Date: 20160229

Docket: A-102-15

Citation: 2016 FCA 64

CORAM:

NOËL C.J. SCOTT J.A. DE MONTIGNY J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

GLEN FRENCH And the other appellants listed in the “Revised Schedule A”

Appellants

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

Heard at Montréal, Quebec, on February 11, 2016.

Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on February 29, 2016.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:	NOËL C.J.
CONCURRED IN BY:	SCOTT J.A. DE MONTIGNY J.A.

 

Date: 20160229

Docket: A-102-15

Citation: 2016 FCA 64

CORAM:

NOËL C.J. SCOTT J.A. DE MONTIGNY J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

GLEN FRENCH And the other appellants listed in the “Revised Schedule A”

Appellants

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NOËL C.J.

[1]               These appeals brought by Glen French (Mr. French or the appellant) and 41 other appellants listed in Revised Schedule A are from an interlocutory order issued by the Tax Court of Canada (2015 TCC 35) wherein C. Miller J. (the Tax Court judge) allowed a motion by Her Majesty the Queen (the respondent) to strike a plea in the appellants’ respective Amended Notices of Appeal. The plea in question invokes sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 (the Interpretation Act) and alleges that in assessing the legal validity of a gift under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the ITA), Parliament intended that a uniform concept of gift in line with the civil law of the Province of Québec be applied across Canada.

[2]               The 42 appeals were consolidated by order of this Court issued on April 22, 2015, Mr. French being designated as the lead appellant. In conformity with this order, the reasons which follow will be filed in docket A-102-15 and copy thereof will be filed as reasons for judgment in each of the consolidated appeals.

[3]               The legislative provisions which are relevant to the analysis are set out in Annex I to these reasons.

I.                    BACKGROUND

[4]               The assessments in issue disallow in whole the appellant’s claimed tax credits with respect to alleged gifts made to Ideas Canada Foundation, a registered charity, pursuant to section 118.1 of the ITA. Mr. French contends that he made such gifts during the 2000, 2001 and 2002 taxation years. A portion of Mr. French’s gifts was made from his personal funds while the remainder was funded by loans tied to the gifts.

[5]               Mr. French’s primary position is that he is entitled to the full amount of the claimed tax credits. He further maintains in the alternative that he is entitled to the tax credits claimed in respect of the portion of the gifts that exceeded the value of any consideration he would have received in the process. In making the latter argument Mr. French invokes the civil law of the Province of Quebec even though none of the purported donations were made in that province. The plea in question reads:

PART III – STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND REASONS

18.       The Appellant relies, inter alia, on … article 1810 of the Civil Code of Québec (“CCQ”) and sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 (“Interpretation Act”).

…

Partial Deduction

23.       In the alternative, the Appellant should be entitled to a deduction for that portion of each of the Donations that exceeded the value of any benefit or remuneration obtained from each of the Donations (excluding the value of any tax advantage).

24.       Under the civil law, Article 1810 of the CCQ expressly provides that “a remunerative gift … constitutes a gift … for the value in excess of that of the remuneration”. Consequently, to the extent that the Loans or some aspect thereof may have constituted remuneration to the Appellant, the Donations less the remuneration constituted a “gift” in Québec through operation of sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act.

25.       Had the Appellant been resident of Québec during the Taxation Years, he would unquestionably be entitled under section 118.1 of the Act to a deduction of the portion of the Donations in excess of the remuneration.

26.       Parliament did not intend for section 118.1 of the Act to produce radically different results for taxpayers in Québec that would not apply to taxpayers in the rest of Canada.

…

PART IV – RELIEF SOUGHT

28.       For these reasons, the Appellant asks this Court to:

...

REFER the matter back to the CRA for reconsideration and reassessment … on the basis that the Appellant was entitled to deduct the portion of the Tax Credits attributable to the portion of the Donations in excess of any benefit or remuneration received by the Appellant for the Donations;

[6]               The Tax Court judge struck the above plea pursuant to rule 53(1)(d) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure), SOR 90/688a (TCC Rules), on the basis that it was doomed to fail. For the reasons which follow, I have come to the view that it is not plain and obvious that the impugned plea cannot succeed and that the appeal should accordingly be allowed.

