Date: 20061222
Docket: IMM-1644-06
Citation: 2006 FC 1549
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED ZIAR JAOUADI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER
BLANCHARD J.
1. Introduction
[1] The Applicant, Mohamed Ziar Jaouadi, seeks judicial review of his negative Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) decision dated March 1, 2006.
2. Facts
[2] The Applicant, a 28 year-old citizen of Tunisia, arrived in Canada on August 2, 2000, as part of a group of more than one hundred young Tunisian tourists. At that time the Applicant was suffering from psychotic episodes and depression. He is still being treated with anti-depressants for this condition.
[3] On August 11, 2000, the applicant claimed refugee status, alleging that he had been arrested and tortured several times by the police who were targeting him because he practices Islam and because he was not a member of a student organization known as the “Parti de l’Union des Étudiants Rassemblement constitutionnel démocratique”, a youth organization associated with the party in power. He claimed that he was first arrested at a student demonstration April 7, 1999, and was detained and beaten for three days. Two weeks later he was again detained between the 27th and 28th of April, 1999, and tortured. He alleged he was under administrative surveillance until September of 1999, during which time his mail was intercepted and examined. He was imprisoned and tortured a final time for one week, after the police arrested him on April 26, 2000.
[4] At his hearing before the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) held on July 20, 2001, the Applicant claimed to be a sympathizer of Ennhada, a known terrorist organization, and to know several of its members, including its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, who allegedly provided him with a job with the “École professionelle du Barreau”. The Applicant also claims that he is a “refugee sur place” because of his involvement in Canada in several organizations, among others l’Association des jeunes tunisiens au Canada (AJTC) and l’Association des victimes de la torture en Tunisie (AVTT).
[5] Upon learning of the Applicant’s association with Ennhada the IRB adjourned the hearing and asked the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to intervene.
[6] At the resumption of the hearing before the IRB on January 15, 2003, the Applicant significantly changed his story narrated on July 20, 2001. He now claims that he was not a member of Ennhada and had merely met one of its members by chance. He states that he was advised by a friend and by his former counsel to falsify his story regarding his connection to Ennhada. He now states that he fears a return to Tunisia because of his political activities in Canada.
[7] The Applicant also changed counsel after alleging that he had been advised to falsify his story by his first counsel, and his new lawyer brought a motion for recusal of the Board Members. When members of the IRB refused to withdraw from the Applicant’s case, he applied for judicial review of that refusal to the Federal Court. The application was denied on the basis that the Applicant did not come to court with clean hands. The Court did not believe the Applicant’s first story in respect of his association with Ennhada.
[8] The IRB, however, in its December 15, 2004 decision, chose to believe the Applicant’s first story, and rejected the refugee application on the basis that the Applicant’s membership in Ennhada, a terrorist organization, contravened Article 1F(b) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Applicant sought judicial review of the IRB decision.
[9] The application for judicial review was dismissed on September l6, 2005. The Court ruled that it was open to the IRB to prefer the Applicant’s first story to the second.
[10] The Applicant made a PRRA application, on December 12, 2005, wherein he alleges that he risks persecution based on:
(a) links with Ennhada
(b) fact that he is a practicing Muslim
(c) fact that he had been previously arrested, and that he left Tunisia while still under administrative surveillance
(d) claim of refugee status in Canada
(e) association with the AJTC and AVTT, among others
[11] The Applicant also claims that the stress of the Canadian immigration process and his fear of persecution by Tunisian authority may cause him to suffer further psychotic episodes and depression.
[12] A negative decision was rendered by the PRRA Officer on March 1, 2006. That decision is the object of this application for judicial review.
3. Impugned Decision
[13] At the outset, the PRRA Officer explained that because this case started before the coming into force of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 201, c. 27, (the Act), and because the IRB had only decided on the basis of section 96 of the Act, she was required to review the entire file in order to consider whether the Applicant was a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the IRPA. The PRRA Officer also explained that she was not bound by the decision of the IRB.
