Date: 19990310
Docket: A-675-97
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
ROBERTSON J.A.
ROTHSTEIN J.A.
(In re The Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended
and The Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.))
BETWEEN:
SCHRADER AUTOMOTIVE INC.
Appellant
- and -
THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
FOR CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Respondent
Heard at Ottawa (Ontario) on Wednesday, March 10, 1999.
Judgment delivered from the Bench on March 10, 1999.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY: DÉCARY J.A.
Date: 19990310
Docket: A-675-97
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
ROBERTSON J.A.
ROTHSTEIN J.A.
(In re The Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended
and The Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.))
BETWEEN:
SCHRADER AUTOMOTIVE INC.
Appellant
- and -
THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
FOR CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa (Ontario)
on Wednesday, March 10, 1999.)
DÉCARY J.A.
[1] At issue in this appeal from a decision of the Trial Division1 is the classification of tire valves and air chucks under chapter 84 of Schedule 1 of the Customs Tariff Act2 ("the Act").
[2] The Canadian International Trade Tribunal ("the Tribunal") came to the view that the goods at issue should be classified under tariff Item No. 8481.30.90 as "other check valves". Leave to appeal on a question of law was then granted to the present respondent by a judge of the Trial Division pursuant to subsection 68(1) of the Customs Act as it then read3. The Trial Judge allowed the appeal and decided that the tire valves should be classified under tariff item No. 8481.80.91 ("other appliances, other, hand operated or hand activated") and the air chucks under tariff item No. 8481.80.99 ("other appliances, other").
[3] In recent years, this Court has not squarely addressed the standard of review applicable to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal with respect to decisions made under the Customs Tariff Act4, despite a continuing avalanche of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of the proper standard of review with respect to decisions of expert tribunals. The issue was squarely raised by counsel and we shall deal with it.
[4] We have reached the conclusion that the standard of review on an appeal on a question of law from a decision of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal where the issue is the proper interpretation of an item described in Schedule 1 of the Customs Tariff Act, is that of "reasonableness simpliciter", as opposed to that of "patent unreasonableness" or that "of correctness"5. To use the words of Iacobucci J. in Southam Inc., "a court reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must look to see whether any reasons support it" and "the standard of reasonableness simply instructs reviewing courts to accord considerable weight to the views of tribunal about matters with respect to which they have significant expertise"6.
[5] The Canadian International Trade Tribunal is, clearly, a specialized tribunal. It is even more so when the decision at issue is with respect to the Customs Tariff Act. That Act is a statutory enactment and its interpretation thereby becomes a question of law, hence the right to appeal tariff decisions to this Court on a question of law. Yet, the Customs Tariff, law as it may be, is nonetheless a law of a very technical nature. It is legislation of such a specialized nature and expressed in terms that have so little to do with traditional legislation that for all practical purposes the Court is being asked to give legal meaning to technical words that are well beyond its customary mandate. Furthermore, there are unique Canadian and international rules of interpretation applicable to the Customs Tariff that bear little resemblance to the traditional canons of statutory construction. Therefore, considerable deference should be accorded to the Tribunal's decisions and litigants who appeal tariff decisions to this Court should be aware that they have a tough hill to climb.
[6] In the case at bar, the Tribunal made findings which are supported by the evidence, it adopted an interpretation of the tariff that makes reasonable sense and it applied that interpretation to the goods at issue in a way which was open to it. The Court cannot substitute its own interpretation for that of the Tribunal unless the Tribunal's interpretation is found to be unreasonable. In the case at bar, there were no grounds upon which the Trial Judge could have found the Tribunal's interpretation unreasonable.
[7] The appeal will be allowed, the decision of the Trial Division will be set aside and the decision of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal will be restored. The appellant will be entitled to its costs in both Divisions of this Court.
"Robert Décary"
J.A.
__________________1 Reported as Minister of National Revenue (Customs and Excise) v. Schrader Automotive Inc. (1997), 136 F.T.R. 193 (F.C.T.D.).
2 S.C. 1987, c. 49, as amended.
3 Since June 13, 1995, there is an appeal as of right to the Federal Court of Appeal on any question of law. (S.C. 1995, c. 41, s. 20).
4 See, for example, Nalley's Canada Limited v. The Deputy Minister of National Revenue (2 November 1998), A-47-97 (F.C.A.), Minister of National Revenue (Customs and Excise) v. Sunbeam Corp. (Canada) Ltd. (1998), 225 N.R. 228 (F.C.A.) and Minister of National Revenue (Customs and Excise) v. Pigmalion Services (1997), 221 N.R. 91 (F.C.A.).
5 See Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748.
6 Ibid. at 776 and 779.