Ottawa, Ontario, August 24th, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), in which it rejected the applicant’s claim for refugee status under ss. 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
FACTS
[2] The applicant is a 28-year-old citizen of Pakistan. He entered Canada September 5, 2001, on a student visa. Mr. Saeed was raised as a Sunni Muslim, and states that he converted to the Shia sect of Islam in August 2003, due to the influence of some Shia practitioners he was living with in Canada at that time. He was arrested on October 23, 2003, when he entered the Citizenship and Immigration Canada office in Etobicoke to initiate his refugee application.
[3] In his Personal Information Form (PIF) the applicant states that the arrest was based on alleged misrepresentation in terms of his student visa. He further states that he was arrested as part of “Project Thread,” a group formed under the rubric of the Ottawa Business College which has been described in the media as a potential sleeper cell associated with the Bin Laden network. In his argument, the applicant states that the arrest was on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that he posed a threat to national security. In his PIF, Mr. Saeed states that he has been subject to harassment and death threats from personal acquaintances in Pakistan, including the family of his former fiancée, who is a Sunni Muslim. He further states that since Canadian authorities have caused his name to be associated with “Project Thread”, he would be subject to persecution at the hands of the Pakistani authorities and others upon return to Pakistan.
[4] Mr. Saeed claimed refugee protection on the basis of fear of persecution for his membership in the social group of people accused of terrorism as well as his religion on January 2, 2004. After a hearing, the Board rejected his claim for refugee status in a decision dated May 10, 2005.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[5] In a well-reasoned and extensive (39 pages) decision, the Board gave the following reasons for coming to its conclusion.
a) Fear of persecution on the basis of religion
[6] The Board referred to the applicant’s Schedule I Background Information, in which he indicated that he feared he would be killed by Sunni terrorists (specifically the group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan or SSP) but did not mention his fear of family and friends. The Board noted that when questioned about this, the applicant stated he had omitted the fear of his family and friends based on the advice of his counsel, who told him he could include that information later in his PIF. The Board did not find this credible, as his counsel was experienced in refugee law and was unlikely to have given such advice.
b) Fear of persecution on the basis of membership in a social group, i.e. people who had been identified as associated with terrorist activities
[7] The Board found that the media had not connected Mr. Saeed specifically to others known as members of Project Thread, and that there was no other evidence establishing such a link. The Board considered the applicant’s concern that an uncle in the United States had informed relatives in Pakistan that the applicant had been arrested for similar reasons as others associated with Project Thread, i.e. suspicion of terrorist involvement, and determined that this evidence was “self-serving at best” (Board Reasons, p. 4). In its examination of the media evidence, the Board also noted that the link between the persons arrested in association with Project Thread and terrorist activities was actually discredited or dismissed by the media in many cases.
[8] The Board considered the applicant’s evidence of the treatment of persons arrested in association with Project Thread upon return to Pakistan, submitted by way of affidavits given by such individuals and others who had knowledge of the situation. The Board found that the most serious allegation contained in this evidence was that of Imran Younas Khan, who claims to have been attacked and shot at, but escaped by running away. The Board found his ability to escape by running unlikely, and as such dismissed this evidence as not credible.
[9] The Board noted that the evidence indicated that both Amnesty International and the Pakistani Human Rights Commission were aware of the returnees, but had not given any reports subsequent to their return indicating ongoing problems. Furthermore, there was nothing to indicate that the returnees had sought any assistance from these organizations. The Board stated that even had it accepted the evidence that returnees were questioned, detained, unable to find employment, beaten, and threatened, it would still have concluded that this did not amount to persecution or serious harm for members of Project Thread. For example, the Board stated: “An isolated beating would on its own not be considered serious harm or persecution” (Board Reasons, p.13).
[10] The Board went on to conclude that the treatment of another returnee, Muhammad Siddiqui, appeared to be in line with the Pakistan Passport Act, and that even if he had been forced to pay a bribe, such treatment did not amount to persecution, stating: “I can see how counsel might characterize a bribe of $400 Canadian dollars as extortion however in many places of the world such as Pakistan the requirement to bribe officials is both accepted and expected” (Board Reasons, p. 17).
