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Date: 20060629

Docket: A-459-05

Citation: 2006 FCA 248

CORAM:        DÉCARY J.A.

                        LINDENJ.A.

                        SHARLOW J.A.

BETWEEN:

SUPERIOR FILTER RECYCLING INC.

Appellant

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

Heard at Vancouver, British Columbia, on June 29, 2006.

Judgment delivered from the Bench at Vancouver, British Columbia, on June 29, 2006.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:                                   SHARLOW J.A.


Date: 20060629

Docket: A-459-05

Citation: 2006 FCA 248

CORAM:        DÉCARY J.A.

                        LINDENJ.A.

                        SHARLOW J.A.

BETWEEN:

SUPERIOR FILTER RECYCLING INC.

Appellant

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Delivered from the Bench at Vancouver, British Columbia, on June 29, 2006)

SHARLOW J.A.

[1]                The appellant seeks to reverse a decision of a Judge of the Tax Court of Canada to refuse an adjournment sought by the appellant, apparently with the consent of the Crown. Having reviewed the material in the record and heard submissions made by the appellant's representative, we are unable to discern any error of law or principle in the denial of the adjournment.

[2]                The granting of adjournments is a discretionary matter, not an entitlement. The Tax Court is not obliged to accede to a party's request for an adjournment, even if the other party consents. Generally, once a matter is set down for hearing, the parties must be prepared to proceed at the scheduled time.

[3]                It is argued for the appellant that if the adjournment had been allowed, the appellant would have discovered certain statutory changes relating to British Columbiacorporations. It is suggested that these statutory changes might have caused the Judge to take a different view of the appellant's motion to permit Mr. Lindsay to represent the appellant in the Tax Court proceedings. We are all of the view that the statutory provisions cited by the appellant have no bearing on the issue of the representation of corporations in the Tax Court.

[4]                It is argued for the appellant that the decision under appeal is vitiated by a reasonable apprehension of bias. We are unable to accept this argument. The record discloses no factual foundation for the appellant's submission on this point. The fact that the Judge stated that the appellant's predicament originated from its failure to file returns on a timely basis was simply a statement of fact that was apparent from the record. It did not indicate any predisposition against the appellant.

[5]                The appellant complains that the refusal of the adjournment was unfairly prejudiced because its representatives had no time to prepare. However, it seems to us that even with the additional preparation time the appellant's motions could not have succeeded.

[6]                Fundamentally the appellant wishes to assert that it is entitled to have its appeals allowed because of alleged flaws in the conduct of officials of the Canada Revenue Agency during the objection process. The jurisprudence is clear that the mandate of the Tax Court is to determine the correctness of assessments under appeal. No complaint about the conduct of tax officials during the objection process is relevant to that determination: Main Rehabilitation Co. Ltd. v. Canada, 2004 FCA 403 (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed); Webster v. Canada, 2003 FCA 388 (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed). Therefore, the Judge could not have granted the appellant's motion to allow its income tax appeal, even if he had accepted the submission of the appellant that the tax officials had in some way acted outside their "jurisdiction" in confirming the assessments now under appeal. The correctness of the assessments is now properly before the Tax Court, and stands to be determined by that Court on the merits.

[7]                The appellant also argues that the Judge was wrong to deny its motion to permit Mr. Lindsay to represent the appellant, and that he was wrong to grant the Crown's motion that the appellant retain counsel. Having reviewed the record, we are unable to conclude that the Judge erred in making those orders.

[8]                This appeal will therefore be dismissed with costs.

"K. Sharlow"

J.A.


FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                                                               A-459-05

APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BEAUBIER OF THE TAX COURT OF CANADA DATED SEPTEMBER 27, 2005 ON COURT FILE NO.

2004-4042(IT)G

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                                               SUPERIORFILTER RECYCLING INC. v. HMTQ

PLACE OF HEARING:                                                         VANCOUVER, BC

DATE OF HEARING:                                                           JUNE 29, 2006

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:        DÉCARY, J.A.

                                                                                                LINDEN, J.A.

                                                                                                SHARLOW, J.A.

DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY:                             SHARLOW, J.A.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. Nelson Meikle

Mr. David-Kevin: Lindsay

FOR THE APPELLANT

Ms. Johanna Russell

Ms. Lisa M. Macdonell

FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Mr. Nelson Meikle

Mr. David-Kevin: Lindsay

Kelowna, BC

FOR THE APPELLANT

John H. Sims, Q.C.

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Vancouver, BC

FOR THE RESPONDENT

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