Federal Court Decisions

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Decision Content

 

 

Date: 20060512

Docket: IMM-5387-05

Citation: 2006 FC 588

Ottawa, Ontario, May 12, 2006

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHORE

 

BETWEEN:

MIGUEL ANGEL ALEGRIA MONROY

MICHELLE ALEGRIA YANEZ

LUIS ANGEL ALEGRIA YANEZ

PATRICIA YANEZ FRANCO

ANA KAREN ALEGRIA YANEZ

Applicants

and

 

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP

AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

 

REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

 

INTRODUCTION

[1]               How could the Board exercise its special expertise without the slightest direct reference to excerpts or at least citations from documents from the Board’s own Documentation Centre concerning the conditions in the country in question?

 

[2]               The Court set aside the Board’s decision, given that it ignored the evidence on record (Padilla v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1, [1991] F.C.J. No. 71 (QL)).

 

NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING

[3]               This is an application for judicial review under subsection 71(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001 c. 27 (Act) of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) dated August 24, 2005, by which it was decided that the applicants were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Act.

 

FACTS

[4]               The applicants, Miguel Angel Alegria Monroy, his spouse, Patricia Yanez Franco, and their three minor children, Ana Karen Alegria Yanez, Michelle Alegria Yanez and Luis Angel Alegria, Yanez, are citizens of Mexico. The claims of the spouse and children are based on that of Alegria Monroy, the principal claimant.

 

[5]               Alegria Monroy was allegedly threatened, beaten together with his spouse and confined for having refused to cooperate with a group of persons who wanted to use his services as a taxi driver for illegal business purposes.

 

[6]               They arrived in Canada on March 29, 2005 and applied for protection from Canada at that time.

 

IMPUGNED DECISION

[7]               The Board concluded that Alegria Monroy and his family had not met the burden of establishing in a clear and convincing manner that the Mexican state was unable to ensure their protection.

 

[8]               Alternatively, the Board concluded that Alegria Monroy and his family had an internal flight alternative within Mexico City.

 

ISSUES

[9]               This application raises the following issues:

1.      Did the Board commit a reviewable error in concluding that the applicants did not show that the Mexican state was unable to protect them?

2.      Did the Board commit a reviewable error in concluding that the applicants had an internal flight alternative in Mexico City?

 

ANALYSIS

 

Standard of review

[10]           The Board has well-known expertise in fact-finding, especially in the assessment of the credibility of persons claiming refugee status and of the availability of protection from the country of origin (Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, [1998] S.C.J. No. 46 (QL)).

 

[11]           This Court has repeated on numerous occasions that the standard of patent unreasonableness applies to the Board’s decisions (Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1283 (QL), at paragraphs 9-15; Moore v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1772 (QL), at paragraphs 8-9; Tvauri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1188 (QL), at paragraphs 10-11; Wen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 907 (QL)).

 

[12]           The issue of whether there is an internal flight alternative is also a question of fact. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is patent unreasonableness (Chorny v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 999, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1263 (QL), at paragraphs 9-10; E.H.S. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1325, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1606 (QL), at paragraph 10; Urgel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1777, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2171 (QL), at paragraph 13; Dillon v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 381, [2005] F.C.J. No. 463 (QL), at paragraph 7; Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1591, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1912 (QL), at paragraph 18).

 

State protection

[13]           In its reasons, the Board reviewed the case law and noted the general principles governing the matter of state protection. These principles may be summarized as follows. There is a presumption that a state is able to protect its citizens, and it is up to persons claiming refugee protection to rebut this presumption through clear and convincing evidence. (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74 (QL), at paragraph 50). It is not necessary for state protection to be perfect (Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992) 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.), [1992] F.C.J. No. 1189 (QL), at paragraph 7). It is up to persons claiming refugee protection to exhaust all possible recourses in their country before applying for international protection (Kadenko c. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1376 (QL), at paragraph 5).

 

[14]           In this case, Alegria Monroy and his family have discharged the burden of proof on them. Alegria Monroy alleged that he had been attacked on several occasions and kidnapped and that his wife had also been attacked, but they never reported the incidents to the police and they never consulted a lawyer because of the situation they described.

 

[15]           Alegria Monroy gave two reasons for his failure to request protection from the authorities: his attackers allegedly told him they had contacts with the police and members of the government, and the police themselves are corrupt.

