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Docket: 2002-2958(IT)I |
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BETWEEN: |
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CHANTAL DUBUC, |
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Appellant, |
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and |
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, |
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Respondent. |
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Appeal heard on October 3, 2003, at Montréal, Quebec
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Before: The Honourable Justice Alain Tardif |
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Appearances: |
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For the Appellant: |
The Appellant herself |
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Counsel for the Respondent: |
Nathalie Goyette |
JUDGMENT
The appeal of the assessment under the Income Tax Act for the 1998 taxation year is dismissed, without costs, in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 28th day of May 2004.
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"Alain Tardif" |
Tardif J.
Translation certified true
on this 18th day of October 2004.
Shulamit Day, Translator
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Citation: 2004TCC164 |
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Date: 20040528 |
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Docket: 2002-2958(IT)I |
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BETWEEN: |
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CHANTAL DUBUC, |
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Appellant, |
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and |
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, |
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Respondent. |
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Tardif J.
[1] The Appellant is appealing a reassessment dated November 5, 2001, by which the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") added the amount of $20,775 to the Appellant's total income as undeclared income from a Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) for the 1998 taxation year.
[2] In making and confirming the assessment at issue, the Minister relied upon the following assumptions of fact:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) On April 30, 1999, the Appellant filed her income tax return for the 1998 taxation year;
(b) For the taxation year at issue, the Appellant declared the following income:
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Employment Income |
$5,700 |
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Spousal Support |
$8,067 |
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Total income |
$13,767 |
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Taxable Income |
$13,767 |
(c) On May 28, 1998, in a division of property, the Public Service Pension Plan of Mr. Richard Radziszewski, the Appellant's former spouse, was officially shared with her and the amount of $20,906.70 was paid into a locked-in registered retirement savings plan, identified by the number "CRI 175495" and managed by "National Bank Securities" (hereinafter referred to as the "RRSP");
(d) Under Quebec legislation, the Appellant could not withdraw funds from this RRSP;
(e) On or about August 31, 1998, the said RRSP was assessed at $20,930.27; the Appellant had it transferred to "Laurentian Trust";
(f) On September 3, 1998, Georges Doualan sold the Appellant 831 shares in Société 9066-1000 Québec Inc. with her RRSP, at a cost of $25 per share for a total of $20,775;
(g) At the time of this transaction, Georges Doualan held an investment advisor's licence with "Maxima Capital Inc.";
(h) On September 3, 1998, Mr. André Rousseau, director of Société 9066-1000 Québec Inc. confirmed to "Laurentian Trust" that the Appellant had purchased 831 class B shares in Société 9066-1000 Québec Inc.;
(i) All or most of the fair market value of the assets of 9066-1000 Québec Inc. are not primarily used in an active business nor were they shares of the capital stock or indebtedness of one or more small business corporations;
(j) All or most of the assets of 9066-1000 Québec Inc. are not used in a qualifying active business nor are they shares in a qualifying active business;
(k) On September 3, 1998, Yvan Laniel CA submitted an auditor's report to "Laurentian Trust", mentioning, among other things, that Société 9066-1000 Québec Inc. is a [TRANSLATION] "small business that is being acquired" and that [TRANSLATION]"9066-1000 Québec Inc. constitutes an eligible corporation within the meaning of subsection 4900(6)/4900(12) of the Canadian Income Tax Regulations";
(l) On September 16, 1998, the Appellant obtained a loan of $16,620 from "Financière Telco Inc.";
(m) Jean Tremblay is the majority shareholder of 9066-1000 Québec Inc. and of "Financière Telco Inc.";
(m.1) 9066-1000 Québec Inc. holds 9,156 G shares in "Financière Telco Inc.";
(n) "Financière Telco Inc." is related to 9066-1000 Québec Inc.;
(n.1) Financière Telco Inc. only conducts lending activities;
(o) From the facts previously mentioned, it is clear that the Appellant provided her RRSP as a guarantee;
(p) The Appellant has not repaid "Financière Telco Inc." and does not seem to have paid interest on this loan;
(q) The alleged loan arrangements were offered only in return for the purchase of shares in 9066-1000 Québec Inc. using the Appellant's RRSP;
(r) As a result of the strategy mentioned above, the Appellant was able to withdraw her RRSP without paying taxes;
(s) According to the Appellant, she did not notify "Laurentian Trust" that she had provided her RRSP as a loan guarantee and this explains why the Trust did not issue a T4RSP to her for the 1998 taxation year;
(t) The fair market value (FMV) of the Appellant's RRSP was $20,775 when she provided her RRSP as a guarantee for the $16,620 loan;
(u) the Minister therefore added the full amount of $20,775 to Appellant's total income for the 1998 taxation year;
(v) the Minister also considered applying the general anti-avoidance rule as an alternative position.
[3] The question at issue is fully articulated at paragraph 4 of the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal:
[TRANSLATION]
The question at issue involves determining whether the Minister is justified in adding the amount of $20,775 to the Appellant's income for the 1998 taxation year.
[4] The Appellant wanted to become financially independent. Having learned that it was possible to cash her RRSP or an equivalent amount without having to face an income tax assessment, she took steps with the tax authorities to obtain more information on how to do so.
[5] According to her testimony, she allegedly received all the required information on how to access her RRSP quickly, without tax consequences.
[6] An employee of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), a certain Pierre Gariepy, allegedly provided her with the information during telephone conversations.
[7] First, she transferred the amount of her RRSP into a self-managed RRSP with "Laurentian Trust"; the Appellant then contacted a business advertising its services in the newspapers.
[8] Since she was somewhat distrustful, she did some checking; she went to the place of business of the group that provided the services in which she was interested. She obtained answers to her questions. Given the size of the business, her hesitation and scepticism dissipated rapidly. In addition, reassuring responses were provided to all her questions.
[9] Since the business appeared professional, reliable and genuine to her, the Appellant accepted the proposal that had been made to her. In addition, this proposal corresponded with the information obtained from Mr. Gariepy.
[10] She therefore directed "Laurentian Trust" to buy 831 shares in 9066-1000 Québec Inc., for a value of $20,775.41, using the funds from her RRSP.
[11] The 9066-1000 Québec Inc. corporation mentioned above was controlled by Jean Tremblay. When the shares were purchased, a corporation operating under the business name "Financière Telco Inc.", also controlled by this same Jean Tremblay, granted a loan to the Appellant.
[12] The Appellant thus obtained a loan of $16,620 from "Financière Telco Inc." In fact, however, she only obtained $13,419.25. The difference, or more than $3,200.75 was paid as fees to "Financière Telco Inc." for services rendered with respect to the loan at issue.
[13] Although this was a loan, the Appellant did not make repayments of any sort, nor was she required to pay interest. The issue of repayment did not concern the Appellant; further, she did not have any intention of repaying the loan.
[14] I believe the Appellant when she states that she consulted an individual who was supposed to be qualified to answer her questions.
[15] With respect to the Appellant's good faith, it must first be decided whether the contact she had with CCRA may affect the correctness of the assessment that she is appealing.
[16] Was the individual who allegedly provided the Appellant with information an employee of CCRA or of Revenu Québec? The evidence does not allow me to answer this question. Furthermore, I am unaware of the specific questions asked and the answers obtained.
[17] I conclude from the evidence that the Appellant did take steps to find out whether it was possible to benefit from her RRSP without being subject to assessment.
[18] The evidence showed that no one by the name of Gariepy was employed by the Respondent when the steps were initiated; the identity of the individual consulted by the Appellant thus remains unclear. The Appellant indicated that the individual in question informed her of the conditions required for her to be able to use her RRSP without having to pay any taxes; she stated that she had taken notes in order to follow the instructions she received.
[19] Assuming that the Appellant actually did receive information from a CCRA agent and she followed the instructions, can I allow her appeal?
[20] To answer this question, it is necessary to refer to the doctrine of issue estoppel arising by conduct of individuals in authority; this doctrine has been addressed from all angles in jurisprudence. In other words, can the doctrine of estoppel be applied in this case?
[21] The Supreme Court of Canada, in Canadian Superior Oil Ltdv. Paddon-Hughes Development Co., [1970] S.C.R. 932,restates the conditions required for the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct:
I do not propose to consider this aspect of the case any further, because, in any event, I am in agreement with the concurrent findings of the Courts below that no estoppel was proved. The appellants adopted, in argument, the legal principles stated in Greenwood v. Martins Bank, [1933] A.C. 51 at p. 57:
The essential factors giving rise to an estoppel are I think:
(1) A representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made.
(2) An act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made.
(3) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission.
(Emphasis added.)
[22] In light of this decision, it appears that intention figures very significantly in the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct. In other words, the intention to express a course of conduct constitutes a basis for the doctrine of "estoppel by representation".
[23] In this case, there is no direct or even secondary evidence that there was intent. Moreover, this aspect is completely absent from the evidence.
[24] The courts have also stated many times that an error in law does not lie against the Crown. In Guerriero v. Canada IN THE MATTER OF The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, [1987] T.C.J. No. 821, Justice Miller of this Court dismissed the taxpayer's appeal because the latter did not meet the burden of proof and because an error in law does not lie against the Crown. Justice Miller referred to the following passage from Blackmore:
In Blackmore versus M.N.R., NR 519, the learned judge in dealing with this same issue stated:
"Legally I am bound to say that notwithstanding any mistake or error or wrong advice on the part of the personnel of the Commission, the Commission is not prevented from seeking to carry out the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971. This has been held repeatedly by umpires in the past. There is the well-established principle that an estoppel will not arise when the conditions of the statute are not met. Put tritely, estoppel does not lie against the Crown and further estoppels of all kinds are subject to the general rule that they cannot override the law of the land."
[25] In Stickel v. M.N.R., [1972] F.C. 672 (Q.L.) , Justice Cattanach provided a very good summary of the state of the law on this issue:
70. In short, estoppel is subject to the one general rule that it cannot override the law of the land.
[26] In keeping with these principles, even if the Appellant had proven that the Minister of National Revenue or the Minister of Finance had confirmed that the structure of the group of corporations met the definition given in paragraph 70(10)(b), this cannot discharge the Court of its obligation to apply the Act as written. These facts are therefore not relevant to the circumstances of this case.
[27] In Goldstein v. Canada, [1995] T.C.J. No. 170 (Q.L.), Justice Bowman examined the correctness in law of the interpretation of paragraph 146(1)(c) of the Act, and responded to the issue of estoppel. This decision of Justice Bowman is one of the main decisions that addresses the issue of estoppel with respect to tax matters. Justice Bowman stated the following:
Estoppel is no longer merely a rule of evidence. It is a rule of substantive law. Lord Denning calls it "a principle of justice and of equity."
It is sometimes said that estoppel does not lie against the Crown. The statement is not accurate and seems to stem from a misapplication of the term estoppel. The principle of estoppel binds the Crown, as do other principles of law. Estoppel in pais, as it applies to the Crown, involves representations of fact made by officials of the Crown and relied and acted on by the subject to his or her detriment. The doctrine has no application where a particular interpretation of a statute has been communicated to a subject by an official of the government, relied upon by that subject to his or her detriment and then withdrawn or changed by the government. In such a case a taxpayer sometimes seeks to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. It is inappropriate to do so not because such representations give rise to an estoppel that does not bind the Crown, but rather, because no estoppel can arise where such representations are not in accordance with the law. Although estoppel is now a principle of substantive law it had its origins in the law of evidence and as such relates to representations of fact. It has no role to play where questions of interpretation of the law are involved, because estoppels cannot override the law.
The question of the interpretation of paragraph 146(1)(c) is a matter of law and I must decide it in accordance with the law as I understand it. I cannot avoid that obligation because the Department of National Revenue may previously have adopted an interpretation different from that which it now propounds. The question is not whether the Crown is bound by an earlier interpretation upon which a taxpayer has relied. It is more to the point to say that the courts, who have an obligation to decide cases in accordance with the law, are not bound by representations, opinions or admissions on the law expressed or made by the parties.
[28] In Hawkes v. Canada, [1995] T.C.J. No. 1507, Justice Margeson cites a passage from the publication Phipson On Evidence, which reads as follows: "Estoppels of all kinds, however, are subject to one general rule: they cannot override the law of the land. Thus, where a particular formality is required by statute, no estoppel will cure the defect."
[29] In Holitzki v. Canada, [1998] T.C.J. No. 1146 (Q.L.), at paragraph 7, Justice Rowe explained that "[t]he law is clear that stoppel [sic] will not lie to override a statutory provision; in this case the Income Tax Act."
[30] Associate Chief Justice Bowman, in Moulton v. Canada, [2002] T.C.J. No. 80, at paragraph 11, recently affirmed the following:
The appellant argues with great conviction that he should be entitled to rely on advice given by the CCRA and relied upon by him in good faith. I agree that the result may seem a little shocking to taxpayers who seek guidance from government officials whom they expect to be able to give correct advice. Unfortunately such officials are not infallible and the court cannot be bound by erroneous departmental interpretations. Any other conclusion would lead to inconsistency and confusion.
[31] Since this case was heard in Quebec, it is relevant to mention Alameda Holdings Inc. v. Canada, [1999] T.C.J. No. 839 and Houde v. Canada, [2001] T.C.J. No. 130. These decisions state that the doctrine of estoppel by conduct cannot be applied in cases heard before courts in the province of Quebec. Moreover, in Québec there is a fin de non-recevoir defence, based on article 1457 of the Civil Code of Quebec (hereinafter referred to as C.C.Q.), which has substantially the same effect as the doctrine of estoppel by conduct. At paragraph 70 of Alameda Holdings Inc., supra, Justice Dussault said the following with respect to this issue:
Counsel for the appellant pleaded the doctrine of estoppel and that of fins de non-recevoir. According to counsel, the characteristics and conditions of application of these two institutions are similar, and so should be their effects. This is an over-simplification in my view. I believe that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be pleaded in the instant case and that it is the Civil Code of Quebec that applies. In Soucisse, supra, Beetz J. of the Supreme Court of Canada distinguishes between the two concepts, while recognizing that there has often been confusion between the two and that both terms are used. He refers in particular to Mignault J.'s opinion in Grace and Company, supra, that the concept of estoppel, as applied in the English system, is unknown to the civil law. However, he expressly acknowledges the existence of fins de non-recevoir in civil law and recognizes that one possible legal basis for a fin de non-recevoir might be the wrongful conduct of a party under articles 1053 et seq. of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (articles 1457 et seq. of the Civil Code of Quebec).
[32] Given that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to disputes in Quebec, it is worthwhile to review the file in light of article 1457 of the C.C.Q., which reads as follows:
1457. Every person has a duty to abide by the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another.
Where he is endowed with reason and fails in this duty, he is responsible for any injury he causes to another person by such fault and is liable to reparation for the injury, whether it be bodily, moral or material in nature.
He is also liable, in certain cases, to reparation for injury caused to another by the act or fault of another person or by the act of things in his custody.
[33] In order to determine whether the said agent Gariepy, with whom the Appellant allegedly had a conversation, made an error, it would have first been necessary to know specifically what questions were asked and the answers provided. Second, it would have to have been established that the answers constituted error or negligence. In order to conduct such an analysis, a great many more details, and in particular the testimony of Gariepy, would have been required.
[34] With respect to this issue, the Appellant did not provide a great deal of explanation, other than that she wanted to use her RRSP immediately, without having to pay the taxes, and that the said agent Gariepy told her how to do it. She took notes in order to follow the requirements properly.
[35] Such facts are obviously insufficient to draw conclusions as to the possible responsibility arising from an error. Furthermore, even if the evidence had established that agent Gariepy had provided an erroneous opinion, it would not necessarily have been a mistake.
[36] Although the Appellant has clearly established that there was a mistake, again, I cannot conclude as to the correctness of her appeal since the fin de non-recevoir is in essence focused on recovery of federal tax debt and not the correctness of the assessment. In fact, the Tax Court of Canada does not have jurisdiction to consider this issue. Its jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the assessment was established correctly in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
[37] Justice Paris of this Court recently dealt with the jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada with respect to recovery of federal tax debt in Pintendre Autos Inc. v. Canada, [2003] T.C.J. No. 717 (Q.L.):
In this case, in pleading a fin de non recevoir, the Appellant is not challenging the amount of the assessments. In the Amended Notice of Appeal, the Appellant does not contest the fact that "Les Services de personnels" failed to remit source deductions that had to be remitted on behalf of the Appellant.