[14] The PRRA Officer noted that the Applicant changed his story several times. She also observed that the Applicant had had no difficulty in obtaining his identity card and his passport and had been able to leave Tunisia without difficulty. The PRRA Officer found that the Applicant was not implicated in any political party nor was he involved in any group whatsoever in Tunisia. Further, she found that he could not be a suspected Ennhada sympathizer since he had been able to live a normal life in Tunisia, which included studying, working and traveling. She reasoned that simple involvement in different groups such as the AJTC in Canada would not be perceived as involvement in subversive groups by the Tunisian authorities.
[15] The PRRA Officer determined that, even if the articles written by the Applicant had been brought to the attention of the Tunisian Authorities, new measures have been announced to promote freedom of the press in Tunisia.
[16] As for the applicant’s medical condition, the PRRA Officer concluded that the Applicant would be able to receive the needed medical attention in his country.
[17] The PRRA Officer found that the Applicant would not be personally targeted upon his return to Tunisia. She found that Tunisia had made efforts recently to improve matters for journalists and NGOs by allowing more freedom of expression and political opinion. Even though all persons returning to Tunisia after an extended period away are subject to questioning, this was not, in itself, determined to be a risk of persecution. The Applicant had not shown that he would be identified by the Tunisian authorities for his involvement in Canada with organizations such as the AJTC. Even if he were to be so identified, the PRRA Officer did not find that he would be imputed to have opinions contrary to the Tunisian Government such that he would be at risk upon his return.
4. Issues
A. Did the PRRA Officer err in not granting the Applicant a hearing?
B. Did the PRRA Officer apply the wrong standard of proof in assessing the Applicant’s risk?
C. Did the PRRA Officer err in her assessment of the Applicant’s refugee sur place claim?
5. Analysis
A. Did the PRRA Officer err in not granting the Applicant a hearing?
[18] The first issue raised involves the application of the factors established by section 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations) to the facts of the case, and is therefore a question of mixed fact and law. It is necessary for a reviewing court to determine the applicable standard of review with respect to each decision of an administration decision-maker, not merely each general type of decision under a particular provision. See Canada (Attorney General) v. Sketchley, 2005 FCA 404 at paragraph 46. As such, I will proceed with a pragmatic and functional analysis in respect of this first question, which involves considering: (i) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (ii) the relative expertise of the PRRA Officer; (iii) the purpose of the statute on the whole, and (iv) the nature of the question (Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226).
[19] There is no privative clause in the Act. Sections 72 to 75 of the IRPA specifically contemplate judicial review of inadmissibility decisions by the Federal Court, yet it is not as of right since leave is required. Additionally, the powers of a court on judicial review are more limited than on appeal. Further an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal is again not as of right and is dependant on a serious question of general importance being certified. These factors militate in favour of a certain level of deference by the Court.
[20] Three factors are relevant in determining the relative expertise of the PRRA Officer (Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 at paragraph 33). They are:
(a) The Officer’s expertise
(b) The Court’s own expertise relative to that of the Officer, and
(c) The nature of the specific issue before the Officer relative to the Court’s expertise.
[21] The PRRA Officer is expected to have extensive knowledge of country conditions since his or her work involves assessing such conditions in the context of alleged risks of return to a specific county of a claimant. In this respect PRRA Officers have greater expertise than the Court and this factor consequently militates in favour of a greater degree of deference. PRRA Officers, however, are often not legally trained, and, as a result, their familiarity with the law will extend only to IRPA and the associated Regulations as they relate to their functions. The Court is an expert in the law and its application, and will, as a result, show little deference to the decision of a PRRA Officer where the issue is one of law.