II.                 DECISION OF THE TAX COURT JUDGE

[7]               The Tax Court judge first emphasized the high threshold that must be met before a plea can be struck under rule 53(1) of the TCC Rules, i.e.: it must be plain and obvious that it has no chance of success. He then went on to examine whether this was the case.

[8]               He rejected the proposition that one may resort to the civil law of Quebec to determine when a gift arises for purposes of applying the ITA outside of the Province of Quebec. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act ensure that civil law is not applied in the rest of Canada and that common law is not applied in Quebec when private law concepts of the two legal systems are called into play, which, the Tax Court judge held, “is the very situation before me” (Reasons at para. 13). He added that nothing in the preamble to the Federal Law–Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, which amended the Interpretation Act by introducing sections 8.1 and 8.2, “invites one, as an interpreter of federal legislation, to ignore common law in favour of civil law or vice versa: indeed, quite the opposite” (Reasons at para. 16).

[9]               In any event, he took the view that there was no need to resort to the civil law, for the common law meaning of “gift” has been clearly established in the case law. In particular, he pointed to the definition set out in Friedberg v. R., [1992] 1 C.T.C. 1 (Fed. A.D.) at para. 4 [Friedberg] and taken up in Maréchaux v. Canada, 2010 FCA 287 at para. 3 [Maréchaux FCA]:

… a gift is a voluntary transfer of property owned by a donor to a donee, in return for which no benefit or consideration flows to the donor.

[My emphasis]

[10]           Accordingly, the Tax Court judge discarded the appellant’s contention that where the requisite intent is present, the common law arguably recognizes as a gift a transfer of property for partial consideration (herein a split or remunerative gift), holding that such a proposition cannot be sustained given the decisions of this Court in Maréchaux FCA, Kossow v. Canada, 2013 FCA 283 [Kossow FCA], and Canada v. Berg, 2014 FCA 25 [Berg FCA] (Reasons at para. 19):

The Appellants suggest that common law has acknowledged the concept of split receipting for a long time (see for example Woolner v Canada, [1997] T.C.J. No. 1395). I presume this is raised to convince me that the common law concept of gift is murky. Reliance on Woolner does not justify looking to Québec law, but goes more to the Appellants’ view of the correctness of the Maréchaux [FCA], Kossow [FCA] and … Berg [FCA] … decisions. Again, it certainly does not sway me that there is any confusion with respect to the common law meaning of “gift”.

[11]           The Tax Court judge dismissed the idea that bijuralism could entail the principle of uniformity, noting that it is neither its objective nor where it is heading as a legal doctrine (Reasons at para. 14):

The Appellants’ contention that Parliament did not intend section 118.1 of the Act to produce radically different results simply has no foundation in the law, notwithstanding it may be supportable by common sense. It is not an argument.

[12]           He found support in the December 2002 amendments to the ITA “allowing a tax credit for certain ‘gifts’ that would be invalid under private law solely because the taxpayer has received a benefit in return for making the gift” (Reasons at para. 23). These amendments were enacted in 2013 with an effective date of December 21, 2002 (the 2002 amendments). The Tax Court judge explained that by providing a result more clearly reflecting the civil law concept of remunerative gift, the 2002 amendments “legislatively dissociates the common law meaning of gift from the federal legislation” (Reasons at para. 23).

[13]           As to the appellant’s argument that the 2002 amendments were meant to clarify the law rather than change it, the Tax Court judge relied on the October 2012 Department of Finance’s Explanatory Notes introducing these amendments which recognize that a sale at less than fair market value could be treated in part as a gift pursuant to the civil law, but not the common law. By identifying situations in which the charitable donation tax credit will be available, notwithstanding benefits received by the donor taxpayer, Parliament has clearly changed the law (Reasons at para. 24).

[14]           Unable to perceive “a glimmer of a legal basis” upon which the appellant could build an argument based on sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, the Tax Court judge concluded that allowing the appellant to pursue such an argument would be a waste of time for all the stakeholders involved (Reasons at para. 26).

III.               THE POSITION OF THE APPELLANT

[15]           The appellant argues that the Tax Court judge’s decision is based on a misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act. He asserts that this Court has repeatedly favoured an interpretation of federal legislation that accords with both common law and civil law traditions while still reaching a reasonably uniform result across Canada, citing, inter alia, Grimard v. Canada, 2009 FCA 47 [Grimard] and Canada v. 9101-2310 Québec inc., 2013 FCA 241 [9101-2310 Québec inc.].

