Ottawa, Ontario, November 15th, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
Applicant
and
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] Mr. Ruofan Zhang is a 25-year-old Chinese citizen who came to Canada in 2002 as a student. While his study permit was originally issued for a period of two years, he was able to extend it for a year. Unfortunately for him, his second application to extend his visa was refused, as well as his subsequent application to restore his student permit so he could continue his studies. This application for judicial review relates to the decision by an immigration officer, Anthony Maekawa, to refuse his restoration application.
[2] Mr. Zhang has raised a number of arguments to support his challenge of the immigration officer’s decision. Although some of these arguments are without merit, I have concluded that the impugned decision must be quashed because it is not substantiated by any reasons whatsoever.
BACKGROUND
[3] Mr. Zhang moved to British Columbia in 2002 on a temporary student permit that was valid until August 2004. He subsequently applied for and was granted an extension of his temporary resident status to August 30, 2005. Mr. Zhang first studied English as a second language until December 2004 (first at Sprott Shaw Community College, and then at Victor College), before enrolling in a Carpentry and Construction Industry Training Program at Canadian Community College (CCC) in January 2005.
[4] Since he wanted to continue these studies, Mr. Zhang applied to have his study permit extended in August 2005. After having interviewed him by telephone (and with no interpreter) on December 14, 2005, immigration officer Dorothy Ng decided the same day to refuse his application. In the operative portion of her letter informing Mr. Zhang of her decision, Officer Ng wrote:
Dear Mr. Zhang,
Any person wishing to extend their temporary resident status in Canada must satisfy an officer that they meet the criteria. This includes satisfying the officer that they will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay, that they will not contravene the conditions of entry and that they do not belong in a category of persons inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
In reaching a decision, an officer considers several factors, which include but are not limited to:
· the applicant’s travel and identity documents;
· the reason for travel to Canada and the reason for applying for the extension;
· the applicant’s financial means for the extended stay and return home;
· The applicant’s ties to his/her country of residence, including immigration status, employment and family ties;
· whether the applicant would be likely to leave Canada at the end of their authorized stay.
After considering all the circumstances of your case, I am not satisfied that you meet the requirements of the Act and Regulations. Your application for an extension of your study permit has been refused. Since I have refused your application for a renewal, you are now without status in Canada. You may be reported under subsection A 44(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for remaining in Canada without authorization.
[5] It appears from the notes she entered in the Field Operations Support System (FOSS), the computerized note-taking system maintained by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), that Officer Ng believed Mr. Zhang had decided to study carpentry instead of commerce so he could stay in Canada and work. She also wrote that Mr. Zhang could not confirm he had completed any of the courses listed on his CCC transcript. She determined he had only finished one course there, and was only enrolled in one course at the time of the interview. On that basis, she concluded he was not a bona fide student, and did not intend to leave Canada at the end of his stay.
[6] Mr. Zhang did not leave Canada, nor did he seek leave of this Court to challenge Officer Ng’s decision to refuse his extension application. Instead, Mr. Zhang submitted a restoration application on December 28, 2005, seeking to re-acquire the temporary resident status he had lost just two weeks earlier. In his application, he submitted further evidence of his attendance at CCC, and of his acceptance at Northwest Community College in Terrace, British Columbia. It is worth quoting in full from the letter of December 21, 2005 addressed to CIC by Ms. Nuala Power, president of the CCC:
This letter is to address the rejection of the extension of the study permit for Mr. Ruo Fan Zhang. I do not believe the following facts were made clear when the student talked to the immigration officer.
Mr. Zhang has completed the introduction to Construction Framing Program at Canadian Community College in Vancouver, B.C. He was enrolled full time and completed the course with satisfactory grades including in Safety Certificates.
He has now been accepted to do the next part of his training which he will do at Northwest Community College, a public community college in Terrace, northern British Columbia. Canadian Community College has an articulation agreement with Northwest Community College for this program. I am enclosing a copy of the acceptance letter from Northwest Community College.
