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Date: 20061120

Docket: IMM-7519-05

Citation: 2006 FC 1402

OTTAWA, Ontario, November 20, 2006

PRESENT:     The Honourable Paul U.C. Rouleau

 

 

BETWEEN:

CARLTON ANTHONY WILLIAMS

Applicant

and

 

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

 

[1]               This is an application made pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act dated November 22, 2005 by which the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board granted the respondent’s application to cancel the stay of deportation issued against the applicant. On July 7, 2006, Justice Layden-Stevenson granted the application for leave.

 

[2]               The facts leading to this application are as follows.  The applicant, born in 1966, is a citizen of Jamaica and came to Canada around the age of ten. He was landed on February 11, 1981. He is not a citizen of Canada.

 

[3]               The applicant has had no contact with his father since that time and it is believed that he has recently passed away. The applicant’s two sisters and mother live in Canada and arrived around the same time as he did. It is believed that the applicant has no remaining family in Jamaica.

 

[4]               Since arriving in Canada, the applicant has amassed over at least 50 criminal convictions, including assault, sexual assault, failure to comply, attempted break and enter, drug trafficking, harassment and failure to appear, amongst others. The applicant is also addicted to crack cocaine and is mentally ill, having been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia in 1990 as well as a personality disorder. The applicant’s antisocial traits cause him to be generally aggressive and hostile to others. He is also troubled by frequent psychotic episodes and paranoid delusions because of which he believes others will harm him and can read his mind.

 

[5]               On July 3, 2002, a deportation order was issued against the applicant. However, on April 22, 2003, IAD member Daniele A. D’Ignazio granted a stay of the deportation order for a period of four years with conditions. She did so primarily on her finding that there was a reasonable expectation that the applicant was able to complete and comply with specific and strict undertakings. The testimony before the IAD indicated that the applicant had a supportive family, and that he had made significant progress in understanding his mental illness and its treatment.

 

[6]               On August 30, 2005, the Minister brought an application to cancel the stay pursuant to subsection 68(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act because the applicant had failed to meet the following conditions:

 

  • Report in person to Citizenship and Immigration.
  • Make reasonable efforts to seek and maintain full-time employment and report any change in employment immediately.
  • Continue psychotherapy with Dr. Freidman or any qualified psychiatrist.
  • Make reasonable efforts to maintain himself in a condition to prevent his mental illness and substance abuse from conducting himself in a manner dangerous to himself and others from committing further offences.
  • Not knowingly associate with individuals who have a criminal record or who are engaged in criminal activity.

 

 

 

[7]               Subsequent to the Minister’s application, the applicant was convicted of two criminal offences involving assaults against peace officers, and was found not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder for two other identical charges. On March 18, 2005, the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordered that the applicant be detained at the medium security Queen Street Mental Health Centre and that a program be created for his detention in custody and rehabilitation.

 

[8]               In its ruling, the IAD sought to determine whether the applicant had failed to meet the conditions of his stay, and if so, whether this justified its cancellation. The IAD made a number of findings that favoured the cancellation of the stay:

 

§         Upon release into Canadian society, the applicant will be unable to comply with conditions imposed on him.

§         The applicant will not remain compliant of taking his medications, nor will he avail himself of the support network.

§         The applicant will be unable to conduct himself in a manner that his mental illness and tendency towards violent behaviour will not result in his committing further crimes.

 

 

 

[9]               The IAD found that it was required to consider the criteria of Ribic v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.B.D. No. 4 and engage in a “fundamental justice balance” in the context of section 7 of the Charter and the decision of Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.

 

[10]           In addressing the Ribic factors, the IAD compared how the new evidence available at the time of the application compared with the evidence at the time the stay was granted. In so doing, it was noted the applicant was consistently non-compliant in respect of taking medication and attending at his psychiatrist. Further, the evidence provided by those responsible for assessing his state of health indicated that he continued to be a risk to the public and was unaware of his aggressive demeanour or the details of past criminal behaviour.

 

[11]           Turning to his establishment, it was noted that valiant efforts had been made on the part of his sisters and his mother, and even his solicitor, but all had been unsuccessful in having any meaningful influence on his behaviour. While the IAD concluded that his family would obviously be emotionally affected if he was removed from Canada, there was no evidence that they would suffer great personal hardship.

 

[12]           The IAD did find that the applicant would suffer a potential hardship if removed to Jamaica. On this point, the IAD approached the issue in the context of Romans v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 3 F.C.R. 159 [Romans II]. The IAD concluded that the conditions in Jamaica for mentally ill persons such as the applicant would be significantly worse than in Canada. However, in order to determine whether deportation would be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, the IAD determined that it was required to balance this conclusion with the danger that the applicant would pose to Canadian citizens.

 

[13]           The IAD found that where the removal of a permanent resident for serious criminality is done in the interest of protecting Canadian society, the applicant’s foreign hardship cannot be considered in isolation and should be done so in accordance with the other Ribic factors. It is only when the balancing required by section 7 of the Charter confirms that the potential hardship faced by the permanent resident would be grossly disproportionate to the government’s interest that a deportation would not be in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

 

[14]           On these findings, the IAD notably found that while the applicant would face serious difficulties, there was no evidence that he would be tortured, and according to the findings in Romans, he would likely find himself on the street, the subject of verbal and physical abuse. The IAD further noted that no country condition documents were provided other than a letter from the Consulate General that the main mental health institution in Jamaica could not properly care for the applicant. While the evidence indicated that the applicant would suffer substantially more unfortunate circumstances in Jamaica that in Canada, they would not “shock the conscience” of the Canadian public when considering the threat the applicant posed to the public safety in Canada.

