Date: 20020706
Docket: 2000-4195-EI, 2000-4199-CPP,
2001-323-EI, 2001-324-CPP,
2001-1035-EI, 2001-1036-CPP
BETWEEN:
JACQUELINE CASTONGUAY,
THE DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES AND GEORGE MAZEROLLE,
AND BERNADETTE FERRON,
Appellants,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Angers, J.T.C.C.
[1] These are six appeals heard on common evidence in Fredericton, New Brunswick. The appellants appealed from decisions by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister"), who determined, in the first case, that Nadia Landry held insurable employment within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act (the "Act") and pensionable employment under the Canada Pension Plan (the "CPP") with the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay during the period from January 4, 1999 to June 14, 1999. The New Brunswick Department of Family and Community Services (the "Department"), for its part, appealed from the Minister's decision that the Department is deemed to be the employer under subsection 10(1) of the Insurable Earnings and Collection of Premiums Regulations (the "Regulations") and subsection 8.1(1) of the Canada Pension Plan Regulations (the "CPPR").
[2] In the second case, the Minister determined that Germaine Chiasson held insurable employment within the meaning of the Act and pensionable employment under the CPP with the appellant George Mazerolle during the period from July 11, 1999 to November 17, 1999. The Department, for its part, appealed from the decision that it is deemed to be the employer under the above-mentioned regulations.
[3] In the third case, the Minister determined that Francine Doiron held insurable employment within the meaning of the Act and pensionable employment under the CPP with the appellant Bernadette Ferron during the period from July 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999. The Department, for its part, asked that the style of cause of this third case be amended to include the Department as an appellant, which request was objected to by the respondent.
[4] The burden is on the appellants to establish on a balance of probabilities that the Minister's decision is wrong in fact and in law. The Minister relied on the following assumptions of fact in concluding that the employment in question was insurable and pensionable in each of the cases.
In the Bernadette Ferron appeals - 2001-1035(EI) and 2001-1036(CPP), the assumptions of fact are as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) the Appellant needs continual personal care and domestic help to enable her to live at home,
(b) the Department of Family and Community Services ("DFCS") provided financial assistance to the Appellant in the form of subsidies to enable her to employ a personal care attendant;
(c) the Worker's duties consisted of helping the Appellant in her daily activities and with her personal care, which included preparing meals, washing and dressing, as well as housework, such as cleaning, washing the dishes, changing the bed linen and doing the laundry and ironing;
(d) the Worker was not a registered nurse and did not have the training to provide medical care;
(e) the Worker worked from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. six days a week, from Monday to Saturday;
(f) the Worker received $35.00 a day;
(g) DFCS issued a cheque to the Appellant;
(h) the Worker was under the Appellant's direct supervision and control;
(i) the Appellant controlled the Worker's hours;
(j) the Appellant controlled the Worker's duties;
(k) the Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance of her duties;
(l) the Worker was hired personally to take care of the Appellant;
(m) the Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to various clients;
(n) there was a contract of service between the Worker and the Payer.
In The Department of Family and Community Services and George Mazerolle appeals - 2001-323(EI) and 2001-324(CPP), the assumptions of fact are as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) the Payer lived permanently at Mireille Gagnon's home;
(b) because of her advanced age, the Payer needs continual care to enable him to live at home;
(c) DFCS provided financial assistance to the Payer in the form of subsidies to enable her to employ a personal care attendant;
(d) the Worker's duties consisted of helping the Payer in his daily activities and with his personal care, which included preparing meals, washing and dressing;
(e) the Worker was not a registered nurse and did not have the training to provide medical care;
(f) the Worker worked seven days a week for a weekly total of 80 to 90 hours;
(g) the Worker received $5.50 an hour;
(h) the Payer was not totally subsidized by DFCS: for the period in issue DFCS paid the Worker a total of $3,091.10 and the Payer paid her a total of $192.40;
(i) DFCS gave its portion of her pay directly to the Worker, without going through the Payer;
(j) the Worker was under the Payer's direct supervision and control or under the supervision and control of Mireille Gagnon exercised on behalf of the Payer;
(k) the Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the Worker's hours;
(l) the Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the Worker's duties;
(m) the Payer and Mireille Gagnon controlled the Worker's hourly rate of pay;
(n) the Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance of her duties;
(o) the Worker was hired personally to take care of the Payer;
(p) the Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to various clients;
(q) there was a contract of service between the Worker and the Payer;
(r) DFCS was deemed to be the employer with respect to the remuneration it paid directly to the Worker.
