Date: 20000824
Dockets: 98-711-IT-I
BETWEEN:
RAYNALD TREMBLAY
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Tardif, J.T.C.C.
[1] This appeal concerns the 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years. The issue to be decided is whether the additional taxable benefits, amounting to $9,358 for each of the 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years, that were included in the appellant's income for those years, were correctly calculated.
[2] By consent of the parties, this judgment is rendered on the basis of all the exhibits filed and of the transcript of all the testimony and counsel's argument.
Facts
[3] During the years in issue, the appellant owned all the shares of numbered company 2643-5446, which operated a bowling alley. At that time, the bowling alley was located at 1472 Wallberg Boulevard, several buildings from 1284 Wallberg where the appellant lived with his family. The company was then leasing the premises occupied by the bowling alley.
[4] In August 1994, the appellant incorporated another company, 9004-9693 Québec Inc., with he himself holding 75 percent of the shares and his wife, Hélène Gaudreault, the other 25 percent. This company was located at 341 Vézina Boulevard, in Dolbeau. The company built the building housing the bowling alley and related enterprises, including a restaurant, a bar, a bowling boutique and a catering service.
[5] At that location, the company operated the bowling alley under the name of Salon de Quilles Dolbeau Enr. and it was located approximately 2.7 kilometers from the family residence. With 14 lanes, and with 15 employees during the busy season, the Salon de Quilles Dolbeau Enr. could accommodate as many as 210 people.
[6] Activities ranged from general sports to inter-league competitions; there were also numerous tournaments and parties, as well as gatherings of office and factory workers, families and so on. The bowling alley was in operation from the end of August to mid-May every year.
[7] During the years in question, the company had placed a 1992 Dodge Grand Caravan 4 x 4 ("Dodge Caravan") at the appellant's disposal.
[8] The dispute has to do with whether the use of that vehicle was a taxable benefit. The respondent maintains that the use of the vehicle in question was a taxable benefit for the appellant. The appellant, however, submits that the distance that the vehicle was driven for his personal use was less than 10 percent of the total distance driven and, therefore, he did not derive any personal benefit from the vehicle from a tax point of view.
[9] The evidence primarily concerned the appellant's schedule. He described his work as an activity that monopolized his time, seven days a week and over 12 hours a day. With regard to the inactive period from mid-May to mid-August, the appellant said he laid off his employees but devoted all his time to refurbishing and making repairs and improvements to the bowling alley, as well as to preparing for the upcoming bowling season.
[10] Along with his activities related to the operation of the business, the appellant was involved—and he testified at length on this—in the Association des salons de quilles du Saguenay-Lac St-Jean and the Association des salons de quilles du Québec ("ASQ"), as well as the Fédération des associations de salons de quilles du Québec, in which he served as president for three years for the ASQ and was a technical director.
[11] The appellant had to travel periodically for the two associations and ran up significant kilometrage for which he received no compensation. This was characterized by the respondent as volunteer work.
[12] On this volunteering issue, the parties submitted opposing views. The respondent saw it as an essentially personal activity that had nothing to do with the operation of the business that owned the vehicle that is at the heart of the dispute, while the appellant considered that activity to be related to the operation of the bowling alley.
[13] On this subject, I believe that it was indeed an activity related to the bowling alley, and its sole aim was the consolidation and development of the sport of bowling and its sidelines. Were it not for the fact that he derived his livelihood from this activity, I doubt whether the appellant would have shown as much interest and, above all, so much commitment. Therefore, under the circumstances, I believe that the kilometers driven for the purpose of participating in the various associations should not be excluded.
[14] The appellant argued that the Dodge Caravan was used almost exclusively for the operation and smooth running of the business. He listed and described the various uses, including errands, transporting players, participating in competitions, numerous contacts with potential clients, renewal of the inventory required for the business and participation in many meetings, etc. In sum, the appellant argued that the Dodge Caravan, which was used 95 percent of the time by him, was exclusively for company activities, with the exception of the distance driven between the place of business and his residence—approximately 2.7 kilometres—and a trip or two to the Charlevoix area.
[15] The appellant called Gabriel Dubé to testify in his capacity as accountant and consultant for the business. The Court was unimpressed by the testimony of Gabriel Dubé, who described himself as a public accountant and consultant. He said he was a regularly-consulted resource person, and he testified as if it were his own case that was involved. He even ventured comments and observations that arose more from his intuition than from facts of which he had direct personal knowledge.
