Date: 19990603
Docket: 97-1557-UI
BETWEEN:
9010-7020 QUÉBEC INC.
(CRH MARKETING INC.),
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
AND
BENOÎT GOSSELIN,
Intervener.
Reasons for Judgment
Lamarre, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal from a decision by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") according to which Benoît Gosselin held insurable employment with the appellant from November 18 to 26, 1996. In his decision, the Minister determined that the employment was insurable because there was an employer-employee relationship between Mr. Gosselin and the appellant. The Minister relied on paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act (the "Act") in making his decision.
Facts
[2] In making his decision, the Minister relied on the facts stated in paragraph 5 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) the appellant was incorporated in 1994 ;
(b) the appellant operated a telemarketing business;
(c) the appellant's clients were insurance brokers, insurers, the Quebec Automobile Club (QAC) and merchants;
(d) the appellant hired the worker on November 22, 1996;
(e) the worker was required to sign an alleged subcontract in order to work for the appellant;
(f) the worker was to solicit customers by telephone to renew their automobile and home insurance or join the QAC;
(g) the appellant controlled the quantity and quality of the worker's work;
(h) the appellant provided the worker with the names and telephone numbers of persons to contact;
(i) the worker went to the appellant's premises to perform his duties;
(j) the appellant had provided the worker with training;
(k) the appellant provided the worker with all the necessary tools for his work;
(l) the worker had a fixed work schedule to meet, that is, from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.;
(m) the worker was paid at a fixed rate of $7 an hour;
(n) the worker could earn performance bonuses if certain ratios were exceeded.
[3] Pierre Renzetti testified for the appellant as its general manager. According to his testimony, the appellant obtains telemarketing contracts from various clients such as insurance brokers, the Quebec Automobile Club (QAC) and various merchants. The appellant has a call centre with 56 workstations for the purpose of carrying out these contracts. It rents the workstations (each consisting of a desk, a headset and a computer) to telemarketing agents.
[4] The work of these agents consists in telephoning persons on a list of names provided by the appellant's clients, in order to recruit new members, renew memberships or propose new arrangements to current members. According to Mr. Renzetti, although an agent may recruit a person he knows well, agents generally limit themselves to the list of names provided to them. The appellant is responsible for ensuring that this list, which belongs to its clients, remains confidential.
[5] The client determines the characteristics of the products or services it markets and the agent must pass on to the various persons contacted through telemarketing the information the client wants to have transmitted. So, if memberships were sold at prices other than those fixed by the client or if membership forms were improperly completed, the client would stop awarding contracts to the appellant.
[6] The appellant provides each agent with a tape recorder. Mr. Renzetti testified that taping serves as a coaching aid to enable agents to see what they can improve. However, he said that agents were free to use it to record their telephone conversations with the people they contacted. Thus, Jean-Pierre Arcand, who worked as a telemarketing agent for the appellant, said that he recorded himself if he wanted to send the content of his conversation recorded on cassette directly to the client instead of retranscribing the information he had obtained. Mr. Renzetti moreover indicated that the appellant checked to see whether the agents had correctly entered the personal information of the various applicants. He also mentioned that either he or Richard Houle, a shareholder of the appellant, was present in the appellant's premises and they updated the situation with the agents if the latter did not keep them informed. Without speaking of control, Mr. Renzetti said that he received a report from each agent every week and that he gave priority in renting the workstations to those who were most effective. Indeed, the appellant benefited from obtaining the maximum number of memberships.
[7] Agents must reserve a workstation at least one week in advance. When they reserve, they choose the time slot that suits them. These time slots are divided into work periods. Agents may thus reserve a workstation from Monday to Friday from 8:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. or from 4:30 to 9:30 p.m. They may also reserve Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. According to the availability sheet completed by Mr. Gosselin, entered as Exhibit A-4, agents are asked to establish their schedules precisely, so that they are able to adhere to them in order to meet the expectations of the appellant's clients. It is also stated on the availability sheet that [TRANSLATION] "any absence automatically entails the loss of an office which could have been occupied by a co-worker".
[8] According to Mr. Renzetti, agents who rent workstations may also use them for their own purposes, and he cited Giroflée Ash as an example. Ms. Ash testified that she rented a workstation from the appellant in order to look for clients for her own services. She said she also accepted mandates from the appellant. To do this, on October 7, 1996, she had to sign a contract with the appellant of the same type as that which Mr. Gosselin signed on November 22, 1996 (see Exhibits A-3 and A-12). Ms. Ash's contract, entitled [TRANSLATION] "Subcontract", reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
1. The subcontractor [the agent] and CRH [the appellant] agree on the following points:
(i) Mandate:
The subcontractor shall engage in promoting the goods and services of CRH's clients to merchants and consumers by telephone (making appointments, direct sales, conducting surveys, identifying potential customers, etc.). The subcontractor is required to meet the qualitative and quantitative objectives for each of the mandates given.
(ii) Conditions:
The subcontractor is a self-employed worker and may accept other mandates from other companies provided they do not conflict with those given by CRH. He may have himself replaced by a person of his choosing and may perform his mandate during the hours and in the locations he finds convenient. He is responsible for submitting his invoice to CRH once a week. The subcontractor is responsible for his expenses. The subcontractor is not an employee of CRH; he is not entitled to vacation, sick days or any other fringe benefits. CRH will make no deductions nor will it withhold any tax. The subcontractor shall take advantage of the registration exemption if his annual income is less than $30,000 or register for the GST and the QST if it is greater than $30,000.
(iii) Fee structure:
The subcontractor is paid by the hour in accordance with the attached schedule, or by the piece in the case of special contracts. The subcontractor may receive a supplement of $1.25 an hour for performing his work and producing his reports on computer in D.B.F. mode for any contract providing for remuneration by the hour. Where equipment is available, the subcontractor may rent a computer from CRH at the rate of $1 an hour. The subcontractor shall submit his invoice with the reports and supporting documentation to CRH not later than Monday of the following week. CRH will pay the subcontractor's invoice on Thursday of the following week, deducting any rental fees.
(iv) Termination:
The subcontractor and CRH may terminate this contract by giving 48 hours' notice in writing, except where the code of ethics has been violated, in which case it will be terminated without notice.
(v) Guarantee:
The subcontractor guarantees that the information transmitted is accurate.
[9] According to the pay schedule appended to the contract, agents are paid $7 an hour and receive a sales bonus calculated in accordance with a certain ratio (which is computed based on the weekly total of new members divided by the weekly total of soliciting hours). Mr. Renzetti said that if a worker did not equal the ratio, his contract was not renewed, but that this did not prevent that worker from renting the workstation for his own purposes.
[10] Ms. Ash subsequently signed a second contract on January 12, 1997. The terms of this contract are appreciably the same as those of the first, except that it specifically states that the contractor (the agent) has no obligation to attend meetings or training sessions or to follow a call script to the letter. It also states that the contractor has no immediate supervisor or controller. The client's rights and the duties of the contractor and the appellant are also described and read as follows:
2.00 CLIENT'S RIGHTS:
2.01 The clients supply their clientele lists or prospect lists. They are the sole owners of the lists, which must be kept confidential.
2.02 The clients decide which territories will be covered and in what sequence.
2.03 The clients supply or accept call scenarios and expect that the information transmitted will be clear and accurate.
2.04 Payments are always made to the order of the client.
2.05 The clients own all advertising material.
2.06 The clients decide on the format or structure of the computer file with which they exchange data.
2.07 The clients are directly represented in the sense that the calls are made on the client's behalf.
3.00 CONTRACTOR'S DUTIES:
3.01 The contractor is required to promote the clients' goods and services to merchants or consumers by telephone for the purpose of making a direct sale, setting an appointment, conducting a survey or identifying a prospect, etc.
3.02 The contractor is required to carry out his contract within the time period agreed upon.
3.03 The contractor is required to note the client's files in the required format.
3.04 The contractor is required to represent the client in a manner consistent with the ethics of a telemarketing professional, in accordance with the rules of the CRTC code of ethics for direct marketing.
3.05 The contractor is required to comply with the general rules of conduct set by the contractors and CRH (no smoking, rest areas, etc.).
3.06 The contractor is required to submit his report and invoice on a weekly basis.
4.00 CRH'S DUTIES:
4.01 CRH is required to negotiate mandates with clients and to see that they are performed.
4.02 CRH is required to prepare all the computer equipment for the execution of TM campaigns.
4.03 CRH is required to ensure that the equipment rented by the contractors is ready, available and in good working order.
4.04 CRH is required to exchange information with the clients daily.
4.05 CRH is required to transmit information to the contractors on the conduct of the TM campaigns.
4.06 CRH is solely responsible for telephone expenses, rent expenses, business taxes and administrative and other expenses.
4.07 CRH is solely responsible for advances to and adjustments regarding the contractor.
5.00 TERM OF CONTRACT:
5.01 The term of the contract is one week starting on Monday and ending the following Saturday.
5.02 The contract is automatically renewable every week on the same terms and conditions as set out herein.
6.00 TERMINATION:
6.01 It is agreed that either of the parties may terminate this contract at any time simply by providing written notice to the effect that the party is not fully satisfied.
6.02 Where the contractor is not fully satisfied, he may request, in writing, that the contract be terminated immediately. Equipment rental will not be billed for the rest of the period and a 10% termination allowance will be added to the balance for the week. Adjustments and payments will be made on the following Thursday.
7.00 TERMS OF CONTRACT:
7.01 The contractor reserves a workstation rental slot in accordance with his availability and the mandates to be subcontracted.
7.02 The parties agree to make their availability known on the preceding Monday and that equipment reservations and the mandates to be subcontracted will be determined no later than 5:00 p.m. on the preceding Tuesday.
8.00 EQUIPMENT RENTAL:
8.01 Analog telephone, headset (paper list)
(Not available at home)
Plan A $0.50
8.02 Analog telephone, headset, computer with fax/modem, automatic dialing and TM software
Plan B $1.00
8.03 Analog telephone, headset, computer with fax/modem, automatic dialing by sequential call generator and TM software.
Plan C $2.00
9.00 CODE OF CONDUCT:
9.01 Smoking is permitted only in the area reserved for that purpose.
9.02 All food and drink must be consumed in the cafeteria.
9.03 Be careful not to disturb the concentration of the other contractors in the soliciting rooms.
9.04 Be careful with the equipment.
10.00 INTERPRETATION:
10.01 As the context requires, the singular shall be interpreted as including the plural and the masculine as including the feminine and neuter.
10.02 The schedules to this contract form an integral part hereof.
[11] Mr. Renzetti testified that the stated contractor's duties applied to all the agents. These duties were the same under the old contract. Mr. Gosselin received training four hours a day for three days. This training was given by a partner in the appellant under the supervision of a QAC representative. It would appear that each agent must pay the workstation rental expense even during training. The weekly report provided for Mr. Gosselin (Exhibit A-5) for the week of November 18 to 23, 1996 shows his hours of training and the hours during which he was present. However, the invoice attached to these attendance sheets was not completed.
[12] Aida Hamaoui, Geneviève Côté and Louise Sauvage also testified. They all said that they had been hired by the appellant to do telemarketing. They stated that they had no fixed schedule to meet and were hired by the week.
[13] Ms. Côté said she had a contract with the appellant to sell subscriptions to the newspaper Le Devoir. She worked on Saturdays and had to reserve her workstation one week in advance. If she reserved a workstation, she lost her deposit if she did not show up. However, this did not occur in her case since when she was not available she always had herself replaced by a person already employed by the appellant. She stated, however, that she could have had herself replaced by another person who did not necessarily have to be employed by the appellant. She completed a sales invoice and was paid based on that. She had previously performed the same work as a direct employee of the newspaper Le Devoir. With Le Devoir her schedule was more settled and she was on a salary.
[14] Ms. Hamaoui did not rent a workstation and worked for the appellant at her home using the lists supplied by the appellant. She billed by the number of sales made and was paid on a commission basis. Ms. Hamaoui filed a claim for unemployment insurance when she stopped working and her employment was ruled not insurable.
[15] Pierre Fecteau, an engineer, also testified. He gives telemarketing contracts to the appellant in the form of very specific mandates, providing databases belonging to his own customers. He himself trains the agents hired by the appellant and he does so at his own expense. Despite this fact, he said that each agent gathered information in his own way (data collection was thus not very standardized) and the information obtained was not always reliable. He could not give specific instructions with respect to the agents' work schedules, but required that the agents present the product correctly. Mr. Fecteau testified that it was the appellant, not he, who had control over the telemarketing agents.
[16] Alain Lemay, the appellant's accountant, testified that the appellant's business had a turnover of $1 million. He said that the business was viable simply on the basis of the workstation rentals, which, at up to $2 an hour, could bring in as much as $30,000 a month, whereas the fixed costs for the workstations were between $12,000 and $13,000 per month. Mr. Lemay did not have the appellant's financial statements with him and was unable to confirm the percentage of profits generated by the rentals and the telemarketing.
[17] Fabia Grigolo, who also worked for the appellant during the period from October 30, 1996 to June 6, 1997, testified as well at the respondent's request. She said she had been hired by the appellant following a two-hour trial period and that she had received training. The appellant required her to work at least 100 hours in order to be paid during the training and that is what she did. The appellant obliged her to sign an employment contract as though she were a self-employed worker. She indicated the hours when she was available and had to stick to the hours she had chosen. She said she worked regularly 25 to 30 hours a week, except during a two-week period in May 1997 when she went away on vacation on her own initiative and at her own expense.
[18] Ms. Grigolo testified that she contacted the people on the list provided by the appellant and that if she contacted other persons her supervisor subsequently checked and approved them. She always worked on the appellant's premises and received basic remuneration of $7 an hour, plus a commission based on the number of customers recruited. She could also earn a bonus. To get paid, she had to complete time sheets indicating the number of hours she had worked and listing her sales. She thus had to record the number of subscribers she had recruited. She stated that she had tried to maximize her sales and that if she did not produce enough she could be dismissed. She also mentioned that she had never had anyone else perform her work in her stead and that the same was true of the other workers. According to her, if they did not go in to work, they were dismissed without pay. Similarly, contrary to what Messrs. Renzetti and Arcand said, Ms. Grigolo stated that all the workers were monitored by telephone, which enabled the appellant to verify whether the agents were complying with sales standards.
[19] In addition, although her contract stipulated that she was to pay $1 per hour for the rental of a workstation, Ms. Grigolo said that this amount was ultimately not withheld from her pay and that she did not have to pay the rental if she did not work. She stated that she received $7 an hour, not $6. According to the invoices she submitted to the appellant (Exhibit A-1), an amount for rental corresponding to $1 per hour was deducted. However, the hourly rate of pay indicated is $8, not $7 as stated in the contract (see Exhibit A-2).
[20] Lastly, Diane Charette, an appeals officer with Revenue Canada, testified. After talking with Messrs. Gosselin and Renzetti, she came to the conclusion that the former was an employee of the appellant. The facts leading her to this decision were as follows:
- the employment contract gave the appellant the option of laying off the worker;
- the appellant set the wage schedule;
- the worker was paid on the basis of his hours of work; these hours had to be grouped together in the time slot chosen by the worker, with the appellant offering two time slots from Monday to Friday and a single slot on Saturday;
- the appellant gave each worker training on the product for sale and on how to enter data in the computer; the appellant thus in a way controlled the work method used by the worker;
- according to Ms. Grigolo, all the workers' telephone conversations were recorded, and it was therefore possible for the appellant to trace the agent who made a call in the event of a complaint and to discuss the matter with the agent if necessary;
- in order to be paid the worker had to report the number of hours he worked and the number of sales he made;
- the worker received a list of persons to contact directly from the appellant, not from the appellant's client.
[21] In Ms. Charette's view, all this indicates that the appellant exercised extensive control over the work performed by the workers. As for Mr. Gosselin, he always worked at the appellant's place of business and was paid a wage of $7 an hour, which indicates that he had virtually no chance of profit. In Ms. Charette's opinion, the fact that he paid a rental fee of $1 an hour was not a sufficient ground for saying that the worker was exposed to a risk of loss. The worker did not invest in the appellant's business.
[22] Mr. Gosselin did not testify. However, in two letters entered in evidence as Exhibits A-6 and A-7, Revenue Canada first took the position that Mr. Gosselin and Ms. Grigolo did not hold insurable employment with the appellant. The same decision was made respecting Pierrette Desmarteaux, who had also worked as a telemarketing agent for the appellant (Exhibit A-8). Mr. Gosselin appealed the decision to the chief of appeals at Revenue Canada, who reversed the initial decision and held that Mr. Gosselin's employment with the appellant was insurable. This is the decision from which the appellant appealed to this Court and which is the subject of the instant case.
Analysis
[23] For his employment to be insurable during the period at issue, Mr. Gosselin had to be employed under a contract of service, as required by paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Act. To determine whether that employment was insurable, the criteria cited in Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1986] 3 F.C. 553, namely control, ownership of the tools, chance of profit and risk of loss as well as the integration or organization test—that is, whether the person is working for his own business or for that of the person who hired him—must be analyzed in light of the whole of the various elements which constitute the relationship between the parties.
[24] This is a borderline case involving elements of a contract of service and other elements relating to a contract for services.
[25] As regards control, which is an element of some importance in civil law, I, like Ms. Charette, am of the opinion that the appellant definitely exercised control over its agents' work. In my view, that control was exercised quite regularly. Indeed, Mr. Renzetti testified that he or Richard Houle, a shareholder of the appellant, was on site and regularly inquired into the work performed by the agents. Similarly, although there was some contradiction among a few witnesses respecting the recording of the agents' telephone conversations, Mr. Renzetti did say that recording the conversations enabled the appellant to determine what improvements could be made and to provide some coaching.
[26] It is true that some agents, like Ms. Hamaoui, worked at home and were to some extent subject to less control than the agents working on site. Still, those agents were to all intents and purposes limited to the lists supplied by the appellant. The appellant was responsible for keeping those lists confidential. It was also responsible for the agents since it risked losing contracts if they did not carry out the instructions given by the clients or failed to meet certain deadlines.
[27] The agents had also received training for which they were paid if they worked a minimum number of hours. The agents moreover had to report the number of hours they worked and the number of sales they made if they wanted to be paid. In this sense, the appellant definitely had control over the work performed by its agents and over the way in which they represented its clients in dealing with the persons contacted. If in fact the agents were self-employed workers, the appellant would not have had to give them training for which they were even paid.
[28] Some witnesses did say that they were allowed to have themselves replaced for the purpose of performing their work. This is moreover provided for in the contract. That in itself is an important consideration militating in favour of the argument that the contract was a contract for services.[1] Ms. Grigolo stated that the agents could not have themselves replaced. She also stated, contrary to the testimony of other witnesses, that if the agents did not report for work at the times they had reserved, they were dismissed. Mr. Renzetti testified that he gave priority to agents who made the most sales. Ms. Côté said that, in point of fact, if ever she had someone replace her, it was always another agent who worked for the appellant.
[29] The evidence did not actually show that none of the agents who testified had had himself replaced by someone who had not first been trained by the appellant. I therefore conclude that the fact of being permitted to find a replacement for oneself cannot play an important role here. The weight of the evidence suggests instead that the appellant exercised control over the work of these agents or of those who might replace them.
[30] Remuneration was dictated by the appellant. The agents received hourly wages calculated on the basis of the number of hours worked and they had to meet sales quotas if they wanted their contracts to be renewed and to earn bonuses. In addition, at the appellant's request, the agents had to bill weekly for the number of hours they worked and payment was made on the same day every week. Furthermore, they were not entitled to any fringe benefits or paid vacation. Their chance of profit rested on the sales bonuses they could receive. Their risk of loss was limited to the absence of remuneration if they did not work and to the possibility that their contracts might not be renewed.
[31] In my view, these elements do not constitute a sufficient basis for considering these agents as self-employed workers. Agents were assured a guaranteed income ($7 an hour) for their hours worked. Sales bonuses were added to that if they met a certain sales quota. If the agents performed their work poorly, it was the appellant who bore the risk (loss of contracts with its clients and lower profits), not the agents, who were in any event paid for their hours of work even if their contracts might not be renewed.
[32] Furthermore, I note that, in the second contract signed by Ms. Ash, the appellant granted a 10% termination allowance in the event of termination of the contract. Although this does not appear in the contract signed by Mr. Gosselin, it is another indication that the appellant treated its agents as employees, not as persons working for themselves.
[33] As regards the tools, the appellant emphasized that the agents had to rent the equipment. This could indeed be considered as constituting an element of a contract for services. However, the document entered as Exhibit A-1 shows in Ms. Grigolo's case that she was paid a net hourly wage of $7. According to her contract (Exhibit A-2), if she had paid for the equipment rental, she would have had to receive a net hourly wage of $6. If that was the case for Ms. Grigolo, one can reasonably wonder whether all the agents did not receive the same treatment.
[34] It is also not clear from the evidence that the agents had to pay the equipment rental if they did not use the workstations they had reserved. Based on the contradictory and incomplete evidence on this point, I cannot attach a great deal of importance to this factor as supporting the argument that the contract was a contract for services. Furthermore, the new contract signed by Ms. Ash clearly states that if the agent terminates his contract, he will not be required to pay the equipment rental.
[35] Mr. Lemay tried to explain that the appellant could survive solely on the equipment rental, meaning to suggest, I imagine, that the agents' work did not form an integral part of the appellant's business. Unfortunately I cannot attach any importance to this factor. The approximate figures that Mr. Lemay gave (he mentioned rental fees of $2 an hour, whereas most of the contracts submitted provided for $1 an hour) were not corroborated in any way by the appellant's financial statements, which were simply not entered in evidence. I therefore cannot assign any probative value to this testimony.
[36] Moreover, the question of organization or integration must be considered from the standpoint of the employee, not that of the employer. Even if telemarketing revenue was less than that from workstation rental, the agents' work was nevertheless necessary to the operation of the appellant's business. As MacGuigan J. stated in Wiebe Door Services Ltd, supra, at p. 563:
. . . We must keep in mind that it was with respect to the business of the employee that Lord Wright [in Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd., [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161] addressed the question "Whose business is it?"
[37] As to the integration of the agents' activities into the appellant's business, I am of the opinion that agents such as Mr. Gosselin acted as employees of the appellant, not as persons working for themselves. It is true that these agents could go to work for others outside the time slots during which they worked for the appellant. However, the contract signed by the agents clearly states that they may "accept other mandates from other companies provided they do not conflict with those given by [the appellant]". Agents could choose to work full time or part time for the appellant, but, regardless of their choice, they had to fulfil their undertaking to the appellant within the time slots they had chosen. This is in fact what the document completed by Mr. Gosselin and filed as Exhibit A-4 appears to indicate. It clearly states that agents must determine their schedules precisely, so as to be able to adhere to them, and that any absence automatically entails the loss of an office which could have been occupied by another co-worker. This seems to me to be fairly clear evidence that the days and hours of work were integrated into and coordinated with the appellant's operations.
[38] Lastly, the fact that the appellant drafted contracts between itself and its agents in which the agents were described as self-employed workers does not change the actual and factual situation as between the parties to the contracts. In Irving Edward Orton v. M.N.R., N.R. 9, Cattanach J. wrote, at p. 3:
The fact that the parties to a contract refer therein to a certain relationship existing between them, as was done in paragraph 5 of the contract between the appellant and Public Works, is not conclusive of the existence of that relationship. The parties simply by saying something is what it is not cannot convert that something into something other than it is.
On this matter, MacKenna, J. observed in Ready Mixed Concrete v. Minister of Pensions1 at page 439:
. . . that the question whether the relation between parties to a contract was that of master and servant or otherwise was a conclusion of law dependent on the rights conferred and the duties imposed by the contract; and that if facts were such that the relation is that of master and servant, it was irrelevant that the parties had declared it to be something else.
________________
1 (1968) All E.R. 433.
[39] In closing, I wish to emphasize that I have reviewed the recent decision in Vulcain Alarme Inc. v. M.N.R. rendered by the Federal Court of Appeal at Montréal on May 11 1999 (file number A-376-98), and dealing with the procedure for distinguishing between a contract of service and a contract for services. I find that the facts in Vulcain are quite different from those in this appeal and that the Federal Court of Appeal's conclusion in Vulcain does not apply to the instant case.
[40] Having regard to all these elements, which were analyzed in the overall context of the relationship between the parties, I find that the weight of the evidence is rather to the effect that the appellant's agents, including Mr. Gosselin, were employed by the appellant under a contract of service. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed and the Minister's decision is confirmed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of June 1999.
"Lucie Lamarre"
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 31st day of March 2000.
Erich Klein, Revisor