CANADA |
Cour d'appel fédérale |
BETWEEN:
and
Respondent
and
MINISTER OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 13, 2010.
Judgment delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 13, 2010.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: SHARLOW J.A.
CANADA |
Cour d'appel fédérale |
Date: 20100413
Docket: A-324-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 99
CORAM: NADON J.A.
SHARLOW J.A.
LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
CATHY LEDUC
Applicant
and
MARYSIA TURNER
Respondent
and
MINISTER OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 13, 2010)
SHARLOW J.A.
[1] The applicant Cathy Leduc is asking this Court to set aside a decision of the Pension Appeals Board dismissing her claim for survivor benefits under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. 8, in relation to a deceased contributor, Mr. Jacques Leduc, to whom Ms. Leduc was legally married at the time of his death. The Board’s decision was based on its determination that Ms. Leduc did not meet the statutory definition of “survivor” because the respondent Marysia Turner was the “common-law partner” of Mr. Leduc at the time of his death.
[2] Ms. Leduc is entitled to survivor benefits only if she meets the definition of “survivor” in subsection 42(1) of the Canada Pension Plan. The definition reads as follows:
42. (1) In this Part, … |
42. (1) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente partie. […] |
“survivor”, in relation to a deceased contributor, means (a) if there is no person described in paragraph (b), a person who was married to the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death, or (b) a person who was the common-law partner of the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death. |
« survivant » S’entend : a) à défaut de la personne visée à l’alinéa b), de l’époux du cotisant au décès de celui-ci; b) du conjoint de fait du cotisant au décès de celui-ci. |
[3] The phrase “common-law partner” is defined as follows in section 2 of the Canada Pension Plan. The definition reads as follows:
2. (1) In this Act, … |
2. (1) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi. […] |
“common-law partner”, in relation to a contributor, means a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year. For greater certainty, in the case of a contributor’s death, the “relevant time” means the time of the contributor’s death. |
« conjoint de fait » La personne qui, au moment considéré, vit avec un cotisant dans une relation conjugale depuis au moins un an. Il est entendu que, dans le cas du décès du cotisant, « moment considéré » s’entend du moment du décès. |
[4] The Board concluded, after considering a large volume of documentary evidence and the oral evidence of several witnesses, that at the time of Mr. Leduc’s death, Ms. Turner was his “common-law partner” as defined in section 2, and therefore she fell within the statutory definition of “survivor’ in section 42, and Ms. Leduc did not. This is essentially a factual conclusion that must stand absent palpable and overriding error, or a breach of the duty of procedural fairness.
[5] It is argued for Ms. Leduc that the absence of a transcript of the Board hearing is a breach of the Board’s duty of procedural fairness because, without a transcript, this Court is unable to deal effectively with the issues raised in the application for judicial review. We do not accept this argument. In our view, and notwithstanding the able submissions of counsel for Ms. Leduc, the record provides a sufficient basis for assessing the merits of the arguments raised by Ms. Leduc in this application for judicial review.
[6] It is also argued for Ms. Leduc that the Board erred by failing to consider certain oral evidence favouring her position. In our view, the factual conclusion of the Board on the key issue before it is supported by the record and well explained by the reasons. Even if we were to assume that there was some oral evidence favouring Ms. Leduc’s position that was not mentioned in the Board’s reasons, this would indicate only that the evidence was given little weight, not that it was disregarded. Having considered the entire documentary record and the submissions of Ms. Leduc, we are not persuaded that the Board made any palpable and overriding factual error in concluding that Ms. Turner met the statutory definition of “common-law partner”.
[7] For these reasons, this application will be dismissed with costs payable to the respondent Ms. Turner. The respondent the Attorney General of Canada has not asked for costs.
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-324-09
STYLE OF CAUSE: Cathy Leduc v. Marysia Turner and Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: April 13, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: Nadon J.A.
Sharlow J.A.
Layden- Stevenson J.A.
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: Sharlow J.A.
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
|
Bahaa I. Sunallah
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT, Marysia Turner
FOR THE RESPONDENT, Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ottawa, Ontario
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
Ottawa, Ontario
Myles Kirvan Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
FOR THE RESPONDENT, Marysia Turner
FOR THE RESPONDENT, Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development
|