Date: 20010829
Dockets: 2001-134-IT-I, 2001-136-IT-I, 2001-137-IT-I,
2001-139-IT-I, 2001-141-IT-I, 2001-155-IT-I,
2001-157-IT-I, 2001-164-IT-I, 2001-165-IT-I,
2001-166-IT-I, 2001-167-IT-I, 2001-176-IT-I,
2001-395-IT-I, 2001-396-IT-I, 2001-399-IT-I,
2001-401-IT-I, 2001-404-IT-I & 2001-409-IT-I
BETWEEN:
MICHELINE ETHIER, BRENT BENNETT, JANICE BROWN,
KEITH CROFT, PHILLIPPE DUGUAY, KENNETH G. SHANNON,
J. THOMAS ANDRESS, GAIL TRAYNOR, LLOYD WILTON,
BRIAN G. WEST, GRANT SPOONER, DONALD H. DEBOER,
GEORGE MORNINGSTAR, GARFIELD ROACHE, MICHAEL R. BELAIR,
PATRICK FALLU, MARK BLONDIN and PAUL F. COLLINS
Appellants,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor Judgment
Mogan J.
[1] The appeals of the 18 Appellants named herein were heard together on common evidence at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario on August 15, 2001. The Appellants are all employees of Cameco Corporation ("Cameco") and they reside within (or close to) the Town of Blind River, Ontario, about 140 kilometres east of Sault Ste. Marie. The issues in these appeals are concerned with the extent to which the Appellants may be taxed with respect to their acquisition and sale of shares of Cameco. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts signed by all 18 Appellants and counsel for the Respondent. The Agreed Statement of Facts ("ASF") was entered as Exhibit R-1. Because it is short, I will set it out in full:
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties agree to the following facts for the purposes of this appeal:
1. The Appellants were employees of Cameco on October 1, 1990.
2. In 1990, Cameco offered a Share Savings Plan (the "Plan") to all employees on staff as of October 1, 1990 (as per section 4.01 of the Plan). A true copy of the Plan is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
3. A description of the Plan was also published. A true copy of the description is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
4. The Plan has not been modified or amended in writing, orally or otherwise.
5. The Appellants and Cameco have adhered to the terms of the Plan.
6. The Plan entitled the employees to purchase Cameco Share Savings bonds (the "Bonds").
7. The bonds were all issued as of December 31, 1990 in accordance with the Plan.
8. Prior to becoming public sometime after December 31, 1990 and prior to June 1, 1991, Cameco was a Canadian-Controlled Private Corporation ("CCPC").
9. The FMV of the shares at the time of public offering was $12.50 per share.
10. In accordance with sections 9.01 and 9.06 of the Plan, the Bonds were assorted with a right to be exchanged for a number of shares equal to the value of the bonds exchanged at a price of 90% of the initial public offering price, that is, $11.25 per share (subject to the conditions of the Plan).
11. In accordance with section 9.09 of the Plan, no fraction of shares were emitted and the Appellants were reimbursed in money and fractional interests.
12. The Appellants acquired bonds, exchanged them for shares and sold the shares at the time and prices described on Schedule "1".
13. On February 22, 1994 the common shares of Cameco had a FMV of $26.
14. At different dates, all the Appellants except Mr. Spooner made the election of subsection 110.6(19) of the Income Tax Act (the "Act").
15. The elections of the Appellants Belair, Croft, Deboer, Ethier, Fallu, and West were filed on or before May 1, 1995. All the other elections were charged a penalty under subsection 110.6(26) based on the elected capital gain filed.
16. The Minister cancelled all of the penalties assessed on the basis that the elections were invalid (with no admission on either side concerning the issue of the validity of the elections).
[2] The Cameco Share Savings Plan referred to as "Exhibit A" in paragraph 2 of the ASF is Exhibit R-2 in these appeals. Similarly, the description of the Plan referred to as "Exhibit B" in paragraph 3 of the ASF is Exhibit R-3 in these appeals. Schedule "1" referred to in paragraph 12 of the ASF is not reproduced in these reasons for judgment but it is a schedule with 10 columns having the following headings:
1. Appellant
2. # Units of Bonds (1 unit = $3,000)
3. Date Bonds were exchanged for shares
4. # of shares obtained
5. Cost of the shares (bonds)
6. FMV on the date of exchange per share
7. Total FMV of the shares on the date of exchange
8. Taxable benefit assessed
9. Date of sale of the shares
10. Proceeds of disposition
In the first column are the names of the 18 individuals whose appeals I am deciding herein plus the name of a 19th individual whose appeal was adjourned. The particular information pertaining to each Appellant is set out in the remaining columns of Schedule 1. After entering the ASF as Exhibit R-1 and the other two documents as Exhibits R-2 and R-3, the parties decided not to call any witnesses and, accordingly, there was no oral evidence.