 

[16]           In ignoring the documentary evidence on record, the Board erred in fact and in law.

 

[17]           First of all, the Court underlines the fact that the applicants’ credibility was not called into question.

 

[18]           The Board rendered its decision solely on the basis of the facts that would allow it to reject the applicants’ claim and did not analyze the rest of the evidence.

 

[19]           Relevant evidence was not considered, and this evidence was clear and convincing (Fok v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), A-881-90, [1993] F.C.J. No. 800 (F.C.A.) (QL).

 

[20]           The Board wrote that, in De Baez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 785, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1020 (QL), the Court stated that the actions of some police officers does not obviate the need to seek protection from the authorities.

 

[21]           But unfortunately, without having made any distinction, the Board did not consider information request MEX42974.EF, dated October 27, 2004, which mentions the existence of a “blue brotherhood” code within the police.

 

[22]           Informational memorandum MEX42974.EF, dated October 27, 2004, mentions the following:

A researcher based at the Centre for Research and Economic Study (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, CIDE) in Mexico City and specializing in public security issues in Mexico stated in 14 September 2004 correspondence that

 

Une chercheuse du Centre de recherches et d’études économiques (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas — CIDE) à Mexico, se spécialisant dans la sécurité publique au Mexique, a déclaré dans une communication écrite du 14 septembre 2004 que

 

 

[traduction]

 

[n]obody is willing to talk about it, and I don't know of any serious studies, but there are many rumours about the existence a “brotherhood” (hermandad in Spanish), or several distinct ones, in Mexican police forces. I had never heard of a brotherhood that might span different levels of police forces (state and federal, [for instance]), but it does not surprise me. Indeed, unfortunately, I find the scenarios [of police covering up or refusing to prosecute various crimes against other police officers] completely credible, although nearly impossible to prove or disprove.

 

[p]ersonne ne veut en parler et je ne connais aucune recherche sérieuse sur le sujet, mais il existe nombre de rumeurs sur l’existence d’une « fraternité » (hermandad en espagnol) ou de plusieurs fraternités distinctes au sein des forces policières du Mexique. Je n’ai jamais entendu parler d’une fraternité qui s’étendrait à différents niveaux de corps de police (étatique et fédéral, [par exemple]), mais cela ne me surprend pas. En effet, je pense malheureusement que ces scénarios [selon lesquels les policiers se couvrent l’un l’autre ou refusent de poursuivre un autre policier] sont totalement crédibles, mais presque impossibles à prouver ou à réfuter.

 

In 13 October 2004 correspondence, the co-director of the academic-led research organization Democracy, Human Rights and Security (Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad, DDHS) based in Mexico City and specializing in police and public security issues in Mexico (DDHS n.d.) stated that the only information about an informal blue brotherhood among the police which was made public concerns the local Federal District police force. The co-director further noted that sources within the police have told her that “if necessary” police officers protect one other by, for example, tampering with evidence in a case; however, this “information is extremely difficult to confirm” (DDHS 13 Oct. 2004).

 

Dans une communication écrite du 13 octobre 2004, la co-directrice de l’organisme de recherche Démocratie, Droits de la personne et Sécurité (Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad — DDHS), établi à Mexico et dirigé par des universitaires, laquelle est spécialiste de la sécurité publique et de la police à Mexico (DDHS s.d.), a déclaré que la seule information publique sur une fraternité bleue informelle au sein de la police concernait le corps de police local du District fédéral. La co‑directrice a ajouté que des sources au sein de la police lui avaient dit [traduction] « [qu’]au besoin » les policiers se protégeaient entre eux, par exemple, en altérant des preuves; toutefois, cette [traduction] « information est extrêmement difficile à confirmer » (DDHS 13 oct. 2004).

 

While the Research Directorate could not find documentary sources on whether an informal “blue brotherhood” exists across different levels of police forces in Mexico, media sources of 2002 and 2004 reported on a clandestine group of senior police officers within the Federal District's Public Security Secretariat (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica, SSP) called La Hermandad which has apparently been in existence for over twenty years in Mexico City (La Jornada 15 June 2002; Christian Science Monitor 23 Oct. 2002; El Sol de Mexico 10 Aug. 2004; Todito.com 26 Aug. 2004; Independent 5 Sept. 2004).