Mr. Zhang has been an excellent and engaged student in our program. He was tested, selected and admitted by Northwest Community College because of the construction and language skills he has gained. After graduating from Northwest Community College, he will be eligible for a one-year work permit, as allowed for graduates of public Colleges and Universities. There is currently a desperate need for trained carpenters/framers in all of British Columbia and therefore he will easily be able to find gainful employment for that year that will be a benefit to British Columbia and Canada as a whole. In fact the city government of Terrace, B.C. has welcomed this articulation with the Canadian Community College and Northwest Community College. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at …
[7] Mr. Zhang’s restoration application was assigned to Officer Maekawa, who refused it on March 2, 2006. The officer’s letter essentially quoted paragraph 47(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the IRPA), and section 182 of its accompanying Regulations, and simply stated that the application was refused as he was not satisfied Mr. Zhang met those criteria.
[8] On May 1, 2006, a Minister’s Delegate held a hearing and determined Mr. Zhang was inadmissible to Canada because he had not left Canada at the end of the period authorized for his stay. As a consequence, an exclusion order was issued against Mr. Zhang.
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
[9] Mr. Zhang submitted a number of arguments in furtherance of his application for judicial review, but most of them relate to alleged breaches of procedural fairness. First and foremost, he claims the restoration decision contains no reasons, aside from concluding he did not meet the criteria in paragraph 47(a) of the IRPA and section 182 of the Regulations.
[10] He also argues that Officer Maekawa had a duty to consider the extensive documentary evidence Mr. Zhang submitted in support of his application and to provide reasons why he did not consider it sufficient to restore Mr. Zhang’s status.
[11] Along the same lines, Mr. Zhang contends that Officer Maekawa fettered his discretion by relying exclusively on Officer Ng’s conclusions as the basis of his own refusal, without analyzing Mr. Zhang’s new study plan and corroborating documents. Thus, he claims, Officer Maekawa violated the principle of “he who hears must decide” by relying on Officer Ng’s conclusions from the phone interview.
[12] Mr. Zhang’s other set of arguments has to do with alleged factual errors. He claims, for example, that it was patently unreasonable for Officer Maekawa to conclude he was in the same course and facility for both his extension and restoration applications, as appears from his entry in the FOSS system on January 23, 2006. In his extension application, he asked to study at the CCC from August 2005 until November 24, 2006, while in his restoration application, he showed he had been accepted at Northwest in January 2006 for one year in its English as a Second Language Carpentry Program in Terrace, B.C.
[13] He also submits that Officer Maekawa erred in relying on the previous refusal because Officer Ng made errors in arriving at her decision. For example, he argued that Officer Ng had no basis to conclude his program was only one year long (instead of two) and that he had only completed one course rather than a full year of the program, as outlined in Ms. Power’s letter.
[14] Finally, Mr. Zhang argues that he did not tell Officer Ng he decided to study construction so he could stay and work in Canada. Rather, he would have told her that he planned to look at both the Chinese and Canadian markets after graduating. He claims that he was entitled to state he may apply to work in Canada after his graduation, because he has every right to take advantage of the respondent’s Post-Graduation Work Program, just as it is acceptable for temporary resident visa applicants to state that they plan to apply for permanent residence in Canada. The appropriate test in that respect, he submits, is whether he would remain illegally, and there was no evidence before Officer Ng to support such a conclusion.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
[15] The Minister has responded to each of Mr. Zhang’s allegations, and also raised a few additional issues. Overall, the Minister argues that Officer Maekawa was entitled to rely on Officer Ng’s decision to conclude Mr. Zhang would not leave Canada at the end of his stay, because he had said so when interviewed for his extension application. Since that decision was not challenged, and since Mr. Zhang was relying on the same program to seek the same status, Officer Maekawa was entitled to rely on his colleague’s finding in the extension application.