[3] Relying on statements in Exhibits R-2 and R-3, I propose to expand on the facts set out in the ASF (Exhibit R-1). Employees of Cameco on October 1, 1990 were given the opportunity to purchase Cameco Share Savings Bonds. The Bonds were issued in units of $3,000. An employee could purchase one or more units to a maximum of three times annual earnings. The Bonds paid annual interest at the rate of 11%. The purchase price of each Bond ($3,000) was loaned by Cameco to the employee. One-half of the loan was repaid by the employee over 10 years by payroll deductions. The employee's repayment amount was only $96 in the first year but it increased by $12 each year for the remaining nine years for a total of $1,500. As already stated, Cameco matched each employee's repayment amount and so the entire $3,000 loan (cost of a Cameco Share Savings Bond) would be repaid over 10 years.
[4] If Cameco became a public corporation before June 1, 1991, an employee who had purchased a $3,000 Bond was granted the right to exchange the Bond for shares in Cameco at a price per share equal to 90% of the amount at which shares in Cameco were first offered to the public. According to paragraph 9 of the ASF, shares were first offered to the public at $12.50 per share. Therefore, an employee who had purchased a $3,000 Bond had the right to exchange that Bond for 266 shares (at a price of $11.25 per share) plus $7.50 cash because Cameco would not issue a fraction of a share. There was no exchange privilege prior to January 1, 1994. During 1994, an employee could exchange one-third of his/her Bond for shares; during 1995, two-thirds of his/her Bond for shares; and after 1995, all of his/her Bond for shares.
[5] According to Schedule 1 to the ASF, none of the Appellants made any exchange for shares in 1994 and only six exchanged for shares in 1995. The rest of the Appellants made all their exchanges for shares in 1996 and 1997. The fair market value ("FMV") of the Cameco shares had gone up significantly from the original public issue price of $12.50 in the spring of 1991. According to Schedule 1, the FMV of Cameco shares in 1996 and 1997 was in the range of $51.00 to $71.00. The Appellants all sold Cameco shares at various times in 1996 and 1997 and realized significant capital gains on such sales.
[6] The Appellants reported their respective capital gains for income tax purposes. Some Appellants filed an election for 1994 pursuant to subsection 110.6(19) of the Income Tax Act with respect to their right to exchange (during 1994) one-third of each Bond for shares. Some Appellants claimed a capital gain deduction for 1994 with respect to their right to exchange (during 1994) one-third of each Bond for shares. The first important question in these appeals is whether each Appellant, as an employee of Cameco, received an employment benefit upon the exchange of a Bond for shares of Cameco. Set out below are the relevant words in subsections 7(1) and 7(1.1) of the Act.
7(1) Subject to subsection (1.1), where a corporation has agreed to sell or issue shares of the capital stock of the corporation ... to an employee of the corporation ...
(a) if the employee has acquired shares under the agreement, a benefit equal to the amount ... by which
(i) the value of the shares at the time the employee acquired them
exceeds
(ii) the total of the amount paid or to be paid to the corporation by the employee for the shares ...
shall be deemed to have been received by the employee by reason of the employee's employment in the taxation year in which the employee acquired the shares;
7(1.1) Where ... a Canadian-controlled private corporation ... has agreed to sell or issue a share of the capital stock of the corporation ... to an employee of the corporation ... and at the time immediately after the agreement was made the employee was dealing at arm's length with
(a) the corporation,
(b) ...
(c) ...
in applying paragraph (1)(a) in respect of the employee's acquisition of the share, the reference in that paragraph to "the taxation year in which the employee acquired the shares" shall be read as a reference to "the taxation year in which the employee disposed of ... the shares".
[7] As I understand subsection 7(1), an employee is deemed to have received a benefit in the year in which he or she acquired the shares. Subsection 7(1) is "subject to subsection (1.1)" which is parallel in structure to subsection (1) but applies only to employees of a Canadian-controlled private corporation ("CCPC"). As I understand subsection 7(1.1), an employee of a CCPC is deemed to have received the same kind of benefit as an employee of some other corporation under subsection (1) but there is a difference in timing. The benefit to an employee of a CCPC is not brought into income until "the taxation year in which the employee disposed of the shares".
