Date: 20001212
Docket: A-158-99
CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A.
McDONALD J.A.
SHARLOW J.A.
BETWEEN:
FRED WEEKS
Applicant
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, Wednesday, October 25, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, December 12, 2000
REASONS FOR REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: SHARLOW J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A.
McDONALD J.A.
Date: 20001212
Docket: A-158-99
CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A.
McDONALD J.A.
SHARLOW J.A.
BETWEEN:
FRED WEEKS
Applicant
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
When Mr. Weeks filed his income tax returns for 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, he claimed tax credits under subsection 118.2(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th supp), for a number of expenditures on the basis that they were medical expenses incurred for the care of his son John. John was born in 1978 with a congenital brain malformation as a consequence of holoprosencephaly syndrome and lissencephaly. He suffers from a spastic quadriplegic form of cerebral palsy, a right sighted sensorineaural hearing loss, microcephaly and moderate mental retardation. John's disabilities are such that he requires full time care and supervision in all aspects of daily living.
Despite early advice that John should be cared for in an institution, Mr. Weeks and his wife decided to care for him at home. They have done so all his life. The evidence is that the high quality of care, support and stimulation they have provided to John have given him an increased life expectancy, better health and a better qualify of life than would have been expected had he been cared for in an institution.
The financial cost to Mr. Weeks of the decision to care for John at home has been substantial. Many of his expenditures qualified for tax relief as medical expenses. For the years under appeal, some of his claims for a medical expense tax credit were initially disallowed, but were allowed after Mr. Weeks filed notices of objection and then an appeal to the Tax Court.
By the time Mr. Week's appeal was heard in the Tax Court, there remained in dispute claims relating to expenditures totalling $47,139.01 over the four years under appeal.
Of the total amount in dispute, $13,913.66 represents expenditures for books, compact discs, videos, toys, computer equipment and entertainment, including outings for movies and theatrical productions, and a 1992 trip to the wheelchair games in West Virginia in which John participated. The Tax Court Judge found that these expenditures generally were of the kind that parents would normally make for the benefit of their children. The computer equipment, for example, was not specially adapted for use by John or by a person with John's disabilities.
Mr. Weeks does not dispute that finding, but he explains that these expenditures were made to provide the stimulation that has proved so helpful to John. Mr. Weeks also says that over the years such expenditures were greater than would be required for a normal child, because John is older than children who typically enjoy the use of these things, and because John's disabilities cause him to be much harder on toys and equipment than most children would be.
The remaining $33,225.35 represents the purchase price of a van, plus interest. A van was required to take John to various events and family outings in his wheelchair. The portion of Mr. Week's claim relating to the cost of equipping the van so that it could transport John in his wheelchair was allowed. What remains in dispute is the cost of the van itself, and the related interest expense.
It has not been suggested that any of those expenditures were unreasonable. Nor does Mr. Weeks dispute that other family members made some use of the items purchased with the claimed expenditures. He claims, however, that the expenditures were made principally for John's care and were required because of John's disability.
There is evidence that the expenditures for which Mr. Weeks is seeking tax relief would have been treated as therapeutically desirable in an institutional setting. However, there is no evidence that such expenditures would have been made by any institution in which John might have been placed.
The Tax Court Judge held that Mr. Weeks' claim for a medical tax credit for these expenditures was properly disallowed because the expenditures did not come within the scope of subsection 118.2(2) of the Income Tax Act. It was also argued in the Tax Court that Mr. Weeks should be entitled to relief under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that subsection 118.2(2) is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15 and the discrimination is not justified under section 1. The Tax Court Judge found no discrimination, and dismissed the appeals. Mr. Weeks now seeks judicial review of the decision of the Tax Court Judge.
I will first review the scheme of the Income Tax Act relating to tax relief for individuals who are disabled, and then I will consider the interpretation of the language of the specific provision in issue in this case, subsection 118.2(2). If the appeal cannot succeed on the basis of statutory interpretation, I will consider the Charter arguments.
Scheme of the Income Tax Act
There are a number of provisions of the Income Tax Act that are intended to provide tax relief to disabled individuals and members of their families who support them. Numerous amendments since 1994 have made the tax relief more generous, but for present purposes I have ignored those changes.
