Tax Court of Canada Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 19991123

Dockets: 98-1115-UI; 98-1116-UI; 98-1117-UI; 98-1118-UI

BETWEEN:

CHARBONNEAU BERCIER TAILLON COURTIERS D'ASSURANCE LTÉE,

Appellant,

and

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

SERGE BERCIER, MARC CHARBONNEAU, GILLES TAILLON AND CHRISTIANE TAILLON,

Interveners,

AND

BETWEEN:

SERGE BERCIER,

Appellant,

et

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

CHARBONNEAU BERCIER TAILLON COURTIERS D'ASSURANCE LTÉE,

Intervener,

AND

BETWEEN:

MARC CHARBONNEAU,

Appellant,

and

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

CHARBONNEAU BERCIER TAILLON COURTIERS D'ASSURANCE LTÉE,

Intervener,

AND

BETWEEN:

GILLES TAILLON,

Appellant,

and

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,

Respondent,

and

CHARBONNEAU BERCIER TAILLON COURTIERS D'ASSURANCE LTÉE,

Intervener.

Reasons for Judgment

Somers, D.J.T.C.C.

[1] These appeals were heard on common evidence at Ottawa, Canada, on October 6, 1999.

[2] The respondent informed the appellant company and the appellants of his decisions finding that the brokers and receptionist held insurable employment when they were associated with the appellant company during the period in question, that is, from January 1 to December 31, 1996, because they were employed under a contract of service within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, now paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act.

[3] Subsection 3(1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act reads in part as follows:

3.(1) Insurable employment is employment that is not included in excepted employment and is

(a) employment in Canada by one or more employers, under any express or implied contract of service or apprenticeship, written or oral, whether the earnings of the employed person are received from the employer or some other person and whether the earnings are calculated by time or by the piece, or partly by time and partly by the piece, or otherwise.

[4] Paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act is similar to paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act.

[5] In making his decisions, the respondent relied on the following assumptions of fact, according to which the brokers and the receptionist were employed under a contract of service. Those assumptions of fact were admitted or denied as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

(a) the appellant is a company which operates a general insurance agency; (admitted)

(b) the appellant has two offices, one located at 144 East, Main Street, Hawkesbury, Ontario, and the other at 440 St-Philippe Street, Alfred, Ontario; (admitted)

(c) the appellant's shareholders are the following companies: (admitted)

Gestion MG Charbonneau Inc. 33 1/3%

Gestion S & L Bercier Inc. 33 1/3%

Gilles Taillon Courtier d'assurance Inc. 33 1/3%

(d) the shares of the corporations referred to in subparagraph (c) above are held respectively by Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier and Gilles Taillon and their respective spouses; (admitted)

(e) Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier and Gilles Taillon (the "brokers") were also hired by the appellant to perform the day-to-day administration of the appellant, manage the staff and act as insurance brokers; (denied)

(f) the brokers are not related persons within the meaning of section 251 of the Income Tax Act; (denied)

(g) there is an arm's length relationship between the appellant and the brokers; (denied)

(h) there is an arm's length relationship between the brokers; (denied)

(i) the appellant had 12 full-time employees, including the brokers, and one part-time employee; (admitted)

(j) the brokers met each week to plan the appellant's operations and review the business's results; (admitted)

(k) the appellant provided the brokers with premises and necessary equipment; (admitted)

(l) the brokers determined their work schedules by consulting each other; (denied)

(m) the brokers consulted each other in making important decisions concerning the appellant; (admitted)

(n) the brokers received a salary from the appellant; (admitted)

(o) the receptionist did bookkeeping and secretarial work for the appellant; (no knowledge)

(p) the receptionist performed her duties at the appellant's office in Alfred, Ontario; (no knowledge)

(q) the receptionist reported directly to Gilles Taillon, who is her spouse and one of the brokers; (no knowledge)

(r) the receptionist received an annual salary of $35,000; (no knowledge)

(s) the receptionist had sick leave and paid vacation; (no knowledge)

(t) the receptionist's hours of work were fixed by the appellant; (no knowledge)

(u) the appellant provided the receptionist with premises and necessary equipment; (no knowledge)

(v) the appellant issued T4 slips to the brokers and to the receptionist for 1996; (admitted)

(w) there was a contract of service between the brokers and the appellant; (denied)

(x) there was a contract of service between the receptionist and the appellant. (no knowledge)

[6] As the appellant company's receptionist, Christiane Taillon, discontinued her appeal, there was no knowledge of subparagraphs (o) to (u) and (x).

[7] The burden of proof is on the appellants, who must show on a balance of evidence that the Minister's decisions are ill-founded in fact and in law.

[8] The appellant Charbonneau Bercier Taillon Courtiers d'Assurance Ltée is a company which operates a general insurance agency. The appellant company has two offices, one located at 144 East, Main Street, Hawkesbury, Ontario, and the other at 440 St-Philippe Street, Alfred, Ontario. The appellant's shareholders are Gestion MG Charbonneau Inc., Gestion S & L Bercier Inc. and Gilles Taillon Courtier d'assurance Inc., each of which holds 33 1/3% of the shares.

[9] The shares of the above corporations are respectively held by Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier, Gilles Taillon and their spouses. There is an arms length relationship among the brokers.

[10] Marc Charbonneau admitted in his testimony that he wears, as he put it, [TRANSLATION] "a shareholder's and a broker's hat". The shareholders, including Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier and Gilles Taillon, respectively represent the three management companies. He said that the appellant shareholders looked after the administration of the appellant company and were also brokers.

[11] Marc Charbonneau admitted subparagraph 4(j) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal, which states that the brokers met each week to plan the appellant company's operations and review the business's results. He also admitted that the brokers received a salary from the appellant company.

[12] Moreover, the Shareholders' Agreement (Exhibit A-1) refers to a disability salary to be paid should Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier or Gilles Taillon be unable to perform their duties.

[13] The appellant Charbonneau Bercier Taillon Courtiers d'Assurances Ltée is the owner of the offices.

[14] There is well-settled case law recognizing four basic criteria for distinguishing a contract of service from a contract for services.

[15] In Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1986] 3 F.C. 553, the Federal Court of Appeal listed those four criteria:

(a) the degree or absence of control exercised by the employer,

(b) the degree of integration,

(c) ownership of the tools, and

(d) the chance of profit or risk of loss.

[16] (a) Control

The appellant company exercised control over the brokers. Although brokers Marc Charbonneau, Serge Bercier and Gilles Taillon were directors, it was the corporate appellant that had control over the directors acting simultaneously as directors and brokers. The appellant company is a corporation, separate from its shareholders and directors. As a corporation may have control over these persons, the existence of such control is sufficient to conclude that this element suggests there was a contract of service.

[17] (b) Degree of integration

The three brokers worked exclusively for the appellant company. Their expertise was essential to the company's operations, so that this element enables us to conclude that there was a contract of service.

[18] (c) Ownership of the tools

As the appellant company is the owner of the offices, this element leads us to believe that there was a contract of service.

[19] (d) Chance of profit or risk of loss

The three brokers are both shareholders and employees. Since they may receive income as shareholders, their chance of profit or risk of loss is based on the company's performance, but as employees, they have no such chance or risk. The three brokers have two sources of income and in their capacity as employees they are tied to the appellant company by a contract of service.

[20] The appellant Marc Charbonneau refers to paragraph 5(2)(h) of the Employment Insurance Act, which concerns "employment excluded by regulations made under subsection (6)". There was no evidence that the circumstances of the employment in these cases were governed by regulation.

[21] The witness relied on paragraph 5(2)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act in claiming that his employment was excluded because he controlled more than 40% of the voting shares of the corporation. There was no evidence that the brokers personally and individually held 40% of the voting shares.

[22] The brokers should not confuse paragraphs 5(1)(a) and 5(2)(i) of the Employment Insurance Act. Paragraph 5(2)(i) of the Employment Insurance Act governs persons who are not dealing with each other at arm's length. There is no evidence that the brokers and the appellant company were not dealing with each other at arm's length.

[23] Having regard to all the circumstances, the sole testimony of Marc Charbonneau, the admissions and the documentary evidence, the Minister correctly concluded that the brokers held insurable employment within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, now paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Employment Insurance Act, during the period in issue, since there was a contract of service.

[24] The appeals are dismissed and the Minister's decisions confirmed.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 23rd day of November 1999.

"J.F. Somers"

D.J.T.C.C.

[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Translation certified true on this 11th day of September 2000.

Erich Klein, Revisor

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