Tax Court of Canada Judgments

[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Docket: 2002-3447(IT)G

BETWEEN:

DENIS CORRIVEAU,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

___________________________________________________________________

Appeals heard on May 19, 20 and 21, 2004, at Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec by

The Honourable Judge C. H. McArthur
Appearances:
Representing the Appellant:	The Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent:	Simon-Nicolas Crépin

____________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

          The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed, with costs.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 16th day of August, 2004.

"C. H. McArthur"

McArthur J.

Certified true translation

Colette Dupuis-Beaulne

[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Citation: 2004TCC550

Date: 20040816

Docket: 2002-3447(IT)G

BETWEEN:

DENIS CORRIVEAU,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

McArthur, J.T.C.C.

[1]      These are appeals filed by Mr. Denis Corriveau from the Notices of Assessment issued by the Minister of National Revenue (hereinafter the "Minister") for the 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxation years. These Notices of Assessment established the Appellant's taxable income at $128,093 for the 1995 taxation year, $14,204 for the 1996 taxation year, and $0 for the 1997 taxation year.

[2]      The appeals were heard under the general procedure because of the size of the amounts at issue. The Appellant, moreover, opted not to be represented by counsel. The Appellant maintains that the Notices of Assessment incorrectly established his taxable income for the years at issue, because the Minister failed to consider certain expenditures in respect of these taxation years and because the Minister used the accrual accounting method, whereas the Appellant records his income and expenditures on a cash basis.

[3]      In establishing these Notices of Assessment, the Minister based his opinion on the following factual hypotheses:

a)          prior to May 5, 1995, the Appellant was the owner of the following 13 rental buildings:

131 5th Street

134 Carter

15 Pinder East

169 Georges

68-72 Montréal

507-509 Cardinal Bégin East

22 Concession 5

493-503 Cardinal Bégin East

Chalet Lac Vaudry

151 6th Street

348-350 Larivière

38-40 Poirier Street, Lac Duffault

53 Matapédia Street, Rouyn-Noranda

b)          the Appellant had not maintained any account books with regard to any of these rental buildings;

c)          the Appellant claimed his rental expenses using the cash method of accounting;

d)          the Appellant claimed expenses paid in 1995, but in respect of prior years;

e)          the Appellant deposited all his rental income in a personal bank account;

f)           the Appellant used the same bank account for his personal and business operations;

g)          the Appellant reported the following gross rental income:

1995:                $26,569

1996:                $ 8,277

1997:                $        0

h)          these gross rental income amounts were accepted by the Minister without an audit;

i)           the Minister granted the Appellant the rental expenses supported by substantiating documentation on an accrual basis;

j)           on May 5, 1995, the Appellant transferred ownership of all his rental buildings, with the exception of those located at 38-40 Poirier, Lac Duffault and 53 Matapédia Street, Rouyn-Noranda;

k)          on May 5, 1995, these 11 rental buildings were transferred to the corporation 9019-4754 Québec Inc.;

l)           the Appellant was the sole shareholder of 9019-4754 Québec Inc.;

m)         the Appellant claimed rental expenses for the period from May 5 to December 31, 1995, for the 11 buildings that were transferred on May 1995 to 9019-4754 Québec Inc.;

n)          the eligible rental expenses in 1995 are $66,309;

o)          on August 21, 1996, the Appellant sold the building located 38-40 Poirier, Lac Duffault;

p)          the Appellant suffered a deductible capital loss of $691 as a result of this sale;

q)          on November 29, 1996, the Appellant sold the building located at 53 Matapédia Street, Rouyn-Noranda;

r)           the Appellant made a taxable capital gain of $431 on the sale of the land in this transaction;

s)          the building itself was a depreciable asset;

t)           the loss of $6,055 on the disposition of this building is not eligible;

u)          eligible rental expenses in 1996 are $12,823;

v)          the Minister calculated the Appellant's taxable capital gain at $61,073 and $18,570 for the 1995 and 1996 taxation years respectively;

w)         the Minister took into account a non-capital loss of $50,915 for the 1993 taxation year;

x)          the loss cited in the previous paragraph was taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the Appellant's taxable income for the 1995 taxation year;

y)          the Appellant had a net capital loss of $18,644 in 1988;

z)          the Appellant had a net capital loss of $22,986 in 1990;

aa)        the Appellant had a net capital loss of $13,813 in 1991;

bb)        the net capital losses cited in paragraph y), z) and aa) were taken into consideration for the purposes of calculating the Appellant's taxable income for the 1995 taxation year.

