Court File No. 2005-4348 (IT) I CITATION: 2007TCC296

TAX COURT OF CANADA

IN RE: the Income Tax Act

BETWEEN:

ALLISON CLEMENT

Appellant

- and -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

- and -

ALESSANDRO D'OVIDIO

Third Party

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT DELIVERED ORALLY FROM THE BENCH BY JUSTICE JOE E. HERSHFIELD in the Courts Administration Service, 180 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario on Thursday, April 19, 2007 at 1:45 p.m.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. Theodore Cowdrey Mr. Laurent Bartleman

Agent for the Appellant Counsel for the Respondent

Also Present:

Mr. Alessandro D'Ovidio

A.S.A.P. Reporting Services Inc. 8 2007

200 Elgin Street, Suite 1004 Ottawa, Ontario K2P 1L5 130 King Street West, Suite 1800 Toronto, Ontario M5X 1E3

1	Toronto, Ontario
2	REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
3	(Edited from the transcript of Reasons delivered
4	orally from the Bench at
5	Toronto, Ontario on April 19, 2007)
6	JUSTICE HERSHFIELD: The Appellant
7	appeals a reassessment in respect of her 2003
8	taxation year which included in her income child
9	support payments made by her former spouse in the
10	amount of \$9,600. Pursuant to an order made under
11	Subsection 174(3) of the Income Tax Act by Justice
12	Bowie on January 4, 2007, the Appellant's former
13	spouse, Alessandro D'Ovidio, was joined as a party
14	to the appeal.
15	The Appellant and her former
16	husband lived separate and apart since April 1996
17	because of the breakdown of their marriage. A
18	divorce judgment was issued in November 2002 by the
19	Ontario Superior Court of Justice. The Appellant
20	and her former husband are the parents of three
21	children over which they have joint custody, with
22	the primary residence of the children being at the
23	home of the Appellant.
24	A separation agreement was
25	executed in 1996 pursuant to which the Appellant
26	was required to pay for the support of the children $ASAP$ Reporting Services Inc.

1	the amount of \$1,000 per month, \$333 per child,
2	with indexing. Further contributions towards
3	certain child-care costs were required as well.
4	The issue in this hearing is
5	whether a commencement day was created after the
6	1996 agreement was entered into. It is not in
7	dispute that by oral agreement the fixed monthly
8	payments reduced, in about June of 1998, to \$800
9	per month or \$266 per child per month.
10	There was an unsigned written
11	amending agreement presented at the hearing. This
12	unsigned agreement reflects the change to the child
13	support amount from \$1,000 to \$800. The
14	Appellant's testimony was that it reflected the
15	amount of support being unilaterally imposed on her
16	and was prepared on her husband's behalf.
17	Her ex-husband testified that he
18	had never seen the document. He did acknowledge
19	however that the support amount paid on a regular
20	monthly basis or fixed monthly basis was reduced to
21	\$800 per month as per an oral agreement between
22	them at that time, although he testified as well
23	that he continued to pay other expenses for the
24	children in various amounts which might have

brought the total to some \$1,000, or perhaps even

in excess of \$1,000 per month in some years.

25

26

That was the state of affairs	
until November 2002 at the time of the petition for	
divorce. As part of those proceedings in 2002 the	
parties signed an affidavit agreeing to support	
amounts of \$266 per month per child. A separate	
clause of the affidavit provided that based on	
costs for the children of approximately \$800 per	
month it is agreed that the father pay \$800 per	
month to the mother.	

The affidavit and it's included written support payment agreement are witnessed by a commissioner for taking affidavits. There does not appear to be a disagreement that this agreement, reduced to writing, reflected the actual obligations accepted by and honoured by the parties since 1998. This does not mean that they didn't disagree on a number of other points including in particular whether the change, even as far back as 1998, was intended to put the parties in the post-1997 tax regime, which would deny child support deductions to the payer and allow receipts of child support amounts to be tax free to the recipient.

The Appellant's ex-husband says he was unaware of any such consequence then, in 1998, or later in 2002. His suggestion is that his $ASAP \ Reporting \ Services \ Inc.$

2.4

Τ	ex-spouse unilaterally imposed the agreement on him
2	to ensure a tax advantage to her. The Appellant's
3	testimony was that it was his idea in the first
4	place and that he knew it was a change in the
5	support obligations and even filed his post-1998
6	tax returns claiming a reduced payment.
7	The Respondent's counsel pointed
8	out inconsistencies in the Appellant's notice of
9	objection relative to her testimony, and had the
10	Appellant admit that she was now suing for arrears
11	even though she testified that her ex had paid the
12	\$800 per month agreed upon.
13	I have listened to the witnesses.
14	I don't find either of them reliable. The
15	hostility between them is still palpable and each
16	spins testimony in a light believed at that moment
17	to be favourable to their cause. In these
18	situations, the documents will speak for
19	themselves. Accordingly, I find that the November
20	2002 affidavit is a written agreement reducing
21	child support from \$1,000 to \$800 per month and as
22	such creates a commencement date as at November
23	18th, 2002, the date that the affidavit was sworn
24	before the commissioner.
25	I note here that it is Subsection
26	54.1(4) that defines when a commencement day is $ASAP Reporting Services Inc.$

