Date: 19990422 Docket: A-189-81
CORAM: STONE J.A. DESJARDINS J.A. McDONALD J.A.
IN THE MATTER of section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10
BETWEEN:
TGI FRIDAY'S OF MINNESOTA, INC.,
Appellant,
- and - THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS,
Respondent,
- and - KEN DOLAN INC.,
Intervenant.
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on Thursday, April 22, 1999. Judgment rendered from the Bench on Thursday, April 22, 1999.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: STONE J.A.
Date: 19990422 Docket: A-189-81
CORAM: STONE J.A. DESJARDINS J.A. McDONALD J.A.
IN THE MATTER of section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10
BETWEEN:
TGI FRIDAY'S OF MINNESOTA, INC.,
Appellant,
- and - THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS,
Respondent,
- and -
KEN DOLAN INC.,
Intervenant.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on Thursday, April 22, 1999)
STONE J.A.
[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of the Trial Division of March 25, 1981.
Page: 2
[2] The issue before the learned Trial Judge was whether the Registrar of Trade Marks
in his decision of May 21, 1980 erred in expunging the trade mark "Friday's" from the
register pursuant to section 44 of the Trade Marks Act as it then stood.' The relevant
portions of that section read as follows:
44. (1) The Registrar may at any time and, at the written request made after three years from the date of the registration by any person who pays the prescribed fee shall, unless he sees good reason to the contrary, give notice to the registered owner requiring him to furnish within three months an affidavit or statutory declaration showing with respect to each of the wares or services specified in the registration, whether the trade mark is in use in Canada and, if not, the date when it was last so in use and the reason for the absence of such use since such date.
44. (1) Le registraire peut, à tout moment, et doit, sur la demande écrite présentée après trois années à compter de la date de l'enregistrement, par une personne qui verse les droits prescrits, à moins qu'il ne voie une raison valable à l'effet contraire, donner au propriétaire inscrit un avis lui enjoignant de fournir, dans les trois mois, un affidavit ou une déclaration statutaire indiquant, à l'égard de chacune des marchandises ou de chacun des services que spécifie l'enregistrement, si la marque de commerce est employée au Canada et, dans la négative, la date où elle a été ainsi employée en dernier lieu et la raison de son défaut d'emploi depuis cette date.
(2) The Registrar shall not receive any evidence other than such affidavit or statutory declaration, but may hear representations made by or on behalf of the registered owner of the trade mark or by or on behalf of the person at whose request the notice was given.
(2) Le registraire ne doit recevoir aucune preuve autre que cet affidavit ou cette déclaration statutaire, mais il peut entendre des représentations faites par ou pour le propriétaire inscrit de la marque de commerce, ou par ou pour la personne à la demande de qui l'avis a été donné.
(3) Where, by reason of the evidence furnished to him or the failure to furnish such evidence, it appears to the Registrar that the trade mark, either with respect to all of the wares or services specified in the registration or with respect to any of such wares or services, is not in use in Canada and that the absence of use has not been due to special circumstances that excuse such absence of use, the registration of such trade mark is liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.
(3) Lorsqu'il apparaît au registraire, en raison de la preuve à lui fournie ou de l'omission de fournir une telle preuve, que la marque de commerce, soit à l'égard de la totalité des marchandises ou services spécifiés dans l'enregistrement, soit à l'égard de l'une quelconque de ces marchandises ou de l'un quelconque de ces services, n'est pas employée au Canada, et que le défaut d'emploi n'a pas été attribuable à des circonstances spéciales qui le justifient, l'enregistrement de cette marque de commerce est susceptible de radiation ou modification en conséquence.
R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10.
Page: 3
[3] The trade mark had been registered on May 4, 1973 in the name of Friday's Ltd. of which one Herman Lindy was the president and major shareholder. In 1977, the company assigned the trade mark to Mr. Lindy as a result of which he became its "registered owner". Notwithstanding the assignment, the company continued to make use of the trade mark to the exclusion of Mr. Lindy even though the company was not the "registered user" under section 49 of the statute.
