Date: 20010123
Dockets: 1999-3785-EI, 1999-3786-CPP
BETWEEN:
ROTARY AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT INC.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
PETER G. HASELOH, LINDA M. LAFLEUR, DONALD N. LAFLEUR,
Intervenors.
Reasons for Judgment
Rowe, D.J.T.C.C.
[1] On June 4, 1999 the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") issued letters of decision to Rotary Air Force Management Inc. (RAF) - the payor - and to each of the intervenors deciding they had been engaged in insurable employment with RAF pursuant to the provisions of the Employment Insurance Act (the "Act") during the period from January 1, 1997 to September 10, 1998. In each instance, the Minister decided the intervenors had been employed by the payor pursuant to a contract of service and the Minister was satisfied each intervenor would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment had they been dealing with the payor at arm's length. The Minister had issued - on June 4, 1999 - a letter of decision concerning Daniel Haseloh wherein the Minister found Daniel Haseloh to have been in insurable employment with the payor during the period January 1, 1997 to June 6, 1998. However, Daniel Haseloh died in an accident and the Notice of Appeal written on the letterhead of the appellant - filed on August 26, 1999 - was signed by Donald Lafleur, Peter Haseloh, Linda Lafleur, and Linda Lafleur on behalf of Daniel Haseloh, deceased. The Notice of Appeal was accepted by the Registry of the Tax Court of Canada on the basis it was an appeal by RAF and on October 13, 1999, Revenue Canada sent out notices to the signatories informing them of the appeal and advising they could participate by filing a Notice of Intervention. On November 24, 1999, a Notice of Intervention was filed but only on behalf of Linda Lafleur, Donald Lafleur and Peter Haseloh. There was no representation on behalf of the Estate of Daniel Haseloh, deceased. Thereafter, the Reply to Notice of Intervention referred only to the parties named in the said Notice.
[2] The Minister - on June 4, 1999 - issued letters of decision to RAF and to the named intervenors wherein the Minister found them to have been in pensionable employment with the payor during the period from January 1, 1997 to September 10, 1998 on the basis they were employed pursuant to a contract of service. The same procedures were followed with respect to the appeal process as noted above and the separate appeal by RAF - 1999-3786(CPP) - was followed by a Notice of Intervention, filed in the same manner as the within appeal. On June 4, 1999 the Minister also issued a letter to the appellant deciding Daniel Haseloh had been engaged in pensionable employment from January 1, 1997 to June 6, 1998. Donald Lafleur - acting as agent for RAF - and counsel for the respondent agreed the evidence taken on the within appeal would be applied to the appeal filed pursuant to the Canada Pension Plan.
[3] Donald Lafleur testified he resides in Kindersley, Saskatchewan and is the General Manager of the appellant corporation. He confirmed the share structure of RAF - during the relevant period - was as set forth in the Reply to Notice of Appeal, as follows: Daniel Haseloh - 32.8%; Linda Lafleur - 16.8%; Donald Lafleur - 16.9%; Peter Haseloh - 28.5% and Les Brown - 5%. Brown was not included in the Minister's decision. Today, Lafleur stated he and his wife - Linda - each own 25% of the shares, Peter Haseloh - with his wife - owns 40% and Les Brown holds the remaining 10%. RAF was created in 1987 but the same people had operated the business before incorporation. The Head Office of the corporation was in Kindersley, Saskatchewan and RAF carried on the business of manufacturing a kit aircraft, known as a gyroplane, examples of which were illustrated in a calendar for the year 2000 issued by RAF and filed as Exhibit A-1. The manufacturing portion of the business was carried on by a corporation - Rotary Air Force Engines Inc. - and the shareholders were the same as in RAF except that the Saskatchewan Diversification Corporation held shares as part of a financing mechanism. The original design for the aircraft was created by Bernard Haseloh, an uncle to Linda Lafleur and her brothers, Daniel Haseloh and Peter Haseloh. Donald Lafleur stated that about 5% of corporate revenue was gained from machining parts for use in the oil field but the remaining portion was attributable to the manufacture and sale of the aircraft kit which was unique. The RAF shop at Kindersley employed 22 people who worked operating a lathe mill, various saws and computer-aided machines. These workers were paid an hourly wage and an individual fulfilling the role of Sales Coordinator was considered to be an independent contractor. Donald Lafleur stated he and his wife - Linda - had worked in the Yukon operating an electrical business and Peter Haseloh was a heavy duty mechanic. As a result of being involved in those trades, they were accustomed to earning substantial incomes. Daniel Haseloh had been a sales agent and had earned a good income. The parties decided to take the gyroplane design of Bernard Haseloh and to add some comforts such as a heated cabin in order to appeal to potential customers. Beginning in 1987, they all worked extremely hard to promote the product and - in 1988 - the model designated as RAF 1000 was introduced, followed by another version - RAF 2000 - in 1990. The later version was a two-place machine and was created to satisfy a demand in the marketplace. At that time, RAF was operating out of premises in Ponoka, Alberta. After a failed attempt to secure some funding from the provincial government, the business was re-located to Kindersley, Saskatchewan where the required financing was obtained through the mechanism of a municipal bond program supported by the Province of Saskatchewan. One of the conditions of the financing program was that the shareholders of RAF were required to enter into a shareholder's agreement in which they all agreed not to receive any vacation or overtime pay in order to ensure that the salary of each shareholder employed by the corporation would not exceed the sum of $3,000.00 per month. Additional restrictions were set forth in various clauses of said agreement - filed as Exhibit A-2 - including the requirement the shareholders transfer to RAF all proprietary property such as patents, trademarks, licensing agreements, etc. currently standing in any of their names. During this period, RAF had 20 employees and they were paid overtime and for extra duties pertaining to attendance on weekends at air shows where the RAF-manufactured aircraft would be on display. The original model - RAF 1000 - was taken to an air show in Florida and responses began to come in to the Kindersley office resulting in the sale of 14 machines. Later, the RAF 2000 was introduced into the marketplace and 24 units were sold. Currently, the appellant sells an updated version with a different engine. Donald Lafleur stated the community bonds were redeemed by RAF during 1997 so all the restrictions imposed by the agreement - Exhibit A-2 - were no longer in place following that event. However, RAF became involved in litigation in the United States and a condition was imposed in the course of that process which required a continuation of substantially the same restrictions as contained in the said shareholder's agreement until the matter was ultimately resolved in September, 1998. On June 6, 1998, Daniel Haseloh died as a result of a mid-air collision while carrying out an aerial photography assignment during the process of making a promotional video. Daniel had performed demonstrations of the gyroplanes at airshows in order to attract potential buyers. Once salary restrictions had been removed, the shareholders in RAF had held a meeting and examined the levels of risk and stress affecting the performance of each member of the family group and used that factor in order to determine amounts to be taken out of the corporation in the form of salary. Daniel earned the most due to his input and the risk factor inherent in his work. Examples of Order Forms including a portion devoted to details concerning a Free Introductory Flight offer were filed as Exhibit A-3. All sales of the RAF product were in the form of a kit and in order to comply with regulations set by the appropriate branch of the federal government, 51% of the assembly work had to be performed by the purchaser. In order to assist buyers in this process, RAF developed