An individual with a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment may qualify for the "disability tax credit" under subsection 118.3(1). This is the most general form of tax relief, in the sense that it may be claimed without proving any disability related expenditure. The parts of subsection 118.3(1) that are relevant for present purposes read, in 1994, as follows:
| (1) Where (a) an individual has a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment, (a.1) the effects of the impairment are such that the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted, (a.2) a medical doctor, ... has certified in prescribed form that the individual has a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment the effects of which are such that the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted, (b) the individual has filed for a taxation year with the Minister the certificate described in paragraph (a.2), and (c) no amount in respect of remuneration for an attendant or care in a nursing home, in respect of the individual, is included in calculating a deduction under section 118.2 (otherwise than by reason of paragraph (2)(b.1) thereof) for the year by the individual or by any other person, for the purposes of computing the tax payable under this Part by the individual for the year, there may be deducted an amount determined by the formula A [times ] $4,118 where A is the appropriate percentage for the year. |
| (1) La produit de la multiplication de 4_118_$ par le taux de base pour l'année est déductible dans le calcul de l'impôt payable par un particulier en vertu de la présente partie pour une année d'imposition, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies: a) le particulier a une déficience mentale ou physique grave et prolongée; a.1) les effets de la déficience sont tels que la capacité du particulier d'accomplir une activité courante de la vie quotidienne est limitée de façon marquée; a.2) un médecin en titre ... sur formulaire prescrit, que le particulier a une déficience mentale ou physique grave et prolongée dont les effets sont tels que sa capacité d'accomplir une activité courante de la vie quotidienne est limitée de façon marquée; b) le particulier présente au ministre l'attestation visée à l'alinéa a.2) pour une année d'imposition ; c) aucun montant représentant soit une rémunération versée à un préposé aux soins du particulier, soit des frais de séjour du particulier dans une maison de santé ou de repos, n'est inclus par le particulier ou par une autre personne dans le calcul d'une déduction en application de l'article 118.2 pour l'année (autrement que par application de l'alinéa 118.2(2)b.1)). |
The "appropriate percentage for the year" (le taux de base pour l'année) is the lowest personal tax rate percentage, which for the years under appeal was 17%.
In 1994, the amount of the disability tax credit under the Income Tax Act would reduce federal income tax by approximately $700 per year. If an individual who is entitled to the disability tax credit does not have sufficient tax payable to make use of the credit, the excess may be transferred to a supporting individual. In this case, the disability tax credit to which John would be entitled is transferable to Mr. Weeks.
In addition to the disability tax credit, subsection 118.2(1) provides a tax credit for specific medical expenses incurred by the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse or dependent, as defined in subsection 118(6). John is a child of Mr. Weeks and is dependent on Mr. Weeks for support, and therefore John is a "dependent" of Mr. Weeks.
The medical expense tax credit is the amount obtained by multiplying the lowest personal tax rate percentage (17%) by the total medical expenses in excess of the lesser of $1,614 and 3% of net income for the year. Thus, for example, a person with a net income of $50,000 and total medical expenses of $10,000 may claim a medical expense tax credit that would reduce federal income tax by $1,445 (17% of the difference between $10,000 and 3% of $50,000).
Subsection 118.2(2) contains a long list of items that qualify as medical expenses for purposes of the medical expense tax credit. In 1994, subsection 118.2(2) read as follows:
| (2)For the purposes of subsection (1), a medical expense of an individual is an amount paid (a) to a medical practitioner, dentist or nurse or a public or licensed private hospital in respect of medical or dental services provided to a person (in this subsection referred to as the "patient") who is the individual, the individual's spouse or a dependant of the individual (within the meaning assigned by subsection 118(6)) in the taxation year in which the expense was incurred; (b) as remuneration for one full-time attendant (other than a person who, at the time the remuneration is paid, is the individual's spouse or is under 18 years of age) on, or for the full-time care in a nursing home of, the patient in respect of whom an amount would, but for paragraph 118.3(1)(c), be deductible by reason of section 118.3 in computing a taxpayer's tax payable under this Part for the taxation year in which the expense was incurred; (b.1) as remuneration for attendant care provided in Canada to the patient if
to the extent that the total of amounts so paid does not exceed $5,000 (or $10,000 where the individual died in the year); (c) as remuneration for one full-time attendant upon the patient in a self-contained domestic establishment in which the patient lives, if
