Tax Court of Canada Judgments

Dockets: 2001-3493(IT)G 2003-2655(GST)I

BETWEEN:

KEWAL SIDHU,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

Appeals heard on January 23, 2004 at Vancouver, British Columbia

Before: The Honourable Justice J.E. Hershfield
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:	David Davies Sergio A. Rodriguez
Counsel for the Respondent:	Linda Bell

____________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

The appeal from the reassessment made under the Income Tax Act (the "Act") with respect to the 1993 disposition of the Appellant's 60^th Avenue Property is dismissed for the reasons set out in the attached Reasons for Judgement. Costs to the Respondent in respect of such matter are fixed in the amount of $1,000, such cost being allowed for preparation for the hearing and the appearance of counsel at the hearing of the matter.

The appeals from the reassessments made under the Act with respect to the 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years are allowed, without further costs, on the basis consented to in a signed Consent to Judgment presented at the commencement of the hearing. In accordance with such Consent these reassessments are referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that:

1.        In 1994:

          (a)       The Appellant's net rental income will be reduced to $8,403.20;

(b)      The Appellant's business income from K & S Sidhu Trucking will be reduced to $10,509.72;

          2.        In 1995:

(a)       The Appellant's net rental income will be reduced to a loss of ($4,962.10);

(b)      The Appellant's business income from K & S Sidhu Trucking will be reduced to Nil;

3.        In 1996, the Appellant's net rental income will be reduced to a loss of ($11,208,87);

         

4.        In 1997, the Appellant's net rental income will be reduced to $541.43; and

5.        In 1998, the Appellant's net rental income will be reduced to $8,964.47.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 2nd day of April 2004.

"J.E. Hershfield"

Hershfield J.

Citation: 2004TCC174

Date: 20040402

Dockets: 2001-3493(IT)G 2003-2655(GST)I

BETWEEN:

KEWAL SIDHU,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Hershfield J.

[1]      This is an appeal in respect of the Appellant's 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years from reassessments respecting:

(a)       income or losses on four rental properties in all such years except 1993;

(b) income or losses from a trucking business in the 1994 and 1995 years;

(c)               an RRSP withdrawal in the 1997 year; and

(d)              a capital gain on the disposition of a property (the "60^th Ave Property" or "subject property") in 1993.

[2]      The first two areas of appeal were resolved prior to the hearing by way of a Consent to Judgment. Such resolution is set out, in accordance with that Consent, in my Judgment. The third area of appeal was not argued and was not dealt with under the Consent. Accordingly, the appeal in respect of the RRSP inclusion in 1997 is dismissed.

[3]      The fourth area of appeal was argued at length. The Appellant and a son testified on the Appellant's behalf and an auditor from the CCRA testified on the Respondent's behalf. A book of documents was submitted by each party.

[4]      The fourth issue has a number of sub-issues:

-         whether the reassessment being beyond the normal reassessing period at the time of the reassessment is grounds to allow the appeal;

-         whether there was an increased cost base in the subject property due to a change of use in 1992 such that there was no gain to report on the disposition in 1993;

-         whether there was a principal residence exemption available in respect of the subject property; and

-         whether the Appellant was entitled to a lifetime capital gains deduction on the sale of the subject property pursuant to section 110.6 of the Income Tax Act (the "Act") as it read in 1993.

[5]      The 60^th Ave Property was acquired by the Appellant in 1983. According to the Notice of Appeal, it was a rental property until 1992 when the Appellant and his family began to occupy it as their principal residence. Until that change, the Appellant asserts that he and his family lived at a property on 62^nd Ave (the "62^nd Ave Property"). The Reply denies that the Appellant moved into the 60^th Ave Property and that it was his principal residence until it was sold in 1993. The Reply asserts that there was a gain on the disposition that was not reported. The Appellant's assertions raise the issue as to whether there was a change in use in 1992 (that the Appellant also failed to report). If there was a change of use, a disposition would thereby be deemed to have occurred in 1992 pursuant to section 45 of the Act. This would permit the Appellant to claim, as he does, that he has the benefit of, on disposition in 1993, the increased cost base that arises from that unreported deemed disposition in 1992 so that the actual disposition in 1993 would not give rise to a gain.