 

Même si aucune information indiquant si une [traduction] « fraternité bleue » s’étend à différents niveaux de corps de police au Mexique n’a pu être trouvée parmi les sources documentaires consultées par la Direction des recherches, des sources médiatiques de 2002 et de 2004 ont signalé l’existence d’un groupe clandestin d’agents supérieurs de la police au sein du Secrétariat de la sécurité publique (Secretaria de Seguridad Publica — SSP) du District fédéral, groupe appelé La Hermandad, qui existerait depuis plus de vingt ans à Mexico (La Jornada 15 juin 2002; The Christian Science Monitor 23 oct. 2002; El Sol de Mexico 10 août 2004; Todito.com 26 août 2004; Independent 5 sept. 2004).

 

According to the Independent, it is believed that La Hermandad connects criminal gangs with senior-level authorities, who then benefit from illegal activities such as drug trafficking and extortion (5 Sept. 2004). Another newspaper reported that La Hermandad apparently exerts considerable control over police operations in Mexico City and reportedly collects a portion of the bribes taken by police officers working there (Christian Science Monitor 23 Oct. 2002).

Selon l’Independent, La Hermandad établirait des relations entre des gangs de criminels et des autorités supérieures qui, par la suite, bénéficieraient d’activités illégales comme le trafic de stupéfiants et l’extorsion (5 sept. 2004). Un autre journal a signalé que La Hermandad exercerait un contrôle considérable sur les opérations policières à Mexico et recueillerait une partie des pots-de-vin acceptés par les policiers y travaillant (The Christian Science Monitor 23 oct. 2002).

 

[23]           In its 2005 Report, Amnesty International explained the following:

Arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment by police remained widespread, particularly at state level. The authorities failed to combat these practices effectively or to ensure judicial remedy to victims.

Cette année encore la police, notamment au niveau des États, a eu très largement recours à la détention arbitraire, à la torture et à d’autres mauvais traitements. Les autorités n’ont pas combattu efficacement ces pratiques et n’ont pris aucune mesure pour que les victimes bénéficient d’une voie de recours.

 

[24]           In the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004Mexico”, the following was mentioned:

. . .

 

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, there were credible allegations of police involvement in kidnappings for ransom . . . .

 

. . .The head of the PGR's anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) announced that members of the Chihuahua State Judicial Police (PJE) had carried out the forced disappearances and killings at the behest of the Juarez drug cartel. The authorities arrested 13 PJE agents and 4 more were at large at year's end.

 

. . .

 

[T]he police regularly obtained information through torture, prosecutors used this evidence in courts, and the courts continued to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture. Many victims were afraid to report or follow through on complaints against the police, thereby hampering prosecution of the perpetrators.

 

. . .

 

The authorities rarely punished officials for torture, which continued to occur in large part because confessions are the primary evidence in many criminal convictions. Many human rights groups linked torture to the prevalence of arbitrary detention and claimed that torture often follows an arbitrary arrest, sometimes without a warrant, as police or prosecutors attempt to justify the detention by securing a confession to a crime . . . .

 

. . .

 

Police corruption was a problem. Police have been involved in kidnappings, armed robbery, and extortion, as well as protection of criminals and drug traffickers. From January to July, in Mexico City alone, 140 policemen were charged for various crimes, compared with 502 in 2003. In April, the Governor of Morelos State dismissed all 552 state policemen after the arrest of two top officers for allegedly protecting drug dealers.

 

[25]           In the report entitled Mexico: State Protection (December 2003–March 2005), the following was mentioned:

Key points discussed at a July 2004 conference on justice reform in Mexico, sponsored by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for US-Mexican Studies, included statements that the criminal justice system was “both ineffective and unfair” (CSIS 16 July 2004). At the conference, numerous national and international justice reform experts claimed that in Mexico “[fewer] than 5 per cent of crimes are investigated and [fewer than] 2 per cent go to trial” (ibid.). Moreover, the criminal justice system was deemed unfair due to its use of arbitrary detention, delays in trial and sentencing, “incarceration without sentencing” or pretrial detention and “poor legal defence” (ibid.; see also AI 28 Sept. 2004).