TESTIMONY

[4]      Mr.Pierre Lavallée and the Appellant himself testified for the Appellant. Mr. Richard East testified for the Respondent.

[5]      The role of Mr. Lavallée in this case remains unclear. He maintained throughout his testimony that he was not acting as the representative of the Appellant. Nonetheless, Mr. Lavallée submitted a number of arguments for the Appellant and on his behalf.

[6]      Mr. Lavallée is a lawyer in the Rouyn-Noranda region. During the years at issue, he was working in a law office, "Gagné Trudel", which provided the Appellant with legal services, such as incorporating companies and selling buildings. Mr. Lavallée thus maintained a professional relationship with the Appellant. In his testimony, Mr. Lavallée stated that, during the years at issue, the legal fees for incorporating a company varied between $1,000 and $1,200. At a maximum, they could be $1,500. Furthermore, Mr. Lavallée admitted that his legal expertise was more in the insurance field and for that reason he did not handle corporate legal files or commercial law. Nonetheless, Mr. Lavallée said that he had seen the Appellant's files on several occasions and maintained that he could state that the Appellant had in fact incurred these legal costs.

[7]      The Appellant testified that he has recorded his income and expenses according on a cash basis since 1972. He further explained that he had been audited by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (hereinafter "CCRA") in 1985 and that no one had advised him at that time that he should use the accrual method rather than the cash method. The Appellant had accordingly assumed that the method he was using was satisfactory. Beyond that, the Appellant gave explanations which, in his view, showed that the assessments of the Minister were incorrect. By way of example, the Appellant explained that the expenditures attributable by the auditor to the building located at 38-40 Poirier were in fact attributed to the building at 151 6th Street, and in so doing, the Appellant maintained that these were maintenance expenses and not capital expenses.

[8]      Mr. East was the last witness to testify. Mr. East has been an auditor for CCRA since1991. He explained that the Appellant's file had been assigned to him in April 1999, but that the audit of the file had not closed until August 2000. According to Mr. East, an audit of this type normally takes between two and three months. Mr. East explained that the Appellant had used the cash method, which had complicated the audit process. Furthermore, the Appellant did not use a ledger and kept his invoices in plastic bags or in file folders that were not organized. Mr. East had accordingly had to piece together the Appellant's invoices with the help of spreadsheets, which explained why the audit had taken over 15 months.

[9]      Mr. East summarized as follows the reasons why he had disallowed the deduction of a number of expenses claimed by the Appellant. On the one hand, the Appellant used the accrual method. He was claiming expenses paid during the year but which could have been incurred during previous years. The Appellant also claimed expenditures which had been incurred by one or other of the companies of which he was a shareholder. Since these expenditures were attributable to the companies, the Appellant was not able to deduct them from the calculation of his income. By way of an example, Mr. East had disallowed the deduction of legal fees claimed by the Appellant, on the grounds that these fees were attributable to the company that owned the buildings. Lastly, the Appellant had failed to adequately justify some of the expenditures he was claiming. In the absence of supporting documentation, no deduction could be granted for these expenditures. For example, the Appellant had claimed the deduction of expenses in respect of the purchase of construction materials as current expenses. The Appellant maintained that these purchases had been used in repairing a building located at 151 6th Street, in which there had been two fires in the early 1990s. Since the Appellant had no insurance on this building, he was of the opinion that the repair work constituted current expenses, which were deductible. Mr. East explained that the invoices provided by the Appellant did not indicate the building for which the materials were intended. Since the Appellant had made major renovations to another building that belonged to him, Mr. East had assumed that the expenditures were related to that other building. As a result, Mr. East had deemed these expenditures to be capital expenses and had accordingly disallowed the deduction thereof.   