[6]      It is acknowledged that both 1992 and 1993 were beyond the normal reassessment period at the time of the reassessment. The Appellant asserts that the requirement for 1993 to be an open year for reassessment has not been met. He asserts that if he made a misrepresentation on his 1993 return, it was not attributable to neglect, carelessness, willful default or fraud and the appeal must be allowed on that basis. The misrepresentation would be failing to report the 1993 disposition if it were found that there was a gain in 1993 to report. The Appellant asserts that the omission to report a gain was based on his honest belief that he was not required to report a gain in respect of a property that was his residence.[1]

[7]      The Appellant says that he ordinarily inhabited the subject property throughout 1992 and in 1993 until it was sold and now wants to designate it as his principal residence in the event that the reassessment is found not to be statute barred and the change of use position is not accepted. Further, the Appellant says that even if the reassessment is found not to be statute barred on the basis that the requirements of subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) of the Act have been met,[2] and the change of use position is not accepted, he is entitled to the lifetime capital gains deduction as the statutory bar to that claim, arising from his failure to report the gain, requires that the failure be due to gross negligence which he asserts has not been established (even if I find that such failure was due to neglect).

[8]      On the change of use issue, the Appellant relies on the 1992 year being statute barred. His position is that if I find that there has been such change of use, the Minister will have to reassess 1992 and he will live again to fight another day. What alarms me about this position is not that it is an attempt to avoid tax on the gain on the subject property (which it is open for him to do if the facts bare out his assertions) but that the facts of this case are so suspicious and inconclusive, the evidence so inconsistent and lacking in disinterested corroboration in both oral testimony and documentation, and so confused that one can readily imagine that the Appellant could bring his case, on another day, in respect of the 1992 year, on the basis that there was no change of use in 1992 without apparent contradiction or, if there was a change of use in 1992, he could bring his case on the basis that the failure to report a disposition under section 45 should stand up better in terms of an argument that the 1992 year is statute barred.

[9]      I do not trust the Appellant's innocence as to any of this. Aside from the evidentiary problems of when, if ever, the subject property was used in any real sense as a residence, the Appellant wants me to believe that when he filed his 1993 return he believed that the principal residence exclusion applied to his entire gain without regard to the fact that it had only been used as a residence, if it was so used at all, for a short period prior to sale after holding it as rental property for some nine years and realizing a gain of some $160,000. He had an accountant prepare his return for the year (in which he reported some $39,000 of employment income as a longshoreman and some $15,000 in rental and business losses) but mentioned nothing to him of the significant gain on the disposition. He said he relied on things his friends told him. Such reliance and his failure to mention the sale to his accountant was negligent at best. Indeed, in light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, I find it to be grossly negligent of the Appellant not to have reported the disposition to his accountant. His failure to have even mentioned it to his accountant ensured either a misrepresentation of his income in 1993 or the ongoing non-disclosure of the gain in 1992 that would arise if there was a change of use. I distrust the Appellant. He relied on his accountant to compute his tax liabilities on his real estate holdings and trucking business. Although he was represented as being a longshoreman with a grade 10 education having no knowledge of tax requirements, this affords the Appellant no excuse in this case. To act on self-serving advice from fellow longshoremen and withholding mention of a disposition of property to his professional adviser while seeking assistance in reporting rental and business losses is to turn a blind eye to, and reflects a wanton disregard of, compliance obligations in a self-assessing system. Accordingly, I would dispose of the first issue in favour of the Respondent subject to finding that there was no change of use in 1992.[3] That is, the subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) requirements for reassessments beyond the normal period, have been clearly met in this case provided there was no change of use in 1992. Beyond this, I am suspicious that the Appellant may be craftier than he wants me to believe. It is easy to imagine that the evidence reveals something of a shell game where the pea under the shell is a dwelling or two or three. Suspicions that the asserted change of use of the subject property was contrived as an afterthought, as argued by the Respondent, have not been undermined by the evidence presented. On the other hand however, the evidence would not support a finding that the occupation of the subject property for some short time in or about 1992 was fabricated. As explored further in these Reasons, there is room to find, irrespective of my distrust of the Appellant's testimony, that the subject property was actually occupied as a family residence at some point. On the evidence however, such occupation has not been proven by the Appellant to be other than marginal and temporary. This takes me to consider the evidence presented at the hearing in respect of the Appellant's change of use argument.