[11] Similarly, the Board found there was no evidence to indicate a specific risk of persecution in Pakistan based on conversion from Sunni to Shia. In any event, the Board was of the view that the pertinent question was not so much whether the applicant returned to Pakistan as a Sunni or as a Shia, but whether Pakistan could provide adequate protection to its citizens.
c) State protection
[12] The Board considered the documentary evidence with regard to the existence of state protection in Pakistan for individuals targeted by religious extremists. It concluded that adequate, although imperfect, state protection exists for Mr. Saeed. It based its conclusion on the Pakistani government’s commitment to ridding Pakistan of sectarian violence, the fact that Pakistan is generally in control of its territory, and the existence of institutions in place to protect citizens.
[13] The Board took note of the fact that Mr. Saeed was still under investigation by the Canadian authorities but that he had also received clearance to have his refugee claim heard.
[14] The Board accepted that the applicant was a member of a particular social group, which it described as “those arrested as a result of immigration violations after enrolling at the Ottawa [Business] College.” The Board acknowledged that the applicant might be questioned in Pakistan, but concluded there was “no evidence that the actions of Pakistan, setting aside possible travel restrictions, have gone beyond that level in the past with others more directly linked to Project Thread.” The Board found it more probable than not that Mr. Saeed would be treated in a similar manner (Board Reasons, p. 32).
[15] The Board noted that there was a possibility of serious harm to returnees, but based on the lack of specific evidence about the situation of returnees, declined to conclude that the applicant would face a serious possibility of such harm.
[16] The Board found that a majority of violent actions aimed at Shias were mass attacks by suicide bombers, and incidents of individuals being personally targeted had decreased.
[17] Citing the case of Canada (M.E.I.) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm.L.R. (2d) 130, the Board found that state protection in Pakistan was sufficient as it met the test of being in control of its territory, having military, police and civil authorities in place, and making serious efforts to protect its citizens.
[18] The Board concluded that the applicant’s fear of harm by his family and friends was not credible, his fear of being subjected to harm on the basis of association with members of Project Thread was not objectively well-founded, and that his fear of persecution based on his conversion to Shia and the lack of state protection was not well-founded.
ISSUES
[19] There are four issues to consider in the context of this application for judicial review:
i) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant was not linked to Project Thread?
ii) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant would not be subject to persecution based on his ostensible connection to Project Thread?
iii) Did the Board err in its articulation of the proper test for determining whether adequate state protection exists?
iv) Did the Board err in its assessment of the evidence with regard to the issue of state protection in Pakistan?
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
i) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant was not linked to Project Thread?
[20] The applicant submits that the Board erred by ignoring his testimony at the hearing, in which he claimed his friends and family were aware of his arrest and that he was viewed as a terrorist threat because of his connection to Project Thread. He alleges the Board focused only on his explanations as to how his friends and family obtained this information. The applicant submits this amounts to requiring corroborating evidence, even though there was no contradictory evidence to undermine the claimant’s explanations, which has been held to be an error by this Court (see, e.g., Ahortor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 65 F.T.R. 137, [1993] F.C.J. No. 705 (QL)). In the alternative, the applicant argues that the Board failed to express its disbelief to the applicant in plain language.
ii) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant would not be subject to persecution based on his ostensible connection to Project Thread?
[21] Relying on the case of Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2001 FCT 776, the applicant contends that the Board erred in finding that it was unlikely Mr. Khan could evade armed attackers by running away, because it was not entitled to make an implausibility finding on this basis and also because it erred by stating that it was a group of armed attackers, when in fact the evidence indicated Mr. Khan was chased by a group, of which only one person was armed.
[22] The applicant further submits that the Board ignored or misstated the evidence relating to Mohammad Khalid Jahangir’s affidavit, which demonstrated a clear link between membership in Project Thread and Mr. Jahangir being attacked. With regard to the other affidavits, the applicant argues the Board erred by failing to properly assess the cumulative nature of the actions taken against Project Thread members, which, taken as a whole, meet the threshold for persecution.
iii) Did the Board err in its articulation of the proper test for determining whether adequate state protection exists?
