Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 27, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
MEI AH FILM PRODUCTION CO. LTD., and
MEI AH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD.
and
GOLDEN FORMOSA ENTERTAINMENT LTD.,
CHIEN-WEN CHEN, HUI MEI CHEN,
And HUI-CHENG CHEN
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
O’KEEFE J.
[1] Film City Entertainment Ltd., Mei Ah Film Productions Co. Ltd., and Mei Ah Development Company Ltd., (the plaintiffs), commenced an action claiming copyright infringement by the defendants. This is a motion by the plaintiffs for summary judgment against the defendants, pursuant to Federal Court Rules, 1998, S.O.R. 198-106, Rule 216. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have reproduced and distributed to the public a film in which copyright is owned and licenced by the plaintiffs.
[2] The plaintiffs request the following relief:
That the plaintiffs be granted summary judgment against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright subsists in Canada in the film “Diva, Ah Hey!” (the work);
2. A declaration that Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd.;
4. A declaration that Film City Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the Film from Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (the Act);
5. A declaration that the defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work as described herein;
6. A permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their respective directors, officers, employees, servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly, infringing copyright in the work by any one or more of the following means: reproducing all or a substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff, Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for;
7. The following damages jointly and severally against the defendants:
(a) statutory damages pursuant to section 38.1 of the Act in the amount of $10,000; and
(b) exemplary and aggravated damages in the amount of $7,000;
8. Pre-judgment interest calculated against the statutory damages of $10,000 from June 13, 2003, pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c-79;
9. Post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c-79, commencing from the date of judgment;
10. Costs of this action in the amount of $3,840.00 in costs plus GST, and $667.86 for disbursements.
Background
[3] The plaintiffs have commenced an action for copyright infringement against the defendants. The plaintiffs allege that Golden Formosa Entertainment Limited (the corporate defendant), distributed to the general public, unauthorized counterfeit versions of a film in which the plaintiffs own the copyright in Canada. The plaintiffs also allege that the personal defendants, while acting in their capacities as either managers or directors of the corporate defendant, knowingly authorized and ordered the infringement.
[4] The film in question is a Chinese-language motion picture entitled (in English), “Diva, Ah Hey!” (the work) with accompanying sound track. The work is distributed in Canada by Film City Entertainment Ltd. (Film City) in various audio visual formats, including VHS video cassette tape, VCD and DVD formats.
[5] Film City owns the exclusive right in Canada to reproduce, distribute, sell, rent and offer for sale or rent the work, such right having been obtained by written exclusive licence from the respective owners of the copyright.
[6] Copyright exists in the work in Canada.
[7] The affidavit evidence of Patrick Mak establishes that he attended at the premises of the corporate defendant on June 13, 2003, and rented a video cassette of a copy of what he believed to be the Chinese language film with the English title, “Diva, Ah Hey!”.
[8] The affidavit evidence of Michael Leung establishes that he viewed the film and stated it was a crude and counterfeit form of the work.
[9] The defendant, Hui Mei Chen orders and procures movie products for the corporate defendant. In the past, this defendant purchased movies from Film City.
[10] The affidavit evidence of Mr. Leung also states that the defendants, Chien-Wen Chen and Hui Mei and Hui-Cheng Chen are “family members who share actively in the management and operation of the premises, including the principal activities of the corporate defendant which involve obtaining and distributing Chinese language movies and television shows (including the work) to the general public”.
Issue
[11] Should summary judgment be granted in this case?
Analysis and Decision
[12] In relation to summary judgments, Rules 213 to 218 of the Federal Courts Rules, 1998, apply and can be found in the attached annex.
[13] The plaintiffs also rely on sections 5 and 27 and subsections 38.1(5), 38.1(7), 39(2) and 53(2) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
[14] Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Granville Shipping Co. v. Pegasus Lines Ltd. S.A. et al. (1996) 111 F.T.R. 189 (F.C.T.D.), summarized the general principles that apply in applications for summary judgment as follows:
[8] I have considered all of the case law pertaining to summary judgment and I summarize the general principles accordingly:
1. the purpose of the provisions is to allow the court to summarily dispense with cases which ought not proceed to trial because there is no genuine issue to be tried (Old Fish Market Restaurants v. 1000357 Ontario Inc. et al.), at p. 222;
2. there is no determinative test (Feoso Oil Limited v. Saria (1995), 184 N.R. 307 (F.C.A.) but Stone, J. A., seems to have adopted the reasons of Henry, J., in Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie (Pizza Pizza) (1990), 75 O.R. (2d) 225 (Gen. Div.). It is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial, it is whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact at a future trial;
3. each case should be interpreted in reference to its own contextual framework (Blyth, supra, and Collie, supra);
4. provincial practice rules (especially rule 20 of the Ontario Rules) can aid in interpretation (Feoso, supra, and Collie, supra);
5. this court may determine questions of fact and law on the motion for summary judgment if this can be done on the material before the court (this is broader than rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure) (Patrick);
6. on the whole of the evidence, summary judgment cannot be
granted if the necessary facts cannot be found or if it would be unjust to do so (Pallman, supra, and Sears, supra);
7. in the case of a serious issue with respect to credibility, the case should go to trial because the parties should be cross-examined before the trial judge (Forde, supra, and Sears, supra). The mdere existence of apparent conflict in the evidence does not preclude summary judgment; the court should take a “hard look” at the merits and decide if there are issues of credibility to be resolved (Stokes, supra).