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

[10]     The conclusions sought by the Appellant were difficult to identify. During his pleadings, the Appellant summarized the conclusions he requires essentially as follows:

1.      The Appellant is asking for permission to use the cash method, as opposed to the accrual method used by the Minister in preparing the Notices of Assessment. Failing that, the Appellant is asking for permission to amend his income tax returns for the 1991 to 1994 taxation years so as to include the expenses incurred during these years, but which were in fact paid in 1995;

2.      The Appellant is asking that the documents that were not considered by Mr. East when the Notices of Assessment were prepared be considered;

3.      The Appellant is seeking to have the expenses incurred in the repair of the building located at 151 6th Street attributed to that building and that they be deemed current expenses and not capital expenses;

4.      The Appellant would like the deduction for brokers' fees in respect of the transfer of his shares be allowed and, failing that, that the transfer be deemed to have been for $0 per share rather than of $4.50 a share in order to eliminate the capital gain arising out of this transfer.

ANALYSIS

[11]     First, the credibility of the Appellant is not being challenged. It is also important to remember that it is impossible for me to make a finding with regard to the Notice of Assessment in respect of the 1997 taxation year, since the tax owing is zero. In Okalta Oils Limited v. M.N.R., [1955] S.C.R. 824, the Supreme Court of Canada established that an assessment in respect of which no tax is payable gives the taxpayer no right of appeal[1]:

Under these provisions, there was no assessment if there was no tax claimed. Any other objection but one ultimately related to an amount claimed was lacking the object giving rise to the right of appeal from the decision of the Minister to the Board.

The principle was reaffirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada v. Consumers' Gas Co., [1987] 2 F.C. 60, at page 67, paragraph 13:

What is put in issue on appeal to the courts under the Income Tax Act is the Minister's assessment. While the word `assessment' can bear two constructions, as being either the process by which tax is assessed or the product of that assessment, it seems to me clear, from a reading of section 152 to 177 of the Income Tax Act, that the word is there employed in the second sense only. This conclusion flows in particular from subsection 165(1) and from the well established principle that a taxpayer can neither object to nor appeal from a nil assessment.

There are some exceptions, where the Court can rule on an assessment in respect of which no tax is payable.[2] However, these exceptions do not apply to this appeal.

[12]     The Appellant stated that he used the cash method and that he had in fact asked for permission to file his tax returns based on this method. In support of his claim, the Appellant filed en liasse exhibit A-1 comprising: an invoice in the amount of $455.82 from "Fiscalité Martial Lupien", nine faxes comprising accounts from the "Rouyn-Noranda School Board" for tax arrears, 14 cheques signed by the Appellant and made out to the "Rouyn-Noranda School Board", and a statement of account from "location Rouanda 1991 Inc." in the amount of $1,222.33. All these expenses were incurred by the Appellant during years prior to the ones for which he claimed the deduction.

[13]     The Appellant also submitted as exhibit A-9: a cheque in the amount of $2,307.30 made out to the order of the "City of Rouyn-Noranda" and nine pages as evidence of water tax arrears totalling more or less the same amount. These are amounts that were owing by the Appellant in respect of water tax arrears which in fact had been incurred during previous years.

[14]     It is not open to the Appellant to the cash method. In Banner Pharmacaps NRO Ltd. v. The Queen, T.C.C., No. 2001-199(IT)G, February 26, 2003, [2003] T.C.J. No. 115, Mogan J. stated the following at paragraphs 37 to 39:

In an old case, Ken Steeves Sales Ltd v. M.N.R., 55 DTC 1044, the Exchequer Court held that, when determining the profit the loss of a business, the cash method of accounting is not permissible under the Act. Cameron J. stated at page 1050:

For these reasons I must reach the conclusion that the "cash receipts and expenditure" method purported to have been used by the Appellant in this case is a method which is not permissible under the Act. I say that because of the fact that it excludes as an item of income all receivables, which in my opinion form a necessary part of any trader's profit and loss statement. Such a method is incomplete and misleading and one which fails entirely to show the true state of a tax payer's position or to reflect his true profit or loss. [...]

I am not aware of any subsequent case which has diminished the effect of Ken Steeves Sales.

There is an underlying assumption in the Income Tax Act that income from business or property will be determined by the accrual method of accounting. Many examples support that underlying assumption. When computing income:

- paragraph 12(1)b) requires receivables to be included;

- paragraph 18(1)a) permits the deduction of expenses incurred; and

- paragraph 20(1)l) permits the deduction of a reserve of a reserve for doubtful debts.

In section 28, there is explicit permission to use the "cash method" to compute income from farming and fishing. Without such explicit permission, it appears to me that farmers and fishermen would be required to use the accrual method of accounting.

In my opinion, the Appellant has no choice. It must adopt the accrual method of accounting. It cannot adopt the cash method.[...]

[15]     This decision was confirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal[3]. The appeal did not deal with this part of the decision. Furthermore, the Judges of the Federal Court of Appeal did not see fit to amend this passage. The statements by Mogan J. thus remain unchanged: the Appellant must use the accrual method. I can thus not substitute the method adopted by the Appellant for that used properly by the Minister in producing the Notices of Assessment.

[16]     The Appellant has raised an argument based on estoppel in order to justify his use of the cash accounting method. According to the Appellant, the tax authorities misled him by failing to tell him, when he was audited in 1985, that he was not to use the cash method. I cannot endorse this claim. On the one hand, the Appellant did not raise this argument, either in his Notice of Appeal or in his reply. Furthermore, the evidence is insufficient to support this conclusion: the Appellant has submitted no evidence that would establish that he was in fact audited in 1985. In addition, furthermore, issue estoppel requires that the intention of the tax authorities be shown to have misled the Appellant so that he would continue to use the cash method. No evidence of this has been submitted to the Court.

[17]     With regard to the Appellant's request that he be authorized to amend his tax returns for the 1991 to 1994 taxation years, I must state that this exceeds my authority, which is limited to determining the correctness of the assessments issued which are at issue here. The assessments at issue in this case relate to the 1995 to 1997 taxation years. I accordingly have no authority to order that the Appellant be authorized to amend his income tax returns in respect of the 1991 to 1994 taxation years. If, however, the Appellant wishes to amend his returns for the 1991 to 1994 taxation years, he is free to do so, if this is still allowable in terms of the prescribed time limits.

[18]     With regard to the request of the Appellant to have the documents processed which were not considered by Mr. East at the time of the audit, I cannot accede to this request. Subsection 171(1) of the Act allows me to order that the Appellant's assessments be referred back to the Minister for review:

The Tax Court of Canada may dispose of an appeal by

a)       dismissing it; or

b)       allowing it: and

(i)       vacating the assessment,

(ii)       varying the assessment, or

(iii)      referring the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment.

[19]     In order to refer the assessment back to the Minister for review, I must be convinced, on the balance of probabilities, that the assessment is incorrect. In order to satisfy the onus of proof incumbent upon him, the Appellant may submit evidence that was not brought to the attention of the CRA. This is what the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in Buchanan v. Canada, No. A-416-01, May 31, 2002, [2002] F.C.J. No. 838, at paragraph 18:

[...] Proceedings in the Tax Court are not a judicial review of the correctness or reasonableness of the Minister's assessment. Rather, the function of the Tax Court is to arrive at the correct assessment itself (unless it is unable to do so and considers it necessary to refer the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration under subparagraph 171(1)(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act). The Tax Court's consideration of the matter will be on the basis of the evidence adduced in the Tax Court, even if that evidence was not before the Minister when he made his assessment. See Johnston v. Minister of National Revenue, [1948] 3 D.T.C. 1182, page 1183, per Rand J. [...]

[20]     In the instant case, the evidence submitted by the Appellant does not support the conclusion that the assessments issued deserve to be revised. Although the Appellant has submitted numerous documents, such as invoices, receipts, account statements, letters, etc., the absence of any connection between these items of evidence and the Appellant's arguments make any conclusion favourable to the Appellant virtually impossible. On the other hand, the auditor, Mr. East, explained clearly and concisely how he had arrived at the assessments that are at issue here. I see no flaws in his procedure. I have advised the Appellant on several occasions that the onus was on him, and counsel for the Respondent and myself have given him all the assistance it was in our power to give. Despite that, I conclude that the Appellant has not satisfied the onus upon him. The following is a summary of the evidence submitted by the Appellant.