[22] I now deal with the purpose of the statute on the whole. The objectives of the Act are set out in subsection 3(2). The main objective is to recognize that the refugee program is “…about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted.” Paragraphs 3(2)(d) and 3(2)(e) of the Act are particularly relevant to the work of a PRRA Officer. They read as follows:
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(d) to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment;
(e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings; |
d) d’offrir l’asile à ceux qui craignent avec raison d’être persécutés du fait de leur race, leur religion, leur nationalité, leurs opinions politiques, leur appartenance à un groupe social en particulier, ainsi qu’à ceux qui risquent la torture ou des traitements ou peines cruels et inusités;
e) de mettre en place une procédure équitable et efficace qui soit respectueuse, d’une part, de l’intégrité du processus canadien d’asile et, d’autre part, des droits et des libertés fondamentales reconnus à tout être humain; |
[23] The PRRA Officer is consequently required to assess a claimant’s risk of return to his country with the objective of protecting that person against torture, risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The risk assessment is directly related to the personal situation of each claimant and the particular conditions of the country in question at the time. The legislative purpose here does not call for the decision-maker to resolve and balance competing policy objectives or the interests of various communities. The legislative characteristics are not “polycentric” in nature. Rather, the statutory provisions essentially seek to determine the rights of the parties resulting from factual determinations. In such circumstances, less deference is shown by the reviewing court.
[24] The fourth factor requires consideration of the nature of the specific question. The question deals with whether the PRRA erred in deciding that a hearing was not warranted in the circumstance and involves the application of the factors set out in section 167 of the Regulations to the facts of the case. This is a question of mixed law and fact and warrants less deference from a reviewing court.
[25] Upon considering the above factors, I find that the standard of reasonableness simpliciter is appropriate for a question involving the application of the section 167 factors to a decision as to whether to hold a hearing in a PRRA. I am supported in this finding by the determinations of my colleagues in the following decisions. See Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 437 at paragraphs. 8-22; Beca v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 566 at paragraph 9.
[26] The PRRA procedure is not an appeal procedure or a level of review for IRB decisions. The purpose of the PRRA is to assess risks to which a person may be subject on removal to his or her country of origin, based on new facts which may have come to light after the decision on the refugee application. See Alvarez v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 143, at paragraph 6.
[27] Generally, the risk assessment is done without a hearing and on the basis of new evidence that has been submitted since the rejection of the refugee claim. The procedure is dictated by paragraphs 113(a) and (b) of the Act:
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113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows:
(a) an applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection;
(b) a hearing may be held if the Minister, on the basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a hearing is required; |
113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit :
a) le demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet;
b) une audience peut être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis compte tenu des facteurs réglementaires; |
[28] The factors to consider in determining whether a hearing is required are enumerated in section 167 of the Regulations:
|
167. For the purpose of determining whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b) of the Act, the factors are the following:
(a) whether there is evidence that raises a serious issue of the applicant's credibility and is related to the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act;
(b) whether the evidence is central to the decision with respect to the application for protection; and
(c) whether the evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing the application for protection. |
167. Pour l’application de l’alinéa 113b) de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à décider si la tenue d’une audience est requise :
a) l’existence d’éléments de preuve relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux articles 96 et 97 de la Loi qui soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité du demandeur;
b) l’importance de ces éléments de preuve pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande de protection;
c) la question de savoir si ces éléments de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que soit accordée la protection. |
These factors are cumulative.
[29] The Applicant argues that the PRRA Officer made an independent credibility finding when she determined, contrary to the finding of the IRB, that the Applicant would not be suspected of being connected to Ennhada by the Tunisian authorities. He claims that this would engage subsection 167(a) of the Regulations, in that it raises a serious issue in regards to the Applicant’s credibility. Given that findings concerning the Applicant’s association with Ennhada are central to the decision, the Applicant argues that the other factors in section 167 of the Regulations are met. On this basis, the Applicant contends that a hearing should have been held.
