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Federal Court |
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Cour fédérale |
Halifax, Nova Scotia, August 24, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) for judicial review of: a decision of a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) officer (the officer), dated May 2, 2011, rejecting the applicant’s PRRA application; a decision of an enforcement officer (the enforcement officer), dated September 23, 2011, denying the applicant’s request for a deferral of the date on which she was required to leave Canada; and the removal order issued against the applicant. The officer’s PRRA decision was based on the risk that the applicant would face if returned to Brazil.
[2] The applicant requests the following relief: a review of the officer’s decision and an order for a new PRRA where all the evidence will be considered; a review of the enforcement officer’s decision; an extension of time for the applicant to leave Canada and a stay of the removal order issued against her.
Background
[3] The applicant, Evdokia Reutov Filha, is a citizen of Brazil. At a young age, she moved with her family to Bolivia.
[4] The applicant is married to a man in Bolivia. The couple have two daughters; one lives in Brazil while the other lives in the United States. The applicant also has a sister living in Alberta who is a Canadian citizen.
[5] In 1985, when the applicant was fourteen years old, her father arranged her marriage. Within three years, she gave birth to two daughters. Throughout their relationship, the applicant’s husband abused her. She filed complaints to the Bolivian police on several occasions. Occasionally, the police would issue a citation and have the applicant deliver it to her husband. However, the applicant’s husband ignored all citations that she gave him.
[6] To escape further abuse, the applicant went to Argentina on March 14, 2008 and applied for a Canadian visitor’s visa. She stayed until a six month visitor’s visa was granted on or about April 16, 2008. Thereafter, she returned to Bolivia.
[7] On June 6, 2008, the applicant came to Canada. She remained after her six month visa expired. Therefore, on November 23, 2009, a removal order was issued against her. An arrest warrant for the purposes of removal was issued two days later.
[8] On December 24, 2009, the applicant filed a refugee claim.
[9] On January 7, 2010, the applicant was arrested for the purposes of removal. She was notified that her refugee claim could not be processed as there was a removal order against her. She was however granted the opportunity to file a PRRA application, which she filed on or about January 25, 2010.
[10] The following year, on January 30, 2011, the applicant was involved in a serious automobile accident in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The other driver was intoxicated and hit the applicant’s car head-on. The applicant suffered two broken legs, a broken hip, several broken teeth, broken ribs and other injuries. Since the accident, she has been unable to return to her previous employment. The applicant has commenced a lawsuit in the Court of the Queen’s Bench in Alberta against the other driver. The applicant is also scheduled to appear as a chief witness for the Crown in the associated criminal proceeding.
Officer’s Decision
[11] The officer issued her decision on May 2, 2011. The Notes on File that form part of the decision, were initially issued in French. Upon request, the applicant received a translated English version on August 17, 2011.
[12] The officer first noted on the notes on file form that the applicant was not excluded from applying for PRRA protection under either subsections 112(1) or 112(2) of the Act. She also noted that the applicant was not described under subsection 112(3) of the Act.
[13] The officer then delved into the risks identified by the applicant. The officer first summarized the facts. The officer noted that the applicant filed her PRRA application on or about January 25, 2010, with additional arguments and evidence submitted on various subsequent dates.
[14] The officer noted the alleged risk that the applicant faced from her husband if she returned to Bolivia, her last country of permanent residence. The officer acknowledged the applicant’s
submission that she would also face risks if returned to Brazil because her husband also held Brazilian citizenship and could easily track her down there. Further, it would be difficult for her to return to Brazil as she left that country many years ago and did not speak Portuguese. Either way, the applicant alleged that she faced similar risks in Brazil and Bolivia due to both countries’ primitive laws on conjugal violence.
[15] The officer noted that the applicant had not made a refugee claim that was rejected by the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) and had also not filed a previous PRRA claim that had been rejected. The officer marked on the notes to file form that there was new evidence.