[8] According to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the ASF, the Appellants all acquired their Cameco Share Savings Bonds prior to January 1, 1991 when Cameco was a CCPC. According to paragraph 12 of the ASF, the Appellants exchanged their Bonds for shares and sold the shares in 1996 or 1997. In the assessments under appeal, the Minister of National Revenue included in computing the income of the Appellants certain benefits under subsection 7(1.1) because the Minister regarded each Appellant as an employee of a CCPC, and the amount of the benefit in dispute in each appeal was included in computing income only in a year when an Appellant sold Cameco shares.
[9] Subsection 7(1) applies to all Appellants because their corporate employer (Cameco) had agreed to sell shares of its capital stock to them. The amount of the benefit which each Appellant is "deemed to have received" is determined by the formula in paragraph 7(1)(a) as the amount by which (i) the value of the shares at the time of acquisition, exceeds (ii) the cost of the shares to the employee. It is clear from the terms of the Plan that the cost of each share was $11.25 to each Appellant who exchanged a Bond (or part of a Bond) for Cameco shares. Because Cameco became a public company sometime in the spring or summer of 1991, the value of the Cameco shares "at the time of acquisition" was determined by the price of the shares on the open market. The price of Cameco shares in 1996 and 1997 was in the range of $51.00 to $71.00. All of the Appellants exchanged Bonds for Cameco shares in that period. Therefore, under subsection 7(1), each Appellant was deemed to have received an employment benefit equal to the amount by which (i) the value of the shares at the time of acquisition (exchange), exceeded (ii) the cost of the shares to the Appellant. An example from Schedule 1 to the ASF will illustrate the measure of the benefit. One of the Appellants (Brent Bennett) exchanged one $3,000 Bond on June 30, 1996 and received 266 Cameco shares at an aggregate cost of $2,992.50 (266 times $11.25). On that day (June 30, 1996), the market price of Cameco shares was $63.80. Mr. Bennett's benefit under subsection 7(1) is determined as follows:
Value at acquisition (266 x $63.80) $16,970.80
Less: Cost (266 x $11.25) 2,992.50
Benefit per subsection 7(1) $13,978.30
[10] Having concluded that subsection 7(1) applies to all Appellants, I find that each Appellant is deemed to have received a benefit on the exchange of a Bond for Cameco shares. The amount of the benefit is determined by the formula in paragraph 7(1)(a); and the operation of that formula is illustrated by the example of Brent Bennett in paragraph 9 above. According to Schedule 1 to the ASF, each Appellant sold his or her Cameco shares within a few days after acquiring such shares in exchange for a Bond (or part of a Bond). Upon the sale of such shares, each Appellant knew that he or she had realized a significant gain, and each Appellant reported the gain as a capital gain for income tax purposes.
[11] Because each Appellant sold his or her Cameco shares within a few days after acquiring such shares, the FMV of the shares on the day of sale was not in any case much different from the FMV of the shares on the day of acquisition (just a few days previously). Accordingly, the amount of the deemed benefit under subsection 7(1) was not much different from the amount of the capital gain reported by each Appellant. All or a significant part of the capital gain reported by each Appellant would disappear through the operation of paragraph 53(1)(j) of the Act which states:
53(1) In computing the adjusted cost base to a taxpayer of property at any time, there shall be added to the cost to the taxpayer of the property such of the following amounts in respect of the property as are applicable:
...
(j) if the property is a share and, in respect of its acquisition by the taxpayer, a benefit was deemed by section 7 to have been received in any taxation year ... by the taxpayer, ... the amount of the benefit so deemed to have been received;
[12] Paragraph 53(1)(j) requires the cost of the shares to be increased by "the amount of the benefit so deemed to have been received". Using Brent Bennett's transaction (paragraph 9 above) as an illustration of how paragraph 53(1)(j) operates, if Mr. Bennett had sold all 266 shares at the same market price ($63.80) as prevailed on the date of his acquisition (exchange), his capital gain (applying paragraph 53(1)(j)) would be nil as shown below:
Proceeds of Sale (266 times $63.80) $16,970.80
Less: Cost ($2,992.50) plus benefit ($13,978.30) $16,970.80
Capital Gain -0-
[13] In my view, the above computation produces an equitable result because, if part of the gain is taxed as income under section 7, then the amount taxed as income should be added to the cost in order to reduce any resulting gain by the same amount. It would be possible for Mr. Bennett to realize a capital gain or loss on the subsequent disposition of the 266 shares depending on whether his net proceeds of disposition were greater or less than $16,970.80. In any event, because he is assessed under subsection 7(1.1), the benefit is not taxed until the year in which he sells the shares.