[10]     One focus of the Respondent's case was on documentary inconsistencies regarding where the Appellant and his family resided in 1992. That focus established that the Appellant had, primarily in terms of changing his address for receiving mail purposes, not abandoned the 62^nd Ave Property as his residence. That is, there were a number of documentary examples showing the 62^nd Ave Property as his place of residence well after the asserted move to the subject property. His 1992 chequing account statements and personal cheques drawn on such account with his credit union showed the 62^nd Ave Property as his address. Similarly, newspaper ads on his rental properties were billed to the 62^nd Ave Propertyin 1992 and 1993 as opposed to the 60^th Ave Property or to his current residence on 62^nd Ave that he testified that he moved to in or about March 1993 (such current residence being a different residence than the one referred to in these Reasons as the 62^nd Ave Property). Repair and maintenance supplies were billed to the 62^nd Ave Property in 1992 and 1993. A mortgage application in 1993 showed the Appellant's address as the 62^nd Ave Property. The Appellant's lawyer in 1992 sent title documents in respect of a purchase of certain real estate to the Appellant at the 62^nd Ave Property. Even the address of a daughter of the Appellant was shown on a Tuition and Education Credit Certificate as the 62^nd Ave Property as at January 1993. On the other hand, a few of the Respondent's exhibits and one of the Appellant's exhibits showed that the Appellant had also used the 60^th Ave Property as his mailing address during the period in question.

[11]     Such evidence simply shows that the Appellant may never have abandoned the 62^nd Ave Property as a place that he regarded as a satisfactory place to receive his mail. It does not in itself contradict his testimony that he did not actually live there in 1992 or 1993. The use of the 62^nd Ave Property as a mailing address however is consistent with a finding that the Appellant had not abandoned the 62^nd Ave Property as his residence even though he and his family may have lived elsewhere at times and someone else, a renter, lived there during all or a part of the time under review. He still owned the property and described it as his "main" house. Such finding, while not incompatible with a finding that the 60^th Ave Property was being used as a residence at some point in 1992 or 1993, is not of much assistance to the Appellant in the resolution of concerns in respect of the time and nature of any occupation of the subject property in terms of supporting a change of use. Indeed such finding when taken together with other evidence tends to support my general distrust of the Appellant's testimony.

[12]     The Appellant testified that the move to the 60^th Ave Property was made because it was bigger and it allowed for the rental of the 62^nd Ave Property which he testified could be rented for more money than the 60^th Ave Property. While he testified that his whole family lived at the 60^th Ave Property from about January 1992 until about March 1993, during cross-examination he said he stopped renting the 60^th Ave Property due to damage to the house by tenants and that he lived there himself to fix the house. While rental income did increase in 1992 when receipts were reported from the 62^nd Ave Property and while no rental receipts were reported in 1992 from the 60^th Ave Property, I am unconvinced that the move, to the extent there was one, was motivated by either the size of the subject property or rental opportunities. Doubts as to this latter aspect of his testimony were raised given that considerable renovations had been done to the larger 60^th Ave Property and given, according to the Appellant's own testimony, that the tenant at the 62^nd Ave Property could not afford to rent that property without sub-tenants who had to be secured.

[13]     The Appellant testified that his children changed schools as a result of the move but it was uncertain which of his children had changed schools or for how long. No school records were produced. He testified that he knew his neighbors well but no disinterested testimony of neighbors was brought. The Appellant also testified that he moved out of the 60^th Ave Property because it was unsafe. A neighbor had been killed. He later said that the reason for the move out of that property was because the house had a bad smell.