[16] With respect to the sufficiency of the reasons, the Minister argues this kind of decision is entitled to a minimal degree of procedural fairness. Not only was Mr. Zhang seeking only temporary resident status, but he had the means to understand the restoration decision, because it referred to the statutory requirements in the IRPA and its Regulations, and concluded Mr. Zhang had not met them. Furthermore, he was seeking the same status that he had just been refused. If he was unsure of the basis for that decision, he could have requested an explanation from CIC. Finally, Mr. Zhang must have been aware that he had lost his temporary resident status because he had not established that he would leave Canada at the end of his authorized period, since he received all of the FOSS notes relating to his restoration application within a couple of weeks of receiving the refusal letter from Officer Maekawa.
[17] The Minister also claims that Mr. Zhang has mistakenly attributed comments in the FOSS notes to Officer Maekawa. The only FOSS notes that would have been written by Officer Maekawa were written February 25, 2006, and state: “Restoration application refused because he does not meet requirements under R182.”
[18] The Minister goes on to argue that a tribunal is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it, and that there was nothing wrong with Officer Maekawa consulting Officer Ng’s earlier decision and notes.
[19] Finally, the Minister argues that an applicant cannot ignore an order where there is a procedure for its review, and then later seek to challenge it indirectly in different proceedings. In addition, it is submitted that Mr. Zhang has sought to introduce new evidence about what he said during his interview with Officer Ng that was not before Office Maekawa when he made his decision, and this new evidence should therefore be disregarded.
ISSUES
[20] There are essentially two issues to be resolved in this application for judicial review:
1. Did Officer Maekawa fail to observe any rule of procedural fairness owed to Mr. Zhang?
2. Did Officer Maekawa commit factual errors or fail to consider the information before him in denying the restoration application?
ANALYSIS
[21] This Court has consistently held that immigration officers’ decisions are subject to the reasonableness standard on judicial review: see, for example, Castro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 659, and Patel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 224. This is indeed consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker]. To the extent that alleged errors are of a factual nature, this is therefore the standard against which they must be assessed.
[22] However, this case does not solely involve substantive review questions. Mr. Zhang, in fact, argues Officer Maekawa breached his procedural fairness obligations. In Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, the Federal Court of Appeal reaffirmed that procedural fairness is not subject to any deference by this Court. The Court cited C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, and concluded:
[53] CUPE directs a court, when reviewing a decision challenged on the grounds of procedural fairness, to isolate any act or omission relevant to procedural fairness (at para. 100). This procedural fairness element is reviewed as a question of law. No deference is due. The decision-maker has either complied with the content of the duty of fairness appropriate for the particular circumstances, or has breached this duty.
[23] Section 182 of the Regulations provides that a foreign national who has lost his or her temporary resident status as a result of failing to comply with certain conditions may apply to restore that status. On an application by a foreign national to restore his or her temporary resident status, an officer shall restore that status if it is established that the foreign national meets the initial requirements for their stay. Pursuant to section 179 of the Regulations, the initial requirements for a foreign national’s stay in Canada as a temporary resident include establishing that the foreign national will leave Canada at the end of the period authorized for his or her stay. These provisions of the Regulations can be found in Schedule “A” to these Reasons.
[24] I must say from the outset that I agree with many of the submissions made by counsel for the Minister. First of all, it is fair to say that a tribunal or a decision-maker is presumed to have considered all of the evidence submitted without having to refer specifically to each and every piece of documentary evidence filed by the parties.
[25] I also agree that the FOSS notes of January 23, 2006 were made by another immigration officer in another CIC office. These are the notes to which Mr. Zhang has referred to support his allegations that Officer Maekawa made an erroneous finding of fact with respect to his course of studies.
[26] I would also reject Mr. Zhang’s submissions regarding the principle that “he who hears must decide.” As I said in Kniazeva v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 268, the case law is clear that this principle does not apply to administrative decisions, especially visa officers’ decisions. The same is true for immigration officers. Having said this, it is far from clear what weight Officer Maekawa gave to his fellow officer’s notes, or to Officer Ng’s decision in Mr. Zhang’s extension application.
[27] Finally, I do not think there is any dispute with the principle that Mr. Zhang could not challenge Officer Ng’s decision as part of the present application for judicial review of Officer Maekawa’s decision. As the Federal Court of Appeal has held in Canada v. Grenier, 2005 FCA 348, an applicant cannot ignore an order where there is a procedure for its review, and then later seek to challenge it indirectly in different proceedings. To that extent, Mr. Zhang should not be able to rely on evidence of what he may have said during his interview with Officer Ng that was not before Officer Maekawa.