(d) for the full-time care in a nursing home of the patient, who has been certified by a medical practitioner to be a person who, by reason of lack of normal mental capacity, is and in the foreseeable future will continue to be dependent on others for his personal needs and care; (e) for the care, or the care and training, at a school, institution or other place of the patient, who has been certified by an appropriately qualified person to be a person who, by reason of a physical or mental handicap, requires the equipment, facilities or personnel specially provided by that school, institution or other place for the care, or the care and training, of individuals suffering from the handicap suffered by the patient; (f) for transportation by ambulance to or from a public or licensed private hospital for the patient; (g) to a person engaged in the business of providing transportation services, to the extent that the payment is made for the transportation of
(h) for reasonable travelling expenses (other than expenses described in paragraph (g)) incurred in respect of the patient and, where the patient was, and has been certified by a medical practitioner to be, incapable of travelling without the assistance of an attendant, in respect of one individual who accompanied the patient, to obtain medical services in a place that is not less than 80 kilometres from the locality where the patient dwells if the circumstances described in subparagraphs (g)(iii), (iv) and (v) apply; (i) for or in respect of an artificial limb, iron lung, rocking bed for poliomyelitis victims, wheel chair, crutches, spinal brace, brace for a limb, ileostomy or colostomy pad, truss for hernia, artificial eye, laryngeal speaking aid, aid to hearing or artificial kidney machine, for the patient; (i.1) for or in respect of diapers, disposable briefs, catheters, catheter trays, tubing or other products required by the patient by reason of incontinence caused by illness, injury or affliction; (j) for eye glasses or other devices for the treatment or correction of a defect of vision of the patient as prescribed by a medical practitioner or optometrist; (k) for an oxygen tent or other equipment necessary to administer oxygen or for insulin, oxygen, liver extract injectible for pernicious anaemia or vitamin B12 for pernicious anaemia, for use by the patient as prescribed by a medical practitioner; (l) on behalf of the patient who is blind or profoundly deaf or has a severe and prolonged impairment that markedly restricts the use of the patient's arms or legs,
(l.1) on behalf of the patient who requires a bone marrow or organ transplant,
(l.2) for reasonable expenses relating to renovations or alterations to a dwelling of the patient who lacks normal physical development or has a severe and prolonged mobility impairment, to enable the patient to gain access to, or to be mobile or functional within, the dwelling; (l.3) for reasonable expenses relating to rehabilitative therapy, including training in lip reading and sign language, incurred to adjust for the patient's hearing or speech loss; (m) for any device or equipment for use by the patient that
(n) for drugs, medicaments or other preparations or substances (other than those described in paragraph (k)) manufactured, sold or represented for use in the diagnosis, treatment or prevention of a disease, disorder, abnormal physical state, or the symptoms thereof or in restoring, correcting or modifying an organic function, purchased for use by the patient as prescribed by a medical practitioner or dentist and as recorded by a pharmacist; (o) for laboratory, radiological or other diagnostic procedures or services together with necessary interpretations, for maintaining health, preventing disease or assisting in the diagnosis or treatment of any injury, illness or disability, for the patient as prescribed by a medical practitioner or dentist; (p) to a person authorized under the laws of a province to carry on the business of a dental mechanic, for the making or repairing of an upper or lower denture, or for the taking of impressions, bite registrations and insertions in respect of the making, producing, constructing and furnishing of an upper or lower denture, for the patient; or (q) as a premium, contribution or other consideration to a private health services plan in respect of one or more of the individual, the individual's spouse and any member of the individual's household with whom the individual is connected by blood relationship, marriage or adoption. |
(2)Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), les frais médicaux d'un particulier sont les frais payés_: |
| a) à un médecin, à un dentiste, à une infirmière ou un infirmier, à un hôpital public ou à un hôpital privé agréé, pour les services médicaux ou dentaires fournis au particulier, à son conjoint ou à une personne à la charge du particulier (au sens du paragraphe 118(6)) au cours de l'année d'imposition où les frais ont été engagés; b) à titre de rémunération d'un préposé à plein temps (sauf une personne qui, au moment où la rémunération est versée, est le conjoint du particulier ou est âgée de moins de 18 ans) aux soins du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) -- pour qui un montant serait, sans l'alinéa 118.3(1)c), déductible en application de l'article 118.3 dans le calcul de l'impôt payable par un contribuable en vertu de la présente partie pour l'année d'imposition au cours de laquelle les frais sont engagés -- ou à titre de frais dans une maison de santé ou de repos pour le séjour à plein temps d'une de ces personnes; b.1) à titre de rémunération pour les soins de préposé fournis au Canada au particulier, à conjoint ou à une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), dans la mesure où le total des sommes payées ne dépasse pas 5_000_$ (ou 10_000_$ en cas de décès du particulier au cours de l'année) et si les conditions suivantes sont réunies:
c) à titre de rémunération d'un préposé à plein temps aux soins du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) dans un établissement domestique autonome où le particulier, le conjoint ou la personne à charge vit, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies_:
d) à titre de frais dans une maison de santé ou de repos pour le séjour à plein temps du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), qu'un médecin atteste être quelqu'un qui, faute d'une capacité mentale normale, dépend d'autrui pour ses besoins et soins personnels et continuera d'en dépendre ainsi dans un avenir prévisible; e) pour le soin dans une école, une institution ou un autre endroit -- ou le soin et la formation -- du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), qu'une personne habilitée à cette fin atteste être quelqu'un qui, en raison d'un handicap physique ou mental, a besoin d'équipement, d'installations ou de personnel spécialisés fournis par cette école ou institution ou à cet autre endroit pour le soin -- ou le soin et la formation -- de particuliers ayant un handicap semblable au sien; f) pour le transport par ambulance du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), à destination ou en provenance d'un hôpital public ou d'un hôpital privé agréé; g) à une personne dont l'activité est une entreprise de transport, dans la mesure où ce paiement se rapporte au transport, entre la localité où habitent le particulier, son conjoint ou une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) et le lieu -- situé à 40 kilomètres au moins de cette localité -- où des services médicaux sont habituellement dispensés, ou vice-versa, des personnes suivantes_:
si les conditions suivantes sont réunies_:
h) pour les frais raisonnables de déplacement, à l'exclusion des frais visés à l'alinéa g), engagés à l'égard du particulier, du conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) et, si ceux-ci sont, d'après le certificat d'un médecin, incapables de voyager sans l'aide d'un préposé à leurs soins, à l'égard d'un seul particulier les accompagnant, afin d'obtenir des services médicaux dans un lieu situé à 80 kilomètres au moins de la localité où le particulier, le conjoint ou la personne à charge habitent, si les conditions visées aux sous-alinéas g)(iii) à (v) sont réunies; i) au titre d'un membre artificiel, d'un poumon d'acier, d'un lit berceur pour les personnes atteintes de poliomyélite, d'un fauteuil roulant, de béquilles, d'un corset dorsal, d'un appareil orthopédique pour un membre, d'un tampon d'iliostomie ou de colostomie, d'un bandage herniaire, d'un oeil artificiel, d'un appareil de prothèse vocale ou auditive ou d'un rein artificiel, pour le particulier, son conjoint ou une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a); |
| i.1) au titre de sous-vêtements jetables, de couches, de cathéters, de plateaux à cathéters, de tubes ou d'autres produits dont le particulier, son époux ou conjoint de fait ou une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) a besoin pour cause d'incontinence due à une maladie, à une blessure ou à une infirmité; j) pour des lunettes ou autres dispositifs de traitement ou de correction des troubles de la vue, destinés au particulier, à conjoint ou à une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), sur ordonnance d'un médecin ou d'un optométriste; k) pour une tente à oxygène ou tout autre équipement nécessaire à l'administration d'oxygène, pour de l'insuline, de l'oxygène, de l'extrait hépatique injectable pour le traitement de l'anémie pernicieuse ou des vitamines B12 pour le traitement de l'anémie pernicieuse, destinés au particulier, à son conjoint ou à une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), sur ordonnance d'un médecin; l) au nom du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), qui a une déficience -- cécité, surdité profonde ou déficience grave et prolongée qui limite de façon marquée l'usage des bras ou des jambes -- :
l.1) au nom du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), qui doit subir une transplantation de la moelle épinière ou d'un organe:
l.2) pour les frais raisonnables afférents à des rénovations ou transformations apportées à l'habitation du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) -- ne jouissant pas d'un développement physique normal ou ayant un handicap moteur grave et prolongé -- pour lui permettre d'avoir accès à son habitation, de s'y déplacer ou d'y accomplir les tâches de la vie quotidienne; l.3) pour les frais raisonnables engagés relativement à des programmes de rééducation conçus pour pallier la perte de la parole ou de l'ouïe, y compris les cours de lecture labiale et de langage gestuel; m) pour tout dispositif ou équipement destiné à être utilisé par le particulier, par son conjoint ou par une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a) et qui répond aux conditions suivantes, dans la mesure où le montant payé ne dépasse pas le montant fixé par règlement, le cas échéant, relativement au dispositif ou à l'équipement:
n) pour les médicaments, les produits pharmaceutiques et les autres préparations ou substances -- sauf s'ils sont déjà visés à l'alinéa k) -- qui sont, d'une part, fabriqués, vendus ou offerts pour servir au diagnostic, au traitement ou à la prévention d'une maladie, d'une affection, d'un état physique anormal ou de leurs symptômes ou en vue de rétablir, de corriger ou de modifier une fonction organique et, d'autre part, achetés afin d'être utilisés par le particulier, par son conjoint ou par une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a), sur ordonnance d'un médecin ou d'un dentiste, et enregistrés par un pharmacien; o) pour les actes de laboratoires, de radiologie ou autres actes de diagnostic et les interprétations nécessaires, sur ordonnance d'un médecin ou d'un dentiste, en vue de maintenir la santé, de prévenir les maladies et de diagnostiquer ou traiter une blessure, une maladie ou une invalidité du particulier, de son son conjoint ou d'une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a); p) à une personne autorisée par la législation d'une province à exercer la profession de prothésiste dentaire, pour la fabrication ou réparation de dentiers ou pour la prise d'empreintes et la réalisation de mises en place en vue de la fabrication, production, construction et fourniture de dentiers, pour le particulier, son conjoint ou une personne à charge visée à l'alinéa a); q) à un régime privé d'assurance-maladie, à titre de prime, cotisation ou autre contrepartie à l'égard du particulier, de son conjoint ou d'une personne habitant chez le particulier et avec laquelle le particulier est uni par les liens du sang, du mariage, de l'union de fait ou de l'adoption ou à l'égard de plusieurs de ces personnes, |
The prescribed expenses referred to in paragraph 118.2(2)(m) are listed Income Tax Regulation 5700, which in 1994 read as follows:
| For the purposes of paragraph 118.2(2)(m) of the Act, a device or equipment is prescribed if it is a (a) wig made to order for an individual who has suffered abnormal hair loss owing to disease, medical treatment or accident; (b) needle or syringe designed to be used for the purpose of giving an injection; (c) device or equipment, including a replacement part, designed exclusively for use by an individual suffering from a severe chronic respiratory ailment or a severe chronic immune system disregulation, but not including an air conditioner, humidifier, dehumidifier, heat pump or heat or air exchanger; (c.1) air or water filter or purifier for use by an individual who is suffering from a severe chronic respiratory ailment or a severe chronic immune system disregulation to cope with or overcome that ailment or disregulation; (c.2) electric or sealed combustion furnace acquired to replace a furnace that is neither an electric furnace nor a sealed combustion furnace, where the replacement is necessary solely because of a severe chronic respiratory ailment or a severe chronic immune system disregulation; (d) device or equipment designed to pace or monitor the heart of an individual who suffers from heart disease; (e) orthopaedic shoe or boot or an insert for a shoe or boot made to order for an individual in accordance with a prescription to overcome a physical disability of the individual; (f) power-operated guided chair installation, for an individual, that is designed to be used solely in a stairway; (g) mechanical device or equipment designed to be used to assist an individual to enter or leave a bathtub or shower or to get on or off a toilet; |
| (h) hospital bed including such attachments thereto as may have been included in a prescription therefor; (i) device that is designed to assist an individual in walking where the individual has a mobility impairment; (j) external breast prosthesis that is required because of a mastectomy; (k) teletypewriter or similar device, including a telephone ringing indicator, that enables a deaf or mute individual to make and receive telephone calls; (l) optical scanner or similar device designed to be used by a blind individual to enable him to read print; (m) power-operated lift or transportation equipment designed exclusively for use by, or for, a disabled individual to allow the individual access to different areas of a building or to assist the individual to gain access to a vehicle or to place the individual's wheelchair in or on a vehicle; (n) device designed exclusively to enable an individual with a mobility impairment to operate a vehicle; (o) device or equipment, including a synthetic speech system, braille printer and large print-on-screen device, designed exclusively to be used by a blind individual in the operation of a computer; (p) electronic speech synthesizer that enables a mute individual to communicate by use of a portable keyboard; (q) device to decode special television signals to permit the script of a program to be visually displayed; (q.1) a visual or vibratory signalling device, including a visual fire alarm indicator, for an individual with a hearing impairment; (r) device designed to be attached to infants diagnosed as being prone to sudden infant death syndrome in order to sound an alarm if the infant ceases to breathe; (s) infusion pump, including diposable peripherals, used in the treatment of diabetes or a device designed to enable a diabetic to measure the diabetic's blood sugar level; (t) electronic or computerized environmental control system designed exclusively for the use of an individual with a severe and prolonged mobility restriction; (u) extremity pump or elastic support hose designed exclusively to relieve swelling caused by chronic lymphedema; and (v) inductive coupling osteogenesis stimulator for treating non-union of fractures or aiding in bone fusion. |