[16] Turning to the common considerations applicable to all protection grounds, the officer noted that the risk identified by the applicant was among those described in sections 96 and 97 of the Act. However, this risk was not personal and other individuals in a similar situation shared the same risk. Further, the officer noted that the applicant was not unable, or because of the risk alleged, unwilling to avail herself to state protection. The officer did not mark anything down in the sections pertaining to the potential internal flight alternative or the law of general application on the notes to file form.
[17] The officer found that no controversy arose around the alleged spousal abuse. Rather, the primary issue was whether the applicant would be at risk in Brazil (her country of nationality) and if she would be able to avail herself of state protection there.
[18] The officer noted that aside from the fact that her husband held Brazilian citizenship, there was no evidence adduced to establish that he would be interested in tracking her down or how he would do so if he wanted to. There was also no evidence that he had taken any efforts to track her down since she came to Canada. Similarly, there was no evidence of any threats or violence made against the applicant while she was visiting her daughter in Brazil.
[19] The officer also noted that the applicant had visited her daughter in Brazil on three occasions in 2004 and once in 2006. The applicant alleged that she returned to Bolivia after all three trips in 2004 due to threats that her husband made against her. However, no such allegation was made for her return in 2006. Further, after staying in Argentina to undergo the Canadian visa application process, the applicant returned to Bolivia where she stayed until her departure to Canada on June 6, 2008. The officer found no explanation for the applicant’s return to her persecutor after her time in Argentina.
[20] In light of this evidence, the officer found that the applicant had failed to discharge the onus of proving that her husband had any interest in tracking her down or would have any way of doing so. As such, the officer concluded that the applicant had not established that there was a reasonable chance that she would be a victim of spousal abuse if she returned to Brazil. The officer acknowledged that the applicant would likely face difficulties if she returned to Brazil, but noted that her eldest daughter lived there. The difficulties of adapting to a different language and a country that she left as a child did not correspond to risks referred to in sections 96 or 97 of the Act. As the officer came to this decision on the risk that the applicant would face if returned to Brazil, she did not assess the risk of the applicant returning to Bolivia.
[21] Finally, the officer noted that she consulted the applicant’s refugee claim, PRRA application, written submissions signed by applicant’s counsel on February 3, 2010 and other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary.
Issues
[22] The applicant, in her memorandums of argument, alleges that there was a breach of natural justice. In her reply, the applicant submits the following point at issue:
1. Did the officer consider all of the evidence?
[23] Based on my review of all of the applicant’s submission, I would rephrase the issues as follows:
1. What is the appropriate standard of review?
2. Was there a breach of natural justice?
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[24] The applicant submits that she was denied natural justice in three ways.
[25] First, the applicant submits that her PRRA application was written in English but considered by a French speaking PRRA officer whose English language proficiency was uncertain and not demonstrated. The applicant submits that the fact that the decision was written in French indicates that the officer was unable to write in English. If the officer could not write in English, it is unlikely that she could read and fully appreciate the applicant’s English application. In support, the applicant highlights the officer’s statement that “PRRA Application Received CIC Calgary 25, 2010”, which does not include a month and is therefore not a date.
[26] Further, the applicant notes that the officer did not check either the yes or no box to answer whether “The Risk is faced by the Applicant in every part of the country or countries of nationality or habitual residence” on the notes to file form. This was particularly relevant as the applicant’s country of nationality differed from her country of habitual residence.
[27] The applicant also highlights that on the notes to file form, the officer acknowledged that there was new evidence, but did not specify what it was. There was therefore no indication that she considered the injuries that the applicant sustained from the January 2011 automobile accident. This evidence should have been listed under the section on the notes to file form entitled, “Sources Consulted”. The officer should also have specified which “other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary” she considered.
[28] In the applicant’s further memorandum of argument, she highlights various typographical errors in the officer’s letter to this Court’s administrator. The applicant submits that this evidence is further indicative that the officer is less than fluent in English.
[29] Second, the applicant submits that the officer failed to consider important new information, specifically the serious automobile accident that occurred on January 30, 2011. The injuries that the applicant sustained from this accident render her unable to flee spousal abuse and have disabled her in such a way that she is unable to support herself and must depend on her abusive husband.