[16] As an expert, he should have known that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer and, that being so, that it is vital that he give his clients good advice. However, not only did he not advise the appellant to keep a log to record the business use of the vehicle, but he also tried to devalue the relevance of such a log, adding that none of his clients kept one.
[17] The appellant also called Poulin Tremblay who had known the appellant for some ten years. He described the appellant as heavily involved in the bowling world. He himself had been associated with bowling for more than 35 years and, as the owner of a number of bowling alleys, he described the many constraints and requirements with which bowling alley operators must deal.
[18] He confirmed that the appellant received absolutely nothing for the many trips he made for the various association meetings. He also explained the many concerns and requirements involved in the operation, consolidation and development of bowling alleys.
[19] While Mr. Tremblay's testimony certainly gave the Court a better understanding and awareness of the requirements and constraints associated with the operation of a bowling alley, it did not contribute anything significant regarding the appellant's personal use, if any, of the vehicle placed at his disposal by the company.
[20] The evidence established that the vehicle was driven between 25,000 and 30,000 kilometers a year. The appellant asserted that, when the bowling alley was located on Wallberg Boulevard, a few buildings from his residence, he often walked to his place of business, which makes one wonder whether the vehicle was really that essential for the daily needs of the business. During the second phase of the business's existence, the distance between the business and his residence was between 2.6 and 2.7 kilometers.
[21] The evidence also showed that the appellant may have used his vehicle on several occasions to drive to Charlevoix, until a property he had there was sold in January 1995.
[22] Apart from these well-established facts, the evidence also showed that the business was inactive every year from mid-May to the end of August, or roughly three months.
[23] With respect to these summer periods, although the appellant said he took advantage of them to make repairs and improvements, to do painting and to prepare for the new season, the evidence was rather sparse as to what daily use was made of the vehicle during those periods, except for the fact that the appellant had to attend a number of meetings.
Analysis
[24] The appellant argued that his personal use of the company vehicle was less than 10 percent. Having regard to the annual kilometrage, 10 percent would be equivalent to between 2,500 and 3,000 kilometers a year, or between 50 and 60 kilometers a week, which is very little, given that the company's place of business was in an area of Quebec where the distances between communities are relatively great.
[25] Based on the fact that the only personal use made of the company vehicle was driving the 2.7 kilometers between his residence and the company's place of business, the appellant concluded that his personal use was on the order of 6.69 percent to 7.78 percent.
[26] This is an assumption that presupposes that the vehicle was used for personal reasons only to make that trip. It does not take into account any other personal use, including possible trips to Charlevoix, concerning which the appellant was unable to provide specific figures.
[27] Given those circumstances, a log would have been very useful, especially since the appellant should have known that he had to rebut the presumption that he had personally benefited from use of the company vehicle.
[28] The evidence tendered by the appellant was basically circumstantial. He established that his was a very demanding business to which he had to devote himself completely, from which it followed that he never had time to use the vehicle for personal purposes.
[29] The respondent supported and fleshed out her claims with references to the Income Tax Act (the "Act") and relevant case law. For his part, the appellant argued essentially that each case stood on its own merits, that this was a unique case in which the evidence had revealed special facts requiring that the validity of his claims be upheld.
[30] I do not think the case law can be overlooked, especially since the facts are not as special and unique as the appellant claimed. The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in Adams v. Canada, [1998] F.C.J. No. 397 (Q.L.) is quite on point. It is appropriate to reproduce some excerpts from that case, in which Robertson J.A expressed himself as follows:
. . .
6. In calculating the income of each taxpayer the Partnership did not include the $1.2 million lease inducement payment as income of the Partnership, either for accounting or taxation purposes. Apparently, it was believed that the payment constituted a non-taxable capital benefit. As a result none of the eighteen doctors included in income the $66,666 received. This was a common assumption prior to the enactment of section 12(1)(x) of the Income Tax Act . . . . On the other hand, in computing income from property for the 1985 to 1988 taxation years, each doctor deducted his or her respective share of the rental inducement amount paid by the Bare trustee to the Partnership as a deferred leasing cost amortized over ten years. In summary, each taxpayer took a deduction with respect to the tenant inducement payment, but none included the amount received as income in any of the taxation years in question.