[16]           Relying on, inter alia, The Queen v. Zandstra, [1974] C.T.C. 503 (Fed. T.D.) [Zandstra] and Woolner v. R., [1999] 4 C.T.C. 2512 (T.C.C.) [Woolner], aff’d [2000] 1 C.T.C. 35 (Fed. A.D.) [Woolner FCA], the appellant submits that the case law is not as clear as the Tax Court judge found. Consistent with this position, he argues that the purpose of the 2002 amendments was to clarify the state of the law rather than change it.

[17]           To the extent that prior decisions of this Court preclude split gifting in the common law provinces, the appellant asks that they be reconsidered as they give rise to a result that is contrary to what Parliament intended. Specifically, these prior decisions did not consider sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act and the impact of the civil law on the construction of the word “gift” as it is used in subsection 118.1(3) of the Act.

[18]           The appellant also provides two alternative grounds on which this Court should allow the appeal, at least with respect to the prayer for relief set out in paragraph 28 of Mr. French’s Amended Notice of Appeal. First, in the event that the general anti-avoidance rule applies, the resulting tax consequences pursuant to subsection 245(2) of the ITA would require recognition of the split gift and the tax credits which correspond to the cash portion of the gift. Second, should the Court determine that the loans constituted a benefit, the appellant submits that the cash portion of the transfer should be treated separately as a gift, on the basis of the rule set out in Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd., [1968] 3 All. E.R. 651 (H.L.), thereby allowing the appellant to claim the corresponding tax credits.

IV.              THE POSITION OF THE RESPONDENT

[19]           The respondent submits that the Tax Court judge’s decision to strike portions of the appellant’s pleadings is discretionary, involves a question of mixed fact and law, and should not therefore be interfered with absent a palpable and overriding error, unless it contains an extricable error of law.

[20]           The respondent contends that the Tax Court judge applied the correct test and arrived at the right conclusion. Specifically, he was correct in holding that sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, in this case, called for the applicable private law concept of “gift”, which for the appellant means the common law concept of “gift”. Indeed, section 118.1 of the ITA does not direct the use of civil law in the common law provinces for the purpose of the definition of “gift”.

[21]           Relying on Maréchaux FCA, Kossow FCA, Berg FCA, and McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, the respondent argues that, contrary to the civil law concept of remunerative gift permitting a transaction to be split into a gift component and a non-gift component, “in the common law, generally speaking any material benefit received by the donor in return for a gift will vitiate the gift” (respondent’s memorandum of fact and law at para. 33).

[22]           The respondent rejects the appellant’s proposition that uniformity is a principle codified in the Interpretation Act. On the contrary, sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act acknowledge that the recognition of bijuralism and complementary can lead to different results in applying federal legislation. Indeed, these sections ensure the integrity not only of the civil law tradition, but also of the common law tradition.

[23]           The respondent disagrees with the contention that Courts have taken an interpretative approach melding common law and civil law concepts so as to achieve uniform results across Canada. In so arguing, the respondent cites, inter alia, Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v. Canada, 2009 SCC 29, Grimard, and 9101-2310 Québec inc., arguing that these decisions actually undermine the appellant’s submissions.

[24]           While Parliament can derogate from the private law of the provinces, by way of dissociation, it has not done so with respect to the meaning of “gift” in section 118.1 of the ITA. This changed as a result of the 2002 amendments. Reiterating the Tax Court judge’s reasons, the respondent argues that the Department of Finance, in the Explanatory Notes relating to these amendments, recognized that prior to the effective date of the amendments, any consideration would have vitiated a gift at common law. As the 2002 amendments were not in effect when Mr. French’s purported gifts were made, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed.

V.                 ANALYSIS

[25]           On a motion to strike pursuant to rule 53(1)(d) of the TCC Rules, the question which arises is whether it is plain and obvious that the argument has no reasonable prospect of success (R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at para. 17).

[26]           The Tax Court judge’s decision allowing the motion to strike is discretionary in nature. Absent a legal error or an error in legal principle, the appellant must show a readily apparent error that could change the result of the case (Turmel v. Canada, 2016 FCA 9; Imperial Manufacturing Group Inc. v. Decor Grates Incorporated, 2015 FCA 100, applying Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33). In my view, such a readily apparent and determinative error has been demonstrated.