In The Department of Family and Community Services and Jacqueline Castonguay appeals - 2000-4195(EI) and 2000-4199(CPP), the assumptions of fact are as follows:
(a) DFCS provided financial assistance to Jacqueline Castonguay to enable her to hire help for the care of her handicapped son;
(b) the Worker's duties consisted of doing general house cleaning and helping with the general care of Jacqueline Castonguay's son;
(c) the Worker did not have the training to administer medication or any of the special care required by Jacqueline Castonguay's son;
(d) the Worker worked every second week, alternating with another Worker;
(e) the Worker worked Monday to Sunday inclusive, for a total of 48.5 hours for the week;
(f) Jacqueline Castonguay offered the Worker $7.00 per hour, totalling $339.50 per pay period;
(g) DFCS controlled the total amount of assistance Jacqueline Castonguay would receive;
(h) Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the Worker's duties;
(i) Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the hourly rate of pay given to the Worker;
(j) Jacqueline Castonguay controlled the number of hours worked by the Worker;
(k) the Worker was required to provide the services personally;
(l) Jacqueline Castonguay had first call on the Worker's time;
(m) the Worker was not required to incur expenses in the performance of her duties;
(n) the Worker accepted the work as a response to a job offer made by Jacqueline Castonguay;
(o) the Worker was not in the business of offering personal care to clients;
(p) there was a contract of service between Jacqueline Castonguay and the Worker;
(q) Jaccqueline Castonguay did not pay the Worker herself;
(r) the Worker was paid directly by DFCS according to the hours submitted by the Worker and confirmed by Jacqueline Castonguay;
(s) DFCS is the deemed employer.
[5] The Appellants called André Lépine, Director, Adults with Disabilities and Senior Services, with the New Brunswick Department of Health and Community Services. Exhibit A-1 gives us not only the organization chart for that department but also a description of the home support program for persons no longer able to perform the activities of daily living on their own. Once the needs of such persons have been assessed, the Department attempts to address them through multidisciplinary services established for that purpose. The Department provides such care to some 9,000 people throughout the province. The care is managed by about a hundred social workers, each of whom handles approximately 150 cases.
[6] According to Mr. Lépine, the funding for this program comes from the budget allocated to his department by the New Brunswick government. The amounts earmarked for the program are indicated in Exhibits A-3, A-4 and A-5.
[7] Lisa Doucette, Director, Human Resources, at the Department, confirmed that the number of employees assigned to that department was as shown in Exhibits A-3 and A-5. She also confirmed that Nadia Landry, Francine Doiron and Germaine Chiasson are not Department employees and thus do not come under its direction in any way. The Department's employees are governed by the New Brunswick Civil Service Act and they must be hired through a competition process. She was not familiar with the workers' mode of remuneration.
[8] In the first case under appeal, Joanne Poirier, a Department social worker, testified that the Appellant's son, Steve Castonguay, was one of her clients during the period from February 1997 to November 1999. Mr. Castonguay had been in an automobile accident and became eligible for the home care program because of the permanent neurological after-effects from which he suffered. His mother, the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay, had been designated to look after her son and to find people able to provide care to him. She informed Ms. Poirier that she had found Nadia Landry to take care of Steve.
[9] According to Ms. Poirier, Nadia Landry started providing care to Steve Castonguay on January 4, 1999. Ms. Poirier had met with Nadia Landry to explain to her the care to be given to Steve Castonguay, which included, inter alia, feeding, dressing and bathing him. It was Ms. Poirier who assessed Steve Castonguay's needs after reviewing his file. She explained to the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay how to do the billing and informed her that she had to submit her invoices to the Department. Ms. Landry was required to work 48.5 hours a week and was paid $7 an hour. At their meeting Ms. Poirier told Ms. Landry that the Department was not her employer.
[10] In cross-examination Ms. Poirier admitted that she was not aware of the discussions that had taken place between Ms. Landry and Ms. Castonguay. Their above-mentioned meeting had lasted close to an hour and it had been the only one. Subsequently, she just received the invoices for the hours worked by Ms. Landry, that is, seven hours a day six days a week and six and a half hours on Sunday. If Ms. Landry had asked for more than $7 an hour, the appellant Ms. Castonguay would have had to pay the difference. Ms. Poirier testified that Steve Castonguay's parents had purchased equipment and had adapted their car to enable Steve to get in. The appellant sometimes took care of her son on her own for a day.