[30] In my view it was open to the PRRA Officer to prefer one version of the Applicant’s story over another. Both the first and second versions of the story were before the Tribunal and formed part of the record, and they were, consequently, also part of the record on the PRRA application. It follows that the facts at issue are not new and had been considered previously by the Tribunal. I am therefore in agreement with the Respondent’s argument that an oral hearing would not have been required to determine the credibility of any new evidence that was not before the IRB. In my view the PRRA Officer did not err in not granting the applicant a hearing
B. Did the PRRA Officer apply the wrong standard of proof in assessing the Applicant’s risk?
[31] The Applicant argues that by concluding that he had to establish on a balance of probabilities that he faced a risk and that the Tunisian government was aware of his activities, the PRRA Officer applied too stringent a burden of proof. The Applicant contends that the burden of proof regarding the knowledge of the authorities should be lower, namely “are aware or may be aware”. Application of the proper standard of proof is a legal question, reviewable on a correctness standard.
[32] In determining whether a person is in need of protection, within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA, the PRRA Officer articulated, at page 14 of her reasons, the correct standard of proof to be applied, namely, on a balance of probabilities. This standard has been repeatedly confirmed in the jurisprudence of this Court. See Li v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FCA 1, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 239 (C.A.), paragraphs 9, 28-29, 39; Selliah v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FCA 160, (2005) 339 N.R. 233 (F.C.A.).
[33] In the last paragraph of her reasons, however, the PRRA Officer appears to have applied a different standard of proof. She wrote: “Je ne puis affirmer qu’il existe des motifs sérieux de croire que le requérant soit exposé personnellement à un risque de torture, de menace à sa vie, de traitement ou peine cruels et inusités en retournant dans son pays d’origine, la Tunisie.” The parties do not dispute that this standard is a lesser standard of proof than proof on a balance of probabilities. I agree. The PRRA Officer articulated the wrong standard of proof at this point in her reasons. Even if I were to accept that the Officer had erred by imposing this standard of proof to the Applicant, the error would be of no consequence to the Officer’s determination of risk. By holding the Applicant to a lesser standard of proof than that required by law, the Applicant suffers no prejudice and the result would not change. If the Applicant was unable to meet the lesser standard, it is clear the more demanding standard would not be met. In any event, reading the decision as a whole, I am satisfied the PRRA Officer applied the appropriate standard of proof in coming to her decision. As a consequence, I find that no reviewable error was committed by the PRRA Officer on the applicable standard of proof.
C. Did the PRRA Officer err in her assessment of the Applicant’s refugee sur place claim?
[34] The ultimate decision before of the PRRA Officer is to determine whether the Applicant is a person in need of protection within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. Such decisions, when considered “globally and as a whole” are reviewable on the reasonableness simpliciter standard. See Demirovic v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 1284, at paragraph 23, Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 437, paragraphs 8-22; Herrada et al. v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 CF 1004, paragraph 24; Yousef v.Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 864, paragraph 17.
[35] The PRRA Officer, in her decision, found there was no evidence that the Applicant’s political activities or political beliefs would be, or would risk being, brought to the attention of the Tunisian authorities. She found that the activities of the AJTC, in particular, are not against the Tunisian government but are intended to aid young Tunisians in Canada. Further, she stated that by simply implicating himself in various groups such as the AJTC in Canada does not constitute subversive behaviour on the part of the Applicant. The PRRA Officer determined that the impact of the Applicant’s political activities and declarations in Canada was minor and opportunistic and not subversive so as to attract the attention of the Tunisian Regime.
[36] Further, the PRRA Officer found that any risk to the Applicant is reduced since recent evidence shows that the Tunisian authorities have announced measures to promote freedom of expression. The PRRA Officer also found that it was unlikely the Applicant would be identified by Tunisian authorities since he had a common name. This finding was essentially based on the fact that the Applicant was permitted to leave Tunisia without incident.
[37] The respondent argues that it is clear from the PRRA Officer’s comprehensive decision that she considered all the evidence before her even though she did not expressly analyze all of the evidence in her reasons. The Respondent argues that the decision was open to the officer and reasonable.
[38] The Applicant argues that the PRRA Officer ignored evidence in order to come to the conclusion that the Tunisian government is neither interested in, nor informed of, his political activities. The Applicant submits that there is ample evidence of his critical stance towards the Tunisian Government in publications found on the Internet, to which the Tunisian Government would have access. He also argues that the PRRA Officer herself acknowledges that the Tunisian Government is concerned with critics of the government on the Internet. He submits, therefore, that it is likely that the Tunisian government is interested and informed about him, putting him particularly at risk, and that the Officer committed a reviewable error by failing to consider this evidence.