1	created. It provides that such day, being the date
2	the child support amounts commence being
3	nondeductible and nontaxable, is created when the
4	child support amount is varied. Child support
5	amount is also defined in that subsection as
6	effectively being the amount received in the
7	respect of the children under a written agreement.
8	The amount actually paid prior to
9	December '02 and since the time of the oral
10	agreement was arguably upward of \$1,000 or more per
11	month although the claim was only for \$800 per
12	month since the time of the oral agreement in about
13	June of 1998. This claim reflects the change in
14	fixed monthly payments, whether or not it had to,
15	based on the 1996 agreement. Whether or not it was
16	so limited, would depend on whether the other
17	expenses paid for the children, such as
18	recreational expenses, could fall under the
19	definition of child support even though they were
20	not paid on a fixed periodic basis.
21	Regardless, what he is allowed or
22	might have been allowed prior to November or
23	December of 2002 is not an issue before me. I am
24	concerned only with 2003 which will impact
25	subsequent years as well as 2003. If a
26	commencement day is created, all payments in

1	respect of the children are nondeductible and
2	nontaxable at and from the commencement day.
3	Expanding the child support amoun
4	to include other expenses or limiting it to \$800
5	makes no difference. The question is whether the
6	affidavit, the written agreement, changes the child
7	support amount. As stated, if it does, a
8	commencement day is created and, as I've already
9	stated, the affidavit does, in my view, meet the
10	requirement for the creation of a commencement day.
11	A Written agreement need not take any particular
12	form. The affidavit needed to include the written
13	agreement as to support in order to get the
14	divorce. The divorce judgment itself says that the
15	Judge grants the joint petition for divorce having
16	read the affidavit of the petitioners. An argument
17	might even be made that it forms part of the order.
18	In any event, the Court needed the written
19	undertaking that the parties were agreed as to the
20	support, and the Court relied on it in giving or
21	granting the petition of divorce.
22	There is no clearer case of where
23	the statutory requirements have been met. I also
24	note before concluding that there are no mistakes
25	here except perhaps in the mind of the Appellant's
26	ex-husband. He says he didn't understand that

1	signing the affidavit would have an adverse tax
2	consequence. This may or may not be true but that
3	is not relevant. He understood and intended the
4	commercial result. He understood and intended the
5	family law result. He knew that the new written
6	understanding reflected the verbal agreement that
7	he had honoured for four years. That he did not
8	understand the tax results or intend the tax result
9	is not relevant. The motives of the parties are
10	not relevant.
11	At the end of the day, the oral
12	agreement did reduce the fixed amount that the
13	Appellant's ex-spouse had to pay. It reduced it to
14	the amount that both parties, reluctantly or not,
15	had agreed to accept as child support. They were
16	bound in respect of this agreement, happily or
17	unhappily, for four years.
18	However, for tax purposes,
19	respecting the oral agreement at \$800 per month did
20	nothing to change the tax regime until it was
21	rendered in writing. For tax purposes, the regime
22	changed when the agreement was reduced to writing
23	and that happened in November 2002.
24	There is no doctrine of mistake or
25	contract that can assist the Appellant's husband in
26	these circumstances where there is a clash between $ASAP\ Reporting\ Services\ Inc.$

1	the parties. Accordingly, the appeal and the joint
2	application under Section 174 shall be disposed of
3	on the basis that a commencement day was created on
4	November 18th 2002, in effect, the Appellant has
5	won her appeal. That's my judgment and
6	reasons, thank you.
7	Upon concluding the Reasons for Judgment at
Ω	2:00 p m

CITATION: 2007TCC296

COURT FILE NO.: 2005-4348(IT)I

STYLE OF CAUSE: Allison Clement -and-

Her Majesty the Queen
-and- Alessandro D'Ovidio

PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING

AND ORAL JUDGMENT: April 19, 2007

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Justice

J.E. Hershfield

DATE OF WRITTEN REASONS

FOR JUDGMENT: May 23, 2007

APPEARANCES:

Agent for the Appellant: Theodore Cowdrey, CA

Counsel for the Respondent: Laurent Bartleman

For the Third Party: Alessandro D'Ovidio

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

Firm:

For the Respondent: John H. Sims, Q.C.

Deputy Attorney General

of Canada

Ottawa, Canada.