[27]           The issue in the present appeal is whether it is arguable when regard is had to sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act that Parliament intended the word “gift” as it is used in subsection 118.1(3), to encompass split gifts, in line with the notion recognized by the civil law. The task in ascertaining Parliament’s intent is always the same. One must read the provision in context and give the words a meaning that is harmonious with the scheme of the act, its object and the intention of Parliament (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27).

[28]           The Tax Court judge correctly postulated that the starting point of the analysis pursuant to sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act is that effect be given to the private law governing a transaction “unless otherwise provided by law”. He went on to discard as “hopeless” the contention that prior to the 2002 amendments Parliament could have intended to exclude the common law meaning of “gift” in favour of the civil law definition (Reasons at para. 22). Only as a result of these amendments can it be said that Parliament provided otherwise by recognizing split gifts, wherever made (Reasons, para. 24).

[29]           In so holding, the Tax Court judge reasoned that if the purpose and effect of the 2002 amendments was to change the law in order to allow for split gifts, it necessarily followed that no such gift could be recognized prior to the coming into force of these amendments. Hence the conviction with which he found that the appellant’s plea had no chance of success (Reasons, paras. 25 and 26).

[30]           The Tax Court judge found support in his assessment of the purpose of the 2002 amendments in the Explanatory Notes which accompanied the 2002 amendments. In his view, these notes make it clear that the purpose was to recognize a form of gift which had no validity under the prior law. His exact words are as follows (Reasons at para. 24):

Even in the Department of Finance’s own Explanatory Notes introducing the [2002] amendments it is recognized that a sale at less than fair market value could be treated in part as a gift in civil law, but not in common law. The [2002] amendments have clearly changed the law by identifying situations in which the charitable donation tax credit will be available, notwithstanding benefits received by the donor taxpayer.

[31]           Consistent with this reading of the Explanatory Notes and his assessment of the purpose of the 2002 amendments, the Tax Court judge rejected any suggestion that the prior jurisprudence could be read as recognizing the validity of split gifts or was in any way “murky” in this regard (Reasons at para. 19).

[32]           I will first address the Tax Court judge’s reading of the Explanatory Notes. These notes, after recognizing that “[a]t common law the presence of a consideration of any value whatsoever makes a gift impossible” and that “[a]s such, at common law a contract to dispose of a property to a charity at a price below fair market value would not generally be considered to include a gift”, go on to state that “[n]evertheless, there have been certain decisions made under the common law where it has been found that a transfer of property to a charity was made partly in consideration for services and partly as a gift”. That is the context in which it is later stated that “[s]ubsections 248(30), (31) and (32) are added to that Act to clarify the circumstances under which taxpayers and donees may be eligible for tax benefits available under the Act in respect of the impoverishment of a taxpayer in favour of a donee” [my emphasis].

[33]           On a plain reading, the Explanatory Notes suggest that the state of the jurisprudence in the common law provinces was not as certain as the Tax Court judge held and that there was a need for clarification. An examination of the case law supports that view.

[34]           I begin by noting that the often-cited definition of “gift” set out in Friedberg does not exclude the possibility that Parliament intended the meaning of “gift” to extend to split gifts. While the Court did state that “a gift is a voluntary transfer of property owned by a donor to a donee, in return for which no benefit or consideration flows to the donor” (at para. 4), Friedberg was not a split gifting case. At no point did the Court address the question whether, in the presence of the requisite donative intent, partial consideration necessarily vitiates a gift.

[35]           In fact, neither Zandstra nor The Queen v. McBurney, [1985] 2 C.T.C. 214 (Fed. A.D.) [McBurney], which are both referred to in Friedberg (at para. 4), stand for the proposition that consideration received by a donor vitiates the whole gift. On the contrary, the Court in McBurney acknowledged the existence of a split gift (McBurney at para. 19) and the Court in Zandstra indicates, without expressing any form of disagreement, that the underlying assessments recognize the validity of a split gift (Zandstra at paras. 9 and 10).

