support a claim against the Crown if no valid cause of action be expressed, or if such claim as is expressed be brought in the wrong Court.
[4] The statement of claim correctly assumes that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) is a police force created and maintained by the government of Canada, but incorrectly states that in enforcing the Criminal Code, "and certain other Statutes" - provincial statutes as it turns out - the R.C.M.P. act "through the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada" when acting as the provincial police of Nova Scotia. The R.C.M.P.'s services are "rented" to the province through the offices of the Solicitor General of Canada. In such role, the R.C.M.P. is responsible to the Attorney General of Nova Scotia. The plaintiff states that the federal minister is "responsible for the enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." So, indeed is the provincial attorney general, equally, if not more so, since, under head 14 of section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the provincial legislature and government have exclusive charge of "the administration of justice in the province."
[5] The plaintiff does not describe the defendant as "Her Majesty the Queen, in Right of Nova Scotia", so by convention he means "Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada." The nearest the plaintiff comes to impleading the federal Crown are the allegations expressed in paragraphs 7 and 12 of the statement of claim, which run:
| 7. The RCMP have been informed by way of numerous letters, of the violations of the Criminal Code of Canada as described below, however they have failed to act and refuse to take any action. Please refer to list of documents, and actual document, attached. They have specifically stated that they will not be doing an investigation, and have taken the position that the matter is strictly civil. Accordingly, they have violated my "equality" rights under the Charter, consistently ignored their responsibilities under the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, their Code of Conduct, and their individual oaths. Furthermore, they decline to explain how or why my allegations of criminal wrongdoing are not credible, and why the laws to which I refer do not apply. |
| 12. Please refer to list of documents attached, and actual documents, for copies of various sections of the Criminal Code referred to below. The RCMP have violated my rights under the Charter by refusing to investigate, and have ignored their obligations as set out in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, their Code of Conduct, and their individual oaths. An explanation of how the laws were criminally broken is given for each instance. The RCMP were advised of full details long ago. |
[6] The facts, which the Court must accept as alleged, in the above quoted paragraphs are that the R.C.M.P. ("H" Division) has declined to investigate and to charge the individuals whom the plaintiff wants accused of the offences he has designated. A police force must exercise judgment and not accuse individuals just because a complainant says so, lest the police launch false or unfavourable allegations and accusations. A police force, especially in the kinds of accusations levied by the plaintiff, is entitled to take advice in law. So the validity of the cause of action against "H" division R.C.M.P. which the plaintiff would levy against the Crown is plainly and obviously not a valid action. Nor is the identity of any alleged tortfeasor made known.
[7] In levying this claim against the federal Crown, the plaintiff has not exhausted his means of seeking remedies. The plaintiff himself is entitled to lay informations accusing his alleged antagonists with the offences of which he wants the R.C.M.P. to accuse them. Then, in true exercise of the administration of justice within the province, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia would have to decide whether to stay or to prosecute. All of this is too remote from the defendant named in the statement of claim, which truly discloses no reasonable cause of action. For this reason, the statement of claim will have to be struck out pursuant to rule 419(1)(a).
[8] The plaintiff nevertheless complains that he was entitled default judgment, because the defendant filed no statement of defence. In answer, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada invokes section 25 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, Chap. C-50. That provision is conclusive in these circumstances. In any event, why would the Court permit default judgment where there is no valid cause of action?
[9] The plaintiff must be very frustrated by his inability to achieve his desired remedies in this thicket of difficult law. The Court, of course, has to declare and enforce the law, even if it be dura lex. The plaintiff and his litigious action would both benefit from the services of an experienced lawyer. Surely in Dartmouth and vicinity there is one who will come forward to help him.
[10] Regrettably for the plaintiff, in the meanwhile this statement of claim will be struck out, and his motion for default judgment will be dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
May 13, 1998