The Appellant has not argued that the Minister erred in any respect in applying the provisions of the Income Tax Act or the Employment Insurance Act to its situation or in respect of any other essential element of the assessment. The Appellant only takes issue with the conduct of the Minister's agents in the period covered by the assessments and submits that this alleged conduct, under the Civil Code, should bar the Minister from recovering the unremitted source deductions. I agree with counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant's fin de non recevoir is directed at the collection of the amounts assessed rather than at any defect or error in the assessments. The Appellant is seeking to prevent the Minister from enforcing the tax liability indicated in the assessments.
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Matters relating to the collection of tax have been held to be beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. In Liu v. The Queen, T.C.J. No. 1507 (Q.L.) Judge Bowman (as he then was) considered the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to crediting an Appellant for source deductions withheld but not remitted by the employer and he stated at paragraph 14:
Even if I had concluded differently it would not have been within the power of this court to declare that in determining the balance owing to the Government of Canada by Mr. Liu there should be taken into account the amount withheld from his commissions but not remitted. This court's jurisdiction, insofar as it is relevant to this case, is to hear and determine references and appeals on matters arising under the Income Tax Act. Essentially in an appeal under the Income Tax Act the question is the correctness of an assessment or determination of loss. Here there is no issue with respect to the correctness of the assessment. The question of amount of the balance of tax owing by a taxpayer may be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court but if that court sees the substantive issue in the same manner in which I do I doubt that it could give the appellant any more relief than I can.
[38] To conclude this aspect of the file, it is appropriate to recall once more that any information or statement that is erroneous or incorrect in law cannot lie against the Crown, since the latter is obligated to apply the Act.
[39] The Appellant testified that she expressed her concerns to a certain Gariepy. Sensitive and sympathetic to her expectations, he allegedly told her about the conditions and requirements. The Appellant said she followed these instructions to the letter.
[40] If the correctness of the Appellant's appeal had its basis in good faith, I would not hesitate to rule in her favour; unfortunately, the Appellant's good faith does not protect her from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Income Tax Act.
[41] The doctrine of estoppel by conduct can provide no relief for the Appellant, regardless of what agent Gariepy may have told her; it has no bearing on the correctness of the appeal since the court must rely on the provisions of the Act alone to dispose of the appeal, regardless of the instructions a public servant may have given the Appellant.
[42] I must therefore dispose of the Appeal by asking whether the assessment is correct under the provisions of the Act. The Appellant has submitted no evidence in this respect; her only allegations are to the effect that she had followed Gariepy's instructions.
[43] With respect to the correctness of the assessment, the Respondent submitted impressive documentary evidence during the testimony of Gino Vita.
[44] The evidence revealed that the Appellant's file was one among many that were being audited as part of a mega-investigation of various companies with which the Appellant had done business. Given the significance of the file, the Respondent authorized Gino Vita to conduct a very meticulous investigation that lasted for several months.
[45] Mr. Vita's work is impeccable; during his testimony he revealed various crafty manoeuvres and smokescreens set up by the organization involving unscrupulous individuals who wanted to become rich to the detriment of taxpayers in need.
[46] The business with which the Appellant dealt was nothing more than an organization set up by unscrupulous individuals in order to cheat those least able to detect the swindle.
[47] The Respondent's evidence established unequivocally that these were individuals who had invested energy and resources in the creation of various corporate entities in such a way as to convince any non-believer or sceptic of the legality of the transactions.
[48] To justify the correctness of the assessment, the Respondent emphasized several arguments, specifically the following:
· The investment in 9066-1000 Québec Inc. was an ineligible investment;
· The RRSP owned by the Appellant was used as a guarantee to obtain what proved to be a loan;
· Through various operations, the Appellant thwarted the purpose of the provisions of the Act as it applies to RRSPs.
[49] The argument that the withdrawal of RRSP contributions should be subject to taxation because it was acquired or accumulated in a manner that sheltered it from taxes is not very convincing. In effect, an RRSP is untaxed money; the taxes payable on the amounts invested in an RRSP are in some way deferred or spread out over future total or partial withdrawals.
[50] In some cases, it is possible to use the funds placed in an RRSP without having to pay any taxes whatsoever; for example, picture the case of a taxpayer deciding to withdraw funds from her RRSP up to the limit of her non-taxable income. On the other hand, generally speaking, Parliament intended to encourage taxpayers to establish a fund that would allow them to ensure a retirement free from financial worries.
[51] To encourage taxpayers to prepare for retirement, Parliament allows them to shelter their savings from taxes and to defer taxation to when the RRSP has to be liquidated.
[52] The Respondent's second argument is more critical.
[53] Investigator Vita explained and described, at length, the strategy of Jean Tremblay and the company he controlled. He also outlined the details of the process that took place with respect to the Appellant's file, by which she obtained an amount of $12,419.25.
[54] This was essentially a loan granted to the Appellant by Financière Telco Inc. The Appellant herself recognized the nature of the transaction. In other words, she knew that her RRSP would be liquidated unless she paid the amount obtained as a loan.
[55] In substance, Financière Telco Inc. granted a loan to the Appellant; her RRSP was given as a guarantee of the loan she obtained. The Appellant's RRSP was invested in a corporation related to Telco, to purchase shares in 9066-1000 Québec Inc., which enabled Tremblay to access the RRSP money.
[56] The Appellant's goal was to obtain the liquid assets from her RRSP without having to pay taxes. In order to do this, Tremblay invented and created a organization that would allow any interested individual such as the Appellant to buy shares in the company that he controlled, using their RRSP, after which a payment in the form of a loan, in an amount a great deal lower than that of the RRSP invested in the shares, was advanced to the RRSP holder.
[57] In order for the file to appear consistent to tax authorities, it was stipulated that the money obtained by the Appellant did not come from her RRSP but was a loan; the loan was subject to mandatory prior acquisition of shares in 9066-1000 Québec Inc.
[58] If the Appellant want to buy back the shares she had acquired, she had to first repay the loan. In this respect, the Appellant expressed her acceptance of the proposed scenario since she stated that she knew her RRSP would be used indirectly to pay back the loan and she had consented to that.
[59] The operations were covered up in order to make them appear credible, as if they had been carried out in compliance with the Act. In fact, this was essentially a loan guaranteed by an RRSP.
[60] The Respondent also summarized the order of the operations: [TRANSLATION] "No RRSP transfer, no loan and no loan repayment, impossible to get the RRSP back."
[61] Finally, the Respondent also emphasized, and this is his main argument, that the Appellant's investment, the acquisition of shares in 9066-1000 Québec Inc., was not a qualified investment.
[62] In other words, was the purchase of shares in 9066 1000 Québec Inc. a qualified investment within the meaning of subsection 146(1)?
[63] To answer this question, I will address only one aspect of the file. The voluminous documentary evidence prepared by the investigator made it possible to observe that the strategy used was a theoretical financial arrangement based mainly on bogus entries in order to demonstrate superficial consistency.
[64] In 1999, the financial statements of Telco Inc. showed interest and contract income for a total of $18,926.53, or $6,796.31 interest income and $12,130.22 contract income. However, Mr. Vita's review of the book of accounts for interest made it possible to establish that the interest income was $59,704.92. The contract income was fictitious.
[65] Based on these observations, it would be inappropriate to analyze all the elements presented by Mr. Tremblay in order to give the impression of compliance.
[66] In fact, this was essentially an artificial financial arrangement with the sole purpose of reassuring RRSP-holders who wanted to make a total or partial withdrawal without having to pay taxes. To justify the exorbitant commission, Mr. Tremblay has set up businesses that shared accounting data, which were either totally fictitious or grossly exaggerated.
[67] In fact, over and above the various appearances and qualifications of certain transactions, RRSP owners such as the Appellant obtained funds from their RRSPs in exchange for an obscene commission.
[68] Although the Appellant is sympathetic and although she may possibly have been the innocent victim of an actual professional swindle, the appeal must be dismissed because the assessment is correct.
[69] To arrive at this conclusion, the Respondent conducted a very meticulous analysis of the facts and considered all the relevant legislative provisions. The assessment, based on the fact that the Appellant's investment was not a qualified investment, is correct.
[70] The appeal is dismissed without costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 28th day of May 2004.
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"Alain Tardif" |
Tardif J.
Translation certified true
on this 18th day of October 2004.
Shulamit Day, Translator