[30] Third, the applicant submits that it would be a breach of natural justice to force an injured and uncompensated person to leave Canada; the place where she was injured and where she has an operation scheduled eight days after her deportation date. As she was injured by a Canadian, she is entitled to help from the Canadian health system. She is also entitled to access the Canadian legal system to seek compensation for her injuries. At a minimum, the applicant submits that she should be permitted to recover, which necessitates more surgeries, and to complete her personal injury claim before being forced to leave. The applicant notes that it is not practical for her to pursue her personal injury claim from South America.
[31] Finally, the applicant submits that she must remain in Canada as she is a chief witness for the Crown in the criminal prosecution pertaining to the January 2011 automobile accident. The applicant’s testimony is required to prove that the intoxicated driver caused her bodily harm. Without this testimony, the accused has a better chance of avoiding criminal punishment, thereby frustrating the Canadian criminal justice system.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[32] As a preliminary point, the respondent submits that the applicant has submitted documents (Exhibits E, F, G, H, I and J) that post-date the officer’s decision. As they were not before the officer, they are inadmissible on judicial review and should be disregarded by this Court on this application.
[33] The respondent submits that the appropriate standard of review in this case is reasonableness. The Court should show significant deference to the officer in reviewing her decision. The respondent acknowledges that a breach of procedural fairness would be assessed on a correctness standard; however, the respondent submits that no such breach occurred in this case.
[34] The respondent notes that the PRRA process is outlined in the Act. Where applicants do not have a prior refugee decision, such as the applicant in this case, all the evidence presented must be considered. PRRA applications are considered on the basis of sections 96 to 98 of the Act and these represent the sole relevant protection risk factors.
[35] The respondent submits that under the PRRA statutory process, the applicant’s submission that the officer did not properly consider all the evidence is incorrect. The officer did consider all the evidence relevant to the protection claim. The sole evidence she did not consider was that which was irrelevant.
[36] The respondent submits that there is no presumption that a decision written in French means that the decision maker did not understand the English submissions and evidence. Rather, the jurisprudence clearly states that unless a particular prejudice is shown in a specific case, a decision maker is entitled to make a decision in either of Canada’s official languages. The respondent submits that the applicant has not identified any misconstruction of the applicant’s submissions or any material error in the officer’s findings of fact. The jurisprudence clearly states that absent any real prejudice, there is no reviewable error.
[37] With regards to the omission in the decision of the month in which the PRRA application was received, the respondent submits that the officer stated earlier in her decision that the PRRA
application was received on or about January 25, 2010. Further, the decision as a whole shows that the officer knew that the application had been received and on what date and considered the materials submitted in the PRRA application in rendering her decision.
[38] The respondent notes the applicant’s submission that the officer did not consider humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) factors related to her establishment, family and automobile accident. However, the respondent submits that this does not raise a reviewable error because the officer only had the jurisdiction to consider the risk factors, not H&C factors.
[39] The relevant risks under section 97 of the Act are risks caused directly by another person or organization in the country to which the applicant would be returning to. The respondent notes that the Federal Court of Appeal in Covarrubias v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 365, [2006] FCJ No 1682 held that a section 97 risk cannot arise due to an inability of a country to provide medical services. Nevertheless, there was no evidence before the officer to suggest that the applicant’s injuries would subject her to persecution or section 97 risks in Brazil. Similarly, there was no evidence before the officer to associate the applicant’s injuries with forward looking risks from her alleged persecutor in Brazil.
[40] The respondent submits that the officer considered the submissions and evidence relevant to the PRRA decision. The officer’s finding of insufficient evidence that the applicant’s ex-husband would find her if she returned to Brazil was reasonable based on the evidence. The applicant has not highlighted any relevant facts that should have been considered but were not.
[41] In summary, the respondent submits that the applicant merely disagrees with the officer’s conclusions without demonstrating that any of them were wrong. Thus, the officer’s decision was reasonable based on the evidence before her.