[36]           It is noteworthy that the ratio decidendi of Zandstra and McBurney was more recently adopted by this Court in Woolner FCA. In that case, the Tax Court concluded that donations made over and beyond the secular tuition fees were “gifts” within the meaning of subsection 118.1(3) of the ITA, thereby recognizing what was in effect a split gift. While the issue on appeal turned on whether the disallowed portion for secular tuition fees should be treated as a gift, at no point did this Court question the Tax Court’s recognition of the gift component (Woolner FCA at paras. 2, 6 and 14).

[37]           The Tax Court judge viewed the appellant’s reliance on Woolner as an attempt to question “the correctness of the Maréchaux [FCA], Kossow [FCA] and … Berg [FCA] … decisions” (Reasons at para. 19). According to him, these three cases which postdate Woolner did away with any possibility that a split gift be recognized in applying the ITA in the common law provinces (Reasons at paras. 19, 23 and 24). Again, this requires that we take a closer look at these decisions.

[38]           The decision of this Court in Maréchaux FCA involved a leveraged charitable donation scheme whereby Mr. Maréchaux transferred $100,000 to a registered charity and received the corresponding charitable donation tax receipt. Out of the $100,000 transferred, $20,000 came from his own money while the remaining $80,000 came from an interest-free loan. In upholding the Tax Court’s decision, denying the tax credit claimed, this Court endorsed paragraph 49 of Woods J.’s reasons holding that the $20,000 portion of the transfer lacked the requisite donative intent (Maréchaux FCA at para. 12):

There is just one interconnected transaction here, and no part of it can be considered a gift that the appellant gave in expectation of no return.

[My emphasis]

[39]           Therefore, it is not clear that the decision of the Tax Court in Maréchaux v. R., 2009 TCC 587 [Maréchaux TCC], as confirmed by this Court, rejected split gifting. On the contrary, Woods J.’s statement, which this Court did not comment on one way or the other, appeared to leave the question open in stressing that “[i]n some circumstances, it may be appropriate to separate a transaction into two parts, such that there is in part a gift, and in part something else” (Maréchaux TCC at para. 48).

[40]           Maréchaux FCA was later discussed in Kossow v. Canada, 2012 TCC 325 [Kossow TCC] where a similar leveraged charitable donation scheme was before the Court. The issue was whether Maréchaux FCA was dispositive of the appeal. Like Mr. Maréchaux, Ms. Kossow argued, among other things, that a gift should be recognized for the $10,000 cash portion of her transfer to the registered charity. At the Tax Court, V. Miller J. dismissed this argument concluding that, as in Maréchaux FCA, “[n]o part of the Donation was given as a gift without expectation of a return” [my emphasis] (Kossow TCC at para. 75). This Court upheld that decision on the same basis. Again, the Court made no firm pronouncement on the question whether a split gift could validly be made.

[41]           Lastly, in Berg FCA, the issue of split gifting was not raised. The Court simply found that Mr. Berg had received consideration for his alleged gift (Berg FCA at para. 28) and that he did not have the required donative intent (ibidem at para. 29).

[42]           In short, it cannot be said with certainty that the meaning of “gift” prior to the 2002 amendments excluded the notion of split gift in the common law provinces and that the effect of these amendments was to change that state of affairs. Indeed, it is equally plausible that these amendments clarified an area of the law that was uncertain.

[43]           Finally, the Tax Court judge found that a quest for uniformity in the application of federal legislation is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason for disregarding the applicable private law. I agree. The objective of sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act is to recognize the role of the civil law and the common law in the application of federal legislation which necessarily entails the possibility of diverging results.

[44]           However, the appellant does not invoke uniformity for the sake of uniformity. The appellant’s plea is based on the broader proposition that Parliament intended to recognize split gifts, wherever made, in line with the civil law. Given that it would have been open to Parliament to attribute to the word “gift” a meaning which coincides with the civil law and that it is arguable that this is what Parliament intended, there is no basis for striking the appellant’s plea at this stage of the proceedings.

[45]           Having reached the conclusion that the Tax Court judge could not strike the impugned plea, it is not necessary to address the alternative grounds advanced by the appellant in support of maintaining the relief sought in paragraph 28 of the Amended Notice of Appeal.

[46]           For these reasons, I would allow the appeals with one set of costs in the lead appeal, and giving the order which the Tax Court judge ought to have given, I would dismiss the respondent’s motion to strike, with one set of costs.