[4] The Registrar's decision to expunge was based on lack of any evidence to the effect that Mr. Lindy, the registered owner, was using the trade mark in association with each of the services in the normal course of trade in Canada on October 30, 1978, the (late of the section 44 notice.
[5] The Trial Judge upheld the Registrar's decision. He was of the view that the phrase "used in Canada" in section 44 requires use of the trade mark by the registered owner unless the actual user of the trade mark was a "registered user" under section 49 of the Act and as such a person "permitted" to use the trade mark. Mr. Lindy launched the present appeal on April 8, 1981.2
z
Subsequent to that date the trade mark was assigned eventually to the present appellant who, by order, was substituted for Mr. Lindy as appellant in this proceeding.
Page: 4
[6] The appellant contests this latter conclusion but only by way of an alternative
argument for setting aside the judgment below. The primary argument is that while the
present appeal was pending hearing, the legislation in question was amended in such a way
as to recognize the use of the trade mark by the company as sufficient to satisfy the "use in
Canada" requirement of section 44 and that the amendment had retroactive effect. The
amendment appears in subsections 50(1) and (2) of the current statute,' and reads as follows:
50. (1) For the purposes of this Act, if an entity is licensed by or with the authority of the owner of a trade-mark to use the trademark in a country and the owner has, under the licence, direct or indirect control of the character or quality of the wares or services, then the use, advertisement or display of the trade-mark in that country or as in a trade-mark, trade-name or otherwise by that entity has, and is deemed always to have had, the same effect as such a use, advertisement or display of the trade-mark in that country by the owner.
50. (1) Pour l'application de la présente loi, si une licence d'emploi d'une marque de commerce est octroyée, pour un pays, à une entité par le propriétaire de la marque, ou avec son autorisation, et que celui-ci, aux termes de la licence, contrôle, directement ou indirectement, les caractéristiques et la qualité des marchandises et services, l'emploi, la publicité ou l'exposition de lamarque, dans ce pays, par cette entité comme marque de commerce, nom commercial -ou partie de ceux-ci - ou autrement ont le même effet et sont réputés avoir toujours eu le même effet que s'il s'agissait de ceux du propriétaire.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, to the extent that public notice is given of the fact that the use of a trade-mark is a licensed use and of the identity of the owner, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proven, that the use is licensed by the owner of the trade-mark and the character or quality of the wares or services is under the control of the owner.
(2) Pour l'application de la présente loi, dans la mesure où un avis public a été donné quant à l'identité du propriétaire et au fait que l'emploi d'une marque de commerce fait l'objet d'une licence, cet emploi est réputé, sauf preuve contraire, avoir fait l'objet d'une licence du propriétaire, et le contrôle des caractéristiques et de la qualité des marchandises et services est réputé, sauf preuve contraire, être celui du propriétaire.
3
S.C. 1993, c. 15, s. 69, the amending statute, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, the Industrial Design Act, the Integrated Circuit Topography Act, the Patent Act, the Trade-marks Act and other Acts in consequence thereof, was assented to on May 6, 1993. The effect of the amendment was to repeal the "registered user" provisions of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 and substitute the new section.
Page: 5
[7] We have underlined the words in the English text which the appellant relies upon as giving this amendment retroactive effect. It seems to us that the phrase "and is deemed always to have had" was intended to declare the law not only for the future but for the past, and that it should be applied accordingly unless there be some obstacle in the way of doing so.
[8] There are two possible obstacles to giving effect to section 50 in the present case.