. . .
[31] The appellant's interpretation of the Act is very simple. First, he refused to acknowledge that the company had placed the Dodge Caravan at his disposal, maintaining that the vehicle was used only for the company's business. Next, he submitted that, even if the company placed the vehicle at his disposal, his use of it was less than 10 percent of total use, and that, he claimed, had the effect of cancelling any personal benefit from having the vehicle at his disposal.
[32] The provisions of the Act cannot be interpreted as simply as that, especially as the case law rejects any such interpretation and provides all necessary indications as to the approach to be taken in that regard.
[33] First of all, I believe it is important to establish whether the appellant received a benefit from 9004-9693 Québec Inc. On that point, there can be no doubt, since the appellant acknowledged that the Dodge Caravan was at his disposal, and he himself put that availability at 95 percent.
[34] Paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act reads as follows:
6. Amounts to be included as income from office or employment.
(1) There shall be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year as income from an office or employment such of the following amounts as are applicable:
(a) Value of benefits — the value of board, lodging and other benefits of any kind whatever received or enjoyed by the taxpayer in the year in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment, except any benefit
(i) derived from the contributions of the taxpayer's employer to or under a registered pension plan, group sickness or accident insurance plan, private health services plan, supplementary unemployment benefit plan, deferred profit sharing plan or group term life insurance policy,
(ii) under a retirement compensation arrangement, an employee benefit plan or an employee trust,
(iii) that was a benefit in respect of the use of an automobile,
(iv) derived from counselling services in respect of
(A) the mental or physical health of the taxpayer or an individual related to the taxpayer, other than a benefit attributable to an outlay or expense to which paragraph 18(1)(l) applies, or
(B) the re-employment or retirement of the taxpayer, or
(v) under a salary deferral arrangement, except to the extent that the benefit is included under this paragraph because of subsection (11).
[35] To grasp the scope of this section, it is essential to understand the meaning of the word "benefit". Rather than writing at great length on the breadth and meaning of this concept, I prefer to turn to the analysis of Judge Pierre Archambault of this Court who very explicitly dealt with the concept of benefit in Luc Dionne v. The Queen, [1996] T.C.J. No. 1691. I consider it appropriate to reproduce some excerpts from that decision in which Judge Archambault expressed himself as follows:
[12] For the Minister to be able to include the transportation allowance of $3,181.34 in Mr. Dionne's income under paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Act, it had to represent the "value" of a "benefit" that Mr. Dionne "received" or "enjoyed" in 1993 "by virtue of a contract of employment". . . .
[17] First let us analyse the common meaning of the word "avantages" [the equivalent of "benefits" in the French text of the provision . . .]. This seems to me to be the most important word in this paragraph. The Nouveau Petit Robert defines it as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
II - 1 - (1196) What is useful, profitable (as opposed to disadvantage). - 2. asset; profit, interest, advantage. This solution offers, holds out major, invaluable benefits. To withdraw an appreciable benefit from someone. These projects are equally appealing; each has its benefits. To confer, offer, obtain, guarantee appreciable benefits on or for someone. Cash benefit. - gain, remuneration, compensation. Benefits in kind.* To forego a real benefit for an illusory gain (cf. To drop the substance for the shadow*). - interest. The new man "apparently asked for exorbitant benefits, a share in profits" (Duhamel). [. . .] ANT. Disadvantage, detriment, damage, handicap, disbenefit, prejudice.
The word "profitable" comes from "profit" which, according to the same dictionary, means "the increase in assets that one owns or the improvement of a situation resulting from an activity. - benefit, profit. Material, intellectual, moral gain. - enrichment." As the purpose of paragraph 6(1)(a) is to expand the notion of employment income that appears in subsection 5(1) of the Act, paragraph 6(1)(a) clearly does not concern moral or intellectual benefits, but solely material benefits, that is to say those "consisting of tangible assets (esp. money), or attaching to the possession thereof" (Nouveau Petit Robert). (See also Savage and Blanchard, supra.) "Situation" means in particular "2- (XVIIth). (Abstract) Set of circumstances in which one finds oneself - circumstance, condition, state; place, position."