[23] The applicant submits that the Board erred in its statement of the test for state protection as whether there were “serious efforts to provide adequate but not necessarily perfect protection for the claimant should he return to Pakistan today” (Board Reasons, p.19). Relying on subsequent case law such as Choudary v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No 2181 (QL), 2004 FC 1727; and Razzak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 951 (QL), 2005 FC 752, the applicant submits that it is insufficient for a state to indicate a willingness to help, but it must provide actual, effective protection.
[24] The applicant submits that the Board erred by basing its decision on this articulation of the test. He argues that the test is insufficient because it would be met in situations where a state made a serious effort, whether or not it provided any actual protection.
v) Did the Board err in its assessment of the evidence with regard to the issue of state protection in Pakistan?
[25] In the alternative, the applicant argues that the Board erred in concluding Pakistan offers adequate state protection to Shias. Specifically, the applicant impugns the Board’s findings that the number of individuals murdered by extremists has decreased, that better police training is now being used, and that there has been a crackdown on extremism by the government. The applicant submits these findings are in direct conflict with the documentary evidence, in which a Human Rights Watch report states that there has been a “sharp increase in the number of targeted killings of Shi’a...in recent years”.
[26] The applicant points to an Amnesty International report indicating that in 2003, torture and ill-treatment by police were still routine in Pakistan, while perpetrators were rarely held accountable. The applicant also notes that the Human Rights Watch report states: “Those implicated in sectarian violence are rarely prosecuted and virtually no action has been taken to protect the affected communities”. The applicant submits that both a U.S. Department of State report and the Amnesty International report indicate that sectarian violence continues and the government appears unable to offer protection from it.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
i) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant was not linked to Project Thread?
[27] The respondent submits that the Board considered the applicant’s testimony and the other evidence on the issue of the perception that Mr. Saeed was involved in a terrorist group. It submits the Board was entitled to weigh the evidence, and it is not this Court’s role to re-weigh the evidence.
ii) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant would not be subject to persecution based on his ostensible connection to Project Thread?
[28] The respondent submits that, with regard to the affidavits of Mr. Khan, the applicant is merely speculating about the possible ways in which the affidavits could have been considered. More specifically, the respondent argues the Board was entitled to make an implausibility finding concerning Mr. Khan’s evidence, as it was based on other documentary evidence before it.
[29] With respect to Mr. Jahangir’s affidavit, the respondent contends that the Board’s reasons clearly indicated that it considered this evidence by referring to it specifically (Board Reasons, p. 9). The respondent argues that the Board in fact gave the affidavit evidence the full benefit of the doubt, and still found that it did not support a finding in the applicant’s favour.
iii) Did the Board err in its articulation of the proper test for determining whether adequate state protection exists?
[30] The respondent submits that the Board was under no obligation to further analyze the effectiveness of state protection as it had already concluded that adequate, though imperfect, protection was available to the applicant, which finding it made correctly. The respondent further argues that the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
iv) Did the Board err in its assessment of the evidence with regard to the issue of state protection in Pakistan?
[31] The respondent argues that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the Board did not consider all the evidence, as the Board clearly took all the documents cited by the applicant into account. With regard to the specific risk of harm, the respondent contends that the Board was entitled to find that the applicant did not have a profile that would put him at risk, and further that the Board did not have to consider documentary evidence since the testimony was found not to be credible.
[32] Furthermore, the respondent argues, the documentary evidence cited by the applicant neither rebuts the presumption of state protection to the applicant nor contradicts the Board’s findings. Specifically, the respondent argues that the Board noted the targeting of Shia professionals, and that the evidence that torture and ill-treatment persist is not inconsistent with the finding that the government has provided training to police officers.