[39] The country condition evidence shows that the Tunisian government is intolerant of public criticism and uses intimidation, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls to discourage criticism by human rights and opposition activists. Political prisoners and Islamists reportedly receive harsher treatment during their arrests and confinement than common political prisoners. The documentary evidence also shows that security forces regularly use violence against Islamists, activists and dissidents, and torture detainees to elicit confessions and political prisoners to discourage resistance. The PRRA Officer acknowledged in her reasons the regime’s lack of tolerance to criticism. She wrote: “Les documents de référence indiquent que le gouvernement de la Tunisie contrôle le pays et est peu réceptive à la critique ou aux parties d’opposition.”
[40] The documentary evidence further establishes that the Tunisian Government blocks access to a number of websites, including nearly all sites belonging to domestic human rights, opposition and Islamist groups. While the evidence shows that the government recently allowed access to several foreign websites that had previously been blocked such as Al-Jazeera, “Reporters without Borders” and Hotmail, a report on “cyber-freedom” nevertheless ranked Tunisia last among 11 Arab countries in terms of freedom of access to the internet. Given this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the Tunisian authorities have an interest in monitoring the content of various critical internet sites. In the circumstances, the PRAA Officer agreed that the AJTC web site is likely available and accessible in Tunisia. In her reasons, she observed: “Considérant cet état de fait, il est raisonnable de penser que les écrits de l’AJTC au Canada, soient accessibles en Tunisie.”
[41] In respect to nationals returning from abroad, the Country Reports show that Tunisian authorities routinely perform security checks on those who have been outside the country for an extended period of time. This is also acknowledged by the PRRA Officer in her reasons: “Les personnes retournant en Tunisie après un certain temps à l’extérieur du pays sont questionnées pour fin d’identité et de sécurité, cette règle s’applique à tous les citoyens de Tunisie.”
[42] Regarding the Applicant’s activities in Canada, the record established that numerous critical statements concerning the Tunisian authorities were made by the Applicant. This evidence is essentially uncontradicted. I discuss below examples of the Applicant’s activities and declarations made in Canada.
[43] In an interview broadcasted on Radio Centre Ville à Montréal on May 6, 2003, the Applicant, as President of the AJTC accuses the Tunisian Authorities of human rights abuses. He stated: “La personne est décédée sous la torture, sa famille n’a jamais eu aucune idée sur son arrestation ou même elle n’a pas plus voir le corps…. Et puis maintenant, le gouvernement tunisien nie l’existence complète de ce jeune homme, de Maher Osmani.”
[44] The Applicant attests that he also helped the AJTC organize a vigil, held on October 31, 2002, to protest the drowning of 14 Tunisians who attempted to seek asylum in Italy. He claims to have issued and published on the AJTC web site a general invitation to attend the vigil on behalf of the Association wherein he wrote:
L’AJTC lance un cri de détresse et fait appel a tous les organismes gouvernementaux et non-gouvernementaux qui s’occupent de l’aide et la protection de la jeunesse de se mobiliser et de donner la main aux jeunes tunisiens en situation alarmante outre que demander aux autorités concernés dans tous les pays du monde entier de faire ouvrir leurs portes aux demandeurs d’asile tunisiens et de traiter plus sérieusement leurs dossiers, ainsi qu’oublier l’ancienne face connue de la Tunisie et de l’y classer parmi les pays les plus dangereux qui ne respectent jamais les droits de la personne.
[45] In his affidavit evidence, the Applicant attests that the AJTC also participated in the organization of a rally against the imprisonment of M. Jebali, a leader of Ennhada, and M. Yahyaoui, webmaster for TUNeZINE, a dissident website published out of France. The rally took place in front of the Tunisian Embassy in Montréal on January 30, 2003, and an article on the rally appeared in “La Presse” newspaper the following day. His participation as an organizer is acknowledged on the AJTC web site and the Applicant’s name appears in a list of participants. His participation in the rally is also noted in the publication “The Observer” and on the “Réveil tunisien” web site.