a set of manuals and videos which could be used during construction of the kit aircraft and purchasers without mechanical training could still assemble the unit. RAF was not permitted to undertake the assembly for the customer because federal legislation regarded gyroplanes as amateur-built aircraft. RAF - as part of a marketing strategy - designed a program whereby a gyroplane owner could demonstrate - and then sell - an aircraft kit to an interested party and obtain a commission arising from the sale. An agreement - Exhibit A-4 - was drafted for that purpose and was usually entered into by individuals who were flight instructors for fixed-wing aircraft but there were also others who had been trained to fly only on gyroplanes. The qualifications required in order to fly the aircraft produced by the RAF kit was 12 hours dual instruction followed by 12 hours solo flight in the context of a total of 45 hours flight experience and 40 hours of ground school. The Ministry of Transport appoints an examiner for the purpose of carrying out the process of determining whether a candidate is to be issued a license and this may involve an actual check ride or merely observation from the ground while the aircraft operator carries out specific manoeuvres. In order to train pilots, a flight instructor was required to have 250 hours flying time. Turning once again to the circumstances surrounding the relocation of the RAF business to Kindersley, Donald Lafleur stated one of the requirements of the bond-financing arrangement was that the corporation retain the services of a qualified accountant. As a result, the accountant advised RAF to treat the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh as employees and to take deductions on the basis they were insurable employees. Although, the intervenors were reluctant to follow this advice, part of the financing agreement involved an oversight function carried out by a Bond Board composed of 10 persons drawn from the Kindersley community of which any two members were entitled to sit in on any business meetings held by RAF. The advice offered by the Board was to avoid any disputes with Revenue Canada until the bond financing had been repaid in full and the shareholders of the appellant accepted that recommendation. A document setting forth the annual earnings of the owners of RAF between 1991 and 1999 was filed as Exhibit A-5. Donald Lafleur stated his opinion that no person not related to the appellant would work in a senior management position for $3,000.00 per month without any possibility of receiving a raise for an indeterminate lengthy period, especially when it was not uncommon to work 80 hours a week. Prior to becoming involved in the family business - later transformed into RAF - he had been a maintenance electrician which according to his reference to statistics issued by the Labour Standards Branch of Saskatchewan would permit him to earn $31.29 per hour based on a 40-hour week resulting in a net monthly salary of over $4,200.00. Peter Haseloh is a qualified heavy-duty mechanic and could earn a wage of $26.03 per hour. Linda Lafleur had worked as an administrator and the type of services performed by her for RAF would probably entitle her to a salary of $55,000.00 per year. During the period the restrictions imposed by the financing mechanism were in effect, RAF paid premiums for life insurance on the shareholders as well as in relation to a group dental plan and the Workers' Compensation Board. Lafleur stated all shareholders anticipated being rewarded for their efforts as a result of increased value of the corporation. An individual working as Sales Coordinator - during his first year - earned the sum of $40,000.00. The employees working in the shop earned between $10.00 and $16.00 per hour based on a 40-hour week. Donald Lafleur referred to a letter dated April 29, 1998 - Exhibit A-6 - issued on the letterhead of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in Kindersley setting forth the list of guarantees granted in favour of the bank by the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh with respect to various loans to RAF in the sum of nearly $30,000.00. Referring to paragraphs 7(e) to 7(j), inclusive of the Reply to Notice of Appeal, Donald Lafleur agreed the facts set forth - therein were accurate, as follows:
"(e) the Appellant's business provided capital assets and management skills to a subsidiary company;
(f) Daniel was involved in all facets of the business and his duties included test pilot services, signing authority, hiring, firing, cash management, bill payment, bank deposits, exchange rates, marketing, sales literature, construction materials, customer correspondence, pricing inventory, purchasing materials, production, manufacturing, investment packages, loan applications, trade account applications, and flight characteristics;
(g) Linda was involved in all facets of the business and her duties included administration services, signing authority, hiring, firing, cash management, bill payment, bank deposits, exchange rates, marketing, sales literature, construction materials, customer correspondence, pricing inventory, purchasing materials, production, manufacturing, investment packages, loan applications, trade account applications, and flight characteristics;
(h) Peter was involved in all facets of the business and his duties included production and design manager services, signing authority, hiring, firing, cash management, bill payment, bank deposits, exchange rates, marketing, sales literature, construction materials, customer correspondence, pricing inventory, purchasing materials, production, manufacturing, investment packages, loan applications, trade account applications, and flight characteristics;
(i) Donald was involved in all facets of the business and his duties included general sales manager services, signing authority, hiring, firing, cash management, bill payment, bank deposits, exchange rates, marketing, sales literature, construction materials, customer correspondence, pricing inventory, purchasing materials, production, manufacturing, investment packages, loan applications, trade account applications, and flight characteristics;
(j) the shareholders' salaries were determined by the unanimous consent of the shareholders;"
[4] Referring to paragraph 7(m) of the said Reply, Donald Lafleur stated the profit split was paid out by way of dividend to the shareholders based on the number of shares held by each recipient and was not in the form of a salary bonus. The corporation paid income tax on $200,000.00 in order to take advantage of a lower rate and the remainder was paid out to the shareholders. The salaries paid to himself, his wife - Linda - and to Daniel Haseloh and Peter Haseloh were set by them as a group decision in amounts as set forth in paragraph 7(n) of the Reply. Each shareholder - in 1996 and 1997 - could draw the sum of $3,000.00 per month from the corporation whether or not any services had been provided. In the event one of the four members of the family group was absent, then the remainder would assume those duties and would work additional hours without any extra compensation. There was no set schedule for working hours and no restrictions on taking holidays and the family members were free to come and go as they chose. Each of them possessed skills which could enable them to earn additional money by providing services to others. Donald Lafleur stated he and the others were always faced with the potential for extensive joint and several liability arising out of their participation in RAF. In order to obtain the bond financing for RAF following the establishment of the business in Kindersley, each family member had to pledge personal assets as security. The Bond Corporation then sold shares to members of the public on the basis of 100 shares being the minimum purchase and the maximum sale to any individual could not exceed the sum of $10,000.00. In total, 700 bondholders participated in the financing scheme and were entitled to be paid out in full or could convert the bonds to shares in RAF. The majority of the bondholders accepted a payout and those that chose to convert bonds to shares were later bought out so that RAF remained a family-owned and controlled corporation. Referring again to salaries and wages in the marketplace relevant for purposes of comparison to the intervenors, Donald Lafleur filed as Exhibit A-7 a bundle of sheets received from Saskatchewan Labour, Planning and Policy Branch.