ANALYSIS
a) Standard of review
[33] With respect to the standard of review for credibility determinations by the IRB, it is well established in the case law of the Federal Court of Appeal and of this Court that patent unreasonableness is the norm (see, e.g. Thavarathinam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FC 1469, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1866 (F.C.A.) (QL), at para. 10; Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993] F.C.J. No. 732 (F.C.A.) (QL), at para. 4, recently applied in Ogiriki v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 342; [2006] F.C.J. No. 420 (QL) , Mohammad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 352; [2006] F.C.J. No. 493 (QL) ). The same standard of review applies to the assessment of the legitimacy of identity documents (see, e.g. Egbokheo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2006 FC 163; [2006] F.C.J. No. 285 (QL), Kosta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 994; [2005] F.C.J. No. 1233 (QL)).
[34] As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada, the standard of patent unreasonableness mandates that this Court should not interfere with a decision unless “there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived" (Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20).
[35] On the other hand, the proper determination of the test for state protection calls for the standard of correctness (see, e.g. the decision of Justice Mactavish in Collins v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1403). This Court has also held that the state protection analysis itself is a matter of mixed fact and law subject to review on the standard of reasonableness (see, e.g. the decision of Justice Dawson in Muszynski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1075). As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ryan, above, a decision is reasonable if it stands up to a “somewhat probing examination”. The state of the law on this issue has been aptly summarized by my colleague Justice Dawson in Muszynski, above:
7. In order to reach a conclusion with respect to the adequacy of state protection, the RPD is obliged to make certain findings of fact. Those findings of fact can only be set aside by this Court, if made in a perverse or capricious manner, or without regard to the material before the tribunal. See: Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 39, 2005 SCC 40 at paragraph 38.
8. Once those findings of fact are made, they must be assessed against the legal test articulated by the Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at page 724, namely do the facts constitute “clear and convincing confirmation of a state’s inability to protect” so as to rebut the presumption of state protection? This is a question of mixed fact and law. On the basis of the pragmatic and functional analysis conducted by my colleague Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Chaves v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 232, I accept that the appropriate standard of review of the decision as to the adequacy of state protection is reasonableness simpliciter.
b) Did the Board err in determining that the applicant was not linked to Project Thread, and that he would not be subject to persecution based on his ostensible connection to Project Thread?
[36] In my opinion, these issues must be reviewed on the standard of patent unreasonableness. A close reading of the evidence before the Tribunal, and in particular the newspaper articles published in respect of Project Thread, discloses nothing to indicate that the applicant was publicly associated with Project Thread. During the hearing, the applicant was asked about how his friends and family might associate him with Project Thread, and he testified that members of his family knew he had been enrolled at the Ottawa Business College and that he had been arrested, the former through his own communication with them and the latter through the communication of an uncle. The newspaper articles published in Canada and in Pakistan linked the College with a number of men arrested during the Project Thread investigation. However, the Board found that the applicant’s evidence with regard to the likelihood of people in Pakistan linking him with Project Thread was self-serving and not corroborated by independent evidence.
[37] Having read the Board’s reasons in conjunction with the testimony and documentary evidence, it is clear that the Board considered the evidence before it and conducted a reasoned analysis. In my opinion, the applicant is in effect asking this Court to re-weigh the evidence on this issue, and it cannot be said that the Board’s findings were patently unreasonable as that standard has been described in the jurisprudence.
[38] After making this finding, the Board nonetheless went on to consider at length the affidavit evidence of returnees to Pakistan who had been associated with Project Thread, finding that the experiences of the returnees did not amount to persecution even if they were all found to be credible, and that in any case the Pakistani officials in question appeared to be operating within the ambit of Pakistani law. Of concern is the wording used by the Board in dealing with the issue of extortion, in which it stated: “I can see how counsel might characterize a bribe of $400 Canadian dollars as extortion however in many places of the world such as Pakistan the requirement to bribe officials is both accepted and expected” (Board Reasons, p. 17).
[39] This logic is somewhat disturbing, as it appears to rest on the notion that if something is a common or expected practice, it cannot give rise to a ground of persecution. However, this finding was not necessary to the conclusions of the Board, as the credibility findings above would have in themselves been conclusive of this issue. Therefore, this passage, although flawed, is not fatal to the Board’s reasons on the standard of patent unreasonableness.
c) Did the Board err in its articulation of the proper test for determining whether adequate state protection exists?