[11] Ms. Poirier also summarized the eligibility criteria for the home care program, which essentially covered the activities of daily living, such as bathing, hygiene and meals. The subsidy received was determined by the recipient's income, and in Steve's case, the Department paid for all of this care. She concluded her testimony by saying that there had never been any question of paying Ms. Landry for her overtime and that, if Ms. Landry had any concerns, she had to make them known to Ms. Castonguay.
[12] Jean-Claude Robichaud testified for the appellants in the case of the estate of George Mazerolle. Mr. Robichaud is a social worker and became involved in the case when he assessed Mr. Mazerolle's needs for the purposes of the home care program. Mr. Mazerolle was 92 years and 6 months old at the time and was unable to live on his own. Mr. Robichaud therefore recommended that he be given four hours of care a day to supplement those already being provided by a Ms. Robichaud, who was living with Mr. Mazerolle. The person hired was Germaine Chiasson. Mr. Robichaud acknowledged he had met Ms. Chiasson only once, at his office.
[13] In 1999, Mr. Mazerolle's niece, Mireille Gagnon, offered to keep Mr. Mazerolle at her home. Ms. Chiasson nonetheless continued providing care for Mr. Mazerolle, who still insisted that his niece take care of all aspects of his care, including his diet. That information was communicated to Ms. Chiasson.
[14] The invoice for Ms. Chiasson's work was submitted to the Department after being verified by Ms. Gagnon. Mr. Mazerolle contributed $92 a month toward the payment for his care and the Department paid the difference. Ms. Chiasson was not the only person caring for Mr. Mazerolle. She worked 44 hours a week and occasionally worked overtime without asking for any additional pay. Although Ms. Chiasson had been hired by Ms. Gagnon, Mr. Mazerolle had verbally authorized the latter to act on his behalf.
[15] One of the invoices sent to the Department was adduced in evidence as Exhibit I-1. It identifies the contribution paid by the Department as $1,987 and that of Mr. Mazerolle as $96.21 for the approved hours, that is, 12 hours a day at $5.50 an hour for one month. A portion of that money was used to pay Ms. Chiasson for her work.
[16] Social worker Carolle Larocque Ferron testified in the case of the appellant Bernadette Ferron. The two are not related. This witness testified that the appellant suffered from Friedreich's ataxia and as a consequence was eligible to receive home care offered through the program. The appellant Bernadette Ferron used a wheelchair. She had nerve impairment and experienced difficulty expressing herself. Francine Doiron cared for her during the period from June 1999 to December 1999, providing personal care, including housework, meal preparation, bathing, hygiene and assistance in getting around. Ms. Doiron worked six days a week from Monday to Saturday, nine or ten hours a day. The Department contributed $35 a day, or $910 a month, and paid that contribution directly to Bernadette Ferron, who then paid Ms. Doiron each week.
[17] In cross-examination Ms. Larocque Ferron explained that the appellant managed her care herself and was able to communicate with the assistance of an intermediary. Ms. Larocque Ferron testified that the appellant had taken care of the hiring of Ms. Doiron and she confirmed that the Department sent its contribution directly to the appellant. That, she testified, is an acceptable practice where there is a climate of trust between the Department and the client (that is, the appellant). She closed her testimony by indicating that, in terms of specialized equipment, the appellant had a wheelchair and a lift available to her, the lift having been purchased by the Department.
[18] Paulette Boudreau Clark testified in the case of the appellant George Mazerolle. This witness has been employed by the Department for 20 years and works in financial services. She testified that, in the appellant George Mazerolle's case, Germaine Chiasson sometimes worked over 44 hours a week but received no additional pay in that event. Ms. Chiasson was paid $5.50 an hour. She and George Mazerolle signed the invoices before they were submitted to the Department for payment.