[5] In cross-examination, Donald Lafleur stated his duties with RAF are managerial in nature but also include matters relating to sales, financing and administration. All the necessary tools and equipment for the business are owned by the corporation and he uses a company credit card for expenses related to the business. Although he does work in the business year-round, he could have chosen not to do so as he was at all times a Director and shareholder in RAF even though there may have been periods during which he was not an Officer of the corporation. He agreed with counsel that in the Financing Agreement - Exhibit A-2 - he had been referred to therein as an employee of RAF.
[6] Karen Klassen testified she began working for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) - formerly known as Revenue Canada - in 1998 and is currently a Rulings Officer for purposes of the Employment Insurance Act and Canada Pension Plan. She was responsible for the ruling issued on September 10, 1998 which was later confirmed by the Minister in the letter dated June 4, 1999, said decision being the subject of the within appeal. Karen Klassen stated that whenever her office was required to make a ruling the first step was to examine whether or not there was a contract of service or a contract for services. In the circumstances involving the intervenors and RAF, it was decided - in accordance with the usual tests - that they were employees working pursuant to a contract of service. She stated the next stage in the process was to examine the Act in terms of the exclusions created by the shareholding structure. In the within matter, she determined no shareholder controlled more than 40 per cent of the voting shares in RAF and was, therefore, not excluded from insurable employment. Since the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were related persons as defined by the Income Tax Act, and were, therefore, deemed not to be dealing with each other at arm's length, it was necessary for the Minister to use the discretion required by the provisions of paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Act in order to be satisfied that it is reasonable to conclude the parties would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment. Once so satisfied, then it could be concluded that the parties were dealing with each other at arm's length. Klassen stated that in the Saskatoon office the practice utilized is to refer to section 251 of the Income Tax Act which defines relationships and to then refer to section 69 of the Income Tax Act which deals with inadequate considerations of various sorts occurring in transactions between persons dealing with each other non-arm's length. Klassen stated that in her view this provision of the Income Tax Act is concerned with fraudulent transactions and the purpose of the non-arm's length legislation contained therein is to exclude fraudulent transactions. In terms of examining the circumstances surrounding employment situations, Klassen stated she followed office policy which was to believe the intent of the legislation was to exclude employments that are fraudulent, fabricated or - as termed by the office Technical Advisor - any employment that was "untoward". Therefore, Klassen stated she was looking to exclude fraudulent employment and pointed out individuals did not have the option of choosing whether or not they wished to be in insurable employment under the Act. Klassen stated she then considered the remuneration paid, the terms and conditions, the duration and nature and importance of the work performed prior to making the ruling. (At this point in the testimony I began asking questions of Klassen for purposes of clarification and it is important to quote directly from the transcript. The only editing done is in relation to syntax, punctuation, grammar or in eliminating repetitive words, portions of phrases, questions or responses uttered solely in acknowledgement or confirmation and the testimony - as set forth in the relevant portions of the exchanges between the witness and the Court - is as follows:)
"His Honour: So your view really is if there is a family home business as legitimate employment, then there's insurable employment?
Ms. Klassen: Our view is that if it's legitimate employment and it is not untoward, it is not fabricated, general overall, then yes, it should be legitimate employment and included under the Employment Insurance Act.
His Honour: What's the point of looking at those factors set out in the legislation?
Ms. Klassen: Because there are many times when we look at those factors, that we find that it is not a legitimate employment. Take remuneration, for example, I personally have dealt on cases where, yes, everything else is above board and reasonable, but has that person truly been paid, and I have personally worked on cases where on paper - or they may tell me - they got $3,000 a month. Well, did they have rights to those funds? Did they receive a cheque? No, it's a paper transaction and that money was never in that person's hand; they never had any rights to that money and therefore were not remunerated.
His Honour: Right. So those indicia set out in paragraph 3(b), if I understand you correctly, are looked at only in the process of or the context of determining the legitimacy of the employment to ensure that it's not a sham?
Ms. Klassen: In essence, that is a large part to do with it, yes. What we want to include is valid legitimate employments and we believe that is the intent of the legislation, that the legislation is not an optional program.
His Honour: But it is not the people out there who have made this up, it is Parliament that has decided certain people will be included, but then later will be excluded if they don't meet the test of certain standards, so I mean, the individuals aren't choosing whether or not to participate.
Ms. Klassen: What we have found is that individuals, particularly shareholders, whether or not they are related, have applied for the exclusion simply because they do not want to pay the EI benefits for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons often that we hear is this person can never be fired, even if they own only two percent of the shares. The legislation tells us that we exclude individuals when they own in excess of 40 percent of the shares. If a person does not have legal control of that corporation, who is to say that they cannot be fired? Again, I have worked on a situation where we had a family business and that family business ...