[28] That being said, I am not convinced that this case can be assimilated to the facts that gave rise to the Grenier decision. In the latter case, the appellant had initiated an action for damages when judicial review was available. The Court was justifiably concerned with the possibility that claimants might try to circumvent the deference that occurs during judicial review by attacking administrative decisions in an action for damages.
[29] Here, however, Mr. Zhang is not trying to avoid judicial review. Rather, it appears he was merely following the procedure set out in section 182 of the Regulations. Having lost his temporary status when his extension application was denied, he decided to apply for a restoration of his status instead of challenging the decision in his extension application in court. It was perfectly legitimate to follow this administrative route instead of the judicial one to correct the mistakes allegedly made by Officer Ng.
[30] While Officer Ng’s decision is not the subject of this application, it nevertheless ought to be considered to the extent that Officer Maekawa relied on it in refusing the restoration application. The Minister cannot have it both ways. If Officer Maekawa was entitled to rely on Officer Ng’s decision because the two applications are essentially based on the same facts, as counsel for the Minister argued, then surely Mr. Zhang should be allowed to dispute the findings made by Officer Ng on the basis of the new documentary evidence submitted to Officer Maekawa.
[31] However, the question of whether Officer Ng’s decision was reasonable given the information she had at the time is not the issue here. Officer Maekawa was presented with evidence countering a number of Officer Ng’s findings, in particular her conclusion that Mr. Zhang would not leave the country at the end of his authorized period. While he could take the extension decision into consideration, he also had to assess Mr. Zhang’s new evidence in support of his claim that Officer Ng’s decision was mistaken or did not reflect his true intentions.
[32] This brings me to the real defect of Officer Maekawa’s decision: the insufficiency of his reasons. It is true that there is nothing in the IRPA requiring an immigration officer to provide reasons to an applicant. But it is well established that the duty of procedural fairness sometimes requires that explanations be given for a particular decision. As the Supreme Court found in Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, an administrative decision that affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual is sufficient to trigger the application of the duty of fairness. As to the particular procedures entailed by this duty of fairness in a given set of circumstances, one must turn to the criteria elaborated by Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé in Baker, above. These criteria include the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it, the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the decision-making body operates, the importance of the decision to the individual in question, the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision, and the choice of procedures made by the decision-making body.
[33] In the case at bar, the decision was certainly more administrative than judicial, which normally points to a lower level of procedural fairness. Indeed, the Minister has cited Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Cha, 2006 FCA 126 [Cha] for the principle that temporary residents – particularly students – are generally entitled to a minimal degree of procedural fairness. I hasten to say, however, that the officer in this case was not called to ascertain purely objective facts, as was the case in Cha. In that case, an immigration officer had to determine whether the applicant had been convicted of an offence listed in section 36 of the IRPA. This is a straightforward and fact-driven inquiry, of a purely objective nature. It is somewhat different from assessing whether a foreign national applying to have his temporary resident status restored will leave the country by the end of his authorized period.
[34] With respect to the statutory scheme, the IRPA provides for judicial review of a rejected restoration application. There is neither a privative clause nor a statutory right of appeal. However, judicial review is available with leave from this Court.
[35] Turning to the third factor, this decision is unquestionably important to Mr. Zhang. As a result of the negative restoration decision, Mr. Zhang was found to be inadmissible to Canada in May 2006 and is currently the subject of an exclusion order. While Mr. Zhang has no right to remain in Canada, the decision that he is challenging in this Court no doubt will have profound implications for him. As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote in Baker, above, at paragraph 25: “The more important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its impact on that person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections that will be mandated.”
[36] As to the fourth criterion, I do not think Mr. Zhang can claim any legitimate expectation in terms of process based on the promises or regular practices of immigration officers. Finally, I am of the view that the IRPA accords the Minister considerable flexibility to decide on the proper procedure, and immigration officers, as a matter of practice, do not conduct interviews in all cases.