| Les dispositifs ou équipements suivants sont prescrits pour l'application de l'alinéa 118.2(2)m) de la Loi: a) une perruque faite sur mesure pour quelqu'un qui a subi une perte anormale de cheveux en raison d'une maladie, d'un traitement médical ou d'un accident; b) une aiguille ou seringue devant servir à donner une injection; c) un dispositif ou équipement, y compris une pièce de rechange, conçu exclusivement pour l'usage d'un particulier souffrant d'une maladie respiratoire chronique grave ou de troubles chroniques graves du système immunitaire, à l'exclusion d'un appareil de climatisation, d'un humidificateur, d'un déshumidificateur, d'un échangeur thermique, d'un échangeur d'air et d'une thermopompe; c.1) un appareil de filtration ou de purification de l'air ou de l'eau pour l'usage d'un particulier ayant une maladie respiratoire chronique grave ou des troubles chroniques graves du système immunitaire, destiné à l'aider à composer avec cette maladie ou ces troubles ou à les surmonter; c.2) une chaudière électrique ou à combustion optimisée acquise pour remplacer une chaudière autre qu'électrique ou à combustion optimisée, lorsque la substitution est effectuée uniquement parce que le particulier a une maladie respiratoire chronique grave ou des troubles chroniques graves du système immunitaire; d) un dispositif ou un équipement destiné à stimuler ou à régulariser le coeur d'une personne atteinte d'une maladie cardiaque; e) une chaussure orthopédique ou une garniture intérieure de chaussure faite sur mesure, sur ordonnance, pour aider une personne à surmonter une infirmité; f) un siège transporteur électrique monté sur rail pour escaliers; g) un dispositif ou équipement mécanique destiné à aider à monter dans une baignoire ou à en descendre, à entrer dans une douche ou à en sortir, ou à monter sur la cuvette ou à en descendre; |
| h) un lit d'hôpital, y compris les accessoires de ce lit visés par une ordonnance; i) tout dispositif qui est conçu à l'intention du particulier à mobilité réduite pour l'aider à marcher; j) une prothèse mammaire externe requise suite à une mastectomie; k) un téléimprimeur ou tout dispositif semblable (y compris un indicateur de sonnerie de poste téléphonique) pour permettre à une personne sourde ou muette de faire des appels téléphoniques et d'en recevoir; l) un lecteur optique ou un dispositif semblable conçu pour être utilisé par un aveugle pour lui permettre de lire un texte imprimé; ou m) un appareil élévateur ou tout équipement de transport mécaniques conçus exclusivement pour un particulier handicapé afin de lui permettre d'accéder aux différentes parties d'un bâtiment ou de monter à bord d'un véhicule ou d'y placer son fauteuil roulant; n) un dispositif conçu exclusivement pour permettre à une personne à mobilité réduite de conduire un véhicule; o) un dispositif ou équipement, y compris un système de parole synthétique, une imprimante en braille et un dispositif de grossissement des caractères sur écran, conçu exclusivement pour permettre à un aveugle de faire fonctionner un ordinateur; p) un synthétiseur de parole électronique qui permet à une personne muette de communiquer à l'aide d'un clavier portatif; q) un décodeur de signaux de télévision spéciaux par lequel le scénario d'une émission est affiché; q.1) un dispositif de signalisation visuelle ou vibratoire, y compris une alarme-incendie visuelle, destiné à un particulier ayant une déficience auditive; r) un dispositif, conçu pour être attaché à un bébé sujet, d'après un diagnostic, au syndrome de mort subite du nourrisson, qui déclenche un signal d'alarme dès que le bébé cesse de respirer; s) une pompe à perfusion, y compris le matériel connexe jetable, utilisée pour le traitement du diabète ou un dispositif conçu pour permettre à un diabétique de mesurer son taux de glycémie; t) un système électronique ou informatisé de contrôle de l'environnement conçu exclusivement pour l'usage d'un particulier dont la mobilité est limitée de façon grave et prolongée; u) des bas élastiques ou un dispositif de compression des membres, conçus exclusivement pour diminuer les tuméfactions causées par le lymphoedème chronique; v) un stimulateur électromagnétique de l'ostéogenèse utilisé pour le traitement des fractures non consolidées ou la reconstitution osseuse. |
In two respects, the conditions for claiming the disability tax credit and the medical expense tax credit are interconnected.
First, paragraph 118.3(1)(c) precludes any claim for a disability tax credit in respect of an individual in the same year as a medical expense tax credit is claimed for that individual for care in a nursing home or for remuneration to a full-time attendant, unless the claim falls under paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1), which is limited to expenses not exceeding $5,000.
Second, a medical expense tax credit may be claimed under paragraph 118.2(2)(b) (remuneration for one full time attendant or for full-time care in a nursing home) only if the patient is a person who, but for the prohibition in paragraph 118.3(1)(c), would qualify for the disability tax credit.
The consequence is that a person who qualifies for the disability tax credit and who also pays remuneration for a full time attendant or for full-time care in a nursing home must choose between, on the one hand, the medical expense tax credit under paragraph 118.2(2)(b) for the cost of attendant or nursing home care or, on the other hand, the disability tax credit plus a medical expense tax credit for a maximum of $5,000 of the cost of attendant or nursing home care.
For example, a person whose net income is $50,000 and who pays $10,000 for attendant care or nursing home care would choose a medical expense tax credit of $1,445 (17% of the difference between $10,000 and 3% of $50,000), rather than a disability tax credit of $700 plus a medical expense tax credit of $595 (17% of the difference between $5,000 (the maximum allowable) and 3% of $50,000). In this case, Mr. Weeks has chosen to forego a claim for the disability tax credit for John in order to make the more advantageous claim for a medical expense tax credit for attendant care.