The Court: Right, but when you look at whether an outsider would enter into a substantially similar contract, as the Appellant said on the witness stand, who is going to work that hard for that remuneration with those qualifications, contractually agree not to have any overtime pay, vacation pay and never to get a raise, and what employee on that shop floor is going to put his or her name to documents which might give them potentially millions of dollars of liability? I mean, who is going to do that?
Ms. Klassen: I would like to address the first part of your question. It is not uncommon for non-related shareholders to enter into an agreement of the nature that these individuals have entered into whether or not they're related. Again, I personally know of shareholders who own 10 percent of those shares, they work 60 or 70 hours a week. They don't take Saturdays, they don't take Sundays. Why would they do this? Because they are also a shareholder in addition to being a worker. If they are a shareholder, they have a common interest of insuring the prosperity of that particular business.
His Honour: But, unless they're defined as related persons, then it doesn't matter. You only get kicked out of the inclusion if you meet the definition of related persons. You can have 10 percent of the shares - you're not a related person - and it doesn't matter. It only matters if you fall into the category of a related person, in which case you're deemed to be in excepted employment unless and until the Minister makes a decision to get a person back into the category again, so that's the only time it applies.
Ms. Klassen: Well, that's true, and if a related shareholder is performing services under circumstances which are comparable to unrelated shareholders, why should they not be included? That business can still fail.
His Honour: So your view of it is - and you can correct me if I'm wrong - and this is obviously the view of your office, that fundamentally unless and until there is evidence the employment is not legitimate, that the people who are employed by that company are engaged in insurable employment, right?
Ms. Klassen: If they meet the other provisions, yes.
His Honour: But you said earlier that the other provisions are fundamentally looked at only in the context of determining ... that it is legitimate, not untoward, and not fabricated, that is what you said.
Ms. Klassen: I did say that, Your Honour. What I meant in this situation was if they own in excess of 40 percent of the shares, then, of course, it would not be included as per the legislation.
His Honour: But that's not what you said. You said, you believe the intent of the legislation is to exclude fraudulent employment only.
Ms. Klassen: Yes.
His Honour: So if there is legitimate employment and it is not untoward - whatever that means - or fabricated, then it should be included in insurable employment.
Ms. Klassen: Yes.
His Honour: You then said the indicia I referred to, "mostly", you said "only" first, and when I pressed you, you said "mostly", in the process of determining whether the employment is legitimate. That's what you said.
Ms. Klassen: Going through the legislation, we come to the factor of shareholdings prior to looking at non-arm's length, right?
His Honour: Yes.
Ms. Klassen: So if they own in excess of 40 percent of the shares, we don't even have to look at arm's length, they're already excluded.
His Honour: Right, but I'm talking about the indicia in paragraph 5(3)(b), the duration, the employment, the comparability.
Ms. Klassen: Right.
His Honour: Your comment was that it is mostly looked at in combination with section 69 of the Act, which somehow you make apply.
Ms. Klassen: No, I didn't - it wasn't in section 69 of the Act, sorry, sir, if I am - if I am being vague ...
His Honour: All right. What's the reference to section 69?
Ms. Klassen: Section 69 refers to the type of transactions that are - I hate to use the word untoward again because it is my technical advisor's term, but -
His Honour: All right, but why do you use section 69 of the Income Tax Act?
Ms. Klassen: Because ...
His Honour: What gives you the right to do that?
Ms. Klassen What I'm saying is that's the type of things that the Income Tax Act relates non-arm's length transactions to.
His Honour: Yes, all right.
Ms. Klassen: What types of things are we looking at? Well, it's talking about transactions at non-arm's length where it's meant to contravene the legislation."
[7] Counsel for the respondent resumed questioning of Ms. Klassen and Klassen stated she considered the duration of the employment and found RAF operated year-round. In terms of remuneration, in 1998 the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were paid a fixed salary regardless of the number of hours worked and the three men received a salary of $5,000.00 per month while Linda Lafleur received a salary of $3,000.00 per month. Klassen stated it was not unreasonable for workers who are shareholders in a corporation to receive a fixed salary regardless of the number of hours worked because as a shareholder it is in their interest to ensure the prosperity of that particular business and to "do what it takes" to achieve that end. She stated that in her opinion while there may not have been a particular employee - at RAF - who was performing exactly the same services under the same terms and conditions, it was not fair to compare the shareholders - who were the subject of her ruling - with other regular employees because it was quite common to look at other businesses and to expect individuals employed in managerial capacities to be working extended hours. Klassen stated she considered the aspect of the importance of the work involved and concluded the intervenors were vital to the operation of the appellant's business and found they were performing valid and reasonable duties. She stated that before coming to the decision that the affected individuals would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with RAF had they been non-related persons, she had the particular file reviewed by the Technical Advisor and also followed office practice of reviewing the case extensively with other CCRA employees carrying out a similar function in order to ensure the decision was made in a fair manner. (At this point, there was a further exchange between the witness and the Court and the relevant portions of the transcript - reproduced in accordance with the earlier stated method - are as follows:)
" His Honour: But, here is the test; whether it's reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length. Your test is whether another group of shareholders somewhere else would have likely operated in the same fashion with their company because they're shareholders as these people were, that's what you use.
Ms. Klassen: We're looking to see whether or not there's a valid and genuine employment.
His Honour: But you can't compare shareholders, the section doesn't ask you to compare shareholders of other companies with shareholders of this company. It asks you to compare whether or not it's reasonable to conclude that these people, if they hadn't been related to the corporation by virtue of the Income Tax Act, would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment if they had, in fact, been dealing at arm's length. So don't you have to look at somebody coming off the street, applying for a job - doing what these people were doing - as an arm's length person and then saying, would this person work that hard for $3,000 a month and put themselves on the hook to that extent? Isn't that the comparison that should be made?
Ms. Klassen: The comparison that I would make in that situation is could an unrelated person enter into that type of a relationship in managerial capacity, and would they be expected to work that hard if they were a manager? Yes, they would be expected to work that hard.
His Honour: For that amount of money?
Ms Klassen: It's possible, yes.
His Honour: Yes, but is it probable?
Ms. Klassen: My husband does it.
...
Ms. Klassen: These individuals also have their shareholder role as well. As a worker, yes, they may have made $30,000, although in the year in question that I looked at, three out of four of them were making $60,000."
[8] In cross-examination by Donald Lafleur, Karen Klassen stated she regarded it reasonable for a person to work long hours for $3,000.00 a month without a raise for years if one believed in the product and the business organization even if required to place personal assets at risk.
[9] Donald Lafleur, agent for the appellant corporation, submitted the evidence demonstrated the business organization was the culmination of a dream and the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were all members of a related team operating as a family unit in a manner unlike a working relationship between parties dealing with each other at arm's length.
[10] Counsel for the respondent submitted the decision of the Minister was within the bounds permitted by the relevant jurisprudence and there was no need for intervention by the Court.
[11] Pursuant to paragraph 5(2)(i) of the Act, insurable employment does not include "employment if the employer and employee are not dealing with each other at arm's length". At this point - without more - the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were all related persons employed by a related corporation as defined by section 251 of the Income Tax Act and would fall into the category of excluded employment or - more precisely - employment that was not included in the category of insurable employment. However, that is not the end of the process and the Minister is required by paragraph (3)(b) of section 5 of the Act to examine certain indicia of the said employment in accordance with the language of the provision as follows:
"if the employer is, within the meaning of that Act, related to the employee, they are deemed to deal with each other at arm's length if the Minister of National Revenue is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the remuneration paid, the terms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of the work performed, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length." (emphasis added)
[12] For reasons which I hope will become apparent, I have added emphasis to the above provision and will refer to the precision of the wording in the course of undertaking an analysis of the evidence.
[13] The first matter to be decided is whether or not there is any basis disclosed by the evidence for me to intervene in the decision of the Minister.
[14] In the case of Crawford and Company Ltd. and M.N.R., reported, [1999] T.C.J. No. 850 (QL), a decision of Porter, D.J.T.C.C. issued December 8, 1999, Judge Porter considered the appeals of three employees of the corporation, of whom two were brothers, falling into the category of related persons within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. The remaining appellant was not a related person to the corporation and this required a separate examination of the facts as no discretion had been exercised by the Minister pursuant to paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act. The analysis undertaken by Judge Porter, as it pertained to the two brothers is extensive, and is relevant to the requisite analysis undertaken in the within appeal. For that reason, I am quoting extensively from the Crawford judgment because it accords with my understanding of the law and the facts in that case are substantially similar to the within appeal. At page 21, commencing at paragraph 58, Judge Porter stated:
"[58] In the scheme established under the EI Act, Parliament has made provision for certain employment to be insurable, leading to the payment of benefits upon termination, and other employment which is "not included" and thus carrying no benefits upon termination. Employment arrangements made between persons, who are not dealing with each other at arm's length, are categorized as not included. Brothers and corporations controlled by them are deemed not to be dealing with each other at arm's length pursuant to subsection 251(1) of the Income Tax Act, which governs the situation. Quite clearly the original purpose of this legislation was to safeguard the system from having to pay out a multitude of benefits based on artificial or fictitious employment arrangements, see the comments of the Federal Court of Appeal in Paul v. The Minister of National Revenue, (A-223-86) unreported, where Hugessen J. said:
We are all prepared to assume, as invited by appellant's counsel, that paragraph 3(2)(c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, and subsection 14(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Regulations have for at least one of their purposes the prevention of abuse of the Unemployment Insurance Fund through the creation of so-called "employer-employee" relationships between persons whose relationship is, in fact, quite different. That purpose finds obvious relevance and rational justification in the case of spouses who are living together in a marital relationship. But even if, as appellant would have us do, we must look only at spouses who are legally separated and may be dealing at arm's length with one another, the nature of their relationship as spouses is such as, in our view, to justify excluding from the scheme of the Act the employment of one by the other.
...
We do not exclude the possibility that the provisions may have other purposes, such as a social policy decision to remove all employment within the family unit from the operation of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, as was suggested by respondent's counsel.
[59] The harshness of this situation has however been tempered by paragraph 5(3)(b) of the EI Act, which provides for such employment between related persons to be deemed to be at arm's length and thus in turn to be treated as insurable employment, if it meets all the other provisions, where the Minister is satisfied having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the remuneration paid, theterms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of the work performed, that it is reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract if they had (in fact) been dealing with each other at arm's length.
[60] It may be helpful to reframe my understanding of this section. For people related to each other the gate is closed by the statute to any claim for insurance benefits unless the Minister can be satisfied that in effect the employment arrangement is the same as that which unrelated persons, that is persons who are clearly at arm's length, would have made. If it is a substantially similar contract of employment, Parliament has deemed it to be only fair that it should be included in the scheme. However, the Minister is the gatekeeper. Unless he is so satisfied the gate remains closed, the employment remains excepted and the employee is not eligible for benefits.
[61] Subsection 93(3) of the EI Act deals with appeals to and the determination of questions by the Minister. It requires that "the Minister shall decide the appeal within a reasonable time after receiving it and shall notify the affected persons of the decision".
[62] Thus, the Minister has no discretion whether or not to decide the question. He is required by law to do so. If he is not satisfied, the gate remains closed and the employee is not eligible. If however he is satisfied, without more ado or any action on the part of the Minister (other than notification of the decision) the employee becomes eligible for benefits, provided he is otherwise qualified. It is not a discretionary power in the sense that if the Minister is satisfied he may then deem the employment to be insurable. He must "determine the question" and depending on that determination the law deems the employment to be either at arm's length or not at arm's length. In this sense the Minister has no discretion to exercise in the true sense of the word, for in making his decision he must act quasi-judicially and is not free to choose as he pleases. The various decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal on this issue reveal that the same test applies as to a myriad of other officials making quasi-judicial decisions in many different fields. See Tignish Auto Parts Inc. v. M.N.R., 185 N.R. 73, Ferme Émile Richard et Fils Inc. v. M.N.R., 178 N.R. 361, Attorney General of Canada and Jencan Ltd., (1997) 215 N.R. 352 and Her Majesty the Queen and Bayside Drive-in Ltd., (1997) 218 N.R. 150."