[19] For its part, the respondent called Joanne Robichaud, an appeals officer. As regards the case of the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay, Ms. Robichaud had met with Nadia Landry as well as Lily Fraser, a Department employee. Ms. Robichaud had been informed of Ms. Landry's working conditions, her pay and the mode of payment. She had not met with the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay. On the basis of the information she had received, stated Ms. Robichaud, she concluded that the appellant was entitled to hire and dismiss Nadia Landry and that the appellant determined Ms. Landry's hours of work. Ms. Landry had no chance of profit or risk of loss and did not supply any tools. Ms. Robichaud concluded that Ms. Landry was not self-employed and that her work was an integral part of that of the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay. There was therefore a contract of service. According to the witness, since her salary was paid to her directly by the Department, the latter became the deemed employer under the Regulations.
[20] As regards the case of the appellant George Mazerolle, Ms. Robichaud had met with the worker Germaine Chiasson, Lily Fraser and Edith Thériault of the Department, and the appellant's niece, Mireille Gagnon. Germaine Chiasson, who provided care to Mr. Mazerolle, worked 80 to 90 hours a week at an hourly rate set by the Department and her paycheque was issued to her by the Department and was in her name only. The Department and the appellant paid her her salary in the proportions with which we are familiar. According to Ms. Robichaud, Mireille Gagnon had the power to hire and dismiss Ms. Chiasson. Ms. Chiasson had no possibility of making a profit and no risk of suffering a loss. The tools were provided by Ms. Gagnon. Ms. Chiasson was an integral part of meeting the appellant's needs. The employment was thus held under a contract of service.
[21] As regards the case of the appellant Bernadette Ferron, Ms. Robichaud had met the worker Francine Doiron as well as the Department social worker responsible for the case. Ms. Doiron started providing care to the appellant on July 1, 1999. She worked from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. every day and her rate of pay was $35 a day. To obtain payment for those services the worker and the appellant signed a form that was then sent to the Department. The Department subsequently sent a cheque to the appellant, who endorsed it and handed it over to Ms. Doiron.
[22] Ms. Robichaud concluded that the instructions for the performance of Francine Doiron's duties came from the Department, that Francine Doiron was paid by the appellant Bernadette Ferron, that Ms. Doiron had no risk of loss or chance of profit and that she was not in business for herself in the home care field. The employment was therefore held under a contract of service.
[23] In cross-examination, Ms. Robichaud confirmed that the tests used are those set out in the case law, namely: control, ownership of tools, chance of profit and risk of loss, and integration. Control is determined based mainly on the working conditions, payroll journal, work schedule and supervision. In the case concerning the appellant Jacqueline Castonguay, the worker Nadia Landry worked from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. each day. According to Ms. Robichaud, that was one of the conditions the appellant had insisted upon, but she acknowledged that this indicated nothing in particular in this instance. The worker Nadia Landry worked at the appellant's home one week and at another person's home the following week. Ms. Robichaud admitted she had not checked with Nadia Landry to see whether she had chosen that arrangement. Nor had she ascertained whether Nadia Landry was working 48 hours a week when the New Brunswick Employment Standards Act provides for a maximum 44-hour work week. In Ms. Robichaud's opinion, this was not relevant to her analysis here. She added that she had conducted other analyses regarding domestic work, such as child care, and that each case is determined on the basis of the facts.
[24] The criteria used by Ms. Robichaud were reviewed in cross-examination. She acknowledged that the fact that the appellant had approached the worker Nadia Landry was not in itself sufficient to allow her to conclude that there was a contract of service. According to her testimony, the chance-of-profit-or-risk-of-loss test did not apply here since the worker did not incur any expenses. There were no tools that could lead one to the conclusion that there was a contract of service. However, the integration that existed by virtue of the fact that the appellant needed the worker's services meant that those services were integrated with the appellant's needs, particularly if the services were to be provided over a long period. Ms. Robichaud ended her testimony by stating that the appellant dictated the work to be done and set the hours of work. However, she could not explain why the worker alternated from week to week with another worker. The Department, she stated, was the deemed employer because it provided the necessary funds.
[25] As regards the case of the appellant George Mazerolle, Ms. Robichaud confirmed that she had done the same analysis. According to that analysis, the Department was the deemed employer because it provided the major portion of Ms. Chiasson's salary, and the appellant was the real employer because he paid the other portion thereof. She admitted she had not spoken with the appellant during her investigation. She testified that the appellant's niece, Mireille Gagnon, had contacted the volunteer centre for her area herself to obtain the names of people who offered the type of assistance in question. It was apparently suggested that she contact the worker, in this instance Germaine Chiasson. Ms. Chiasson had previously worked for the volunteer centre but in 1999 she offered her services on a personal basis. According to Ms. Robichaud, Mireille Gagnon had negotiated with Ms. Chiasson to obtain those services. Ms. Chiasson worked from 80 to 90 hours a week for $5.50 an hour. Ms. Robichaud admitted that in her analysis she had not taken into account the provisions of the Employment Standards Act that govern the maximum number of hours an employee can work per week. With regard to ownership of tools, chance of profit, risk of loss and integration, she drew the same conclusions as in the case previously referred to.