[18] The word "benefits" may therefore have two meanings: one that recognizes a benefit where there is an increase in assets (and thus of one's net worth) and the other where there is an improvement of a person's economic situation without there necessarily being an increase in assets. Such an "improvement" may occur not only where an employer provides an employee with the mere enjoyment of an asset, but also where he makes a payment to a third party in respect of an expense incurred for a good or a service for the employee's benefit.
[19] Let us consider whether these two meanings are consistent with the wording of paragraph 6(1)(a). In reading it, one notes that there are a number of reasons to conclude that these two meanings are recognized therein. First, there is the use of the expression "of any kind whatever" following the word "benefits", which clearly suggests that this paragraph concerns all benefits, whatever form they may take and whether or not they increase the employee's net worth.
[20] Even if there could be the slightest doubt as to the scope of the term, it vanishes when it is seen that the paragraph expressly includes in benefits the board and lodging provided to the employee. These two benefits do not increase the employee's net worth. They merely spare him an expense which, if it had been incurred by the employee, would have reduced his net worth. No one will dispute that an employee receives a net economic benefit when an employer houses him free of charge.
[21] In addition, the use of the verbs "receive" and "enjoy" distinguish the case of an employee who has "received" benefits that increase his net worth, such as ownership of an automobile for his personal use, from that of an employee who has merely "enjoyed" benefits which, without increasing his net worth, "improve his situation", such as that arising from the use of an automobile for personal purposes to the extent that the benefit relates to its operating expenses. The latter benefit was expressly embraced by subparagraph 6(1)(a)(iii) of the Act prior to 1993.
[36] Thus, the question is not whether the recipient of a benefit really profited from it and to what extent. It is sufficient that he had the possibility of making use of the benefit or the right to make use of it. The mere fact of being able to use, for his own purposes, a vehicle that is the property of his employer is in itself a benefit. In this case, the appellant could use or could have used the vehicle for broader purposes than those he described. Furthermore, did he not acknowledge that the Dodge Caravan would have been more reliable and safer for his personal trips to Charlevoix if the weather had been bad?
[37] He had available to him a roomier and safer vehicle with no constraints on how often he could use it. This fact alone is enough to find that there was indeed a benefit.
[38] The fact that the vehicle was never used or very minimally used in no way nullified the benefit. The mere fact of having the right to use it is in itself a benefit under the Act.
[39] A standby charge for an automobile is provided for in paragraph 6(1)(e), which reads as follows:
(e) Standby charge for automobile — where the taxpayer's employer or a person related to the employer made an automobile available to the taxpayer, or to a person related to the taxpayer, in the year, the amount, if any, by which
(i) an amount that is a reasonable standby charge for the automobile for the total number of days in the year during which it was made so available
exceeds
(ii) the total of all amounts, each of which is an amount (other than an expense related to the operation of the automobile) paid in the year to the employer or the person related to the employer by the taxpayer or the person related to the taxpayer for the use of the automobile.
[40] Finally, what constitutes reasonable standby charges for an automobile is covered in subsection 6(2) of the Act, which reads as follows:
(2) Reasonable standby charge. For the purposes of paragraph (1)(e), a reasonable standby charge for an automobile for the total number of days (in this subsection referred to as the "total available days") in a taxation year during which the automobile is made available to a taxpayer or to a person related to the taxpayer by the employer of the taxpayer or by a person related to the employer (both of whom are in this subsection referred to as the "employer") shall be deemed to be the amount determined by the formula
A× [(2 % × (C × D) + 2 × (E - F)]
B 3
where
A is the lesser of
(a) the total number of kilometres that the automobile is driven (otherwise than in connection with or in the course of the taxpayer's office or employment) during the total available days, and
(b) the value determined for B for the year under this subsection in respect of the standby charge for the automobile during the total available days,
except that the amount determined under paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be equal to the amount determined under paragraph (b) unless
(c) the taxpayer is required by the employer to use the automobile in connection with or in the course of the office or employment, and
(d) all or substantially all of the distance travelled by the automobile in the total available days is in connection with or in the course of the office or employment;
B is the product obtained when 1,000 is multiplied by the quotient obtained by dividing the total available days by 30 and, if the quotient so obtained is not a whole number and exceeds one, by rounding it to the nearest whole number or, where that quotient is equidistant from two consecutive whole numbers, by rounding it to the lower of those two numbers;
C is the cost of the automobile to the employer where the employer owns the vehicle at any time in the year;
D is the number obtained by dividing such of the total available days as are days when the employer owns the automobile by 30 and, if the quotient so obtained is not a whole number and exceeds one, by rounding it to the nearest whole number or, where that quotient is equidistant from two consecutive whole numbers, by rounding it to the lower of those two numbers;
E is the total of all amounts that may reasonably be regarded as having been payable by the employer to a lessor for the purpose of leasing the automobile during such of the total available days as are days when the automobile is leased to the employer; and
F is the part of the amount determined for E that may reasonably be regarded as having been payable to the lessor in respect of all or part of the cost to the lessor of insuring against
(a) loss of, or damage to, the automobile, or
(b) liability resulting from the use or operation of the automobile.