[46] It was unreasonable in my view for the PRRA Officer to determine that the Applicant’s activities in Canada were not subversive and would be of no interest to Tunisian authorities. The documentary evidence establishes without doubt that critics of the Tunisian regime are not tolerated, monitored and are dealt with harshly. This evidence was accepted and acknowledged by the PRRA Officer in her reasons for decision. Evidence particular to the Applicant establishes that he engaged in activities and made declarations in Canada that were critical of the Tunisian government. This evidence is uncontraverted. To find the AJTC to be an organization simply to aid young Tunisians in Canada is to ignore the evidence. The evidence clearly establishes that the AJTC engages in activities that are critical of the Regime. To qualify the Applicant’s activities and declarations as non-subversive is also not consistent with the significant evidence showing his criticism of the Tunisian government. In my view, given the evidence before the Officer, both findings are unreasonable in that they were made without regard to the evidence.
[47] I also find unreasonable the PRRA Officer’s determination that the Applicant would not be identifiable to the Authorities by reason of his common name. I cannot imagine how this could be so given the documentary evidence which establishes that returning nationals are subjected to security checks, and particularly those who have been abroad for an extended period as was the Applicant. The Applicant’s identity would have been established before leaving the country in order to obtain a passport or other travel documents. There is simply no evidence to support the PRRA Officer’s finding that having a common name would allow him to avoid detection upon his return. The finding is based on speculation and is unreasonable.
[48] On the evidence, it was open to the PRRA Officer to find that the Applicant’s involvement with Ennhada and his life style while in Tunisia to be of no interest to Tunisian authorities. However, in my view, the Applicant’s activities in Canada do not support a similar conclusion. It matters not that the activities of the Applicant in Canada are opportunistic. The jurisprudence teaches that even if the activities are motivated by the claimant’s desire for asylum, the section 97 analysis must assess any potential harm to be faced upon return because of the political activity engaged in while abroad even if that activity is non-genuine. See Ngongo v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1627 (QL).
[49] In my opinion, the PRRA Officer erred in her assessment of the Applicant’s refugee sur place claim. The above discussed erroneous findings, taken cumulatively, lead me to conclude that the PRRA Officer rendered an unreasonable decision on the evidence that was before her.
[50] The country condition evidence shows that the Tunisian government persecutes those who criticize it, uses violence against political opponents, and treats Islamists in a particularly harsh manner. The evidence submitted by the Applicant, essentially uncontradicted, shows that the Applicant is engaged in activities in Canada that can only be described as political expression that is critical of the Tunisian government, much of it on the Internet. The evidence also establishes that the Tunisian government would likely be aware of the Applicant’s activities since the evidence also establishes that Tunisian authorities monitor the Internet for critical material.
[51] I am left to conclude that the PRRA Officer’s decision was rendered without regard to the evidence. In the result she committed a reviewable error in deciding as she did in respect to the Applicant’s activities in Canada and her resulting conclusion regarding the Applicant’s risks.
[52] For the above reasons, the application for judicial review will be allowed. I will order the matter returned for re-consideration by a different PRRA Officer.
[53] Counsel are requested to serve and file any submission with respect to certification of a question of general importance, if any, within twenty (20) days of receipt of these reasons. Each party will have a further five (5) days to serve and file any reply to the submission of the opposite party. Following consideration of those submissions, an order will issue allowing the application for judicial review and disposing of the issue of a serious question of general importance as contemplated by section 74(d) of the IRPA
“Edmond P. Blanchard”
Judge
Ottawa, Ontario
December 22, 2006
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
STYLE OF CAUSE: Mohammed Ziar Jaouadi v. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness et al.
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: November 15, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER: Blanchard J.
APPEARANCES:
M. Normand Lemyre FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Saint-Pierre Grenier FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
John H. Sims, Q.C. FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec