Date: 20010824
Docket: 2000-4907-EI,
2000-4909-CPP
BETWEEN:
SUPREME TRACTOR SERVICES LTD.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Porter, D.J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals were heard on common evidence by consent of the parties on the 13th of May 2001 at Edmonton, Alberta.
[2] The Appellant has appealed from the decisions of the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister"), dated August 29, 2000 that the employment with it of one Donald Dixon ("the Worker") for the period May 1, 1998 to July 27, 1999 was both insurable under the Employment Insurance Act (the "EI Act") and pensionable under the Canada Pension Plan (the "CP Plan"), for the following reasons:
It has been decided that this employment was insurable for the period in question for the following reason: Donald A. Dixon was employed under a contract of service and was therefore your employee engaged in insurable employment.
Notwithstanding the above, Donald A. Dixon was employed in insurable employment as he was placed in employment by you, to perform services for and under the direction and control of your clients.
The decisions were respectively said to be issued pursuant to section 93 of the EI Act and subsection 27.2(3) of the CP Plan and to be based on paragraphs 5(1)(a) of the EI Act and 6(g) of the Employment Insurance Regulations, and paragraph 6(1)(a) of the CP Plan and subsection 34(1) of the CP Plan Regulations.
[3] At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the Minister conceded that the Worker was engaged as an independent contractor under a contract for services and not an employee under a contract of service. This was in accordance with the initial ruling issued in this case before the appeal to the Minister. Thus, the issue left for this Court was whether or not the Worker had been placed in employment by the Appellant as a grader operator to perform services for and under direction and control of a client of the Appellant, namely, the Municipal District No. 124, Alberta.
[4] The material facts reveal that the Appellant operated a heavy duty equipment business throughout the time in question. It contracted out certain equipment to other organisations. In the case at hand, it contracted with the Municipal District No. 124 (the "MD") to provide summer and winter maintenance of certain roads within the Municipal District area. In order to carry out these responsibilities under the contract, the Appellant was required to provide a motor grader with a skilled and well-trained operator. The operator in question was the Worker, and it is the nature of his employment in this respect, which is at issue.
The Regulations
[5] It is to be noted that the wording in the two statutory schemes (EI and CPP), is somewhat different. One is therefore not necessarily inclusive of the other, although there is a certain commonality. The Regulations in question read as follows:
Employment Insurance Regulations
6. Employment in any of the following employments, unless it is excluded from insurable employment by any provision of these Regulations, is included in insurable employment:
...
(g) employment of a person who is placed in that employment by a placement or employment agency to perform services for and under the direction and control of a client of the agency, where that person is remunerated by the agency for the performance of those services.
...
Section 34 Canada Pension Plan Regulations
34(1) Where any individual is placed by a placement or employment agency in employment with or for performance of services for a client of the agency and the terms or conditions on which the employment or services are performed and the remuneration thereof is paid constitute a contract of service or are analogous to a contract of service, the employment or performance of services is included in pensionable employment and the agency or the client, whichever pays the remuneration to the individual, shall, for the purposes of maintaining records and filing returns and paying, deducting and remitting contributions payable by and in respect of the individual under the Act and these Regulations, be deemed to be the employer of the individual.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), "placement or employment agency" includes any person or organization that is engaged in the business of placing individuals in employment or for performance of services or of securing employment for individuals for a fee, reward or other remuneration.
[6] It is to be noticed that "placement agency" or "employment agency" is defined to include certain situations in the CPP Regulations. That definition is not all inclusive. There is no definition of the term in the EI Regulations.
[7] Bonner, T.C.J. in the case of Computer Action Inc. and M.N.R. and Alan Rocker, T.C.J. 101, Court No. 88-502 (UI) said that the term should be given its ordinary meaning and read in context:
... an organization engaged in matching requests for work with requests for workers.
[8] Teskey, T.C.J. in the case of Rod Turpin Consulting Ltd, o/a Tundra Site Services v. M.N.R. and Dan Monaghan, 1997, T.C.J. No. 1052, D.R.S. 97-17672, Court File No. 97-19(UI), said this:
The Appellant argues that it is not a placement agency but to look at it as a general contractor. This I cannot accept. General contractors usually by the terms of their contracts with clients are responsible to the client to construct the project contracted to be constructed in a good and workmanlike manner. Herein the only responsibility the Appellant had to Cominco was to provide qualified workers as specified by Cominco.
The Appellant was acting as a placement agency in respect of this worker. The Appellant was asked to provide a journeyman electrician which it did. It paid the electrician and charged the wages to Cominco together with a fee for services.
[9] In the case of Dyck v. M.N.R./Bigknife Oilfield Operating Ltd. 1999 T.C.J. No. 852, Court Files 1999-1521 (EI), I held as follows:
The position of the Minister is that Bigknife acted in this situation as a placement or employment agency. The EI Regulation in question was changed in 1997 and thus, previous case law is not particularly helpful. However, the logic of Teskey, J. in Rod Turpin Consulting Ltd. o/a Tundra Site Services v. The Minister of National Revenue ([1997] T.C.J. No. 1052, DRS 97-17672, Court File No. 97-19(UI)) seems as relevant today as it was then. Bigknife was not a general contractor. It was only responsible to supply qualified personnel. There was no individual fees for the different people who were engaged, but no doubt, that was all built into the overall contract. It places Dyck, to the extent that he needed it in providing his services under the direction and control of Fletcher. They had the right to control his work. In my view, EI Regulation 6(g) and CPP Regulation 34 do each apply in this situation.
[10] I am of the view that there is a fundamental principle to be grasped in these cases which really should simplify the question for the parties. It seems to me that the intention or the "pith and substance" of the Regulations is to bring into the basket of the two social schemes set up by Parliament, those workers whether they are employees under a contract of service or independent contractors under contracts for services, who simply contract with entity A for a fee (or other recompense), to be found or placed in work (employment) with or under the direction and control of a third entity B. Thus, these workers do not contract with entity A to do any work for entity A as part of the latter's business. Further, entity A does not contract with entity B to do any work for entity B other than to provide them with personnel for which they collect a fee or other remuneration.
[11] That situation seems to me, to be absolutely and mutually exclusive of any arrangement whereby a worker is engaged to perform services for entity A in the course of the latter's business, or where entity A has a contract with entity B to perform services for entity B. In such a situation, entity A is not providing or placing personnel, but carrying out its contractual obligation to provide those services to entity B.
[12] Thus, the first question to be asked is whether the worker is performing services for entity A as part of the business of the latter, albeit part of that business may be a contract for entity A to provide a service for entity B, or whether entity A is simply acquiring personnel as its very business with no contract to undertake anything further than to pass the worker on to entity B to undertake whatever the business of entity B might be. The simple question to ask is whether entity A is under any obligation to provide a service to entity B other than simply provide personnel. Is it obligated to perform in some other way than simply to make people available? If the answer is yes, it clearly has business of its own as does any general contractor on a building site and the worker is not covered by the Regulations under either statute. If however, the answer is no, that is, it is not obligated to carry out any service other than to provide personnel, then clearly the worker in such a situation is covered by the Regulations under both statutes.
[13] The question as I see it is not so much about who is the ultimate recipient of the work or services provided as this will cover every single possible subcontract situation, but rather who is under obligation to provide the service. If the entity alleged to be the placement agency is under an obligation to provide a service over and above the provision of personnel, it is not placing people, but rather performing that service and is not covered by the Regulations.
[14] I refer to the Federal Court of Appeal case of Vulcain Alarme Inc. v. The Minister of National Revenue, (1999) 249 N.R. 1 for an analogy, where the same principle is clearly set out in relation to whether a subcontractor becomes an employee in certain situations. Létourneau, J.A. said this:
A contractor who, for example, works on site on a subcontract does not serve his customers but those of the payer, that is the general contractor who has retained his services. The fact that Mr. Blouin had to report to the plaintiff's premises once a month to get his service sheets and so to learn the list of customers requiring service, and consequently the places where his services would be provided, does not make him an employee. A contractor performing work for a business has to know the places where services are required and their frequency just as an employee does under a contract of employment. Priority in performance of the work required of a worker is not the apanage of a contract of employment. Contractors or subcontractors are also often approached by various influential customers who force them to set priorities in providing their services or to comply with the customers' requirements.
[15] The simple facts that sub-contractors contracting with entity A are required to comply with the requirements of entity B does not per se place those persons under the direction and control of entity B any more than it makes entity B a customer of those persons.
[16] The parties also placed before me for consideration the following reported cases:
Standing v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) [1992] No. 890
Silverside Computer Systems Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) [1997] T.C.J. No. 38
Silverside Computer Systems Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 96
Bartimaeus Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) [1999] T.C.J. No. 216
The Facts
[17] The Minister in the Replies to the Notices of Appeal signed on his behalf was said to admit the following facts alleged by the Appellant in its Notices of Appeal:
(a) The Appellant carried on active business in Smith, Alberta;
(b) the Appellant and the Worker signed a Memorandum of Agreement that the latter would provide services for grading work, support vehicle and tools, all non-machine expenses, to service and maintain equipment and to ensure all maintenance was done on a regular and daily basis in respect of the grading operation;
(c) that the agreement stated that the Workers' Compensation was $17.00 per billable hour only, and non-billable hours were not to exceed 10 hours per month.
[18] The Minister, in arriving at his decisions, was said in the Replies to the Notices of Appeal to have relied on the following assumptions of fact:
(a) the facts as admitted above;
(b) the Appellant was not related to the Worker;
(c) the Appellant had a contract with the Client to provide a grader and a grader operator to provide grading services;
(d) the Appellant's business included farming and contracting out heavy duty equipment such as caterpillars, backhoes, trucks and graders;
(e) the Worker
(i) worked as a grader operator for the Appellant
(ii) graded roads for the Client; and
(iii) operated a grader owned by the Appellant;
(f) the Client determined the Worker's hours;
(g) the Client instructed the Worker each morning on which road or roads to maintain;
(h) the Client instructed the Worker as to the order his tasks were to be completed;
(i) the Client was responsible for losses or damages incurred by the Worker;
(j) the Client provided the Worker with a two way radio;
(k) the Worker's normal working hours were from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. Monday to Friday;
(l) the Worker's hours were recorded;
(m) the day-to-day work operation decisions were made by the Client's road boss;
(n) the Worker required permission to take time off during the day;
(o) the Worker did not require an assistant;
(p) on May 19, 1999 the Appellant and the Client entered into a contract called Smith Grader Maintenance Agreement (the "Smith Agreement") which covered the period April 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000;
(q) the Smith Agreement consisted of summer and winter maintenance of approximately 163 kilometers of gravel and asphaltic surfaced roads in either the Smith or Smith East region. The maintenance includes blading, spreading gravel, removal of ice and snow and other work as directed by the Client;
(r) additional conditions in the Smith Agreement are as follows:
(i) bids were only accepted by residents owning the required equipment and familiar with the heavy construction industry;
(ii) the Appellant was required to provide and maintain the proper equipment;
(iii) the Appellant was required to provide a skilled and experienced operator;
(iv) the hourly rate includes the operator's wages, fuel, oil, repairs, maintenance and ground engaging tools;
(v) the grader must be a 1994 year or later model with a minimum 185 horsepower and have the necessary attachments;
(vi) the Worker was required to attend the Client's safety meetings;
(vii) the Appellant had to provide the Worker with WCB coverage;
(viii) the Worker commenced and discontinued work upon the direction of the Client;
(ix) the Worker started his duties at 7:00 a.m.;
(x) during the summer the Worker worked only during daylight hours;
(xi) during the winter the work may involve 24 hours emergency services;
(xii) the Client required the Worker to be at the job site within 4 hours of the Client's call in the summer and within 2 hours in the winter;
(xiii) the Client specified the grading requirements regarding crowns, superelevations, ridges rocks, railway crossings, flashing lights, bridges and guardrails;
(xiv) the Worker was required to complete Work Tickets and Road Grading Assignment Maps on a daily basis;
(xv) the Work Tickets and Road Grading Assignment Maps were inspected and signed by the Client; and
(xvi) the Client paid the Appellant $65.00 per hour;
(s) as outlined in the May 4, 1998 Agreement
(i) the Worker provided his tools and his truck as a support vehicle;
(ii) the Worker was responsible for expenses other than for the grader;
(iii) the Worker was responsible for servicing and maintaining the grader including oil changes, filters and grease;
(iv) the Appellant paid the Worker $17.00 per hour;
(v) the Worker was responsible for all operations of the grader, servicing, travelling, tools, and supplying the vehicle to take himself to and from work;
(t) the Appellant required the Worker to wear a safety vest, hard hat, safety footwear, seat belts, and an audible alarm system;
(u) the Worker was paid monthly;
(v) the Worker was paid by cheque;
(w) the Worker was paid after the 25th of each month;`
(x) the Appellant provided the Worker with the grader;
(y) the Client paid the Appellant for the work completed;
(z) the Appellant placed the Worker in employment to perform services for the Client;
(aa) the Appellant was under the direction and control of the Client;
(bb) the Appellant remunerated the Worker.
[19] Evidence was given on behalf of the Appellant by Rose Marie Hayes, who said that at the material times, she was the secretary-treasurer of the Appellant corporation. She and her husband ran the company. Her husband worked in the field. She ran the office. It was an oilfield service company and they provided, amongst other things, road building and maintenance services to the oil industry. They tendered bids on various projects to obtain their work. They had a number of pieces of heavy-duty equipment and at one point in 1998/99 had as many as 120 employees.
[20] The Appellant had successfully bid on the summer and winter grader maintenance contract and that contract (Exhibit A-3) was signed and came into effect April 1, 1999. It is clear from this contract that the corporation was obliged to provide the following service:
The Smith Grader Maintenance Contract consists of summer and winter maintenance of approximately 163 kilometers of gravel and asphaltic surfaced roads in either the Smith or Smith East region as per the attachments. Maintenance will include blading, spreading gravel, removal of ice and snow and other work as directed by the Municipal District's Director of Field Services or his representative.
To carry out this work, the Appellant was required to supply and use a grader of certain specifications and supply a skilled and experienced operator. It is clear that this was not a lease of the equipment, but rather a contract to provide the service in question. The Appellant had the right to change operators at will, but if it wished to change the principal operator, then the approval of the Municipal District (MD) was required for the substitute principal operators. Other incidental operators did not need approval.
[21] Clause 14 of the contract was significant. It read as follows:
The Contractor and all persons subject to his direction, management and control shall indemnify and hold harmless the Municipal District, ...
The Municipal District shall not be liable nor responsible for any bodily or personal injury or property damage of any nature whatsoever that may be suffered or sustained by the Contractor, his employees or agents in the performance of this Agreement.
This seems to me to indicate that the MD considered any operator to remain under the "direction, management and control" of the Appellant.
[22] I noted also in Clause 16 that it was the Appellant who was required to ensure that the assigned operator, who I take it to be the Worker, attend all MD safety meetings.
[23] Clause 18 of the agreement required the Appellant (the contractor) to commence and discontinue work upon the direction of the MD Director of Field Services. It did not require the operator to do so, but the contractor, that is the Appellant, to do so.
[24] Similarly, Clause 20 required the contractor, the Appellant, to provide a contact number to ensure that "the operator" (the Worker) was at the job site within certain specified times of call. Again, this responsibility by contract was imposed upon the Appellant.
[25] Charges by the Appellant to the MD were covered by Clause 26 of the contract. The Appellant was unable to charge the MD for time spent by the worker for breakdowns, changing blades, and "other activities such as meal breaks and refueling, etc.". Thus, clearly none of these tasks fell under the direction or control of the MD.
[26] Mrs. Hayes indicated in evidence that it was she who engaged the Worker. A written agreement was entered between the Appellant and the Worker. Under that contract, the Worker was required to be paid $17.00 per hour for billable hours, which I understood to be hours for which the Appellant was able to bill the MD for grader work done under Clause 26 of its contract with the MD. She said this was calculated as 25% of the $68.00 per hour, the hourly rate of the contract with the MD. It is not written as a percentage in the Worker's contract, simply an hourly amount. Nonetheless, it was tied to the amount which the Appellant could charge the MD. In addition, the Worker was to be paid at the same hourly rate for non-billable work up to 10 hours per month, which had nothing to do with the MD whatsoever.
[27] The contract with the Worker was with him in his trade name of "Triple T Ventures". He had a GST number and charged GST. The contract required him to provide grading contract services to the Appellant on equipment provided by the Appellant, but to be maintained by the Worker. The Appellant was to provide fuel and oil at its own cost.
[28] The Worker provided an account for his services which included billable hours to the MD, as well as other hours. He completed MD forms in this respect, which the Appellant passed on to the MD. The Worker was paid by the Appellant, who in turn billed and was paid by the MD.
[29] In practice, the MD Field Supervisor, out of convenience, contacted the Worker directly, but if unable to reach him would contact the Appellant who would be responsible to get the Worker to the job or have another operator working on the grader. Thus, the evidence revealed that the link was always back to the Appellant from the MD. In this respect, in practice, the Worker received his instructions from the MD (assumption 9(g) and 9(h)), but strictly speaking, the control came through the Appellant who had the legal responsibility to provide the service at the behest of the official from the MD. It subrogated, in practice, its right to control the Worker and assign the Worker to the representative of the MD, but in law retained that right and responsibility.
[30] The assumptions of fact made by the Minister were not greatly challenged by the witness, except to the extent that I have outlined above. To the greatest extent, those differences are contained in the contracts themselves and are matters of interpretation.
[31] I found Mrs. Hayes to be an honest witness and I have no difficulty in accepting her evidence and I do accept it, such as it was. In some total, she said that the corporation submitted tenders to obtain their contracts and then put men and machines in the field to carry out the work contracted to be done. More often than not, it seems the Appellant used regular employees. In the situation at hand, it used the Worker as an independent contractor, but the nature the service provided was no different. Mrs. Hayes maintained that the Appellant was in the business of providing services, not providing personnel to clients. It was clear from her evidence that the Appellant went out and looked for work. It established a clientele in this respect. She said it did not keep a list of job placements and go out and find people to fill them. It took on the work itself and was responsible to carry out the work. I accept her evidence in this respect.
Conclusion
[32] There are really two issues in this appeal. The first involves deciding whether or not as a mixed question of fact and law, the Appellant was acting as a "placement or employment agency". If it was not, the matter ends there. If it was, there are two aspects to the second issue, namely whether in the case of the EI Act, the worker was placed in the employment (read work) to perform services "for and under the direction and control of a client ...", and in the case of the CP Plan, whether "the terms and conditions on which the employment and services are performed ... constitute a contract of service ..." or are analogous thereto.
[33] With respect to the first issue, a number of the reported cases put before the Court can be distinguished as in those it was not in issue that the Appellant was set up as a placement agency. In those cases, that fact was clearly accepted.
[34] In Bartimaeus (above), the learned Judge clearly held that:
The company is set up as broker services between private practitioners in the child and youth field and social services.
And
...is in fact a placement or employment agency as required by this paragraph.
[35] Clearly, in that case the Appellant simply contracted to provide people and did not undertake responsibility to provide the service itself.
[36] In the Isomeric case (above), the learned Judge found:
... the president of the appellant, admitted that the appellant is a placement or employment agency; ...
The Judge went on to consider direction and control issues and whether or not independent contracts for services could be covered in such situations. Clearly, the finding was that they can be.
[37] Similarly, the decision of the Honourable Judge Watson, upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in the Silverside cases (above) clearly held:
... in fact was an organization "engaged in matching requests for work with requests for workers".
Judge Watson went on to consider also the question of control, which is the second issue.
[38] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Appellant was not in fact or law an employment or placement agency in the normal sense of that word or in the sense of the CPP Regulation. It was not engaged in the business of placing individuals in employment orperformance of services or of securing employment for individuals for a fee or reward or other remuneration. Its business was the provision of services themselves in the field of road building and maintenance. It sought out contracts for work. It had a responsibility to meet the terms of these contracts and provide the service for which it contracted. In doing so, it oftimes hired regular employees and at other times engaged independent contracts to carry on the work. But it was the work itself which it contracted to undertake, not simply to provide personnel to the MD for some fee or reward. If the Worker in question became unavailable, it had an ongoing legal responsibility to continue to provide the service. That, it seems to me, is the essential difference. I see no difference here from a subcontractor operating on a building site who places either employees or subcontractors onto the site to carry out the work. That does not make that subcontractor an employment or placement agency. The subcontractor is committed to provide the services to the owner or general contractor to do the construction work in question in accordance with the provisions of the contract.
[39] As I have said in the case of Dataco Utility Services Ltd. v. M.N.R. 2000-4444(EI) and 2000-4445(CPP):
... Clearly, the contract in each case is a contract for services with an independent contractor, the Appellant. Whether the Appellant was to use its own employees or further subcontract with other independent contractors by way of contracts for services, was clearly of no concern to the Utility Companies. Whilst the latter had certain policies, procedures and standards which it required the Appellant's personnel to adopt in the performance of their duties, that was by way of contract with the Appellant. That point should not be overlooked. The personnel used by the Appellant to provide the services were not required to report to the Utility Companies in order to take directions from them. Those personnel, whether they were employees or subcontractors with the Appellant, were required to follow the directions given to them by the Appellant to provide the services which they had contracted to provide for the Appellant, in accordance with the conditions that the Appellant had accepted in the master contracts with the Utility Companies. I do not see that they were in any way under the direction and control of the Utility Companies. The only right to control, held by the Utility Companies, came by virtue of their contract with the Appellant. The fact that the master contracts called for certain things to be done in certain ways, at certain times and allowed the Utility Companies a veto (so to speak) over any particular individual performing that service, did not transform the basic nature of the contract from a contract for services into a placement of personnel under the direction and control of the Utility Companies by a placement agency. The workers' commitment was very much established by their contracts with the Appellant (Exhibit A-3), not anything flowing to them directly from the Utility Companies. The Appellant in turn was obligated to meet its commitments to the Utility Companies. Thus, those requirements were part and parcel of the contracts themselves in both cases.