[14]     As to the Appellant's living patterns that might be drawn from documentary evidence, there is one particularly troublesome example of the confused nature of his evidence. His 1992 tax return showed a different address than either of the 60^th Ave Property or the 62^nd Ave Property addresses. He said that such other address was for a property that belonged to a friend but he could not remember why he showed it as his address. He was questioned as to whether he stayed at this friend's home while his current home on 62^nd Ave was being constructed and he said "yes". His having put this address on his 1992 return then suggests that the construction of his current home would have been done in the fall of 1993 when he signed the 1992 return. This is inconsistent with his testimony that the construction was done in 1994, more than a year after his family had commenced living at the current address in a home that was on the property prior to the new construction. If the new home construction was really one year earlier as evidenced by the address on the Appellant's 1992 return, the Appellant's entire evidence becomes untrustworthy. Indeed, it suggests another scenario which, although speculative, seems on balance to fit the general circumstances of the Appellant's overall situation as it unfolded at the hearing. He was not intending any real move away from the area of his main home. He was building a new home in the area and was selling the 60^th Ave Property. In the hiatus of selling one property (staying there to fix it up) and preparing to move out of another property, he may have lodged some of his family at the 60^th Ave Property for a short period. This may have been as late as December 1992 or January 1993.[4] His children grew up in the main house, had friends there, went to school near there and wanted to live there or near there. A move to the 60^th Ave Property only raises questions - except as a temporary move for some of his family members at some point. That I am so suspicious underlies that the burden on the Appellant in this case has not been met. I am convinced of nothing except that I do not trust the testimony of the Appellant. I am not even satisfied that he in any real sense moved out of his 62^nd Ave Property prior to his move to the new property on 62^nd Ave where he currently resides.

[15]     The son's testimony was that one of the reasons for the move to the subject property was to be in a particular school district. His sister, he said, wanted to go to the school in the district of the 60th Ave Property. He was admitted there as well - he said he was in grade 8. He also said they were only there (at the subject property) a short time and that he transferred after Christmas to the new school and that things did not work out and he changed his mind and went back to his old school when they moved back to 62^nd Ave when he was in grade 9. He said he started grade 9 in September of 1993 at the old school. This would mean, if he was transferred in the middle of grade 8, that it was in January 1993 when he started living at the 60^th Ave Property, one year later than the Appellant wanted me to believe. Admittedly the son was confused and ultimately acknowledged that he could not remember what years he was at which school. The calendar years versus the school years were confusing him. School records would have helped.

[16]     I do not distrust the son's testimony. I am not suspicious of it. However all I can accept from his testimony is that it confirmed that there was a short stay at the 60th Ave Property. Taking the evidence of the Appellant and his son together and the documentary evidence produced by the Respondent, I would say that people were moving about for different reasons and there was more than one house available. The main house was always the 62^nd Ave Property.

[17]     I turn now to the auditor's testimony. Her testimony taken from notes was to the effect that during the audit in 1998 that gave rise to the reassessment currently under appeal, the Appellant told her a different story than the one he was currently telling. He told her at the first meeting in January 1998, in the presence of his accountant, that the current 62^nd Ave Property had been his residence since 1993 and that prior to that his residence had been the 62^nd Ave Property. No mention was made of his living at the 60^th Ave Property. He admitted selling the 60^th Ave Property but offered no explanation as to why he did not report the disposition. In a proposal letter sent out in January 1999 (proposing to assess the gain), the auditor stated that in the interview with the Appellant he could not remember why he did not report the gain. It was only then that explanations were offered in a meeting in February 1999. The Appellant only then told the auditor that he lived at the 60^th Ave Property in December 1992 or January 1993. I find it more than a little suspicious that the Appellant would say nothing of the subject property being used as a personal residence until a second meeting after a proposal letter had been sent out. This was in direct conflict with what he told the auditor at the earlier meeting. However, my suspicion is not so much that the asserted personal use of the subject property in 1992 or 1993 was a fabrication, but rather that the asserted personal use of the subject property was not of such substance in the mind of the Appellant as to be worthy of mention until its mention posed a tax advantage. On the one hand the Appellant now says that in 1995 when he filed his return for 1993, he thought he did not have to report a $250,000 disposition (or even mention it to his accountant) because he knew then that he resided in it and that such residence meant he did not have to report the gain, while on the other hand, such residency was not of sufficient substance to mention to the auditor in 1998 or even in 1999 except as an ambiguous reference to living there in December 1992 or January 1993. The notion of a meaningful residence at the subject property clearly appears to be an afterthought to cover-up the Appellant's misrepresentation on his 1993 return. That is, while I accept, based on the son's testimony, that there was likely some occupation of the subject property in 1992 or 1993 and that the explanation was not a fabrication, such occupation was never the reason for not reporting the income.