Applicant’s Written Reply
[42] In reply to the respondent’s preliminary point, the applicant submits that the officer did not consider the protection risk factors of the applicant’s extensive injuries. However, this was likely not the officer’s fault. The relevant evidence (Exhibits E, F, G, H, I and J) was submitted to the Calgary PRRA unit within 48 hours of the January 30, 2011 accident, long before the date of the officer’s decision. However, it appears that it never reached the officer in Montreal.
[43] The applicant also submits that her medical health is a relevant consideration. The officer should have specifically considered it, which she did not do.
Analysis and Decision
[44] Issue 1
What is the appropriate standard of review?
Where previous jurisprudence has determined the standard of review applicable to a particular issue before the Court, the reviewing court may adopt that standard (see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at paragraph 57).
[45] It is trite law that the standard of review of PRRA decisions is reasonableness (see Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 799, [2010] FCJ No 980 at paragraph 11; and Aleziri v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 38, [2009] FCJ No 52 at paragraph 11). In reviewing the officer’s decision on this standard, the Court should not intervene unless the officer came to a conclusion that is not transparent, justifiable and intelligible and within the range of acceptable outcomes based on the evidence before it (see Dunsmuir above, at paragraph 47; and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] SCJ No 12 at paragraph 59). It is not up to a reviewing Court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome,
nor is it the function of the reviewing Court to reweigh the evidence (see Khosa above, at paragraphs 59 and 61).
[46] Conversely, issues of natural justice are reviewable on a correctness standard (see Wang above, at paragraph 11; Malik v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1283, [2009] FCJ No 1643 at paragraph 23; and Khosa above, at paragraph 43). No deference is owed to the officer on this issue (see Dunsmuir above, at paragraph 50).
[47] Issue 2
Was there a breach of natural justice?
Although the PRRA officer’s decision was at issue in this case, the applicant framed her submissions in terms of a breach of natural justice. The applicant alleges that she was denied natural justice for the following reasons:
1. The applicant’s English application was assessed by a French-speaking officer with a demonstrated lack of English proficiency;
2. The officer did not consider the new evidence pertaining to the applicant’s automobile accident in January 2011; and
3. The applicant is entitled to remain in Canada as she was injured here by a Canadian, is receiving medical care for her injuries, is pursuing legal action and is a key witness in the Crown’s prosecution.
[48] To support her first argument, the applicant highlights that: the decision was originally written in French; the month in which the PRRA application was received was omitted; the officer did not check off either box for one of the statements in the notes to file form; and there were typographical errors in the officer’s letter to this Court’s administrator.
[49] Although these errors were present, they are minor and insignificant when considering the officer’s decision as a whole. As highlighted by the respondent, the officer did correctly note the month in which the applicant’s application was received at an earlier point in her decision. Further, although the decision was written in French, it addresses the different aspects of the applicant’s application, including the complexity of her Brazilian nationality and Bolivian residency. I therefore find no merit in the applicant’s submission on this point. When read as a whole, there is nothing to suggest that because the officer wrote her decision in French she did not understand the applicant’s English submissions or that the applicant suffered any prejudice from this process (see Alexis v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 273, [2008] FCJ No 493 at paragraphs 12 to 14).
[50] Turning to the second point, the applicant submits that she filed evidence of her injuries from the January 2011 automobile accident that should have been considered by the officer when she rendered her decision on May 2, 2011. The officer did note on the notes to file form that new evidence had been received. Admittedly, she did not specify what this new evidence was, but it is notable that there was no space provided for such information, nor any explicit requirement to specify what such new evidence was on the notes to file form.
[51] The officer does broadly state in the sources consulted section of the notes to file form that she consulted “other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary”. However, no where in her decision does she explicitly refer to the automobile accident in which the applicant suffered her injuries. The officer’s decision indicates that she rendered it primarily on the threat of the applicant’s husband which the applicant would face if she returned to Brazil. The officer found no evidence to suggest that he would pursue her or would even have the means to do so. However, the applicant submits that her injuries are such that she would have to depend on her husband if returned to South America, thereby re-exposing her to spousal abuse. This possibility is not addressed by the officer in her decision.
