Ottawa, Ontario, August 25, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
(a.k.a. Abudu-Azeez Ade Keshiro)
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) in which it determined that the applicant was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.
[2] The applicant claims to be a citizen of Nigeria, where he states he was subject to persecution on the basis of his homosexuality. He states that he began a homosexual relationship with his partner, Lukmon, in approximately 1994. He claims that Lukmon’s girlfriend caught the two being intimate in 2004, and subsequently blackmailed the men and reported them to an extremist Muslim group. The applicant further reports that Lukmon was murdered on or around August 10, 2004 and that he himself received death threats from the same group. The applicant also indicates that the police came to his home on August 29, 2004, stating that the applicant was wanted for “homosexuality and accessory to murder”. He therefore fled to Canada on November 1, 2004 and claimed refugee status shortly thereafter. His refugee claim was rejected by the Board in a decision dated July 20, 2005.
[3] The Board first considered several documents that the applicant submitted in order to establish his identity. The applicant’s birth certificate was rejected as the birth weight and length were not filled in, and the birth parents’ names were not noted. Confronted with this lack of information, the applicant was apparently unable to explain it. The Board also considered two driver’s licenses that the applicant submitted. It rejected them because of unexplained disparities in the recorded height and in the address of the issuing office. The Board also questioned the fact that both licenses were valid during the same period of time. Finally, the Board rejected the passport proffered by the applicant based on the fact that he did not list this document on his PIF, and based on its finding that the applicant’s explanation for how he received the passport (i.e. that his brother in Nigeria was able to obtain it for him despite outstanding murder charges) was untenable. As a result, the Board found that the applicant had provided no trustworthy original identity documents, and as such had not discharged the burden of establishing his identity pursuant to section 106 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).
[4] The Board then proceeded to assess the applicant’s fear of persecution. First, it considered a document that was purportedly the death certificate of the applicant’s alleged partner, Lukmon. The Board rejected it, citing inconsistencies between the alleged death certificate and the applicant’s testimony with regard to Lukmon’s height, age, occupation, and the date of death. In the Board’s view, this finding was buttressed by the fact that during his testimony, the applicant was unable to state his partner’s address. The Board also considered an obituary notice purporting to establish Lukmon’s death. The Board rejected this document because it contained various spelling mistakes, including the word “Obituary” itself. The applicant’s explanation for these errors, to the effect that “everything is bribery”, was not considered satisfactory by the Board. Finally, the Board found there were a number of spelling errors and inconsistencies in the Police Report Extract, and that the dates the extremist group was alleged to have come to the applicant’s home were inconsistent with the applicant’s testimony. As such, the Board held that the applicant had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution and rejected his refugee claim.
[5] The only issue to be determined in this judicial review application is whether the Board erred in finding that the applicant failed to establish his identity and key aspects of his claim.
[6] Insofar as the impugned decision is based on credibility findings, it is entitled to a high level of deference and should be reviewed on the standard of patent unreasonableness: Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (F.C.A.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315, [1993] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL). As held by the Supreme Court of Canada, the standard of patent unreasonableness mandates that this Court should not interfere with a decision unless “there is no line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”: Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17 (QL). In Shafi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 896, my colleague Justice Phelan set out the consequences of applying such a standard of review:
The Officer’s factual conclusions can only be reviewed on a standard of patent unreasonableness which is defined as “unreasonableness on its face, unsupported by evidence, or vitiated by failure to consider proper factors or failure to apply appropriate procedures”. The decision is said to be patently unreasonable where “…it was made arbitrarily or in bad faith, it cannot be supported by the evidence or the Minister…failed to consider appropriate factors”. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraphs 41 and 29.
[7] The same standard should be applied to the Board’s findings with regard to identity and authenticity of documents. This Court has indeed come to that conclusion in a number of recent decisions, including Ogiriki v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 342, [2006] F.C.J. No. 420 (QL); Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 296, [2006] F.C.J. No. 368 (QL); Egbokheo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 163, [2006] F.C.J. No. 285 (QL).
[8] In the present case, a careful review of the record and of the parties’ submissions has not convinced me that the Board erred in concluding the applicant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection in accordance with sections 96 and 97(1)(a) of the IRPA. It may be that some of the inconsistencies raised by the Board were minor, but taken as a whole, and in conjunction with the flawed identity documents, they were clearly sufficient to entitle the Board to find problems with the applicant’s credibility.
[9] The Board’s determination that the applicant did not establish his identity is not patently unreasonable, given the numerous omissions, inconsistencies and implausibilities regarding the identity documents. The birth certificate was undated, did not provide a birth weight, and did not state the names of the applicant’s parents. The two driver’s licenses contained inconsistent information regarding the applicant’s height, they were issued in different states and the second one was delivered before the first one expired. As for the passport, the applicant gave inconsistent information regarding its existence. In evidence, he stated that it was in fact a second passport, issued after he had left Nigeria and filled out his PIF, but did not explain why he had not indicated the existence of any passport in his PIF (Transcript, p.11). The Board also found the circumstances surrounding the issuance of this second passport to be implausible.
[10] The applicant has cited the case of Ngoyi v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 272 (QL), to support the proposition that minor inconsistencies in documents cannot be used to uphold the Board’s negative findings. I would note that in paragraph 14 of that case, Justice Tremblay-Lamer stated that certain anomalies in the documents “are relatively insignificant compared with the completely plausible explanations of the applicant.” In the present case, the applicant was confronted, for example on the inconsistencies in his evidence with regard to the driver’s licences (Transcript, pp. 13-14), passport (Transcript, p. 17), and police report (Transcript, p. 25).
[11] The Board also confronted the applicant about inconsistencies regarding documents he provided to support his assertion of a well-founded fear of persecution based on his homosexuality. For example, he was asked about the contrast between information he gave about Lukmon, and information listed on the death certificate, including details regarding Lukmon’s basic physical characteristics, address, occupation, and date of death (Transcript, pp. 19-22). He could not provide a plausible explanation for these inconsistencies.
[12] The applicant argues that the Board erred by failing to provide expert analysis of the documents adduced in evidence. Although expert analysis may be desirable or necessary in some cases, the Board has no obligation to order expert analysis where there is enough evidence to discredit its authenticity. As recently stated by my colleague Justice Barnes in Jin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 126, [2006] F.C.J. No. 181 (QL), at paragraph 19:
While it is correct that the Board is not itself an expert in the field of forensic analysis, it also has no duty to submit suspect documents for expert assessment provided that there is sufficient evidence before it to cast doubt upon their authenticity: see Culinescu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] FCJ No. 1200; Ibnmogdad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FC 321 and Kashif v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 179.
[13] In my opinion, the Board had ample evidence before it to discredit the authenticity of the documents offered in support of the applicant’s claim, and it certainly cannot be said that the Board was patently unreasonable in its findings.
[14] For all of the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that this application for judicial review must be dismissed. Neither of the parties requested that a question be certified, and no questions will be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES that that this application for judicial review must be dismissed. Neither of the parties requested that a question be certified, and no questions will be certified.
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4890-05
STYLE OF CAUSE: Abuduazeez Adetunji Keshiro
(a.k.a. Abudu-Azeez Ade Keshiro) v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
and JUDGMENT: de Montigny J.
APPEARANCES:
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Mr. Loftus Cuddy
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Ms. Aviva Basman
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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Robert Gertler Toronto, ON
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John H. Sims, Q.C., Department of Justice Toronto, ON.
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