[26] As regards the case of the appellant Bernadette Ferron, Ms. Robichaud obtained her information from the Department. She also contacted Francine Doiron and a person named Rosalie, both of whom had worked for this appellant. Bernadette Ferron signed a form which the worker likewise signed and the former received a cheque from the Department payable to her at the end of the month. According to Ms. Robichaud, there was a contract of service here, the employer being the appellant Bernadette Ferron. Ms. Robichaud did not consider the Department to be the deemed employer in this instance because the appellant received the cheque directly from the Department. Ms. Robichaud stated that, if the appellants in the other two cases had received the cheque directly, as in Bernadette Ferron's case, she would not have considered the Department to be the deemed employer.
[27] In Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1986] 3 F.C. 553, the Federal Court of Appeal applied a four-in-one test. In 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., 274 N.R. 367, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the application of that test in determining whether a person is considered to be self-employed or an employee. These cases also remind us that no single element is decisive and that all of the elements, namely: control, integration, chance of profit and risk of loss, and ownership of tools, must be applied to the relationship that exists between the parties. Since the four elements are not necessarily interrelated, it sometimes becomes necessary to consider them individually while looking at the whole of the relationship between the parties.
[28] In the instant cases, most of the statements of fact were proven, but I do not think that they necessarily support the Minister's decision. Taking as a whole the tests that must be considered, I have concluded that the relationship between the parties in these three cases was governed by a contract for services and not a contract of service. The three care recipients had called on the Department's services for an assessment of their needs. The assessment served to determine whether they could obtain assistance in meeting their day-to-day needs. Such assistance varied according to their level of autonomy and primarily involved housework, personal care related to hygiene and health, and assistance with daily activities. Through the assessment, the Department also determined the recipient's ability to pay for such services. In the instant cases, the Department was paying for the services either in whole or in part, and either the recipient or the worker was paid directly, depending on the relationship of trust that existed. It is obvious that the aim of the program is to enable recipients to obtain essential care in their own homes rather than in a nursing home and thereby enjoy a better quality of life.
[29] Once the recipient's needs have been identified, it is necessary to obtain the services of people qualified to meet those needs. Some recipients need more care than others and the number of hours needed to deliver the care can vary. Obviously, the Department and the recipient of the care determine the number of hours needed to meet the recipient's needs. However, in the present cases, it was the workers who decided how many hours they would be working. In the first case, the worker gave 48.5 hours of her time per week without asking to be paid for overtime, and she worked seven days a week. In the second case, the worker put in over 80 hours of work over a seven-day workweek: the recipient needed care 12 hours a day and the number of hours given by that worker was not imposed on her. In the third case, the Department paid the recipient $35 a day for six days a week for the care she needed.
[30] Once they had explained to the workers the nature of the care required by the recipient, the recipient and the Department exercised very little control over those workers in the performance of their work. They were aware of the duties to be carried out and themselves chose to put in more time than prescribed by the employment standards. Some of them signed, along with the recipient, a payment form, a type of invoice. Some alternated from week to week and were free to offer their services to other people. The recipients thus did not have exclusive enjoyment of a worker's services, unless the worker chose to work additional hours.
[31] Chance of profit and risk of loss as well as ownership of tools are not important factors in these cases, which involve basic personal care that does not require any special tools for the performance of the duties. The equipment mentioned was for the recipients' well-being and was not a work tool for the workers.
[32] Degree of integration is a test that is more readily applicable in the context of a commercial enterprise than in that of personal care at home. It cannot be concluded that the workers were integrated into the recipients' business because the services provided enabled the recipients to attain a certain level of autonomy. The services were thus accessory in nature and were not integrated into the recipients' needs. This leads to the conclusion that there was a contract for services rather than a contract of service.