[15] In the case of Adolfo Elia v. M.N.R., [1998] F.C.J. No. 316 (QL), a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal dated March 3, 1998, at page 2 of the certified translation Pratte, J.A. stated:
"Contrary to what the judge thought, it is not necessary, in order for the judge to be able to exercise that power, for it to be established that the Minister's decision was unreasonable or made in bad faith having regard to the evidence before the Minister. What is necessary is that the evidence presented to the judge establish that the Minister acted in bad faith, or capriciously or unlawfully, or based his decision on irrelevant facts or did not have regard to relevant facts. The judge may then substitute his decision for that of the Minister."
[16] In Légaré v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1999] F.C.J. No. 878 - another decision of the Federal Court of Appeal - Marceau, J.A. speaking for the Court stated at page 2 of the judgment:
"In this matter, the Court has before it two applications for judicial review against two judgments by a judge of the Tax Court of Canada in related cases heard on the basis of common evidence which raise yet again the problems of interpretation and application of the saving provision, subparagraph 3(2)(c)(ii). I say yet again because since its passage in 1990, several decisions of the Tax Court of Canada and several judgments of this Court have already considered what workable meaning could be given to subparagraph 3(2)(c)(ii). In reading the text, the problems it poses beyond its deficient wording are immediately obvious, problems which essentially involve the nature of the role conferred on the Minister, the scope of the Minister's determination and, by extension, the extent of the Tax Court of Canada's general power of review in the context of an appeal under sections 70 et seq. of the Act.
While the applicable principles for resolving these problems have frequently been discussed, judging by the number of disputes raised and opinions expressed, the statement of these principles has apparently not always been completely understood. For the purposes of the applications before us, we wish to restate the guidelines which can be drawn from this long line of authority, in terms which may perhaps make our findings more meaningful.
The Act requires the Minister to make a determination based on his own conviction drawn from a review of the file. The wording used introduces a form of subjective element, and while this has been called a discretionary power of the Minister, this characterization should not obscure the fact that the exercise of this power must clearly be completely and exclusively based on an objective appreciation of known or inferred facts. And the Minister's determination is subject to review. In fact, the Act confers the power of review on the Tax Court of Canada on the basis of what is discovered in an inquiry carried out in the presence of all interested parties. The Court is not mandated to make the same kind of determination as the Minister and thus cannot purely and simply substitute its assessment for that of the Minister: that falls under the Minister's so-called discretionary power. However, the Court must verify whether the facts inferred or relied on by the Minister are real and were correctly assessed having regard to the context in which they occurred, and after doing so, it must decide whether the conclusion with which the Minister was "satisfied" still seems reasonable."
[17] In the within appeal, Karen Klassen, the Rulings Officer who made the ruling later confirmed by the Minister, provided an insight into the policy, procedure and the rationale for determining that the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were in insurable employment with the appellant corporation. As Judge Bowman, Tax Court of Canada, in the case of Donald Persaud v. M.N.R. - 96-1987(UI) - dated January 7, 1998 - at page 12 stated:
"It is strange that the first time an appellant is told what these so-called assumptions are is when the Attorney-General files the reply to the notice of appeal. They are not, as I understand it, normally communicated to the appellant prior to the determination nor is the appellant (at that state the applicant) given any opportunity to rebut them or to state why the determination unfavourable to him or her should not be made."
[18] An appellant could make application pursuant to the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111, Sch. 1 "1" in order to obtain documents such as the Report on a Determination or Appeal - known as a CPT 110 - together with other relevant information gathered during the process leading to the confirmation of the ruling by the Minister. In addition, an appellant could apply to the Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 18 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (E.I.) for an Order directing a discovery under oath of a named party including the production of documents. However, these procedures are rarely followed and it is common for the respondent in these appeals to not adduce any evidence at all so the assumptions of fact as stated in the Reply to Notice of Appeal are the sole basis of examining the reasoning that must have preceded the decision. In the event the decision issued by the Minister is one which merely determines the status of an individual in a working relationship as being either pursuant to a contract of service or a contract for services, the facts - as assumed - usually speak for themselves and there is no real element of analysis or use of discretion in arriving at a decision. On the other hand, when the Minister is required by the legislation to be "satisfied" that a certain situation existed which will - in effect - "undeem" that which has been deemed - no mean feat in itself - different considerations apply and it would be useful to have some insight into the process utilized by the Minister. I will begin by setting forth the assumptions of fact contained in paragraph 8 of the Reply, as follows:
"In so deciding as he did, the Minister considered the following assumptions of fact in support of the reason that Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald were deemed to deal at arm's length with the Appellant:
(a) the assumptions of fact above;
(b) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald received their full salary and bonus;
(c) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald controlled their own hours and days;
(d) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald worked between 60 and 85 hours per week;
(e) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald were not paid overtime;
(f) the Appellant stated that the other employees worked regular hours and days and received overtime pay when applicable;
(g) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald but (sic) not receive sick leave or vacation pay;
(h) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald continued to receive their full wage even when they were absent;
(i) if a shareholder was absent for an extended period they would not be replaced, another shareholder would complete the duties;
(j) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald were not supervised;
(k) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald chose the jobs they would work on and they controlled their own work;
(l) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald could not be fired;
(m) Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald had the freedom to work for others;
(n) the shareholders are liable for corporate losses;
(o) the Minister was satisfied that it was reasonable to conclude the Appellant would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with Daniel, Linda, Peter, and Donald if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length."
[19] The salaries of the parties for most of the relevant period were limited by the shareholder's agreement required by the mechanics of the bond financing and subsequently by certain aspects of litigation issued in the United States against RAF which also involved the intervenors as individuals. The restriction was not only relevant to receiving dividends on shares but applied to salaries, bonuses or other remuneration. Certainly, the parties received their full salaries - as opposed to the corporation being in arrears of payment - but they also worked in an environment markedly different from other employees and this was accepted by the Minister as evidenced by the wording of the assumptions referred to above. It is difficult to comprehend how after digesting the specific assumptions contained in paragraphs 8(b) to 8(n), inclusive, the Minister arrived at the conclusion - stated as a fact - that it was reasonable to conclude the appellant (RAF) would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with Daniel Haseloh, Peter Haseloh, Donald Lafleur and Linda Lafleur if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length.