[52] In her affidavit dated October 3, 2011, the applicant submits that she informed the PRRA unit of the accident within 48 hours of its occurrence. As a result, she was allegedly relieved of the twice weekly reporting conditions of her release. In support, she attaches the police accident report and the information of criminal charges laid against the intoxicated driver. The latter document is dated May 11, 2011; after the officer’s decision was rendered. Similarly, the other documents appended to the applicant’s October 2011 affidavit also post-date the officer’s decision.
[53] Thus, the police accident report is the sole evidence of the automobile accident that would have been before the officer. It is also notable that the applicant did not explain the increased risk of spousal abuse that these injuries would expose her to until more recently in her memorandum of argument for this application. There was therefore nothing before the officer to relate the automobile accident with the risk that the applicant might face from her abusive husband.
[54] As such, I do not find that the officer erred in her treatment of the evidence on the automobile accident. It was sufficient for her to broadly reference this evidence as “other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary” under the sources consulted section of the notes to file form.
[55] Finally, the applicant submits that she is entitled to remain in Canada because she was injured here by a Canadian, is receiving medical care for her injuries, is pursuing legal action and is a key witness in the Crown’s prosecution. The applicant does not cite any statutory provisions or jurisprudence to support this assertion. Further, the review of PRRA applications is clearly described in subsection 113(c) of the Act, requiring that consideration be made on the basis of sections 96 to 98 of the Act. Nothing in these provisions suggests that the above mentioned facts entitle the applicant to a positive PRRA finding.
[56] However unfortunate the accident was, the mere fact that it occurred in Canada and was caused by a Canadian does not entitle the applicant to rights that she was not previously entitled to. Greater leeway may be available under an H&C application. However, as stated by Mr. Justice Evans in Varga v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394, [2006] FCJ No 1828, in comparing the PRRA process with the H&C process, “the two decision-making processes should be neither confused, nor duplicated” (at paragraph 12).
[57] As mentioned above, the applicant in this case framed her submissions as a breach of natural justice. Several of her arguments would be more correctly framed as concerns with the officer’s decision. The former attracts the stricter correctness standard of review, whereas the latter attracts the more deferent reasonableness standard. Nevertheless, my analysis of the applicant’s submissions indicates that they must fail on both standards.
[58] I find no error as alleged in the officer’s decision. Although she wrote her decision in French, there was no indication that this prejudiced the applicant. I also find the officer did consider the evidence that was before her at the time of her decision. Finally, although it is very unfortunate that the applicant suffered serious injuries from the automobile accident, this does not entitle her to rights that she did not previously have. The alleged increased risk of spousal abuse arising from these injuries was not presented to the officer and I find no reviewable error in her decision based on the evidence before her. I would therefore dismiss this application.
[59] The respondent did not propose a certified question of general importance.
[60] The applicant proposed the following question as a serious question of general importance for my consideration for certification:
Is a change in the applicant’s medical condition caused by a serious traffic accident relevant to a PRRA decision?
[61] I am not prepared to certify this question as a serious question of general importance as it would not be determinative of this application.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed.
ANNEX
Relevant Statutory Provisions
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
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72. (1) Judicial review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
. . .
98. A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).
113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows:
(a) an applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection;
(b) a hearing may be held if the Minister, on the basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a hearing is required;
(c) in the case of an applicant not described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of sections 96 to 98;
. . . |
72. (1) Le contrôle judiciaire par la Cour fédérale de toute mesure — décision, ordonnance, question ou affaire — prise dans le cadre de la présente loi est subordonné au dépôt d’une demande d’autorisation.
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
. . .
98. La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
112. (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit :
a) le demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet;
b) une audience peut être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis compte tenu des facteurs réglementaires;
c) s’agissant du demandeur non visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la base des articles 96 à 98;
. . . |
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-6689-11
STYLE OF CAUSE: EVDOKIA REUTOV FILHA
- and –
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: March 6, 2012
APPEARANCES:
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Rick Garvin |
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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Myles J. Kirvan Deputy Attorney General of Canada Edmonton, Alberta |
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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