Interpretation of subsection 118.2(2)
The Tax Court Judge found that there is nothing in the list of medical expenses in subsection 118.2(2) that would permit a medical expense tax credit for any of the expenses in dispute. In my view, he was correct.
It was argued for Mr. Weeks that, given the evidence that the expenditures in question were incurred for John's care, they should come within a broad and liberal interpretation of paragraphs 118.2(2)(b), (d) or (e). This would require an interpretation that would treat the Weeks' home as a "nursing home" (paragraphs 118.2(2)(b) or (d)) or as a "school, institution or other place" that has special provision for "equipment, facilities or personnel" for the care and training of persons who need those things because of a physical or mental handicap (paragraph 118.2(2)(e)).
I agree with the Tax Court Judge that the words of those provisions cannot be stretched as far as counsel for Mr. Weeks suggests, particularly when they are compared to the parts of paragraphs 118.2(2)(b) and (c) that deal specifically with the cost of in-home care but are limited to remuneration paid to an attendant. In my view, the cost of devices, equipment or other chattels purchased for the in-home care of a disabled person cannot qualify for the medical expense tax credit unless they are within paragraphs 118.2(2)(i) to (m).
Counsel for Mr. Weeks argues that this interpretation of paragraphs 118.2(2)(b), (d) and (e) results in discrimination against John under section 15 of the Charter, and should be rejected on that ground. If that is so, then the broader interpretation propounded by counsel for Mr. Weeks would in effect be a Charter remedy. The Charter arguments are considered below.
Charter argument
Before dealing with the substantive Charter issues, I wish to comment on the question of remedy. The Charter remedies sought in oral argument in this Court would have involved a judicial redrafting of subsection 118.2(2) to allow a medical expense tax credit for all "disability related expenses". That was not the remedy sought in the Tax Court. In the written argument in this Court no specific suggestion was made for the exact legislative revision that would be required to give a Charter remedy. As a result, the Crown was unable to provide a considered response. At the suggestion of the presiding Judge, it was determined that the matter of remedy would be deferred to a subsequent hearing if the Charter arguments were found to have merit.
Mr. Weeks seeks to rely on subsection 15(1) of the Charter, which reads as follows:
| 15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, withoutdiscrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mentalor physical disability. |
15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l'origine nationale ouethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques. |
I summarize the argument for Mr. Weeks as follows. Disabled people, particularly those with mental disabilities, are a historically disadvantaged group who have been the subject of negative stereotyping that has led in the past to a policy of institutionalization of disabled people. It is now understood that institutionalization is not beneficial for many disabled people, and that in-home care is preferable for many reasons. John's case exemplifies the relative advantages of in-home care to institutional care. If John had been cared for in an institution, the cost of his care would be borne in part by the government through its medical or social programs. To the extent the cost of institutional care would have been borne by Mr. Weeks, it would qualify in its entirety for a medical expense tax credit under paragraph 118.2(2)(b), (d) or (e). It is only because John is being cared for at home that no tax relief is available for some of the expenditures related to his disability. That differential treatment is discriminatory within the meaning of section 15 of the Charter because it gives families an incentive to choose institutional care for their disabled children over home care, thus perpetuating the historic negative stereotyping of disabled people.
It should be noted that the direct impact of the denial of the medical expense tax credit is felt by Mr. Weeks, the person on whom John is dependent for support and therefore the only person entitled to the tax relief being sought. In my view, if there is merit to the Charter argument, a remedy should not be barred merely because the tax relief is claimed by Mr. Weeks and will thus benefit John only indirectly.
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, Iacobucci J. stated the three questions that must be asked to determine a discrimination claim under section 15 of the Charter (at paragraph 88):
| (A) Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimants and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? |
| (B) Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds? |
| and |
| (C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration? |
The first question is a threshold one. In the context of this case, the question becomes whether the lack of tax relief for the expenditures that are the subject of this application causes differential treatment between disabled persons, depending upon whether they are cared for at home or in an institution.
It is argued for Mr. Weeks that providing tax relief for all costs of institutional care but not all disability-related costs of home care is differential treatment. The validity of this assertion rests in part upon the unstated premise that some reasonable comparison can be made between the nature, quality and cost of home care and the nature, quality and cost of institutional care. However, it is far from clear to me that this premise is established on the evidence. The record does not disclose what resources would be available to John in any institution in which he might have resided, or the cost of such resources, or the extent to which such cost would be borne by John or his family.