[18]     While the confusion created by the evidence or lack of it has left me wholly uncertain as to the actual living habits of the Appellant, I have accepted that there was some sort of move to the 60^th Ave Property (albeit likely a marginal and temporary move). It may have been a transitional move pending relocation to the current residence and the sale of the subject property or even a move contrived to lend optical support for a desirable tax position. The question then is whether such occupancy is sufficient to constitute a change of use.

[19]     The relevant provision of the Act reads as follows:

45. (1) For the purposes of this subdivision the following rules apply:

(a)         where a taxpayer,

            (i) having acquired property for some other purpose, has commenced at a later time to use it for the purpose of gaining or producing income, or

            (ii) having acquired property for the purpose of gaining or producing income, has commenced at a later time to use it for some other purpose,

he shall be deemed to have

            (iii) disposed of it at that later time for proceeds equal to its fair market value at that time, and

                (iv) immediately thereafter reacquired it at a cost equal to that fair market value; ...

[20]     If then at any time in 1992, the family "commenced" living in the subject property for some purpose other than the income producing use for which it was acquired, there will be a change in use of the property. The Respondent has not disputed the Appellant's testimony that the property was not rented during this period. The Respondent denies that a new non-income producing use had commenced. Without commencement of such new use there is no deemed disposition under the foregoing provision. Commencement of a new use has been held to mean being put to a use not consistent with the use for which the property was acquired: see Hewlett Packard (Canada) Ltd. v. Canada, [2003] T.C.J. No. 594 (T.C.C.). This case includes a review and analysis of authorities dealing with change of use. Such authorities include Hughes v. M.N.R., [1980] C.T.C. 2173 (T.R.B.), Peachey v. The Queen, 79 DTC 5064 (F.C.A.) and Cantor et al. v. M.N.R., 85 DTC 79 (T.C.C.). The analysis concludes that the cessation of an income earning use is not sufficient to constitute a change of use. An unequivocal act to commence a use inconsistent with the original use is required. A use made of an asset might be found during a period of liquidation not to be a use inconsistent with the original use even if that use does not derive revenue. Such use might be consistent with the liquidation of the asset which is not a use inconsistent with the original use. The burden of proof on the Appellant in the case at bar is to satisfy the Court that it is reasonable to find on the evidence that the occupation of the subject property was an unequivocal use inconsistent with the original use or, at least, that such occupation was not a use reasonably consistent with the original use. The nature of the occupation in the case at bar has not been established so it cannot be said that the Appellant has satisfied the burden of proof imposed on him by these authorities. Aside from the inconsistencies in the Appellant's story, I have no disinterested corroborative testimony or evidence of anything the Appellant has asserted. I draw a negative inference from this. Further, the evidence that tends to support suspicions that the occupation of the subject property was transitional would support a finding that such occupation was not inconsistent with a prior rental use in the context of section 45. When property is being readied for sale, the rental use may cease. The brief occupation by the owner that follows during a pre-sale period is not necessarily a use that is inconsistent with the prior rental use of the property. I am not satisfied that this is not the circumstance of the case at bar. There was evidence that the subject property was being readied for sale (e.g. the recent renovations followed by the actual sale) and I have little hesitation in suggesting that the cessation of rental may be as readily attributed to that as to anything else. A convenient short-term resolution of an occupation hiatus of a rental property being readied for sale is not a use of such property that is inconsistent with the rental use for which it was acquired. Again, there is a burden of proof on the Appellant to show that the occupation of the subject property was not such an occupation and, again, the Appellant has failed to meet such burden. Accordingly I find that there has been no change of use in 1992.