[37] The review of these factors leads me to the conclusion that a relatively low degree of procedural fairness is warranted in an immigration officer’s decision to grant or deny an application to restore temporary resident status. As the Federal Court of Appeal stated in Cha, above, at paragraph 23:
Immigration is a privilege, not a right. Non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country. Parliament has the right to enact legislation prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in Canada. As a result, the Act and the Regulations treat citizens differently than permanent residents, who in turn are treated differently than Convention refugees, who are in turn treated differently than other foreign nationals. (Chieu v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, at paragraph 57; Chiarelli v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1992] 1 R.C.S. 711 at pages 733, 734; Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 at paragraph 46). It is fair to say that compared to other types of non-citizens, foreign nationals who are temporary residents receive little substantive and procedural protection throughout the Act.
[38] That being said, this Court has also held repeatedly that a low level of procedural fairness still imposes some obligations on visa officers to provide reasons for negative decisions. For example, Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson wrote the following in Babalola v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 1062 at paragraph 5:
I am mindful that the duty of fairness owed by visa officers to applicants for student authorizations is minimal. Here, the reasons contained in the visa officer’s notes are less than skeletal and do not accord with the reasons provided in the refusal letter. The minimal duty of fairness was not respected.
[39] We find similar pronouncements in Santos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 494; Xu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1184 (F.C.T.D.) (QL); Saha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1325; and Novak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 243.
[40] The rationale for this obligation to write reasons is manifold. As canvassed in Baker, above, these reasons include allowing the parties to see that their arguments have been carefully considered, enabling the reviewing court to determine the reasonableness of the decision, fostering better decisions from officials and administrative tribunals, and assuring the litigants that they were treated fairly and appropriately. Of course, one also has to be mindful of the excessive burden that would be added on administrative decision-makers if extensive reasons were required. But it is certainly not too much to ask for a minimal explanation of the decision reached.
[41] In the present case, the mere recital of the relevant sections of the IRPA and the Regulations is clearly not sufficient. If overseas visa claimants like the one in Babalola, above, have been entitled to minimal reasons explaining why their applications were rejected, surely the same principle ought to apply to applications within Canada for restoring temporary status. After all, Mr. Zhang had more to lose than an overseas applicant, having already completed part of the program in which he had registered.
[42] The Minister claims that Mr. Zhang had the means to understand why his restoration application was refused, and thus Officer Maekawa satisfied any obligations of procedural fairness by referring to the statutory provisions relevant to the decision. Counsel for the Minister relied on Gardner v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 284 for that proposition.
[43] In that case, Ms. Gardner complained to the Canadian Human Rights Commission about the Treasury Board and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Commission investigated her complaint, then decided to dismiss it. Ms. Gardner applied for judicial review of the Commission’s decision to reject her complaint. In finding that she had the means of understanding the basis of the Commission’s decision, the Federal Court of Appeal traced her correspondence with both the Commission and the Treasury Board. Ms. Gardner was kept informed of the Treasury Board’s response to both her complaint and the Commission’s investigation of her complaint. Furthermore, she had been given the opportunity to respond in each instance. It is quite a stretch to suggest that the facts in this case are sufficiently similar that the Court should conclude Mr. Zhang had the means to understand the basis of Officer Maekawa’s decision.
[44] While it may have been perfectly acceptable for Officer Maekawa to refuse the restoration application, that could not excuse him from providing Mr. Zhang with some sort of an explanation. I simply do not agree that Mr. Zhang had the “means” to understand the basis for the decision, simply by being informed of the applicable statutory provisions. Contrary to Ms. Gardner, Mr. Zhang was not “intimately involved” in the decision-making process. Even more importantly, he submitted further evidence that he was a bona fide student, including a letter from Ms. Power, providing details of his program of study at that institution, his successful completion of that program, and his acceptance to Northwest Community College. On that basis, he was certainly entitled to some explanation as to why these documents were inadequate to show that he was a bona fide student.