[21]     The Appellant filed, as exhibit A-2, three photocopies comprising letters sent by Denis Pilon to the Appellant. Mr. Pilon did not testify at the hearing. In these letters, Mr. Pilon describes the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the sale of the properties located at 53 Matapédia Avenue and at 38-40 Poirier Street. Mr. Pilon also indicates that he received from the Appellant shares as an incentive to purchase of one or other of these properties.

[22]     The Appellant has also filed en liasse, as exhibit A-3, various documents including: the worksheets of the auditor in respect of the capital losses claimed by the Appellant in respect of the buildings located at 52 Matapédia Street and at 38-40 Poirier Street, a statement for the month of September 1996 from "Midland Walwyn" showing delivery charges of $28.50 in respect of 4,000 shares of Sundust Resources Inc., a statement of account from "Tascherau & Massicotte" regarding administration of the monies received from Denis Pilon during the purchase-sale of the building located at 53 Matapédia Street, an account statement from "Taschereau & Massicotte" regarding the administration of money received from Denis Pilon during the purchase-sale of the property located 38-40 Poirier Street, a photocopy of two cheques issued by "Taschereau & Massicotte" drawn on a trust account, one in the amount of $6,000 made out to the order of "Denis Pilon in Trust and Denis Corriveau" and the other in the amount of $10,000 to the order of "Matériaux Hémulat Inc. and Denis Corriveau", a fax comprising a letter from Bernard Barrette to Patrick Massicotte showing the amounts due by the Appellant in respect of the property located at 53 Matapédia Street, a record of adjustments from "Taschereau & Massicotte" showing the Mr. Pilon owed $152.33 to the Appellant, and a statement of account from "Taschereau & Massicotte" indicating fees and disbursements in the amount of $526.82.

[23]     The Appellant has attempted, through these exhibits, to establish, among other things, the existence of a pocket-agreement between Mr. Pilon and himself. According to this pocket-agreement, the property sales would be concluded for prices lower than those shown in the notarized sales contracts. As Counsel for the Respondent stated, the Appellant cannot proceed in this manner with a view to contradicting a notarial act which makes proof against all persons of the juridical act which it sets forth.[4] To do so, the Appellant had to proceed by means of improbation[5], which was not the case. Furthermore, in the absence of the consent of the Respondent, the Appellant cannot enter as evidence letters written by Mr. Pilon when he was not present at the hearing and thereby hope that these letters will provide evidence of their content[6]. Since counsel for the Respondent has objected to the admission of these letters in evidence, they are inadmissible. I do not admit the claim of the Appellant that the sale of these two properties occurred at prices other than those shown in the notarized sales contracts.

[24]     As exhibit A-4, the Appellant filed en liasse the following documents: work sheets of the auditor with regard to accounting and legal fees, office and travel expenses claimed by the Appellant, invoices from a law firm, "Gagné Trudel", and two summaries of sales contracts, one signed by the witness Pierre Lavallée and the other signed by one Alain Turgeon, both lawyers. Based on these worksheets, CRA denied the deduction of these expenses on the grounds that the Appellant had submitted no proof of payment of these expenses. The Appellant has submitted no proof of payment that would refute the claim of CRA.

[25]     The Appellant has also tabled (exhibit A-6) a judgment of the Superior Court, dated June 5, 1996, ordering orders the defendant, Tony Fiset, to repay to the Appellant the amount of $37,000, with interest at the legal rate since the date of service, plus an additional indemnity stipulated by law and costs. The amount in question was invested by the Appellant to purchase a property in Haiti, and the defendant Fiset absconded with the money and did not deliver the deed of ownership to the Appellant. However, as Mr. East states in his testimony: "[...] before Canada Customs and Revenue Agency can allow a business investment loss, Mr. Corriveau will have to provide proof of the initial outlay of his investment and then outline the action he took to recover the amount in question. He will then have to prove that he was the owner of the investment in question, it is up to him to prove that aspect."[7] This has not been proved.

[26]     Exhibits A-10 and A-11 were entered by the Appellant without any specific explanations as to their relevance. They consist of some of the auditor's worksheets. With regard to exhibit A-12, the Appellant has maintained that this is an invoice which should not have been considered by the auditor. First, this invoice is not accompanied by any proof of payment. Second, counsel for the Respondent objected to the introduction of this piece of evidence since it is not one of the items mentioned on the Appellant's list of documents. The Appellant also tabled a newspaper clipping which indicates a public notice of sale by auction of one of the Appellant's properties. This exhibit was given the number A-13. In my opinion, these exhibits prove nothing.