[21]     It should be clear then that given this finding, it is not open for the Appellant to argue that the 60^th Ave Property was his principal residence in 1992 (or 1993). Interestingly, Appellant's counsel took a reverse approach to this analysis. He argued firstly that the subject property was a principal residence as defined in section 54 of the Act. That definition requires a finding that the Appellant or his family "ordinarily inhabited" the subject property in 1992. He argued that the authorities on what constituted "ordinarily inhabited" would support a finding that even a short-term occupation was sufficient to constitute the subject property as a principal residence and that such designation then required a finding that there was a change in use. However, the authorities submitted included the case of Shlien v. M.N.R., 88 DTC 1152 where at page 1154 Couture, C.J.T.C.C. referred to a dictionary definition of "inhabit" that embraced the notion of occupation "as a settled residence". This is consistent with a line of cases that find that a casual residence, which is a residence occupied by a person but which is not reflective of where that person lives in the course of his/her customary mode of life, is not a residence at which that person "ordinarily" resides.[5] On the evidence in the case at bar, once again, the Appellant has failed to satisfy the burden of proof placed on him in this appeal. That is, as in the analysis respecting change of use, if I am unconvinced on the evidence as to the use the Appellant put the subject property when he ceased renting it out in 1992, how can it be said that it became his settled place of abode in 1992. Further, as in the analysis respecting change of use, the evidence that tends to support suspicions that the occupation of the subject property was transitional, would support a finding that such occupation cannot be said to be "settled". Accordingly, the subject property cannot be regarded for the purposes of this appeal as the Appellant's principal residence in 1992 or 1993.

[22]     This takes me to the last issue which is whether the Appellant can now claim the lifetime capital gains deduction in respect of the unreported gain on the disposition of the subject property in 1993. I have already determined that it is an open year on the basis that the Appellant was negligent in not reporting the gain. However, he will only be disallowed the deduction sought if he "knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence"[6] failed to report the gain in the return required to be filed for the year. The Act expressly puts the burden of proof on the Minister in respect of this issue.

[23]     The Appellant relies on the decision in Venne v. The Queen, 84 DTC 6247 (F.C.T.D.) and argues that the bar for finding gross negligence has been raised to require a finding of a high degree of negligence tantamount to intentional acting. While some support may be found to argue otherwise, the decision in Venne does not raise the bar to require the Minister to establish actual intent to deceive or willful misconduct. If that were the test, the subject provision of the Act need only have referred to "knowingly" failing to report a gain. Actions "tantamount" to intentional actions are actions from which an imputed intention can be found such as actions demonstrating "an indifference as to whether the law is complied with or not".[7] The non-reporting of the gain in the circumstances of this case is a gross self-serving indifference to compliance. Not to mention such a significant gain to one's accountant upon whom you rely to ensure appropriate shelter for employment income from property and business losses, on the facts of this case which have shown the Appellant to be untrustworthy, is as tantamount to intentional acting as I might imagine. The burden here is not to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, mens rea to evade taxes. The burden is to prove on a balance of probability such an indifference to appropriate and reasonable diligence in a self-assessing system as belies or offends common sense. Beyond this, I note that the evidence in this case that suggests an attempted cover-up of the Appellant's initial non-reporting only enhances the Respondent's position.

[24]     One last point to mention is that counsel for the Appellant wanted me to draw a negative inference in respect of this last issue from the fact that the Respondent did not assess penalties under subsection 163(2). Indeed the last proposal letter which expressly denied the capital gains deduction for failure to report the gain only warns, after referring to "continually omitting amounts", of potential future penalties for knowingly making false statements. I agree with counsel for the Appellant that this is somewhat inconsistent. In spite of the evidence facing the auditor at the time, contained in her own notes, the non-reporting issue was never raised in terms of gross negligence penalties. The unreported gain was raised and pursued and then assessed and confirmed without penalty under subsection 163(2). Do I now have suspicions that the gross negligence theory adopted by the Minister has been reconstructed from old notes only in response to the appeal of the capital gains deduction issue? Yes, I do but that does not assist the Appellant. There is no estoppel against the Minister. The appeal proceeds on the facts and issues presented at the hearing. The Appellant's representative during the time of the proposed reassessments might have made headway on this point, but once the matter comes to Court, the evidence determines the outcome, not the inconsistencies in the assessing practices of the Minister.

[25]     Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 2nd day of April 2004.

"J.E. Hershfield"

Hershfield J.

CITATION:

2004TCC174

COURT FILE NO.:

2001-3493(IT)G; 2003-2655(GST)I

STYLE OF CAUSE:

Kewal Sidhu and Her Majesty the Queen

PLACE OF HEARING:

Vancouver, British Columbia

DATE OF HEARING:

January 23, 2004

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

The Honourable Justice J.E. Hershfield

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

April 2, 2004

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Appellant:

David Davies Sergio Rodriguez

Counsel for the Respondent:

Linda Bell

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

David Davies Sergio A.Rodriguez

Firm:

Thorsteinssons

For the Respondent:

Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada

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