[20] The answer to the enigma may be forthcoming by returning to the evidence of Karen Klassen, Rulings Officer, whose ruling was confirmed by the Minister on June 4, 1999. In my view - to put it bluntly - the method utilized by her - in accordance with office policy - was to regard the relevant provisions of the Employment Insurance Act in a manner consistent with a regime borne of a mandate to impose a payroll tax but that is not - at this point - the purpose of that legislation. It is apparent in her testimony that the overarching purpose of the Act is to regard the employment of related persons as being included in insurable employment provided the work was legitimately performed and there is no evidence of fraud or transactions fraught with inadequate considerations as outlined in some detail in section 69 - and 14 subsections - of the Income Tax Act. It is also clear the comparison made by Karen Klassen was based on an interpretation of working conditions between the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh and a scenario where other persons may have worked for a corporation in which they also held shares, albeit not in an amount exceeding 40% so as to remove them from the category of insurable employment. Certainly, there can be reference to other workers in other similar industries in order to have another tool with which to undertake the analysis of the various indicia set forth in paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Act. However, the final determination of the issue - in order that the Minister be "satisfied" - must be based on a consideration of whether a non-related person - a stranger - with similar skills and experience could reasonably be expected to provide services to the appellant corporation under substantially similar working conditions having regard to the amount of pay, method of payment, opportunity for increased or additional remuneration, hours and conditions of work and the element of risk to personal assets apart from that normally associated with being a shareholder. The test is not whether some other shareholder with more or less than 40% of the shares in some other corporation would be likely to work as hard and assume personal risk for the greater good of that corporate entity in the hopes of a future reward but whether it is reasonable to conclude Donald and Linda Lafleur and Daniel Haseloh and Peter Haseloh would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with RAF had they not been related and - instead - had been dealing with the corporation at arm's length. It is obvious from the whole of the evidence that I must intervene in the decision of the Minister on the basis the Minister used irrelevant facts, did not have regard to relevant facts and misapplied the law in attempting to discharge the duty required by paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Act. When there is an accumulation of red herrings sufficient to obscure the desired rainbow trout, then one must empty the net and start sorting all over again. Having decided to intervene, I must examine the evidence in order to decide whether or not the named individuals were in insurable employment with RAF during the relevant period contained in each letter of decision.
[21] In the case of David Putter v. M.N.R. - 1999-457(EI) - heard together with the appeals of Daniel Putter v. M.N.R. - 1999-456(EI) - and Equinox Industries Ltd. v. M.N.R. - 1999-458(EI) - I considered the situation of two brothers working over an extended period of time in a family business and concluded they were not employed in insurable employment. At page 16 - paragraph 18 - I wrote the following:
"I do not intend to reiterate the evidence in the within appeals because I have examined it in the course of the process leading up to my decision to intervene. It is reasonable to conclude that after 21 years and 15 years with the corporation, David and Daniel Putter, respectively, were not employed under circumstances - including consideration of their payment of salary (below industry standard), the amount of work performed, lack of holiday time, the ability to control their remuneration, the absence of any need to follow dictates of corporate structure in accordance with majority shareholding by others and, over the course of many years, putting themselves at personal risk for company debt, clearly established they would not have entered into a similar contract of employment with Equinox if they had been dealing with the corporation at arm's length. It strikes me it is difficult - on an objective basis - to assess whether it is reasonable to conclude that the parties would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment unless there is some evidence before the Minister as to comparable salaries or working conditions within the same - or related - industry. There is obviously room for using a yardstick against which a particular employment is to be measured because the alternative would be to permit the parties themselves to put forward the proposition that, notwithstanding the deviation from normal business practices in a similar marketplace, they still would have entered into the contract of employment on a purely subjective basis. Certainly, that is how the process works when the shoe is on the other foot and benefits have been denied to claimants because their conditions of work for a related employer do not - when all the facts have been considered - measure up to the usual or normal conditions that applied - or could be expected to apply - to non-related workers under a substantially similar contract of employment. "
[22] In a recent decision, Jason Miller et al. v. M.N.R. - 2000-2373(EI) - I considered the situation of a family business where three sons each held 16% of the outstanding shares of the employer corporation while the remaining 52% was controlled by a corporation in which the shares were owned equally by their mother and father. In that case, at pages 16-17 I stated:
"I point out that in considering this matter, it is not my function to substitute my opinion for that of the Minister. Whether or not I would have arrived at the same conclusion in the first instance is irrelevant. The relevant jurisprudence requires the threshold for any intervention to be established as a consequence of finding the Minister acted in bad faith, capriciously or unlawfully, or based the decision on irrelevant facts or ignored relevant facts."
[23] The difference between one instance where a Court will intervene in the decision of a Minister and another case where there is no intervention may seem slight, on occasion. Moreover, it may become apparent in the course of reasons for judgment that the judge would probably have come to a different conclusion than the Minister had there been the right - as a matter of law - to embark on that so-called de novo procedure.
[24] Returning to the facts in the within appeal, it does not seem reasonable that the individuals affected by the decision of the Minister would agree to an ongoing restriction on their salaries - for the benefit of the corporation - or that they would work between 60 and 85 hours per week without any overtime pay, unless they were willing to do so within the context of a family enterprise on a non-arm's length basis. The shop employees - some of whom earned $16.00 per hour - would be earning nearly $5,000.00 per month for working that much and they most certainly would not have been paid for not working. For the most part of the relevant period, there were severe restrictions imposed on the parties in their capacity - as workers - to negotiate a reasonable rate of compensation with the corporation. The terms and conditions of the work - apart from the remuneration and excessive hours - were otherwise reasonable except that non-related persons engaged in a managerial capacity would probably not have their working conditions inextricably bound up with certain other commitments required as a consequence of being a shareholder in the corporation. The employment was full time and had resulted from the Lafleurs' and the Haselohs' having incorporated a family business based on an invention - by their uncle - of a type of aircraft. While there was adherence to a corporate structure due to the peculiarities of the financing scheme and subsequent events, the family members carried out the pursuit of their long-held dream primarily within the context of that family relationship and eschewed other high-paying employment for which they were all well qualified and experienced in order to make the business a success. The work being carried out was necessary and important and was vital to the operation of the RAF business. As stated by Donald Lafleur in his evidence, he and the other family members - for business reasons - earlier had chosen to follow the advice of the Bond Board and not rock the boat when Revenue Canada had assessed RAF for premiums on the basis the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh were engaged in insurable employment. In the case of The Minister of National Revenue v. Emily Standing, 147 N.R. 238, F.C.A., Stone J.A. at pp. 239-240 stated:
"...There is no foundation in the case law for the proposition that such a relationship may exist merely because the parties choose to describe it to be so regardless of the surrounding circumstances when weighed in the light of the Wiebe Door test." (87 DTC 5025)
[25] Although the usual context in which the above quotation is placed involves the characterization of a working relationship between that of an employee or an independent contractor, the point is applicable to the within appeal in that parties cannot choose to be included or not in the category of insurable employment as it is not a voluntary scheme and inclusion will be determined by the legislation and relevant jurisprudence. Further, each relevant period has to be assessed on its own, although preceding and subsequent events and situations are often relevant in assisting with the determination of an issue.