I will illustrate with one example. The evidence does not indicate whether institutions generally provide their residents with computers. If they do not, then a computer would be made available to a resident only if the cost were borne by the resident or the resident's family. But in that case no tax relief would be available for the cost of the computer under subsection 118.2(2)(b) as it now reads. Therefore the absence of tax relief for a computer for home use would not amount to differential treatment.
The second and third issues are concerned with whether the differential treatment constitutes discrimination in the substantive sense intended by s. 15(1) of the Charter. In this regard, it is argued that the choice of a place of residence for disabled persons is an analogous ground under section 15 of the Charter, because the past public policy of compelling or encouraging the institutionalization of disabled individuals was an application of false stereotypes attributable to immutable personal characteristics. The argument is that any public policy that provides a continued incentive for such institutionalization is discriminatory, and that such an incentive is inherent in the limitations on the right to claim tax relief for expenditures like those in issue in this case.
Reliance is placed on Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203. That case indicates that within an enumerated or analogous ground of discrimination, there may be imbedded subcategories of analogous grounds. Thus, a rule that precludes aboriginal people from voting in band elections unless they reside on the reserve amounts to discrimination on an analogous ground, called "aboriginality residence." On the other hand, Corbiere is not to be taken as authority for a general rule that the choice of place of residence is always an analogous ground of discrimination for purposes of section 15 of the Charter. That is clear by the following excerpt from paragraph 15 of the majority decision:
| The ordinary "residence" decisions faced by the average Canadians should not be confused with the profound decisions Aboriginal band members make to live on or off their reserves, assuming choice is possible. The reality of their situation is unique and complex. Thus no new water is charted, in the sense of finding residence, in the generalized abstract, to be an analogous ground. |
I see little analogy between the situation of an Aboriginal band member who is denied the right to participate in band elections because of off-reserve residence, and the situation of a disabled person who may feel compelled to choose institutional care over home care in order to obtain more generous tax relief for disability related expenditures.
Despite having considerable doubt that the choice of institutional care over home care for a disabled person is an analogous ground for purposes of section 15 of the Charter, I will assume that there is merit in making the suggested comparison. The premise underlying the argument for Mr. Weeks is that the Charter imposes an obligation on Parliament to provide tax relief for 100% of disability related expenses incurred for home care, because anything less will necessarily drive disabled people to choose institutional care. If that is the argument, the Charter claim cannot succeed unless there is evidence that the differential tax treatment is capable of motivating such a decision.
There is evidence on the record that supports the inference that the choice of care for a disabled person depends to some extent on economic factors. However, the Tax Court Judge found on the evidence that the basis of the decision made by Mr. Weeks and his wife to care for John at home was the quality of care. They made that choice in the hope and belief that John would get better care at home than in an institution (and were proved correct on that score). But their choice was not motivated or dependent on the degree to which the cost of home care would qualify for tax relief.
Even if I were to assume that in general, economic factors are a determining factor in choosing home care over institutional care, the availability of tax relief is only one economic element that might be brought to bear. Another is the pre-tax cost of institutional care. The record contains no evidence on that point. That seems to me to be a critical omission.
It was assumed in argument that institutional care would involve some cost on the part of the family, but there is no evidence as to what that cost would be. In this regard, I will put aside for the moment the proposition that the quality of care would matter to a family making a choice between home care and institutional care for a disabled child. I will assume instead that economic factors are paramount.
If institutional care requires only a nominal expenditure for the family, the lack of tax relief for 100% of the disability-related costs of home care might be an incentive to choose institutional care. But that incentive would diminish as the cost of institutional care increases. Institutional care could theoretically be so costly to a family that home care would be chosen regardless of the tax relief available for the costs of home care. In other words, without knowing what costs a family would bear for institutional care, there is no factual foundation for the conclusion that there is a causal connection between the quantum of tax relief for disability- related costs of home care and the choice between home care and institutional care.
It seems to me likely that the choice between home care and institutional care is based on a combination of factors, including the differences in the quality of care, differences in the available resources, and differences in the after tax costs. In the absence of evidence as to all of the factors that affect or may affect that choice, this Charter argument cannot succeed.
I conclude that Mr. Weeks has failed to establish the factual foundation for his Charter claim. For that reason, this application for judicial review should be dismissed with costs.
I would add that if I had concluded that there is discrimination as alleged, the Charter claim would still face at least one other formidable hurdle. The Crown denies that there is any discrimination, but argues that if there is, it is justified by section 1 of the Charter. In this regard the Crown adduced evidence in the Tax Court to explain the rationale for the tax provisions in
issue. That evidence is uncontradicted and appears on the fact of it to be capable of establishing a section 1 justification.
Karen R. Sharlow
J.A.
"I agree
Rothstein J.A."
"I agree
McDonald J.A."