[33] Counsel for the respondent asked this Court to draw a negative inference from the fact that the appellants did not call the workers and the recipients or their representatives. She invoked the rule, adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lévesque v. Comeau, [1970] S.C.R. 1010, that the failure of a party or a witness to produce evidence that the party or the witness was able to produce and that could have served to clarify the facts constitutes grounds for a court to infer that the evidence of the party or the witness in question would have been unfavourable to the party to whom the failure was attributed.
[34] In the three appeals here, the appeals officer contacted the workers and obtained sufficient facts from them to be able to draw conclusions and make recommendations to the Minister. I do not believe that the workers and the recipients or their representatives did not testify because they wanted to hide evidence that was unfavourable to them. I believe rather that their testimony would not have shed any more light on the contractual relationship between the parties. Evidence concerning the operation of the support program, the services provided and the information collected by the appeals officer was presented by witnesses who were all highly credible. Like Judge Bowman (now Associate Chief Judge) did in Alemu v. The Queen, 99 DTC 714, I refuse to draw any inference unfavourable to the appellants.
[35] The appellants' counsel raised the question of the validity of the regulations made under the Act and the CPP, specifically the provisions regarding a person's being deemed to be the employer. As I have decided that the relationship between the parties was governed by a contract for services, it is not necessary that I address that question.
[36] Counsel for the appellants asked this court to amend the style of cause for the third case, that of Bernadette Ferron, to include the name of the Department. It is obvious from the Notice of Appeal that the Department filed the two appeals in the name of Bernadette Ferron and not in the name of the Department. If the Department wanted to appeal, this should have been done within the time prescribed. The discussion as to whether the Department has the right to appeal as a party affected by the decision would be appropriate if the Court were dealing with an appeal file by the Department. The Court would in that case be able to rule on the question under the authority conferred on it by subsection 104(1) of the Act, which reads as follows:
The Tax Court of Canada and the Minister have authority to decide any question of fact or law necessary to be decided in the course of an appeal under section 91 or 103 or to reconsider an assessment under section 92 and to decide whether a person may be or is affected by the decision or assessment.
[Emphasis added.]
[37] For these reasons, I conclude that the contractual relationship between the parties during the periods in issue was a relationship governed by a contract for services. The appeals are allowed and the Minister's decisions that the workers held insurable and pensionable employment are vacated.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 6th day of July 2002.
|
"François Angers" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 19th day of August 2002.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2001-1035(EI)
2001-1036(CPP)
BETWEEN:
BERNADETTE FERRON,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeals of Jacqueline Castonguay (2000-4195(EI)), (2000-4199(CPP)) and The Department of Family and Community Services and George Mazerolle (2001-323(EI)), (2001-324(CPP))
on January 17, 2002, at Fredericton, New Brunswick, by
the Honourable Judge François Angers
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: Cedric L. Haines, Q.C.
Michèle Hébert
Counsel for the Respondent: Dominique Gallant
Christa MacKennon
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the Minister's decision is vacated in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 6th day of July 2002.
|
"François Angers" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 19th day of August 2002.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2000-4195(EI)
2000-4199(CPP)
BETWEEN:
JACQUELINE CASTONGUAY,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeals of The Department of Family and Community Services and George Mazerolle (2001-323(EI)), (2001-324(CPP)) and Bernadette Ferron (2001-1035(EI)), (2001-1036(CPP))
on January 17, 2002, at Fredericton, New Brunswick, by
the Honourable Judge François Angers
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: Cedric L. Haines, Q.C.
Michèle Hébert
Counsel for the Respondent: Dominique Gallant
Christa MacKennon
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the Minister's decision is vacated in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 6th day of July 2002.
|
"François Angers" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 19th day of August 2002.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2001-323(EI)
2001-324(CPP)
BETWEEN:
THE DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
AND GEORGE MAZEROLLE,
Appellants,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeals of Jacqueline Castonguay (2000-4195(EI)), (2000-4199(CPP))
and Bernadette Ferron (2001-1035(EI)), (2001-1036(CPP))
on January 17, 2002, at Fredericton, New Brunswick, by
the Honourable Judge François Angers
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellants: Cedric L. Haines, Q.C.
Michèle Hébert
Counsel for the Respondent: Dominique Gallant
Christa MacKennon
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the Minister's decision is vacated in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 6th day of July 2002.
|
"François Angers" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 19th day of August 2002.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]