[45] As for Officer Ng’s conclusion that Mr. Zhang would not leave Canada at the end of his stay, this was explicitly addressed in Ms. Power’s letter when she wrote: “After graduating from Northwest Community College [Mr. Zhang] will be eligible for a one-year work permit, as allowed for graduates of public Colleges and Universities.” This clearly reflects Mr. Zhang’s attempt to respond to Officer’s Ng’s conclusion. Indeed, it was perfectly legitimate for Mr. Zhang to take advantage of this Post-Graduation Work Program, just as it would be acceptable for temporary resident visa applicants to state that they plan to apply for permanent residence in Canada. This does not mean Mr. Zhang will not leave Canada if he is not authorized to remain here at the end of that program. Since Officer Maekawa did not even call Mr. Zhang for an interview so he could clarify his intentions, the least the officer could do was provide him with the reasons why he was not convinced by Mr. Zhang’s stated purpose.
[46] For all of the above reasons, I am of the view that this application for judicial review should succeed. In the end, counsel for the Minister tried to argue that the case was moot, since Mr. Zhang could not obtain the restoration of his temporary resident status as he has been declared inadmissible to Canada. If that was to be the case, the Minister would in effect be able to insulate the immigration officer’s decision. I believe, on the contrary, that this decision may provide Mr. Zhang with ammunition to challenge the exclusion order after having applied for an extension of time.
[47] This application for judicial review is therefore granted. No questions for certification have been proposed by the parties, and none will be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: This application for judicial review be granted. No questions for certification have been proposed by the parties, and none will be certified.
SCHEDULE “A”
|
47. A foreign national loses temporary resident status (a) at the end of the period for which they are authorized to remain in Canada; *** 179. An officer shall issue a temporary resident visa to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is established that the foreign national (a) has applied in accordance with these Regulations for a temporary resident visa as a member of the visitor, worker or student class; (b) will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay under Division 2; (c) holds a passport or other document that they may use to enter the country that issued it or another country; (d) meets the requirements applicable to that class; (e) is not inadmissible; and (f) meets the requirements of section 30.
***
182. On application made by a visitor, worker or student within 90 days after losing temporary resident status as a result of failing to comply with a condition imposed under paragraph 185(a), any of subparagraphs 185(b)(i) to (iii) or paragraph 185(c), an officer shall restore that status if, following an examination, it is established that the visitor, worker or student meets the initial requirements for their stay and has not failed to comply with any other conditions imposed. |
47. Emportent perte du statut de résident temporaire les faits suivants : a) l’expiration de la période de séjour autorisé; *** 179. L’agent délivre un visa de résident temporaire à l’étranger si, à l’issue d’un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis : a) l’étranger en a fait, conformément au présent règlement, la demande au titre de la catégorie des visiteurs, des travailleurs ou des étudiants; b) il quittera le Canada à la fin de la période de séjour autorisée qui lui est applicable au titre de la section 2; c) il est titulaire d’un passeport ou autre document qui lui permet d’entrer dans le pays qui l’a délivré ou dans un autre pays; d) il se conforme aux exigences applicables à cette catégorie; e) il n’est pas interdit de territoire; f) il satisfait aux exigences prévues à l’article 30. ***
182. Sur demande faite par le visiteur, le travailleur ou l’étudiant dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la perte de son statut de résident temporaire parce qu’il ne s’est pas conformé à l’une des conditions prévues à l’alinéa 185a), aux sous-alinéas 185b)(i) à (iii) ou à l’alinéa 185c), l’agent rétablit ce statut si, à l’issue d’un contrôle, il est établi que l’intéressé satisfait aux exigences initiales de sa période de séjour et qu’il s’est conformé à toute autre condition imposée à cette occasion. |
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-1556-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: Ruofan Zhang v.
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia
DATE OF HEARING: October 31, 2006
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Adrian D. Huzel FOR THE APPLICANT
Ms. R. Keith Reimer FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Embarkation Law Group FOR THE APPLICANT
Immigration and Citizenship Lawyers
Vancouver, British Columbia
John H. Sims, Q.C. FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada