Tax Court of Canada Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 19990203

Docket: 97-395-IT-I

BETWEEN:

PETER GUY CROCKART,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

Reasons for judgment

Bowie J.T.C.C.

[1] This appeal concerns a claim for a medical expense credit under section 118.2 of the Income Tax Act (the Act). The sole issue is whether the bed which the Appellant purchased because of his wife's disability is a "hospital bed" within the meaning of that expression in paragraph (h) of Regulation 5700.

For the purposes of paragraph 118.2(2)(m) of the Act, a device or equipment is prescribed if it is a

...

(h) hospital bed including such attachments thereto as may have been included in a prescription therefor;

[2] The parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts; the first 10 paragraphs set the basic facts.

1. The parties to this matter have agreed to the facts set out in this statement.

2. The Appellant is an individual resident in Canada.

3. The Appellant's spouse is Heather Crockart. Mrs. Crockart is afflicted with multiple sclerosis, a degenerative disease of the central nervous system that can cause vision problems, numbness, loss of balance, extreme fatigue, tremors, and paralysis.

4. Mrs. Crockart's condition is progressive. It has resulted in paralysis of her left arm and leg.

5. Mrs. Crockart's medical condition, specifically the paralysis of her left arm and leg, prevented her from getting into and out of a "normal" bed unassisted. Mrs. Crockart has difficulty with bladder and bowel control, and must often leave her bed several times per night to use the bathroom. The Appellant works shifts and cannot assist her when at work.

6. In 1994 Mrs. Crockart's physician advised her to purchase an adjustable bed to assist her in getting into and out of bed. This advice constituted a prescription for the purposes of subparagraph 118.2(m)(i) of the Income Tax Act (the "Act").

7. The ability use an electronic control to raise and lower the adjustable bed, together with the use of a stationary pole, allows Mrs. Crockart to get into and out of bed unassisted.

8. After viewing several models, the Appellant purchased a Slumberland adjustable bed. Its size was a "double bed". It is not a classic "hospital" bed with rails and wheels. In addition to its adjustability feature, the adjustable bed was some eight inches lower than her former bed. This assisted Mrs. Crockart in getting into and out of bed.

9. The purchase price of the bed was $3,235. The Appellant paid that amount to the vendor of the bed, and was reimbursed $1,500 by his extended medical plan, leaving him with an out-of-pocket outlay of $1,735. The Appellant filed the receipt with his 1994 income tax return.

10. In his 1994 taxation year the Appellant deducted a medical expense tax credit. In computing the amount of his medical expenses tax credit the Appellant included his out-of-pocket outlay for the adjustable bed. No part of the cost of the adjustable bed was included in computing the Appellant's medical expenses for a prior year.

[3] The only witness was Dr. John Hooge, a physician who has specialized in the treatment of multiple sclerosis for almost twenty years. He is Mrs. Crockart's physician. He advised the purchase of an "adjustable bed". The benefit of it to Mrs. Crockart lies in the ease of getting in and out, particularly when her husband is not there to help her. The bed Mr. Crockart bought can be raised at both the head and foot by electric motors, which are operated by a hand control. It is lower than the beds traditionally found in hospitals, which is beneficial for Mrs. Crockart. It does not have the side rails found on a "classic hospital bed", and this too is beneficial to her. It is a double bed. Dr. Hooge agreed that he had never seen a double bed in use in a hospital. I have no doubt that it is beneficial to Mrs. Crockart, that she and her husband can continue to share a double bed, despite her need for an adjustable bed.

[4] In summary, this bed is one that is not specifically designed and manufactured with medical concerns in mind, it is not one that would likely be found in a hospital, but it has the essential feature of those that are found there which is required by Mrs. Crockart – it is adjustable. Also, it is more beneficial to her condition than a "classic hospital bed" would be in several respects.

[5] Counsel for the Minister takes the position that since you would not find it in a hospital, it is not a hospital bed, and so it does not qualify for the tax credit. He referred me to Williams v. R.,[1] in which Rip J. held that a chemical-free mattress is not a hospital bed. He also referred me to three separate passages from Hansard, and a technical note published by the Department of Finance, from all of which I conclude that the Respondent accepts that this is not a case in which the words in dispute admit of only one meaning. I agree that there is ambiguity, but I do not find either Hansard or the government's technical notes to be useful in resolving it.

[6] In Radage v.The Queen,[2] Bowman J. said[3] of sections 118.3 and 118.4 of the Act:

The court must, while recognizing the narrowness of the tests enumerated in sections 118.3 and 118.4, construe the provisions liberally, humanely and compassionately and not narrowly and technically.

That principle has since been approved by the Federal Court of Appeal.[4] Section 118.2 of the Act, and Regulation 5700 have the same purpose as sections 118.3 and 118.4; they should be construed in the same way. That purpose would be thwarted, not fostered, by the technical construction for which the Respondent contends here. I do not believe that it was the intention of either Parliament, when enacting section 118.2, or the Governor-in-Council, when enacting Regulation 5700, to so limit the availability of the credit as to deny it to Mr. Crockart because he bought a bed having the desirable attributes of a "classic hospital bed", but one more beneficial to his wife than such a "classic hospital bed" would be. Nor, I am sure would Parliament or the Governor-in-Council have intended the provision to be construed in such a way as to preclude its application to a bed which could be shared by husband and wife. I find that the bed in question here has sufficient of the attributes of a "classic hospital bed" as to bring it with the Regulation.

[7] The appeal is allowed, with costs.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 3rd day of February, 1999.

"E.A. Bowie"

J.T.C.C.



[1] [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2813.

[2] 96 DTC 1615.

[3] at page 1625.

[4] Johnston v. The Queen, 98 DTC 6169 at 6171.

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