[15] I have considered the material filed on the motion, the submissions made by counsel for the plaintiffs and the submissions made by Ms. Chen on behalf of the defendants. I am of the view that summary judgment ought to be granted in this case. The plaintiffs have established that they own copyright in the work and that the copyright is registered in Canada. They have also shown that the defendants rented a counterfeit version of the work to Mr. Mak. With respect to the liability of the personal defendants, the affidavit evidence of Michael Leung is referred to in paragraph 46 of the plaintiffs’ memorandum of fact and law. In his affidavit, Michael Leung stated that the defendant Hui Mei Chen, as a long time director and manager of the corporate defendant, was aware of the existence of copyright and the plaintiffs’ rights in the work. Michael Leung also stated at paragraph 33 of his affidavit:
In the within action, the personal defendants all share the family name Chen. To the best of my belief, for the reasons cited above, I believe that they are all family members who share actively in the management and operation of the Premises, including the principal activities of the Corporate Defendant which involve obtaining and distributing Chinese language movies and television shows (including the Film) to the general public.
[16] The defendants filed a defence to the statement of claim but the defence was a bare denial that copyright subsists in the work and a denial that the plaintiffs did the acts alleged. The jurisprudence of this Court has established that mere denial is not a sufficient pleading in allegations of copyright infringement (see Video Box Enterprises Inc. v. Lam, 2006 FC 546 at paragraph 23).
[17] Applying the general principles outlined in Granville Shipping, I am of the view that summary judgment should be granted as there is no genuine issue to be tried. There is no issue as to credibility and the necessary facts are present to grant summary judgment.
[18] The plaintiffs have elected to claim statutory damages.
[19] The plaintiffs’ motion is granted as follows:
Summary judgment is granted against the defendants, including:
1. A declaration that copyright subsists in Canada in the work “Diva, Ah Hey!”;
2. A declaration that Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd.;
4. A declaration that Film City Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42;
5. A declaration that the defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work;
6. A permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their respective directors,
officers, employees, servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly, infringing copyright in the work by any one or more of the following means: reproducing all or a substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for.
[20] With respect to damages, I am not prepared to grant statutory damages in the amount of $10,000. In assessing the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, I have considered all relevant facts including the good faith or bad faith of the defendants, the conduct of the defendants before and during the proceedings and the need to deter other infringements of the copyright in question. In particular, I have considered the information outlined in paragraph 51 of the plaintiffs’ memorandum of fact and law. In particular, I note the defendants’ involvement in similar proceedings, attitude toward the judicial process and high level of sophistication. I have also taken into account the plaintiff’s submissions regarding the obviously counterfeit nature of the recording, the defendants’ continuing copyright infringement and evidence that the defendant has profited from the copyrighted work at the plaintiffs’ expense. Based on the facts of this case, I am prepared to award statutory damages in the amount of $5,000.
[21] I am not prepared to award exemplary and aggravated damages.
[22] With respect to costs, I will award the plaintiffs’ costs in the amount of $4,391.46 as claimed, as I believe that amount is reasonable on the facts of this case.
[23] The plaintiffs are awarded pre-judgment interest calculated against the statutory damages of $5,000 from June 13, 2003 pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79.
[24] The plaintiffs are awarded post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.79, commencing from the date of judgment.
ORDER
[25] IT IS ORDERED that summary judgment is granted against the defendants,
including:
1. A declaration that copyright subsists in Canada in the work “Diva, Ah Hey!”;
2. A declaration that Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd. is the owner of the copyright in the work;
3. A declaration that Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. is the first mesne rightsholder in the work and holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Film Production Co. Ltd.;
4. Film City Entertainment Ltd. holds a licence under copyright for the work from Mei Ah Development Company Ltd. which is protected by the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42;
5. A declaration that the defendants have infringed the plaintiffs’ rights in the work as
described herein.