 

Parmi les points clés soulevés à une conférence sur les réformes judiciaires au Mexique, tenue en juillet 2004 sous le parrainage des organisations états-uniennes Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) et Center for US-Mexican Studies, on trouve l’affirmation que le système de justice pénale était [traduction] « à la fois inefficace et inéquitable » (CSIS 16 juill. 2004). De nombreux spécialistes de la réforme judiciaire aux niveaux national et international ont affirmé à la conférence que [traduction] « moins de 5 p. 100 des crimes [faisaient] l’objet d’une enquête et [que] moins de 2 p. 100 [étaient] jugés par les tribunaux » (ibid.). Ils ont qualifié le système de justice pénale d’inéquitable, lui reprochant des détentions arbitraires, des retards dans les prononcés des peines et dans les procès, des [traduction] « incarcérations sans prononcé de peine », des détentions préventives et de [traduction] « mauvaises défenses juridiques » (ibid.; voir aussi AI 28 sept. 2004).

 

[26]           The following was mentioned in the Amnesty International 2005 Report:

The justice system continued to be misused, particularly at state level. The lack of impartiality of the judiciary and the prosecution services resulted in malicious prosecutions and unfair judicial procedures.

 

Cette année encore, des détournements du système judiciaire ont eu lieu, notamment au niveau des États. Le manque d’impartialité des autorités judiciaires et des services du ministère public a entraîné des poursuites malveillantes et des procédures inéquitables.

 

[27]           Accordingly, in this case, the claimants’ fear was not denied by the Board. Moreover, the claimants were considered credible. In addition, these are considerations that may be verified independently from the applicants’ fear, and this is the very essence of their fear. (Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605, [1991] F.C.J. No. 341 (C.A.) (QL))

 

[28]           Without evidence to the contrary, the applicant could not have been protected as was explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1984] F.C.J. No. 601 (F.C.A.) (QL).

 

[29]           The applicants obviously cannot be protected, and Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74 (QL), demonstrates that “ ‘[p]ersecution’ includes situations where the state is not in strictness an accomplice to the persecution but is simply unable to protect its citizens”. 

[30]           The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 1979 states the following under the heading “and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”:

Being unable to avail himself of such protection implies circumstances that are beyond the will of the person concerned. There may, for example, be a state of war, civil war or other grave disturbance, which prevents the country of nationality from extending protection or makes such protection ineffective . . . .

Lorsqu’il ne peut se réclamer de cette protection, cela tient à des circonstances indépendantes de sa volonté. Il peut y avoir, par exemple, un état de guerre, une guerre civile ou d’autres troubles graves qui empêchent le pays dont l’intéressé a la nationalité de lui accorder sa protection ou qui rendent cette protection inefficace…

 

[31]           In Zalzali, supra, the following was explained at paragraphs 16 and 17:

[T]he natural meaning of the words “is unable” assumes an objective inability on the part of the claimant, and the fact that “is unable” is, in contrast to “is unwilling”, not qualified by “by reason of that fear”, seems to me to confirm that the inability in question is governed by objective criteria which can be verified independently of the fear experienced, and so independently of the acts which prompted that fear and their perpetrators . . . .

 

[T]here can be persecution within the meaning of the Convention even if the reprehensible acts are those of fellow nationals, when the government is unable to protect the victim against what they are doing . . . .

 

[32]           In Padilla, supra, the Court set aside the Board’s decision because the Board ignored the evidence on record.

 

[33]           It is clear that the Board’s decision is patently unreasonable, considering the evidence it had before it.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[34]           For these reasons, the Court allows the application for judicial review.


 

ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS that

1.         The application for judicial review be allowed;

2.         The case be returned to a differently constituted Board for rehearing and redetermination.

 

 

Michel M.J. Shore

Judge

 

 

Certified true translation

Michael Palles

 

 

 


FEDERAL COURT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKET:                                          IMM-5387-05

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                          MIGUEL ANGEL ALEGRIA MONROY

                                                            MICHELLE ALEGRIA YANEZ

                                                            LUIS ANGEL ALEGRIA YANEZ

                                                            PATRICIA YANEZ FRANCO

                                                            ANA KAREN ALEGRIA YANEZ

                                                            v.

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                    Montréal, Quebec

 

DATE OF HEARING:                      April 26, 2006

 

REASONS FOR ORDER BY:         HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHORE

 

DATED:                                             May 12, 2006

 

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Manuel Centurion

 

FOR THE APPLICANTS

Caroline Doyon

 

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

MANUEL CENTURION

Montréal, Quebec

 

FOR THE APPLICANTS

JOHN H. SIMS Q.C.                                                                          POUR LA PARTIE DÉFENDERESSE

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

 

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

 

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