[40] The applicant contended that the Board’s articulation of the test was flawed, to the extent that it relied on the serious efforts of the state without sufficient consideration of whether or not those efforts were effective. There is no doubt that some of the Board’s language is ambiguous and may lead to the interpretation proposed by the applicant. But having carefully considered the reasons of the Board in their entirety, I am of the view that it applied the proper test and turned its mind to the relevant considerations.
[41] In Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, above, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that an applicant must provide “clear and convincing proof” of a state’s incapacity to offer protection, stating as follows at pp. 724-26:
Like Hathaway, I prefer to formulate this aspect of the test for fear of persecution as follows: only in situations in which state protection “might reasonably have been forthcoming”, will the claimant’s failure to approach the state for protection defeat his claim. Put another way, the claimant will not meet the definition of “Convention refugee” where it is objectively unreasonable for the claimant not to have sought the protection of his home authorities; otherwise, the claimant need not literally approach the state.
The issue that arises, then, is how, in a practical sense, a claimant makes proof of a state's inability to protect its nationals as well as the reasonable nature of the claimant's refusal actually to seek out this protection. On the facts of this case, proof on this point was unnecessary, as representatives of the state authorities conceded their inability to protect Ward. Where such an admission is not available, however, clear and convincing confirmation of a state's inability to protect must be provided. For example, a claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated individuals let down by the state protection arrangement or the claimant's testimony of past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize. Absent some evidence, the claim should fail, as nations should be presumed capable of protecting their citizens. Security of nationals is, after all, the essence of sovereignty. Absent a situation of complete breakdown of state apparatus, such as that recognized in Lebanon in Zalzali, it should be assumed that the state is capable of protecting a claimant.
... A subjective fear of persecution combined with state inability to protect the claimant creates a presumption that the fear is well-founded. The danger that this presumption will operate too broadly is tempered by a requirement that clear and convincing proof of a state's inability to protect must be advanced...
[42] I acknowledge that there seem to be different streams of jurisprudence on the issue of state protection. The applicant relies, in particular, on the case of Bobrik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1364 (F.C.), where this Court required actual state protection, over and above evidence of the state’s effort. That decision, however, was subsequently questioned by Justice Gibson in Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State)(T.D.), [1995] 1 F.C. 780, where he wrote:
The first case was Bobrik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). In her reasons for decision in that case, Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer stated:
Thus, even when the state is willing to protect its citizens, a claimant will meet the criteria for refugee status if the protection being offered is ineffective. A state must actually provide protection, and not merely indicate a willingness to help. Where the evidence reveals that a claimant has experienced many incidents of harassment and/or discrimination without being effectively defended by the state, the presumption operates and it can be concluded that the state may be willing but unable to protect the claimant.
Further, Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer stated:
That the large number of discriminatory and harassing incidents did not stop after the applicants sought police assistance provides sufficient evidence that the state in this particular case could not offer effective protection to the applicants.
With great respect, I conclude that Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer sets too high a standard for state protection, a standard that would, in many circumstances, be difficult to attain even in this country. It is a reality of modern-day life that protection offered is sometimes ineffective. Many incidents of harassment and/or discrimination can be effected in a manner that renders effective investigation and protection very difficult. The use of unsigned correspondence that does not identify its source and of random telephone communications where the caller does not identify himself or herself are examples. A single incident of defacement of property is another. The applicants suffered from these types of incidents and received no satisfaction when they reported them to the militia or police. Random assaults, such as those suffered by the applicants, where the assailants are unknown to the victim and there are no independent witnesses are also difficult to effectively investigate and protect against. In all such circumstances, even the most effective, well-resourced and highly motivated police forces will have difficulty providing effective protection. This Court should not impose on other states a standard of "effective" protection that police forces in our own country, regrettably, sometimes only aspire to.