[14] Section 110.6 was introduced into the Act around 1988 to permit an individual to claim a "capital gains exemption" within certain limits with respect to the disposition of capital property. The federal budget in February 1994 proposed to eliminate the capital gains exemption for property disposed of after February 22, 1994 but a special provision (subsection (19)) was added which allowed an individual to make an election with respect to capital gains accrued to February 22, 1994 on property which would be sold at a later date. I am required to consider subsection 110.6(19) because some of the Appellants purported to make an election under that subsection with respect to a capital gain which they regarded as having been accrued to February 22, 1994. It is complicated legislation but, in my opinion, only the following portion of subsection 110.6(19) is relevant:
110.6(19) Subject to subsection (20), where an individual ... (the "elector"), elects in prescribed form to have the provisions of this subsection apply in respect of
(a) a capital property ... owned at the end of February 22, 1994 by the elector, the property shall be deemed, except for the purposes of sections 7 and 35 and subparagraph 110(1)(d.1)(ii),
(i) to have been disposed of by the elector at that time for proceeds of disposition equal to the greater of
(A) the amount determined by the formula
A - B
where
A is the amount designated in respect of the property in the election, and
B is the amount, if any, that would, if the disposition were a disposition for the purpose of section 7 or 35, be included under that section as a result of the disposition in computing the income of the elector, and
(B) the adjusted cost base to the elector of the property immediately before the disposition, and
(ii) to have been reacquired by the elector immediately after that time at a cost equal to
(A) ...
(B) where an amount would, if the disposition referred to in subparagraph (i) were a disposition for the purpose of section 7 or 35, be included under that section as a result of the disposition in computing the income of the elector, the lesser of
(I) the elector's proceeds of disposition of the property determined under subparagraph (i), and
(II) the amount determined by the formula
A - B
where
A is the amount, if any, by which the fair market value of the property at that time exceeds the amount that would, if the disposition referred to in subparagraph (i) were a disposition for the purpose of section 7 or 35, be included under that section as a result of the disposition in computing the income of the elector, and
B is the amount that would be determined by the formula in subclause (C)(II) in respect of the property if clause (C) applied to the property, and
(C) ...
[15] Subsection 110.6(19) applies to capital property "owned at the end of February 22, 1994 by the elector". The only relevant property which any of the Appellants owned on February 22, 1994 was a Bond issued by Cameco. Under the provisions of the Cameco Share Savings Plan (Exhibit R-2), there were limitations on when a Bond could be exchanged for shares. I will attempt to summarize what I regard as the relevant provisions of that Plan.
Article 9.03 Exchange rights could be exercised on the last day of March, June, September or December of any year but not prior to 1994.
Article 9.04 Only one-third of the original amount of a Bond could be exchanged for shares in 1994. Only two-thirds of the original amount of a Bond could be exchanged for shares in 1995.
Article 10.02 No rights under the Plan are transferable or assignable. All rights under the Plan shall be exercised only by the "Participant" (an employee of Cameco who has purchased a Bond).
Under Article 9.03, no employee of Cameco could exchange a Bond (or part of a Bond) for shares prior to 1994. Even in 1994, no exchange could occur before the last day of March. Therefore, on February 22, 1994 (the relevant date for an election under subsection 110.6(19)), the Appellants all owned Cameco Bonds but they could not have exchanged any part of those Bonds for shares on or prior to that date.
[16] Under Article 9.04, any one of the Appellants could have exchanged one-third of the original amount of his or her Bonds for shares on March 31, 1994 but Schedule 1 to the ASF indicates that no Appellant exchanged any part of his or her Bonds for shares prior to December 31, 1995. Paragraph 13 of the ASF states that the common shares of Cameco had a FMV of $26.00 on February 22, 1994. I assume that the Appellants wanted this statement included in the ASF to support any elections which were made under subsection 110.6(19). The agreed FMV of the Cameco common shares on February 22, 1994 has very limited use in determining the FMV of a Bond on February 22, 1994 because (i) no part of a Bond could be exchanged for Cameco shares until March 31, 1994 (a period of 37 days) and, even then, only one-third of any Bond could be exchanged for shares; (ii) the remaining two-thirds of a Bond could not be exchanged for shares until March 31, 1995 (a period of 13 months); and (iii) the right to exchange a Bond for shares was not transferable or assignable.