 

[15]           The IAD noted that the applicant would be released back into society given that the ORB had ordered the applicant to be moved from the Forensic Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene to a medium secure unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto for rehabilitation and temporary release. Therefore, the IAD concluded that the applicant’s removal to Jamaica would not be grossly disproportionate to the legitimate government interest of protecting the safety of the Canadian public. There was therefore no infringement on principles of fundamental justice.

 

[16]           On these findings, the IAD granted the Minister’s application pursuant to paragraph 68(2)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and cancelled the stay.

 

[17]           The applicant now seeks to have that decision set aside on the grounds that the IAD incorrectly found that the applicant would be released into the community where he would be likely to re-offend and did so on its erroneous understanding of the Ontario Review Board’s jurisdiction. It is argued that the ORB may only release an individual without supervision where the individual does not pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.  It is submitted that the IAD ignored these powers and duties and simply assumed that the applicant would be released while still a danger to the public or without a proper assessment of his condition. Alternatively, it is argued that if the Appeal Division did properly consider Board’s powers, it ignored the limitations of the Review Board’s ability to release the individual.

 

[18]           In addition, the applicant argues that the IAD erred in its analysis of whether the applicant’s deportation would be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice pursuant to section 7 of the Charter. It is argued that the standard upon which the IAD must consider the principles of fundamental justice is the risk of cruel and unusual treatment that the applicant would suffer upon return to Jamaica.

 

[19]           The respondent submits that the IAD is entitled to make its determination in respect of the applicant’s danger to the public, regardless of the ORB’s determination and the IAD must not submit to the discretion of the ORB as doing so would fetter its discretion and render its decision on the Ribic factors meaningless.  It is further argued that there is no guarantee that the ORB will indefinitely detain the applicant and should the applicant be declared a threat but not a significant threat to the public, the ORB would not have jurisdiction to continue to detain him.

 

[20]           With respect to the Charter, the respondent maintains that the IAD undertook an appropriate balancing of the interests of the applicant and Canadian society, noting in particular, that only the applicant’s suffering in Jamaica militated in his favour but was simply not satisfactory to convince against deportation, given his lengthy history.  It is further argued that section 12 of the Charter is irrelevant to the present application given that the applicant did not establish any cruel or unusual punishment or treatment or that his removal is so excessive as to outrage the standards of public decency and shock the conscience of Canadians.

 

[21]           I am granting the application and returning the matter to the Immigration Appeal Division for the following reasons.

 

[22]           In its decision the IAD stated as follows at paragraph 36:

 

The only conditions this panel could impose on the respondent that would give it any confidence in a positive outcome would be to have him kept in a mental institution, and upon release, to be brought back before the IAD which could then assess, at the relevant time, the situation concerning his possible rehabilitation, removal or appropriate conditions that might attach to a further stay.  Such an outcome, that might be crafted to satisfy all interests, is not within the panel’s jurisdiction.  His treatment, and when and how he will be released, are within provincial jurisdiction given to the Ontario Review Board under the Ontario Mental Health Act.  There is no reliable mechanism that this panel is aware of, to bring the respondent back before the IAD at the possible time of his future release into society.  Failing such a mechanism, the panel finds the respondent has not demonstrated that he will, in the future when released from the institutional setting which now assures public safety, be able to take care of himself or be taken care of by anyone else in such a way that he will not pose a danger to the Canadian public.

 

 

 

[23]           In my view, the IAD has misapprehended the broad jurisdiction which is bestowed upon it by section 68 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.  Regardless of what action the Ontario Review Board takes, the Immigration Appeal Division continues to have jurisdiction in this matter for as long as its stay is in effect.  Paragraph 68(2)(a) allows the tribunal to impose any condition that it considers necessary when granting a stay of a removal order.  Accordingly, there is no reason why the IAD cannot impose a condition which requires that, upon Mr. Williams being discharged by the ORB, conditionally or otherwise, he report to the IAD, in whatever manner it deems appropriate, in order to satisfy the Division that his rehabilitation and other circumstances are such that he does not pose a danger to the Canadian public.  Provided this is done in a manner which accords with the principles of fairness and natural justice, there is nothing to prevent the IAD from imposing a condition of that nature.  Given what is at stake here, I cannot see that Mr. Williams would be opposed to appearing before the IAD from time to time during the period of the stay to allow the Division to assess his situation on an ongoing basis.

 

[24]           There is no dispute that the humanitarian and compassionate considerations which initially led to the stay of the removal order being granted still exist today.  Therefore, the appropriate course to follow is to set aside the IAD’s decision and refer the matter back to the Division in order to allow it to impose whatever conditions to its stay which it deems necessary.

 


 

JUDGMENT

 

            The application for judicial review is allowed and the matter is returned to the Immigration Appeal Division in order to allow it to impose whatever conditions to its stay which it deems necessary.

 

 

 

"Paul U.C. Rouleau"

Deputy Judge


FEDERAL COURT

 

NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKET:                                                      IMM-7519-05

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                      CARLTON ANTHONY WILLIAMS v. MCI

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                                Toronto, Ontario

 

DATE OF HEARING:                                 October 5, 2006

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rouleau

 

DATED:                                                         November 20, 2006

 

APPEARANCES BY:                                  

Ronald Poulton

(416) 862-0000                                                                       for the Applicant

 

Vanita Goela

(416) 952-6993                                                                       for the Respondent

 

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

MAMANN & ASSOCIATES

Barristers & Solicitors

74 Victoria Street, Suite 303

Toronto, Ontario

M5C 2A5                                                                                for the Applicant

 

                                                                                               

 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

130 King Street West, Suite 3400

Exchange Tower, Box 36

Toronto, Ontario

M5X 1K6                                                                                for the Respondent

 

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