[40] As was said by Mr. Justice Létourneau in the Vulcain Alarme case (above), a contractor who, for example, works on a site as a subcontractor does not serve his customers but those of the Payor. The MD in the case at hand was the client/customer of the Appellant. The Appellant contracted with its customer to provide the service required. The MD did not become the customer of the Worker. There was no privity of contract between them and no direct working relationship, other than as a matter of convenience. This is totally different from the situation which would exist if the contract between the MD and the Appellant simply called for one or more persons to be provided who would then attend upon the MD, receive all their directions from the MD and provide the service directly to it. The latter situation whereby the Appellant would not be required to provide any service itself, but just personnel, would be clearly four-square within the ambit of the Regulations.
[41] The question of direction and control of the work by the MD does not arise as part of the consideration of whether or not the Appellant is an employment or placement agency. That question only arises as part of the second issue and the two issues should not be confused. I glean that they had in fact been confused by the Minister in this case.
[42] Having come to the conclusion that the Appellant is not in fact or law a "placement or employment agency", there is not any need to go any further. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, I express the view that in fact the Worker was not under the direction and control of the MD, nor did it perform services for the MD. He was clearly engaged to provide a service to the Appellant to enable the latter to carry out its contractual obligation to the MD. He was no more placed under the direction and control of the MD than if he had been a subcontractor on a building site on which the Appellant was a general contractor and the Municipal District the owner. The contract between the MD and the Appellant clearly held the latter responsible for their own employees and agents. The requirements passed on to the Worker was simply requirements that the MD had of the Appellant by virtue of its contract with the Appellant.
[43] At the end of the day, in answer to the question "was the Appellant in the business of providing personnel to the MD or was it providing a service to the MD", the answer is clearly that it was providing a service. The situation relating to the Worker was not covered by the respective Regulations. He was not in either insurable or pensionable employment.
[44] The appeals are allowed and the decisions of the Minister are reversed accordingly.
Signed at Calgary, Alberta, this 24th day of August 2001.
|
"Michael H. Porter" |
D.J.T.C.C.COURT FILE NO.: 2000-4907(EI)
STYLE OF CAUSE: Supreme Tractor Services Ltd. and M.N.R.
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: May 15, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Deputy Judge
Michael H. Porter
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 24, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: David R. Abbey
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark Heseltine
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name: David R. Abbey
Firm: David R. Abbey Professional Corporation
Edmonton, Alberta
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, CanadaCOURT FILE NO.: 2000-4909(CPP)
STYLE OF CAUSE: Supreme Tractor Services Ltd. and M.N.R.
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: May 15, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Deputy Judge
Michael H. Porter
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 24, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: David R. Abbey
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark Heseltine
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name: David R. Abbey
Firm: David R. Abbey Professional Corporation
Edmonton, Alberta
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
2000-4907(EI)
BETWEEN:
SUPREME TRACTOR SERVICES LTD.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeal of Supreme Tractor Services Ltd. (2000-4909(CPP)) on May 15, 2001 at Edmonton, Alberta, by
the Honourable Deputy Judge Michael H. Porter
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: David R. Abbey
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark Heseltine
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the decision of the Minister is varied in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Calgary, Alberta, this 24th day of August 2001.
|
"Michael H. Porter" |
D.J.T.C.C.
2000-4909(CPP)
BETWEEN:
SUPREME TRACTOR SERVICES LTD.,
Appellant,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on common evidence with the appeal of Supreme Tractor Services Ltd. (2000-4907(EI)) on May 15, 2001 at Edmonton, Alberta, by
the Honourable Deputy Judge Michael H. Porter
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: David R. Abbey
Counsel for the Respondent: Mark Heseltine
JUDGMENT
The appeal is allowed and the decision of the Minister is varied in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Calgary, Alberta, this 24th day of August 2001.
|
"Michael H. Porter" |
D.J.T.C.C.