[17] The right to exchange all or part of a Bond for shares expired on the maturity date of the Bonds (December 31, 2000) or earlier if the Cameco employee holding the Bond retired or died (Article 9.02). In all the circumstances of the Cameco Share Savings Plan, including the rights to exchange Bonds for shares in Article IX, I cannot regard Bonds held by the Appellants on February 22, 1994 as having the same character as Cameco shares which were later acquired (by exercise of the exchange rights) in 1996 and 1997. In other words, the Cameco shares sold by the Appellants in 1996 and 1997 were not "capital property owned at the end of February 22, 1994" by the Appellants within the meaning of paragraph 110.6(19)(a).
[18] In my opinion, none of the Appellants was entitled to make an election under subsection 110.6(19) of the Act with respect to the Cameco shares which were sold in 1996 or 1997. And if any of the Appellants was purporting to make such an election with respect to the Bonds owned at the end of February 22, 1994, there is no evidence in these appeals concerning the FMV of such Bonds on that date. I conclude that subsection 110.6(19) does not apply to any of these 18 appeals.
[19] I regret that I do not have in evidence any of the assessments or reassessments which are under appeal herein because I cannot determine whether the Minister has assessed the benefit under section 7 in accordance with the amounts in Schedule 1 to the ASF. Also, I cannot determine whether the Minister has applied paragraph 53(1)(j), and whether the various Appellants have been assessed on the basis of capital gains or losses (probably small) on the actual sale of the shares. Having regard only to the issues as pleaded, the appeal of each Appellant is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
"M.A. Mogan"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE NO.: 2001-134(IT)I, 2001-136(IT)I, 2001-137(IT)I,
2001-139(IT)I, 2001-141(IT)I, 2001-155(IT)I,
2001-157(IT)I, 2001-164(IT)I, 2001-165(IT)I,
2001-166(IT)I, 2001-167(IT)I, 2001-176(IT)I,
2001-395(IT)I, 2001-396(IT)I, 2001-399(IT)I,
2001-401(IT)I, 2001-404(IT)I & 2001-409(IT)I
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHELINE ETHIER, BRENT BENNETT, JANICE BROWN, KEITH CROFT, PHILLIPPE DUGUAY, KENNETH G. SHANNON, J. THOMAS ANDRESS, GAIL TRAYNOR, LLOYD WILTON, BRIAN G. WEST, GRANT SPOONER, DONALD H. DEBOER, GEORGE MORNINGSTAR, GARFIELD ROACHE, MICHAEL R. BELAIR, PATRICK FALLU, MARK BLONDIN and PAUL F. COLLINS and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING: Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: August 15, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 29, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name: N/A
Firm:
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
2001-134(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MICHELINE ETHIER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-136(IT)I
BETWEEN:
BRENT BENNETT,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-137(IT)I
BETWEEN:
JANICE BROWN,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-139(IT)I
BETWEEN:
KEITH CROFT,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-141(IT)I
BETWEEN:
PHILLIPPE DUGUAY,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-155(IT)I
BETWEEN:
KENNETH G. SHANNON,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-157(IT)I
BETWEEN:
J. THOMAS ANDRESS,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1996 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-164(IT)I
BETWEEN:
GAIL TRAYNOR,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-165(IT)I
BETWEEN:
LLOYD WILTON,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-166(IT)I
BETWEEN:
BRIAN G. WEST,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-167(IT)I
BETWEEN:
GRANT SPOONER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1996 taxation year is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-176(IT)I
BETWEEN:
DONALD H. DEBOER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-395(IT)I
BETWEEN:
GEORGE MORNINGSTAR,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-396(IT)I
BETWEEN:
GARFIELD ROACHE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-399(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL R. BELAIR,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-401(IT)I
BETWEEN:
PATRICK FALLU,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-404(IT)I
BETWEEN:
MARK BLONDIN,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.
2001-409(IT)I
BETWEEN:
PAUL F. COLLINS,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on August 15, 2001, at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge M.A. Mogan
Appearances
Agent for the Appellant: Brian Hagger
Counsel for the Respondent: Charles M. Camirand and Jade Boucher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1994 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 29th day of August, 2001.
|
"M.A. Mogan" |
J.T.C.C.