[41] The formula in subsection 6(2) of the Act is very explicit and sets out the exact amounts that must be included in the income of the recipient of the benefit. That is an exercise in which there is no room for discretion or subjective evaluation. The formula is basically a mathematical one and contains two assumptions that cannot be ignored.
[42] Paragraph 6(1)(e) and subsection 6(2) take no account of whether or not the recipient of the benefit used the vehicle.
[43] Robertson J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal, in Canada v. Adams, [1998] F.C.J. No. 477, provided a very good explanation of the parameters of these provisions. It is appropriate to reproduce a few excerpts from that judgment:
[6] I agree with the Minister that the term "made available" cannot bear the restricted or narrow interpretation adopted by the learned Tax Court Judge. In the reasons that follow I offer four reasons in support of that conclusion. . . .
[8] . . . Within this context, it is clear to me that the broad and unqualified language found in both linguistic versions of paragraph 6(1)(e) reinforces the Minister's argument that unrestricted use of an automobile is not a condition precedent to the application of that provision. Further support for this understanding is found in the legislative history of that provision.
. . .
[10] . . . The amendment removed all references to an automobile being made available for personal use. I take it for granted that the purpose of the amendment was to repeal the understanding established in Harman that minimal personal use of an automobile was sufficient to oust the application of paragraph 6(1)(e). . . .
[11] . . . As part of the contextual analysis, I turn now to subsection 6(2) which dictates the bases on which standby charges are to be calculated. It is my opinion that that provision also supports the Minister's position.
[12] . . . The first assumption is that the employee made personal use of the automobile during the year. The second assumption is that personal usage amounts to 1000 km for every month the automobile is made available to the employee (12000 km per year). . . .
[13] . . . A/B x [1 1/2% x (C x D)]. . . .
[14] Against this background, it is apparent that both paragraph 6(1)(e) and subsection 6(2) are unconcerned with whether in fact an employee made use of an employer's automobile. Paragraph 6(1)(e) makes no reference to the purposes for which the automobile is made available and, in particular, no longer makes reference to personal use by an employee. . . .
[15] . . . It is actual usage which is of significance not whether an employee had unrestricted or exclusive use of an employer's automobile. It is also important to note that actual usage only becomes relevant within the context of the minimal personal use exception articulated in subsection 6(2).
. . .
[17] In summary, the broad wording used in both linguistic versions of paragraph 6(1)(e), coupled with its legislative history, support the Minister's position. In my respectful view, unrestricted or exclusive use of an employer's automobile is not a condition precedent to the imposition of a standby charge. Nor is actual usage required, whether it be for personal or business purposes. What is required is that an employer have made an automobile available to, or at the disposition of, an employee and, correlatively, that he or she have had a right to use it. This is only logical since subsection 6(2) deems an employee to have made personal use of an employer's automobile, irrespective of whether this is so. . . . That being said the harsh consequences which flow from a deeming provision are tempered by the "minimal personal use" exception grafted on to subsection 6(2) in response to this Court's decision in Harman. This is the point in time where actual usage and the purposes for which the automobile was made available become relevant considerations.
[44] In short, as soon as an automobile is made available, there is a presumption that 12,000 kilometers a year or 1,000 kilometers a month are driven for personal purposes.
[45] As this is a presumption, it may be rebutted by clear and explicit evidence of actual use in terms of kilometers driven, which is why a log is practically indispensable.