6. A permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their respective directors,
officers, employees, servants, agents, assigns, and successors, from, directly or indirectly, infringing copyright in the work by any one or more of the following means: reproducing all or a substantial part of the work in a material form; selling or renting out, or by way of trade distributing, exposing or offering for sale or rental, or exhibiting in public, or distributing to such an extent as to prejudicially affect the plaintiffs’ rights, or possessing for the purpose of doing any of those acts described in this subparagraph, unless the plaintiff, Film City Entertainment Ltd.’s licence has been obtained and paid for.
7. Statutory damages against the defendants jointly and severally in the amount of
$5,000.
8. Pre-judgment interest calculated against the statutory damages of $5,000 from June
13, 2003 pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.79.
9. Post-judgment interest pursuant to the British Columbia Court Order Interest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 79, commencing from the date of judgment.
10. Costs in the amount of $4,391.46.
ANNEX
Rules 213 to 218 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 state as follows:
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213.(1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.
(2) A defendant may, after serving and filing a defence and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.
214.(1) A party may bring a motion for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for the hearing of the motion.
(2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion.
215. A response to a motion for summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
216.(1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
(2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is
(a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or
(b) a question of law, the Court may determine the question and grant summary judgment accordingly.
(3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law.
(4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.
217. A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other relief.
218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order
(a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim;
(b) for security for costs; or
(c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery.
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213.(1) Le demandeur peut, après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur — ou avant si la Cour l’autorise — et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire sur tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration.
(2) Le défendeur peut, après avoir signifié et déposé sa défense et avant que l’heure, la date et le lieu de l’instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire rejetant tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration.
214.(1) Toute partie peut présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire dans une action en signifiant et en déposant un avis de requête et un dossier de requête au moins 20 jours avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis.
(2) La partie qui reçoit signification d’une requête en jugement sommaire signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse au moins 10 jours avant la date de l’audition de la requête indiquée dans l’avis de requête.
215. La réponse à une requête en jugement sommaire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les allégations ou les dénégations contenues dans les actes de procédure déposés par le requérant. Elle doit plutôt énoncer les faits précis démontrant l’existence d’une véritable question litigieuse. 216.(1) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue qu’il n’existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant à une déclaration ou à une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(2) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue que la seule véritable question litigieuse est:
a) le montant auquel le requérant a droit, elle peut ordonner l’instruction de la question ou rendre un jugement sommaire assorti d’un renvoi pour détermination du montant conformément à la règle 153;
b) un point de droit, elle peut statuer sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
(3) Lorsque, par suite d’une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour conclut qu’il existe une véritable question litigieuse à l’égard d’une déclaration ou d’une défense, elle peut néanmoins rendre un jugement sommaire en faveur d’une partie, soit sur une question particulière, soit de façon générale, si elle parvient à partir de l’ensemble de la preuve à dégager les faits nécessaires pour trancher les questions de fait et de droit.
(4) Lorsque la requête en jugement sommaire est rejetée en tout ou en partie, la Cour peut ordonner que l’action ou les questions litigieuses qui ne sont pas tranchées par le jugement sommaire soient instruites de la manière habituelle ou elle peut ordonner la tenue d’une instance à gestion spéciale.
217. Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire aux termes des présentes règles peut poursuivre le même défendeur pour une autre réparation ou poursuivre tout autre défendeur pour la même ou une autre réparation.
218. Lorsqu’un jugement sommaire est refusé ou n’est accordé qu’en partie, la Cour peut, par ordonnance, préciser les faits substantiels qui ne sont pas en litige et déterminer les questions qui doivent être instruites, ainsi que:
a) ordonner la consignation à la Cour d’une somme d’argent représentant la totalité ou une partie de la réclamation;
b) ordonner la remise d’un cautionnement pour dépens;
c) limiter la nature et l’étendue de l’interrogatoire préalable aux questions non visées par les affidavits déposés à l’appui de la requête en jugement sommaire, ou limiter la nature et l’étendue de tout contre-interrogatoire s’y rapportant, et permettre l’utilisation de ces affidavits lors de l’interrogatoire à l’instruction de la même manière qu’à l’interrogatoire préalable.
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FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-337-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: FILM CITY ENTERTAINMENT LTD. et al
- and -
GOLDEN FORMOSA ENTERTAINMENT LTD. et al
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF HEARING: March 27, 2006
APPEARANCES:
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Trevor Kaatz
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Hui Mei Chen
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SELF-REPRESENTED |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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Boughton Law Corporation Vancouver, British Columbia
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Hui Mei Chen Burnaby, British Columbia
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