[27]     The Appellant stated that he has at home many documents illustrating the expenditures he made. These documents, however, were not admitted as evidence. I refuse to order that the audit be recommenced from the beginning solely on the basis of a statement on the part of the Appellant that he has other invoices at home.

[28]     The Appellant also maintained that Mr. East failed to consider some documents with which the Appellant had provided him. In support of his claim, the Appellant explained that Mr. East had given him documents attesting to numerous expenditures that occurred several months after the end of the audit. The Appellant concluded that Mr. East had not considered these documents. In this regard, Mr. East explained that the documents in question had been given to the Appellant several months after the audit had been completed because they had been lost. He did not, moreover, state that he had not considered these documents. The onus is on the Appellant to demonstrate that some documents were not considered at the time of the audit and that this failure to consider them has an impact on the fairness of the assessments made. This has not been demonstrated.

[29]     The Appellant has also asked that the expenses incurred for the repair of the building located at 151 6th Street be attributed to this property rather than to the property at 38-40 Poirier Street, and that the expenses be described as current expenses. I cannot accede to this request because the evidence provided by the Appellant is insufficient.

[30]     Mr. East explained that he attributed these expenses to the property located at 38-40 Poirier Street because the receipts provided by the Appellant did not indicate the building for which the materials acquired were destined. Since the Appellant had carried out major repairs to the property at 38-40 Poirier Street, Mr. East assumed that the expenses were attributable to the renovation of this building. Mr. East accordingly concluded that these were capital expenses and as such were not deductible. On the day of the hearing, the Appellant did not demonstrate that the expenses had been undertaken for the repair of the building located at 151 6th Street rather than for the renovation of the building at 38-40 Poirier Street. At most, the evidence provided by the Appellant supports the conclusion that the building located at 151 6th Street was involved in a fire on two occasions and that the Appellant had obtained a renovation permit for that building[8]. This seems to be insufficient to support a conclusion that the Minister erred in his Notice of Assessment, particularly if one considers that the Appellant also obtained a renovation permit for the building at 38-40 Poirier Street. Further, I am not convinced that the Appellant is correct in his claim that the renovation expenses for the building at 151 6th Street constitute deductible current expenses.

[31]     Lastly, the Appellant wishes to deduct the broker's fees incurred in the transfer of some of his shares to Mr. Pilon. The Appellant emphasized that he had been honest in reporting the capital gain arising out of this transfer and that it would accordingly be reasonable to allow such a deduction.

[32]     The Appellant is within his rights to subtract from the proceeds of the disposition of his shares the amount paid by him to dispose of the said shares. Nonetheless, the Appellant has not proved that he did in fact incur brokerage fees. At most, the Appellant has tabled a statement for the month of September 1996 from "Midland Walwyn", showing delivery charges of $28.50 in respect of his 4,000 shares of "Sundust Resources Inc.". Assuming that these are the brokerage fees to which the Appellant refers, no proof of payment of these fees has been submitted to the Court. I am accordingly not able to concur with the Appellant's request in the absence of evidence.

[33]     Subsidiarially, the Appellant asked that the transfer of his shares be deemed to have occurred for $0 a share in order to eliminate the capital gain. I cannot accede to this request which, it must be acknowledged, would be the equivalent of a misrepresentation of the reality.

CONCLUSION

[34]     Despite the sympathy which I have for the Appellant, the appeals are dismissed, with costs.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 16th day of August, 2004.

" C.H. McArthur"

McArthur J.

Certified true translation

Colette Dupuis-Beaulne

CITATION:

2004TCC550

COURT FILE NO.:

2002-3447(IT)G

STYLE OF CAUSE:

Denis Corriveau and Her Majesty the Queen

PLACE OF HEARING:

Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:

May 19, 20 and 21, 2004

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

The Honourable Judge C.H. McArthur

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant:

The Appellant himself

For the Respondent:

Simon-Nicolas Crépin

SOLICITOR OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

Firm:

For the Respondent:

Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada

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