[46] This, moreover, is what emerges from the judgment in Lavigueur v. M.N.R., 91 DTC 448, rendered by Judge Pierre Dussault of this Court. In that case, the appellant was a shareholder of a company that made available to him a leased automobile for his work. That work consisted in making daily visits to the Lavigueur jewellery stores located on the South Shore, in Montreal and on the North Shore, and to various suppliers. As he lived in Ste-Julie, he returned home with the vehicle since it would have been unwise and even dangerous to leave it in the parking lot next to the head office in Pointe-aux-Trembles. With respect to the kilometers driven for personal purposes, the appellant, who kept no log, maintained that he had used the vehicle very minimally, indeed only exceptionally, for such purposes since he had the use of another vehicle for his personal needs. The analysis of Judge Dussault was as follows:
. . .
Thus the appellant admitted having had the automobile available to him in the evening and on weekends, but stated that he used it for personal purposes only exceptionally. He further stated that he had another automobile for that purpose, which, while it was much older and more modest, fully sufficed for the limited needs of going out in the evening or on weekends. The appellant, however, was not very specific in terms of the total kilometres travelled for business purposes; he stated that the total might be 40,000 to 60,000 kilometres per year, but that he had kept no record of this.
. . .
In order to control the benefit arising from the use for personal purposes of an automobile owned or leased by an employer, Parliament believed it advisable to establish a presumption that personal use amounts to 1,000 kilometres per month or 12,000 kilometres per year, as soon as an employer makes an automobile available to an employee. This presumption may be rebutted by the employee, and the Act imposes an obligation on him do so in a specific manner, "in the prescribed form", when there is less use for personal purposes. In that case, the application of the arithmetic formula in subsection 6(2) operates to reduce the amount to be included in the employee's income proportionately. If an employee does not comply with the obligation thus imposed by the Act, how can he later argue that the Department of National Revenue was wrong to include in his income the amount set out in subsection 6(2) of the Act, which results from the application of the presumption established therein?
[47] In the case at bar, the appellant acknowledged that just the trips he made between his residence and the company's place of business represented about 7 percent of the total kilometers driven in the vehicle, give or take 3 percent. He submitted, on the basis of essentially circumstantial evidence, that his schedule and the demands of the business simply did not allow him to drive more kilometers for personal purposes than those he had to drive to go back and forth between work and home.
[48] The appellant submitted that in mathematical terms he drove about 2,000 kilometers a year for personal purposes and could not have driven any more than 3,000 given his professional activities.
[49] The burden of proof was on the appellant, not the respondent. It was not enough to state and reiterate that he had used the vehicle made available to him by the company essentially for travel between home and work and to conclude that the kilometrage represented by that travel was less than 10 percent of the total. Moreover, the evidence established that the appellant's calculations were not as absolute as he maintained. Did he use the vehicle to go to Charlevoix? The answer was: perhaps once, it depended on the weather.
[50] As the appellant lived in an area where roads are often snow-covered or icy, it is more than likely that the Dodge Caravan was used regularly for family needs in winter.
[51] It is easy to imagine many situations in which it would have been logical, appropriate and reasonable to use the Dodge Caravan rather than the other family vehicles. It was not up to the respondent to prove those situations.
[52] Although the appellant's accountant described it as unrealistic and even archaic, the fact is that a log is undoubtedly the best means of establishing clearly and explicitly the number of kilometers actually driven for personal purposes.
[53] Certainly, there is no strict obligation to keep such a log, except that a person who decides not to keep one will have a real problem proving the exact use to which the vehicle was put. Circumstantial evidence is certainly not the ideal way to rebut the presumption that comes into play against a person to whom a vehicle has been made available his employer.
[54] The quality of the evidence tendered by the appellant and, above all, the lack of a plausible basis for his assertions, mean that he did not fulfil the obligation that was imposed on him by the Act in respect of the 1993, 1994, and 1995 taxation years and that he had to meet if he did not wish to be taxed on the amount resulting from the computation set out in the Act, or if he wished to be taxed on a lesser amount.
[55] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 24th day of August 2000.
"Alain Tardif"
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true on this 19th day of October 2001.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
98-711(IT)I
BETWEEN:
RAYNALD TREMBLAY,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on September 14, 1998, at Chicoutimi, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge Guy Tremblay
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: Régis Gaudreault
Counsel for the Respondent: Pascale O'Bomsawin
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act for the 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years is dismissed in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 24th day of August 2000.
|
"Alain Tardif" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 19th day of October 2001.
Erich Klein, Revisor