[26] The point is that in examining - overall - the working relationship of the intervenors and Daniel Haseloh with RAF in the within appeal, it does not strike me as a situation where it is reasonable to conclude that a non-related person would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with RAF had they actually been dealing with each other at arm's length. Once the restrictions on salary had been removed as a result of being able to see an end to the litigation, then the remuneration was increased dramatically on the basis of a family meeting and the payments were the subject of T4 slips issued to the recipients. That form of salary catch-up would not normally be expected where persons were dealing at arm's length. It is apparent their economic interests were bound up with those of the corporation much like the situation in Crawford, supra - wherein Judge Porter at paragraph 93 stated:
"I am of the view that there did not exist between each of the workers in these appeals and the Appellant Corporation, the degree of adverse economic interest such that one could say that there were separate interests. Their economic interests were clearly linked so closely with those of the Corporation, that the latter could not be said to be acting with a separate mind. The same kind of bona fide negotiating that would take place between those traders, strangers in the marketplace, to which I referred above, was not present in these arrangements. There was not the kind of independence of thought or purpose between the Corporation and the three individuals that one could say that they were dealing with each other at arm's length. Accordingly, I hold that none of them were employed in insurable employment."
[27] As a consequence of the conclusions drawn as stated in the within reasons, the appeal is allowed and each decision of the Minister - dated June 4, 1999 - is varied, to find as follows:
- Daniel Haseloh was employed by Rotary Air Force Management Inc. pursuant to a contract of service for the period from January 1, 1997 to June 6, 1998 but he was not engaged in insurable employment because he and the corporation were not dealing with each other at arm's length.
- Peter Haseloh, Donald Lafleur and Linda Lafleur were each employed by Rotary Air Force Management Inc. pursuant to a contract of service for the period from January 1, 1997 to September 10, 1998 but none of them was engaged in insurable employment because none of them was dealing with the corporation at arm's length.
[28] The parties agreed the evidence taken in the within appeal would apply to appeal - 1999-3786(CPP). There is no doubt on the evidence that Daniel Haseloh, Peter Haseloh, Donald Lafleur and Linda Lafleur were all employees of RAF pursuant to a contract of service. There is no provision in the Canada Pension Plan comparable to that of paragraph 5(3)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act and unless persons are excluded by subsection 6(2) of the Canada Pension Plan then, as employees, they are included. The named individuals were engaged in pensionable employment with RAF and the decisions - dated June 4, 1999 - issued by the Minister to that effect are confirmed. As a result, appeal 1999-3786(CPP) is hereby dismissed.
Signed at Vancouver, British Columbia, this 23rd day of January 2001.
"D.W. Rowe"
D.J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE NO.: 1999-3785(EI)
STYLE OF CAUSE: Rotary Air Force Management Inc. and
M.N.R. and Peter G. Haseloh,
Linda M. Lafleur, Donald N. Lafleur
PLACE OF HEARING: Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
DATE OF HEARING: November 22, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Deputy Judge D.W. Rowe
DATE OF JUDGMENT: January 23, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Agent for the Appellant: Donald N. Lafleur
Counsel for the Respondent: Suzanne Lalonde
Agent for the Intervenors: Donald N. Lafleur
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
For the Intervenors:
COURT FILE NO.: 1999-3786(CPP)
STYLE OF CAUSE: Rotary Air Force Management Inc. and
M.N.R. and Peter G. Haseloh,
Linda M. Lafleur, Donald N. Lafleur
PLACE OF HEARING: Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
DATE OF HEARING: November 22, 2000
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Deputy Judge D.W. Rowe
DATE OF JUDGMENT: January 23, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Agent for the Appellant: Donald N. Lafleur
Counsel for the Respondent: Suzanne Lalonde
Agent for the Intervenors: Donald N. Lafleur
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name:
Firm:
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
For the Intervenors:
1999-3785(EI)
BETWEEN:
ROTARY AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT INC.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
PETER G. HASELOH, LINDA M. LAFLEUR, DONALD N. LAFLEUR,
Intervenors.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeal of Rotary Air Force Management Inc. (1999-3786(CPP)) on November 22, 2000 at
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, by
the Honourable Deputy Judge D.W. Rowe
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Donald N. Lafleur
Counsel for the Respondent: Suzanne Lalonde
Agent for the Intervenors: Donald N. Lafleur
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the decision of the Minister is varied in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Vancouver, British Columbia, this 23rd day of January 2001.
|
"D.W. Rowe" |
D.J.T.C.C.
1999-3786(CPP)
BETWEEN:
ROTARY AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT INC.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent,
and
PETER G. HASELOH, LINDA M. LAFLEUR, DONALD N. LAFLEUR,
Intervenors.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeal of Rotary Air Force Management Inc. (1999-3785(EI)) on November 22, 2000 at
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, by
the Honourable Deputy Judge D.W. Rowe
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Donald N. Lafleur
Counsel for the Respondent: Suzanne Lalonde
Agent for the Intervenors: Donald N. Lafleur
JUDGMENT
The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Minister is confirmed in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Vancouver, British Columbia, this 23rd day of January 2001.
|
"D.W. Rowe" |
D.J.T.C.C.