“Marc Noël”

“I agree

A. F. Scott J.A.”

“I agree

Yves de Montigny J.A.”

ANNEX I

Relevant legislative provisions

REVISED SCHEDULE A

No.	Appellant	Court File No.	Appeal Court File No.
1.	ARNOLD, Mark	2014-3347 (IT) G	A-79-15
2.	BERNSTEIN, Harry	2014-3423 (IT) G	A-77-15
3.	BERNSTEIN Martin	2014-3422 (IT) G	A-75-15
4.	BERTOLACCI, Maria	2014-3588 (IT) G	A-73-15
5.	BERTOLACCI, Paolo	2014-3590 (IT) G	A-70-15
6.	BRAGANZA, Christabel G.	2014-2879 (IT) G	A-68-15
7.	BROWN, David	2014-3083 (IT) G	A-67-15
8.	CAVANAGH-WILLIAMS Suzanne	2014-2880 (IT) G	A-65-15
9.	CLARK, David	2014-2878 (IT) G	A-92-15
10.	CLARK, Elena	2014-3432 (IT) G	A-96-15
11.	COOK, Steve	2014-1243 (IT) G	A-97-15
12.	COUTURE, Daniel	2014-1384 (IT) G	A-99-15
13.	ELLIS, John K.	2014-3498 (IT) G	A-100-15
14.	GADZIK, Theodore	2014-1242 (IT) G	A-103-15
15.	GOLDMAN, Barry	2014-3288 (IT) G	A-104-15
16.	HAMILTON, Alan J.	2014-1375 (IT) G	A-105-15
17.	HENNICK, Darryl	2014-3431 (IT) G	A-107-15
18.	HUNTER, Ronald	2014-3428 (IT) G	A-106-15
19.	KADEY, Moss	2014-3289 (IT) G	A-108-15
20.	KHUBYAR, Edna	2014-3427 (IT) G	A-95-15
21.	LABERGE, Sirkka	2014-2652 (IT) G	A-94-15
22.	LIBURDI, Joseph	2014-3346 (IT) G	A-91-15
23.	MacINTOSH, Ronald E.	2014-1373 (IT) G	A-90-15
24.	MARTEL, Jean	2014-3287 (IT) G	A-84-15
25.	MASON, Wesley	2014-1382 (IT) G	A-83-15
26.	MATHESON, Brian	2014-1383 (IT) G	A-81-15
27.	McCORMICK, John	2014-1904 (IT) G	A-80-15
28.	McCORMICK, Mary	2014-2649 (IT) G	A-78-15
29.	McMILLAN, Shane	2014-1376 (IT) G	A-76-15
30.	PEDDIE, Melvin	2014-3424 (IT) G	A-74-15
31.	PEMBERTON, Arthur	2014-3348 (IT) G	A-72-15
32.	PITCH, Harvin	2014-3349 (IT) G	A-71-15
33.	PRUTIS-MISTERSKA, Krystyna	2014-2299 (IT) G	A-69-16
34.	RASHID, Suleiman	2014-3430 (IT) G	A-66-15
35.	REDMOND, Andrew	2014-1380 (IT) G	A-93-15
36.	RINGEL, Ian	2014-1379 (IT) G	A-87-15
37.	ROSS, Stephen	2014-2773 (IT) G	A-88-15
38.	RUSSET, James P.	2014-1378 (IT) G	A-89-15
39.	SAUGSTAD, Gregory	2014-1177 (IT) G	A-86-15
40.	SOLWAY, Stephen H.	2014-3429 (IT) G	A-85-15
41.	TABAC, Ivan	2014-2651 (IT) G	A-82-15

 

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	A-102-15
STYLE OF CAUSE:	GLEN FRENCH And the other appellants listed in the “Revised Schedule A” v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING:		Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING:		February 11, 2016
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:		NOËL C.J.
CONCURRED IN BY:		SCOTT J.A. DE MONTIGNY J.A.
DATED:		february 29, 2016

APPEARANCES:

Guy Du Pont Michael H. Lubetsky A. Christina Tari Leonard S. Puterman	For The AppellantS
Arnold Bornstein John Grant	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP Montréal, Quebec Tari Law – Tax Dispute Resolution North York, Ontario	For The AppellantS
William F. Pentney Deputy Attorney General of Canada	For The Respondent