The first is that it did not come into effect until some twelve years after the impugned
judgment was rendered and, accordingly, that this Court cannot now apply it. In our view,
however, the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated in Western Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont'
that this is not an insurmountable obstacle. The following passage in the judgment of
Cartwright J. (as he then was) is pertinent both to the issue of retroactivity and to the duty
of an appellate court in circumstances such as these to apply the law retroactively as it was
intended to be applied:'
There is, of course, no doubt of the general rule that unless the intention of the Legislature collected from the words of the Statute is clear and unequivocal we are to presume that an act is prospective and not retrospective. As it is put in the well-known maxim:- "Omnis nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet no praeteritis". But it has often been held that where an act is in its nature declaratory the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable. (vide Craies on Statute Law op. cit. p. 341 and cases there cited).
Having concluded that the Act is declaratory of what is and has always been the law of Alberta in this regard, I do not find it necessary to decide whether, under the applicable Statutes and rules of Alberta, an appeal to the Appellate Division is - to use the words of Duff J., as he then was, in Boulevard Heights v. Veilleux [[1915] 52 Can. S.C.R. 185 at 192] -"an appeal strictly socalled, not an appeal by way of re-hearing"; for even assuming it to be so, I think it clear that the
4
[1953] 1 S.C.R. 345.
Ibid., at p. 369.
Page: 6
Appellate Division would be bound to give effect to a Statute, passed after the judgment from which the appeal is taken but before the hearing or decision of the appeal, declaring what the law is and always has been and so, of necessity, declaring what it was at the time of the trial. This proposition appears to me to be so obvious as not to require authority to support it but if authority is needed it is, I think, to be found in the following passages in the judgments in Boulevard Heights v. Veilleux (supra):
per Duff J. (as he then was) at pages 191 and 192:
There can be no doubt, I think, that if these amendments had been enacted before the hearing of the appeal by the Appellate Division of Alberta, that court would have been governed by them in the disposition of the appeal. The question we have to consider is another question. The Legislature of Alberta has no authority to prescribe rules governing this court in the disposition of appeals from Alberta; and the enactments invoked by Mr. Clarke, which do not profess to declare the state of the law at the time the action was brought, or at the time the judgment of the Appellate Division was given, can only affect the rights of the parties on this appeal to the extent to which the statutes and rules by which this court is governed permit them so to operate.
[Emphasis added]
[9] The second possible obstacle concerns the existence of a "licence" in favour of the company and control of the mark by the owner. While it is apparent that Mr. Lindy did not grant the company a written licence in 1977 for the period up to the date of the section 44 notice, the existence of an oral licence and control by Mr. Lindy, the appellant argues, may be reasonably inferred from the evidence. Mr. Lindy remained in the office of president and the major shareholder of the company up to the date of the section 44 notice during which period the company carried on the bar and restaurant operations in association with which the mark was used. In our view, an inference may be drawn from these facts that the company used the mark under an oral licence from Mr. Lindy or under an arrangement that was tantamount to an oral licence and that the mark remained under his direct or indirect
Page: 7
control. The effect was to permit the company to use the trade mark in the manner that it was used in the company's operations.
[10] The appeal will be allowed and the judgment of the Trial Division as well as the decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks set aside.
"A.J. Stone"
J.A.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
Date: 19990422 Docket: A-189-81
IN THE MATTER of section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10
BETWEEN:
TGI FRIDAY'S OF MINNESOTA, INC., Appellant, -and
THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, Respondent,
-andKEN DOLAN INC.,
Intervenant.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA APPEAL DIVISION
NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD
DOCKET: A-189-81
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL DIVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA, DELIVERED MARCH 25, 1981 IN DOCKET: T-3440-80
STYLE OF CAUSE: TGY FRIDAY'S OF MINNESOTA, INC. v. THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS and KEN DOLAN INC.
PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: April 22, 1999
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: ( Stone, Desjardins, McDonald JJA.) DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: Stone J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Allen D. Israel FOR THE APPELLANT
No one appearing FOR THE RESPONDENT
No one appearing FOR THE INTERVENANT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Allen D. Israel FOR THE APPELLANT Ottawa, Ontario
No one appearing FOR THE RESPONDENT
No one appearing FOR THE INTERVENANT