[43] More recently, Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson has addressed the issue of state protection in B.R. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 269. It seems to me that the following excerpt of her reasons is an accurate statement of the law as it stands now:
Absent a situation of complete breakdown of state apparatus, it is generally presumed that a state is able to protect its citizens. This presumption serves to reinforce the underlying rationale of international protection as a surrogate, coming into play where no alternative remains to the claimant. Refugee claimants must present clear and convincing confirmation of a state's inability to protect them in order to rebut the presumption that states are capable of protecting their citizens: Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. State protection cannot be held to a standard of perfection but it must be adequate. It is not enough to show that a government has not always been effective in protecting persons in a claimant's particular situation. However, where the state is so weak and its control is so tenuous as to make it a government in name only, it may be justifiable to claim an inability to obtain state protection: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 334 (F.C.A.) leave to appeal dismissed, [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 76.
[44] It is also worth noting that Justice Martineau went into an extensive review of the case law on the subject in Avila c. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 CF 359. He made it very clear that an assessment of the availability of state protection must rest on a personalized analysis of the applicant’s situation. This is precisely what the Board has done in the present case. It methodically reviewed the evidence pertaining to the risks alleged by the applicant, and measured that evidence against the backdrop of the current situation prevailing in the country. After having emphasized the various steps taken by the state of Pakistan to curb religious extremism and police abuses, and after having noted that the state is in control of its territories and has structures in place to provide citizens with protection under the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, it came to the conclusion that the state was able to protect its citizens.
[45] In coming to that conclusion, the Board was under no illusions and was clearly aware of the setbacks and of the long road to go before the task is complete. It nevertheless assessed the evidence using the yardstick of “adequate, but not perfect” protection. Indeed, the crucial question identified by the Board from the outset of its analysis was precisely whether Pakistan is “now providing adequate although not necessarily perfect protection for its citizens, Sunni and Shia, who fear they may be targeted personally for serious harm by religious extremists of either sect of Islam” (Board Reasons, pp. 18-19). Accordingly, I find that the Board applied the correct test for state protection.
d) Did the Board err in its assessment of the evidence with regard to the issue of state protection in Pakistan?
[46] The applicant argues that the Board failed to consider certain documentary evidence, and that some of the Board’s findings are inconsistent with the evidence. Specifically, as described above, the applicant impugns the Board’s findings that the number of murders of individuals by extremists has decreased, that better police training is now being used, and that there has been a crackdown on extremism by the government. The applicant submits that this is in direct conflict with the documentary evidence, in which a Human Rights Watch report states there has been a “sharp increase in the number of targeted killings of Shi’a...in recent years”. The applicant points to an Amnesty International report indicating that torture and ill-treatment by police are still routine, and that perpetrators are rarely held accountable. The applicant also notes that the Human Rights Watch report states that “[t]hose implicated in sectarian violence are rarely prosecuted and virtually no action has been taken to protect the affected communities”.
[47] In my opinion, it is trite law that the Board is not required to mention in its reasons all of the documentary evidence it considers. With regard to the impugned sections of the Board’s decision, I would note that these were also supported by the documentary evidence. Even if the Board did not specifically mention the evidence noted by the applicant, upon a somewhat probing examination it is clear the Board acknowledged that violence against Shia practitioners continued, that there have been police abuses, and that police have at times refused to prevent sectarian violence or charge persons involved in such violence (Board Reasons, pp. 20-23).
[48] The Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports formed part of the documentary evidence that was before the Board in this case, and the Board did not explicitly refer to them. The quotations provided by the applicant may be examples of issues on which these international non-governmental organizations take a position somewhat different from that of the internal reporting bodies of the United States and United Kingdom. To my mind, however, the excerpts cited by the applicant underscore issues, notably the risk of violence to Shia practitioners and the potential for impunity towards those who perpetrate violence. On my reading of the Board’s reasons in light of the evidence before it, it was clearly alive to these issues, and entitled to weigh the evidence in a well-reasoned manner, which it did. As such, in my opinion it cannot be said that the Board’s conclusions regarding state protection are unreasonable.
[49] For all the above reasons, this application for judicial review must be dismissed. The parties did not suggest any question for certification purposes, and none will be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES that this application for judicial review must be dismissed. The parties did not suggest any question for certification purposes, and none will be certified.
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-3386-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: ZEESHAN SAEED v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: May 17th, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER: de Montigny J.
APPEARANCES:
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Mr. David Orman
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Ms. Matina Karvellas |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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David Orman Toronto, ON
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John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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